- Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency?Rick Repetti (ed.) - 2016 - London, UK: Routledge / Francis & Taylor.details
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Reasons-responsiveness and ownership-of-agency: Fischer and Ravizza's historicist theory of responsibility. [REVIEW]David Zimmerman - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):199-234.details
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Obligation, Responsibility and Alternate Possibilities.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1993 - Analysis 53 (1):51 - 53.details
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Negligence and moral responsibility.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1986 - Noûs 20 (2):199-218.details
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Luck and moral responsibility.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1987 - Ethics 97 (2):374-386.details
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Making Do: Troubling Stoic Tendencies in an Otherwise Compelling Theory of Autonomy.David Zimmerman - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):25-53.details
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Making Do: Troubling Stoic Tendencies in an Otherwise Compelling Theory of Autonomy.David Zimmerman - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):25-53.details
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Clarke on Omissions.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2015 - Criminal Justice Ethics 34 (3):361-371.details
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Pattern theory of self and situating moral aspects: the need to include authenticity, autonomy and responsibility in understanding the effects of deep brain stimulation.Przemysław Zawadzki - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3):559-582.details
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Dimensions of the Threat to the Self Posed by Deep Brain Stimulation: Personal Identity, Authenticity, and Autonomy.Przemysław Zawadzki - 2020 - Diametros 18 (69):71-98.details
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Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):231-248.details
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Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternate Possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):231-248.details
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The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example.Garry Young - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):961-969.details
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Objections to the God Machine Thought Experiment and What they Reveal about the Intelligibility of Moral Intervention by Technological Means.Garry Young - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):831-846.details
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Individually Sufficient and Disjunctively Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility.Garry Young & Daniel Coren - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):501-515.details
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Igniting the flicker of freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt scenario.Garry Young - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):171-180.details
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Fischer on the Fragilist Account of Alternative Possibilities.Huiyuhl Yi - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (4):1-14.details
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Against Psychological Sequentialism.Huiyuhl Yi - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (2):247-262.details
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Defending Direct Source Incompatibilism.Eric Yang - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (3):325-333.details
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Augustine on the Election of Jacob.Tianyue Wu - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 6 (1):1-30.details
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Compatibilist Libertarianism: Why It Talks Past the Traditional Free Will Problem and Determinism Is Still a Worry.John Daniel Wright - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):604-622.details
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Empirical tests of philosophical intuitions.Robert L. Woolfolk - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):415-416.details
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On Moral Enhancement.Simkulet William - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4):17-18..details
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Law, ‘Ought’, and ‘Can’.Frederick Wilmot-Smith - 2023 - Ethics 133 (4):529-557.details
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Good luck to libertarians: Reflections on al Mele's free will and luck.Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):173 – 184.details
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Indifference as excuse.Jan Willem Wieland & Jojanneke Vanderveen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.details
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Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom.David Widerker - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):242-254.details
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Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions.David Widerker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):113-118.details
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Blameworthiness, non-robust alternatives, and the principle of alternative expectations.David Widerker - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292–306.details
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Blameworthiness, Non‐robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations.David Widerker - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292-306.details
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Agent-Causation and Control.David Widerker - 2005 - Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.details
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Ceteris Paribus, I Could Have Done Otherwise.Ann Whittle - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):73-85.details
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Control and abilities to do otherwise.Ann Whittle - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):1210-1230.details
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Silence as Complicity: Elements of a Corporate Duty to Speak Out Against the Violation of Human Rights.Florian Wettstein - 2012 - Business Ethics Quarterly 22 (1):37-61.details
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Silence as Complicity: Elements of a Corporate Duty to Speak Out Against the Violation of Human Rights.Florian Wettstein - 2012 - Business Ethics Quarterly 22 (1):37-61.details
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The Cognitive Boundaries of Responsibility.Martin Weichold - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):226-267.details
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Experimental evidence for free will revisionism.Chris Weigel - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):31 - 43.details
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Rational 'ought' implies 'can'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.details
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Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.details
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Moral Responsibility Invariantism.Brandon Warmke - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):179-200.details
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Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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Beyond Moral Responsibility to a System that Works.Bruce N. Waller - 2017 - Neuroethics 13 (1):5-12.details
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Donald Davidson as an Analytic Phenomenologist: Husserl and Davidson on Anomalous Monism and Action.Daniel Wagnon - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Restoring Responsibility: Promoting Justice, Therapy and Reform Through Direct Brain Interventions.Nicole A. Vincent - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):21-42.details
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Blame, desert and compatibilist capacity: a diachronic account of moderateness in regards to reasons-responsiveness.Nicole A. Vincent - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):178-194.details
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The modal argument for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (March):227-44.details
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