In their recent article, ‘Why lockdown of the elderly is not ageist and why levelling down equality is wrong’, Savulescu and Cameron argue for selective isolation of the elderly as an alternative to general lockdown. An important part of their argument is the claim that the latter amounts to ‘levelling down equality’ and that this is ‘unethical’ or even ‘morally repugnant’. This response argues that they fail to justify either part of this claim: the claim that levelling down is always (...) morally wrong is subject to challenges that Savulescu and Cameron do not consider; and a policy of maintaining general lockdown does not constitute levelling down, as it provides absolute benefits to those who would be worse off under selective isolation. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Savulescu and Schuklenk defend and extend their earlier arguments against a right to medical conscientious objection in response to criticisms raised by Cowley. I argue that while it would be preferable to be less accommodating of medical conscientious than many countries currently are, Savulescu and Schuklenk's argument that conscientious objection is ‘simply unprofessional’ is mistaken. The professional duties of doctors should be defined in relation to the interests of patients and society, and for (...) reasons set out in this article, these may support limited accommodation of conscientious objection on condition that it does not impede access to services. Moreover, the fact that conscientious objection appears to involve unjustifiable compromise from the objector's point of view is not a reason for society not to offer that compromise. Arguing for robust enforcement of the no-impediment condition, rather than opposing conscientious objection in principle, may be a more effective way of addressing the harms resulting from an over-permissive conscientious objection policy. (shrink)

A recent focus of the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare is the question of whether practitioners should have to justify their refusal to perform certain functions. A recent article by Cowley addresses a practical aspect of this controversy, namely the question of whether doctors claiming conscientious objector status in relation to abortion should be required, like their counterparts claiming exemption from military conscription, to defend their claim before a tribunal. Cowley argues against the use of tribunals in the medical (...) case, on the grounds that there are likely to be fewer unjustified claims to conscientious objection in this context than in the military, and that in any case tribunals will not be an effective way of distinguishing genuine and false cases. I reject these arguments and propose a different conception of the role of a medical conscientious objection tribunal. (shrink)

The neurodiversity paradigm is presented by its proponents as providing a philosophical foundation for the activism of the neurodiversity movement. Its central claims are that autism and other neurodivergent conditions are not disorders because they are not intrinsically harmful, and that they are valuable, natural and/or normal parts of human neurocognitive variation. This paper: (a) identifies the non‐disorder claim as the most central of these, based on its prominence in the literature and connections with the practical policy claims that the (...) paradigm is supposed to support; (b) describes the heterogeneity of autism at the behavioural and causal levels, and argues that at the behavioural level this encompasses ways of being autistic that are harmful in ways that cannot be not wholly attributed to discrimination or unjust social arrangements, challenging the claim that autism is not a disorder; (c) considers and rejects responses to this challenge based on separation of high‐ and low‐functioning autism, separation of autism from co‐occurring conditions, and viewing autism as part of an individual’s identity. Two of these responses fail for reasons that are themselves connected with the behavioural and/or causal heterogeneity of autism. (shrink)

In a recent Dutch euthanasia case, a woman underwent euthanasia on the basis of an advance directive, having first been sedated without her knowledge and then restrained by members of her family while the euthanasia was administered. This article considers some implications of the criminal court’s acquittal of the doctor who performed the euthanasia. Supporters of advance euthanasia directives have welcomed the judgement as providing a clarification of the law, especially with regard to the admissibility of contextual evidence in interpreting (...) advance euthanasia directives, but suggested that the law regarding advance euthanasia directives should be further relaxed to remove the requirement of current suffering and that an unfortunate consequence of the prosecution is that it is likely to deter doctors from performing euthanasia even in more straightforward cases. This article argues that the court’s endorsement of the use of contextual evidence is problematic, that the case for prioritising prior decisions over current interests has not been advanced by the discussion surrounding this case and that worries about the alleged deterrent effect are not well founded. (shrink)

