Raoul Moati intervenes in the critical debate that divided two prominent philosophers in the mid-twentieth century. In the 1950s, the British philosopher J. L. Austin advanced a theory of speech acts, or the "performative," that Jacques Derrida and John R. Searle interpreted in fundamentally different ways. Their disagreement centered on the issue of intentionality, which Derrida understood phenomenologically and Searle read pragmatically. The controversy had profound implications for the development of contemporary philosophy, which, Moati argues, can profit greatly by returning (...) to this classic debate. In this book, Moati systematically replays the historical encounter between Austin, Derrida, and Searle and the disruption that caused the lasting break between Anglo-American language philosophy and continental traditions of phenomenology and its deconstruction. The key issue, Moati argues, is not whether "intentionality," a concept derived from Husserl's phenomenology, can or cannot be linked to Austin's speech-acts as defined in his groundbreaking _How to Do Things with Words_, but rather the emphasis Searle placed on the performativity and determined pragmatic values of Austin's speech-acts, whereas Derrida insisted on the trace of writing behind every act of speech and the iterability of signs in different contexts. (shrink)

My letter of invitation to this seminar expresses the thought that “it will be very useful to have someone from outside the field help us see ourselves.” Given my interests in what you might call the fact of literary study, I was naturally attracted by the invitation to look at literary study as a discipline or profession but also suspicious of the invitation. I thought: Do professionals really want to be helped to see themselves by outsiders? This is an invitation (...) to get a group of people sore at me, and it will only result in the group’s having an occasion not to see itself, since any member of it can easily dismiss anything I say as uninformed. But the invitation goes on to give the title for this session as “The Nature and Function of Literary Study: As Others See Us.” Reading that, I thought: That is different. That identifies me as an other to the “academic and professional concerns” of the field—hence, not just outside but intimately outside, as if my position were an alternative to yours. And how could I not be better informed about being other to you than you are?But of course I know that there is no single unified “you” to which I am other, that some of you, perhaps most, have other others than philosophy and see your practice not against philosophy but against history or criticism or literary theory. So I should perhaps say that I am not exactly single or unified myself, that I am also other to the Anglo-American profession of philosophy, to which at the same time I belong. A way of expressing my otherness to this profession of philosophy is simply to say that I take you as also among my others, that I recognize the study of literature to be an alternative to what I do—a path I might have taken, might still irregularly be taking—to occupy a relation to the way I think, that for most of the members of my profession would be occupied by a profession of logic or science. I will not try here to account theoretically for the intimate differences that may make philosophy and literature alternative studies, which means that I will not here systematically try taking the perspective of an other. But I will be bearing in mind its certain messages and rumors that have lately been coming my way from the field of literary studies. You have, for example, not kept it secret that you have been worrying, as a profession, and sometimes in the form of conducting arguments about the obligation to literary theory as part of literary study, nor secret that these arguments sometimes take on the color or texture of strong statements of, or against, something called deconstruction. I will try to say something about these poorly kept secrets. Stanley Cavell, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, is the author of many works, including Must We Mean What We Say?, The Senses of “Walden,” The Claim of Reason, and, most recently, Themes Out of School. He has been chosen by the American Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters to receive the 1985 Morton Dauwen Zabel Award for Criticism. His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry, “Politics as Opposed to What?,” appears in the September 1982 issue. (shrink)

A permanent state of suspension or deferment -- How theory became history -- "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences" -- "I will teach you differences" -- An assembling of reminders -- ". . . a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing" -- Gedankenwegen: on import and interpretation -- "Of which we cannot speak . . .": philosophy and the humanities -- What is (film) philosophy? -- Order out of chaos -- Idea, image, and intuition -- The world, (...) time -- The ordinary necessity of philosophy -- "Art now exists in the condition of philosophy" -- Falling in love with the world -- Ontology and desire, or a moving response to skepticism -- Automatism and the declaration of existence in time -- Ethical practices of the ordinary -- Perfectionism as self-disobedience -- Comedy and community -- A digression on difference and interpretation -- Perfectionism's ironic transport -- An elegy for theory. (shrink)

Simon Critchley's first book, The Ethics of Deconstruction, was originally published to great acclaim in 1992. This edition contains three new appendices and a new preface where Critchley reflects upon the origins, motivation and reception of The Ethics of Deconstruction.

In this book, Moati systematically replays the historical encounter between Austin, Derrida, and Searle and the disruption that caused the lasting break between Anglo-American language philosophy and continental traditions of phenomenology ...

A collection of essays argues that philosophy is an essential element of human life--a force that shapes human character and national culture and destiny--and offers the rational philosophy of Objectivism as an alternative.

Ayn Rand's literary theory is capable of significant development and extension. Particularly worthy of study are relationships between literary principles and literary practices, such as the creation of implicit or explicit patterns of meaning, the use of common experience and common sense, the provision of cognitive and emotional transformation, the application of control devices to guide readers' understanding, and the assessment of literature in respect to standards of truth and taste.

In Beyond Good and Evil, section 15, Nietzsche offers a criticism of the Kantian contention that the external world is but the work of our organs. As such, he claims, our organs, as part of this world, would by implication also be the work of our organs. Unless then we are to assume that the concept of a causa sui is not an absurd one, the external world is, reduction ad absurdum, not the work of our organs. This paper offers (...) a defence of Schopenhauer from Nietzsche’s charge of circularity, based on the contention that the apparent circularity arises only upon the Nietzschean assumption that the transcendental idealist is, in fact, mistaken in his conception of a transcendental subject. It is only by assuming that Schopenhauer was mistaken, for example, in supposing the law of causality to be of a subjective and transcendental nature, that Nietzsche can even speak about the subject or the world as ‘caused’. A true grasp of Schopenhauer’s position can only lead to the conclusion that no causal chain, let alone a circular one, is at play here. Nietzsche’s error is diagnosed as arising from a deepening of historical sense, which assumes, from the outset, that the conceptual categories of the perceiving subject do not offer us an aeterna veritas. Finally, Nietzsche’s misconception, and his subsequent inability to diagnose it, arises from Schopenhauer’s own inability to escape what Wittgenstein terms the “temporality of our grammar.” Schopenhauer simply does not have the words at hand to ever remove the notion of temporality from the idea that the subject and the world ‘create’ each other. Taking cognisance of Schopenhauer’s ‘double aspect’ theory of the subject, removes from the relationship the notion of causality upon which Nietzsche’s critique is based. (shrink)

Roger E. Bissell offers a new interpretation and clarification of Rand's definition of art, maintaining that an artwork, like language, functions as a "tool of cognition," and that it does so more specifically as a special kind of microcosm which presents an imaginary world. In particular, he argues that architecture and music are aesthetic microcosms and tools of cognition that re-create reality and embody fundamental abstractions and, thus, contrary to assertions by certain Objectivist writers, are forms of art consistent with (...) Rand's definition and concept. (shrink)

KIRSH MINSAAS examines the role of tragedy in Rand's fiction. Rand tended to dismiss tragedy, finding it incompatible with her doctrine that art should serve as a kind of inspirational fuel. But her own fiction often makes use of tragedy in ways that transcend her theory and that reveal its inadequacy as a basis for interpreting her works. A satisfactory comprehension of the meaning and function of the tragic occurrences in Rand's works, Minsaas argues, requires engagement with such conceptual frameworks (...) as Aristotle's catharsis theory, Nietzsche's attack on pity, the Prometheus myth, and the Stoic idea of heroic calm. (shrink)

This article explores the many ways in which Rand's theory of art, though basically mimetic, is strongly infused with expressive elements traditionally associated with Romantic aesthetics. This expressionism, it is argued, puts pressure on Rand's mimeticism to the point of threatening to destabilize it. This is especially evident in Rand's discussion of architecture and music, both of which she regards as valid art forms but fails to accommodate to her mimetic definition of art as a selective re-creation of reality. This (...) inconsistency, the article suggests, is best resolved by reference to the expressive dimension that informs Rand's overall theory. (shrink)

Roger E. Bissell reviews the full-length, taped version of Rand's "The Esthetic Vacuum of Our Age," calling attention to its importance as a foundational document for Rand's later essays on art and to the numerous gems omitted from the much briefer published version.

Minsaas explores the role admiration plays in Rand's literary theory. Seeing admiration as the emotional core of what Rand refers to as a moral sense of life, she first discusses the nature of admiration, focusing on the interrelation between its moral and aesthetic aspects. She then examines its specific significance in Rand's heroic poetics, both in the structure of and in the response to heroic fiction. Finally, she points out certain problems pertaining to Rand's rather partisan preference for heroic art, (...) especially the danger of didacticism and Rand's tendency to dismiss the value of other genres, such as tragedy. (shrink)

In Beyond Good and Evil, section 15, Nietzsche offers a criticism of the Kantian contention that the external world is but the work of our organs. As such, he claims, our organs,as part of this world, would by implication also be the work of our organs. Unless then we are toassume that the concept of a causa sui is not an absurd one, the external world is, reduction adabsurdum, not the work of our organs. This paper offers a defence of (...) Schopenhauer from Nietzsche’scharge of circularity, based on the contention that the apparent circularity arises only upon theNietzschean assumption that the transcendental idealist is, in fact, mistaken in his conception of atranscendental subject. It is only by assuming that Schopenhauer was mistaken, for example, insupposing the law of causality to be of a subjective and transcendental nature, that Nietzsche can evenspeak about the subject or the world as ‘caused’. A true grasp of Schopenhauer’s position can only leadto the conclusion that no causal chain, let alone a circular one, is at play here.Nietzsche’s error is diagnosed as arising from a deepening of historical sense, which assumes, from theoutset, that the conceptual categories of the perceiving subject do not offer us an aeterna veritas.Finally, Nietzsche’s misconception, and his subsequent inability to diagnose it, arises fromSchopenhauer’s own inability to escape what Wittgenstein terms the “temporality of our grammar.”Schopenhauer simply does not have the words at hand to ever remove the notion of temporality fromthe idea that the subject and the world ‘create’ each other. Taking cognisance of Schopenhauer’s‘double aspect’ theory of the subject, removes from the relationship the notion of causality upon whichNietzsche’s critique is based. (shrink)