Advances in forensic techniques have expanded the temporal horizon of criminal investigations, facilitating investigation of historic crimes that would previously have been considered unsolvable. Public enthusiasm for pursuing historic crimes is exemplified by recent high-profile trials of celebrities accused of historic sexual offences. These circumstances give new urgency to the question of how we should decide which historic offences to investigate. A satisfactory answer must take into account the ways in which the passage of time can erode the benefits of (...) criminal investigation, the costs associated with investigating old crimes, and the need to prioritize investigations in the face of limited police resources. This article emphasizes the first of these factors. It begins by considering the moral goals of a criminal justice system and the contribution of criminal investigations to the achievement of these goals, distinguishing between contributions that depend on further steps in the criminal justice process, such as prosecution and punishment, and contributions that can have value independently of these further steps. Using this important distinction, the article then examines a range of factors that relate the passage of time to criminal justice goals, including the seriousness of the crime; deterioration of evidence; death of the offender, victim and others affected by the crime; and diminished psychological connectedness between those affected by the crime and their current selves. While the range and non-uniformity of relevant factors preclude a simple answer to the question of when historic crimes should be investigated and call instead for case-by-case assessment, we find that the analysis does support some general conclusions that can guide such an assessment. (shrink)

Questions about when it is right for police forces to investigate alleged offences committed in the more or less distant past have become increasingly pressing. Recent widely publicized cases of child sexual abuse (CSA) and exploitation, sometimes involving high profile individuals, have illustrated the ethical, psychological, and forensic complexities of investigating non-recent child sexual abuse. Hannah Maslen and Colin Paine have developed the Oxford CSA Framework to assist police to weigh the various ethical considerations that militate for and against initiating (...) a CSA investigation. While such a tool is to be welcomed, and while there is much that is helpful in Maslen and Paine's approach, we suggest that the Oxford CSA framework could be strengthened. Our first suggestion is to abandon a proposed distinction between a set of considerations that is said to generate a “presumption” in favor of investigation and other considerations that may supplement or oppose this presumption. Our second suggestion is to review the weightings applied to the considerations within the model, which lack clear justification and create problematic effects. Finally, we suggest that referring the Oxford CSA Framework to a panel with lived and professional experience of CSA could serve important procedural justice goals and enhance the Framework's recommendations. (shrink)

"William Hughes's Critical Thinking, recently revised and updated by Jonathan Lavery, is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills required to make strong arguments. Hughes and Lavery give a thorough treatment of such traditional topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies and how to spot them, the importance of inference, how to recognise and avoid ambiguity, and how to assess what is or is not relevant to an argument. But they also cover a variety (...) of topics not always treated in books of this sort - special concerns to keep in mind when reasoning about ethical matters and how the nature of a language can affect the structure of an argument. The book gives a lucid treatment of the differences between descriptive and evaluative meaning: one person's freedom fighter is another person's terrorist." "For the fourth edition, Jonathan Lavery has added a new chapter on scientific reasoning, expanded the treatment of analogies, added numerous examples, and revised and updated the text throughout."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

William Hughes's Critical Thinking, revised and updated by Jonathan Lavery, is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills required to make strong arguments. Hughes and Lavery give a thorough treatment of such traditional topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, the importance of inference, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to assess what is or is not relevant to an argument. The authors also cover less traditional topics such as special concerns to (...) keep in mind when reasoning about ethical matters, and how the nature of a language can affect the structure of an argument. In addition to covering basic concepts for analyzing and assessing arguments, the text also has two chapters that are designed to help students write argumentative essays. Last but not least, Critical Thinking includes a selection of logical paradoxes and puzzles that are as entertaining as they are enlightening. For the fifth edition particular attention has been paid to the needs of Canadian students and instructors. (shrink)

William Hughes's Critical Thinking, recently revised and updated by Jonathan Lavery and Katheryn Doran, is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills required to make strong arguments. Hughes, Lavery, and Doran give a thorough treatment of such traditional topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, the importance of inference, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to assess what is or is not relevant to an argument. The authors also cover less traditional topics (...) such as special concerns to keep in mind when reasoning about ethical matters, and how the nature of a language can affect the structure of an argument. In addition to covering basic concepts for analyzing and assessing arguments, the text also has two chapters that are designed to help students write argumentative essays. Last but not least, Critical Thinking includes a selection of logical paradoxes and puzzles that are as entertaining as they are enlightening. For the sixth edition particular attention has been paid to the needs of American students and instructors. (shrink)

Presents a response to the Paul Burkett's review of the book ``Ecology and Historical Materialism.'' Overview of the book; Details of the criticisms presented by Burkett; Information on sociologist Karl Marx's theory of history.

The precautionary principle has its origins in debates about environmental policy, but is increasingly invoked in bioethical contexts. John Harris and Søren Holm argue that the principle should be rejected as incoherent, irrational, and representing a fundamental threat to scientific advance and technological progress. This article argues that while there are problems with standard formulations of the principle, Harris and Holm's rejection of all its forms is mistaken. In particular, they focus on strong versions of the principle and fail to (...) recognize that weaker forms, which may escape their criticisms, are both possible and advocated in the literature. (shrink)

People often have a strong intuitive sense that we ought to rescue those in serious need, even in cases where we could produce better outcomes by acting in other ways. It has become common in such cases to refer to this as the Rule of Rescue. Within the medical field this rule has predominantly been discussed in relation to decisions about whether to fund particular treatments. Whilst in this setting the arguments in favour of the Rule of Rescue have generally (...) been found to be unconvincing, there are some reasons for thinking that it may have more of a role to play at the clinical level. In this article we examine three lines that such reasoning might take. In each case we argue that the reasons given do not support the adoption of a Rule of Rescue in clinical practice. (shrink)

Michael Clark has recently argued that the slippery slope argument against voluntary euthanasia is ‘entirely consequentialist’ and that its use to justify continued prohibition of voluntary euthanasia involves a failure to treat patients who request assistance in ending their lives as ends in themselves. This article agues that in fact the slippery slope is consistent with most forms of deontology, and that it need not involve any violation of the principle that people should be treated as ends, depending upon how (...) that principle is construed. It is concluded that supporters of voluntary euthanasia cannot dismiss the slippery slope argument on the basis of deontological principles but must take seriously the consequences that it postulates and engage in factual argument about their likely extent and about the likely effectiveness of any proposed safeguards. (shrink)

Practitioners of palliative care often argue for more resources to be provided by the state in order to lessen its reliance on charitable funding and to enable the services currently provided to some of those with terminal illnesses to be provided to all who would benefit from it. However, this is hard to justify on grounds of cost-effectiveness, since it is in the nature of palliative care that the benefits it brings to its patients are of short duration. In particular, (...) palliative care fares badly under a policy of QALY-maximisation, since procedures which prevent premature death (provided the life is of reasonable quality) or improve quality of life for those with longer life expectancy will produce more QALYs. This paper examines various responses to this problem and argues that in order to justify increased resources for palliative care its advocates must reject the ‘atomistic’ view of the value of life implicit in the QALY approach in favour of a ‘holistic’ or ‘narrative’ account. This, however, has implications which advocates of palliative care may be reluctant to embrace. (shrink)

This book challenges the widely-held view that Marxism is unable to deal adequately with environmental problems. Jonathan Hughes considers the nature of environmental problems, and the evaluative perspectives that may be brought to bear on them. He examines Marx's critique of Malthus, his method, and his materialism, interpreting the latter as a recognition of human dependence on nature. Central to the book's argument is an interpretation of the 'development of the productive forces' which takes account of the differing (...) ecological impacts of different productive technologies while remaining consistent with the normative and explanatory roles that this concept plays within Marx's theory. Turning finally to Marx's vision of a society founded on the communist principle 'to each according to his needs', the author concludes that the underlying notion of human need is one whose satisfaction presupposes only a modest and ecologically feasible expansion of productive output. (shrink)

_Critical Thinking_ is a comprehensive introduction to the essential skills of good reasoning, refined and updated through seven editions published over more than two decades. This concise edition offers a succinct presentation of the essential elements of reasoning that retains the rigor and sophistication of the original text. The authors provide a thorough treatment of such central topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to distinguish what is relevant from what is (...) not. A companion website provides a range of interesting supplements, including interactive review materials, supplemental readings, and writing tips. (shrink)

Critical Thinking is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills required to make strong arguments. The authors provide a thorough treatment of such topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, the importance of inference, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to assess what is or is not relevant to an argument. This seventh edition adds a chapter on legal reasoning, and grants access to a substantial website of additional questions and other interactive resources.

_Critical Thinking_ is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills of good reasoning, written by Canadian authors for Canadian readers. The book includes a thorough treatment of such central topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to distinguish what is relevant from what is not. Later chapters discuss the application of critical thinking skills to particular topics and tasks, including scientific reasoning, moral reasoning, media analysis, and essay writing. This (...) seventh edition is revised and updated throughout and includes a new chapter on legal reasoning as well as access to a companion website of additional questions and other useful resources. (shrink)

Critical Thinking is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills of good reasoning. The authors provide a thorough treatment of such central topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to distinguish what is relevant from what is not. Later chapters discuss the application of critical thinking skills to particular topics and tasks, including scientific reasoning, moral reasoning, media analysis, and essay writing. This seventh edition is revised and updated throughout, (...) and includes a new chapter on legal reasoning as well as access to a companion website of additional questions and other useful resources. (shrink)

_Critical Thinking_ is a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the essential skills of good reasoning. The authors provide a thorough treatment of such central topics as deductive and inductive reasoning, logical fallacies, how to recognize and avoid ambiguity, and how to distinguish what is relevant from what is not. Later chapters discuss the application of critical thinking skills to particular topics and tasks, including scientific reasoning, moral reasoning, media analysis, and essay writing. This seventh edition is revised and updated throughout, (...) and includes a new chapter on legal reasoning as well as access to a companion website of additional questions and other useful resources. (shrink)

The question of when it is permissible to inflict risks on others without their consent is one that we all face in our everyday lives, but which is often brought to our attention in contexts of technological innovation and scientific uncertainty. Xenotransplantation, the transplantation of organs or tissues from animals to humans, has the potential to save or improve the lives of many patients but gives rise to the possibility of infectious agents being transferred from donor animals into the human (...) population. As well as being an important ethical issue in its own right it therefore provides a useful vehicle for exploring the more general question of how to balance the benefits of a practice against the risks to third parties. This paper focuses on the Rawlsian, justice-based analysis of the risks of xenotransplantation proposed by Robert Veatch. It argues that Veatch is right to take considerations of distributive justice into account, but that his particular approach is flawed. It is hoped that consideration of Veatch’s arguments, and of the underlying assumptions will suggest better ways of executing a justice-based approach. (shrink)

What is the relation between professional standards and ethical policing? At first sight the answer to this question may seem obvious: in policing, as elsewhere, professional standards exist in order to promote ethical behaviour. This view, however, is both open to challenge and in need of elaboration. Sceptics can point to a range of non-moral functions and unintended consequences that may be associated with professional standards while those wishing to develop and implement professional standards need an account of how they (...) can promote ethical behaviour. What are the ethical problems that professional standards can help to solve? Can professional standards succeed in solving those problems and if so how? What does this tell us about the sorts of ethical standards that we should seek to implement, and about how we should determine their content? The present chapter can only sketch the outline of an approach to such questions, but in doing so will hopefully identify some of the issues that need to be considered in developing or assessing professional standards. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind seeks to explain why it is difficult for liberals and conservatives to get along. His aim is not just explanatory but also prescriptive. Once we understand that the differences between disputants spring from distinct moral views held by equally sincere people, then we will no longer have reason for deep political animus. Conservatives and Liberals have distinct moral views and they understand human nature differently. He claims that these differences are best understood by consulting (...) an array of psychological studies, key genetic findings, and the theoretical underpinnings of sociobiology. After summarizing his arguments, we isolate and discuss the three most important and contentious issues in his book. We argue that although the project's motivation is noble and some of his findings are insightful, his key explanations, inferences, and prescriptions are wanting. We end by suggesting a way he could defend a weaker version of his view. (shrink)

This title presents a comprehensive guide to interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) which is an increasingly popular approach to qualitative inquiry taught to undergraduate and postgraduate students today.

Are there key respects in which character and character defects are voluntary? Can agents with serious vices be rational agents? Jonathan Jacobs answers in the affirmative. Moral character is shaped through voluntary habits, including the ways we habituate ourselves, Jacobs believes. Just as individuals can voluntarily lead unhappy lives without making unhappiness an end, so can they degrade their ethical characters through voluntary action that does not have establishment of vice as its end. Choosing Character presents an account of (...) ethical disability, expanding the domain of responsibility and explicating the role of character in ethical cognition. Jacobs contends that agents become ethically disabled voluntarily when their habits impair their ability to properly appreciate ethical considerations. Such agents are rational, responsible individuals who are yet incapable of virtuous action. The view develops and modifies Aristotelian claims concerning the fixity of character. Jacobs' interpretation is developed in contrast to the overlooked work of Maimonides, who also used Aristotelian resources but argued for the possibility of character change. The notion of ethical disability has profound ramifications for ethics and for current debates about blame and punishment. (shrink)

Jacobs' interpretation is developed in contrast to the overlooked work of Maimonides, who also used Aristotelian resources but argued for the possibility of ...

Jonathan Walkan challenges cognitive science's dominant model of mental representation and proposes a novel, well-devised alternative. The traditional view in the cognitive sciences uses a linguistic model of mental representation. That logic-based model of cognition informs and constrains both the classical tradition of artificial intelligence and modeling in the connectionist tradition. It falls short, however, when confronted by the frame problem---the lack of a principled way to determine which features of a representation must be updated when new information becomes (...) available. So far, proposed alternatives, including the imagistic model, have not resolved the problem. Waskan proposes the Intrinsic Cognitive Models hypothesis, according to which representational states can be concpetualized as the cognitive equivalent of scale models.Waskan argues further that the proposal that humans harbor and manipulate cognitive counterparts to scale models offers the only viable explanation for what most clearly differentiates humans from other creatures: the capacity to engage in truth-preserving manipulation of representations. The ICM hypothesis, he claims, can be distinguished from sentence-based accounts of truth preservation in a way that is fully compatible with what is known about the brain. (shrink)

This article explores a concept of artistic transgression I call aesthetic disobedience that runs parallel to the political concept of civil disobedience. Acts of civil disobedience break some law in order to publicly draw attention to and recommend the reform of a conflict between the commitments of a legal system and some shared commitments of a community. Likewise, acts of aesthetic disobedience break some entrenched artworld norm in order to publicly draw attention to and recommend the reform of a conflict (...) between artworld commitments and some shared commitments of a community. Considering artistic transgressions under the concept of aesthetic disobedience highlights often-overlooked features of modern artworld practices. Most significantly, it draws attention to the deliberative participation of a wide variety of citizens of the artworld, including not just artists and performers but also members of audiences, in the transformation of the rules and boundaries of the artworld itself. (shrink)

I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate ‘phenomenally conscious’: for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature is phenomenally conscious at that time. I first defend the Positive Characterization Thesis, which says that for any borderline case of any predicate there is a positive characterization of that case that can show any sufficiently competent speaker what makes it a borderline case. I then appeal to (...) the familiar claim that zombies are conceivable, and I argue that this claim entails that there can be no positive characterizations of borderline cases of ‘phenomenally conscious’. By the Positive Characterization Thesis, it follows that ‘phenomenally conscious’ can not have any borderline cases. (shrink)

I consider a more generic goal teachers have for students in addition to learning some determinate content: that they learn how to learn anything whatsoever. To explain this process, I draw on two insights from Aristotle’s account of learning: first, that in every case students learn by doing the very things they are learning to do; and second, that it is possible to achieve a general educatedness whereby someone can make intelligent judgments and intellectual progress even in previously unfamiliar subject (...) areas. In both cases, Aristotle’s account of the teacher as thinking-facilitator rather than knowledge-infuser is illuminating. This connects with recent literature on Experiential Learning. Having developed this broadly Aristotelian account of learning how to learn I offer some concrete strategies for putting the theory into practice in the philosophy classroom. These strategies include targeted reading guidance and mystery text assignments, both of which develop incrementally throughout the course. (shrink)

The comprehensiveness of Islamic law has been questioned seriously in the modern period by Muslim reformists like Rashīd Riḍā. Such reformists have used as evidence Qur'anic verses and Prophetic reports that seem to state clearly that the strictures of Islamic law are few and limited and that Muslims should not extend them to all areas of life. How could the Shariah have developed as a holistic and exhaustive body of law in light of such evidence? Looking back at earlier Muslim (...) scholars from the ninth to the eighteenth centuries, however, we see that these Qur'anic verses and Prophetic edicts were never understood in this way. They were either diffused with various hermeneutic strategies or understood as applying to debates unrelated to the comprehensiveness or minimalism of the Shariah. (shrink)

In our attempts to achieve privacy and reputation deliverables, advocating for service providers and other data managers to open Big Data black boxes and be more transparent about consent processes, algorithmic details, and data practice is easy. Moving from this call to meaningful forms of transparency, where the Big Data details are available, useful, and manageable is more difficult. Most challenging is moving from that difficult task of meaningful transparency to the seemingly impossible scenario of achieving, consistently and ubiquitously, meaningful (...) forms of consent, where individuals are aware of data practices and implications, understand these realities, and agree to them as well. This commentary unpacks these concerns in the online consent context. It emphasizes that self-governance fallacy pervades current approaches to achieving digital forms of privacy, exemplified by the assertion that transparency and information access alone are enough to help individuals achieve privacy and reputation protections. (shrink)

Among the instrumental value defenses for biodiversity conservation is the argument that biodiversity is necessary to support ecosystem functioning. Lower levels of biodiversity yield lower levels of ecosystem functioning and hence the inference that we should conserve biodiversity. In our book Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics, we point out three problems with this inference. (1) The empirical support for such an inference derives from experiments conducted on a very small set of ecosystem types (mainly grasslands and fresh water aquatic) (...) and ecosystem functions (mainly nutrient uptake, biomass production, and decomposition rates). These experiments suffer from a number of largely unavoidable logistical constraints making the generality of their results questionable. (2) Even if the experimental results were unequivocal, their lack of external validity would still raise significant questions about how (if at all) these results apply to real world conservation problems. And (3) even if the experimental results were unequivocal and completely applicable to conservation problems, relying on such defenses implies other rational policy commitments that are at odds with other positions that environmentalists commonly take. Odenbaugh and I disagree largely about what inferences follow from these points rather than about the points themselves. I think that what follows is that if environmentalists want to use instrumental value defenses, then we need to accept that not all biodiversity is useful to us, and parts that are useful are not necessarily more useful than alternatives that might threaten biodiversity. I also think that the unpalatable implied commitments need to be taken seriously. This may mean that we environmentalists have to accept that biodiversity should not always be conserved, and that parts of the environmentalist agenda are little more than strong personal preferences that others need not respect. If environmentalists are willing to accept these conclusions, then there are no problems with relying on these instrumental value defenses, but I suspect that environmentalists are likely to be unhappy with such conclusions. (shrink)

In 1927, Walter Lippmann published The Phantom Public, denouncing the ‘mystical fallacy of democracy.’ Decrying romantic democratic models that privilege self-governance, he writes: “I have not happened to meet anybody, from a President of the United States to a professor of political science, who came anywhere near to embodying the accepted ideal of the sovereign and omnicompetent citizen.” Almost 90 years later, Lippmann’s pragmatism is as relevant as ever, and should be applied in new contexts where similar self-governance concerns persist. (...) This paper does just that, repurposing Lippmann’s argument in the context of the ongoing debate over the role of the digital citizen in Big Data management. It is argued that proposals by the Federal Trade Commission, the White House and the US Congress, championing failed notice and choice privacy policy, perpetuate a self-governance fallacy comparable to Lippmann’s, referred to here as the fallacy of data privacy self-management. Even if the digital citizen had the faculties and the system for data privacy self-management, the digital citizen has little time for data governance. We desire the freedom to pursue the ends of digital production, without being inhibited by the means. We want privacy, and safety, but cannot complete all that is required for its protection. If it is true that the fallacy of democracy is similar to the fallacy of data privacy self-management, then perhaps the pragmatic solution is representative data management: a combination of non/for-profit digital dossier management via infomediaries that can ensure the protection of personal data, while freeing individuals from what Lippmann referred to as an ‘unattainable ideal.’. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 201-222, September 2021.

Today, there are different understandings of the first article on the content of the Christian faith, for which an analysis from a theological perspective is necessary. This research sought to reveal the meaning of the first article on the content of the Christian faith in recent theological works that have been produced, through the use of a hermeneutic exercise, conducting a bibliometric and categorical analysis and using NVivo software to analyse the qualitative data. We concluded that the recent theological literature (...) addresses the meaning of the first article of the Christian faith based on the existence, concept and definition of God and his attributes, as well as his power, behaviour, creation, revelation and reign. Although there is little extant material compared to other topics or areas of knowledge that can be explored using these tools, this fact is explained because, normally, theologians are not interested in publishing in high-impact journals. The way of approaching God in contemporary literature can be enriched by taking into account specific contexts, such as poverty, discrimination, suffering, violence, human trafficking, immigration and political realities, in such a way that it is not only a metaphysical reflection of God but also a historical and immanent and even an interreligious research that broadens the concept of the Christian God and answers questions that contemporary society asks in daily life. (shrink)

Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction (...) and manipulation of the cognitive equivalent of scale models. A reading of this hypothesis is provided that satisfies condition (1) and which, even though it may not fully satisfy condition (2), turns out (in light of the frame problem) to be the only known way to satisfy condition (3). (shrink)

Philosophers of music commonly distinguish performative from critical interpretations. I would like to suggest that the distinction between critical and performative interpretations is well captured by an analogy to legal critics and judges. This parallel draws attention to several features of performative interpretation that are typically overlooked, and deemphasizes epistemic problems with performative interpretations that I believe are typically blown out of proportion and ultimately fail to capture interesting features of performative interpretation. There is an important distinction to be made (...) between critical and performative interpretation, but its source lies in a difference between the authority of critical and performative interpretations. (shrink)