Exemplifying a fruitful fusion of French and German approaches to social theory, The Power of Dialogue transforms Jurgen Habermas's version of critical theory into a new "critical hermeneutics" that builds on both Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and Michel Foucault's studies of power and discourse. At the book's core is the question of how social power shapes and influences meaning and how the process of interpretation, while implicated in social forms of power, can nevertheless achieve reflective distance and a critique of (...) power. It offers an original perspective on such issues as the impact of prejudice and cultural background on scientific interpretation, the need to understand others without assimilating their otherness, and the "truth" of interpretation. (shrink)

Exemplifying a fruitful fusion of French and German approaches to social theory, The Power of Dialogue transforms Jurgen Habermas's version of critical theory into a new "critical hermeneutics" that builds on both Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and Michel Foucault's studies of power and discourse. At the book's core is the question of how social power shapes and influences meaning and how the process of interpretation, while implicated in social forms of power, can nevertheless achieve reflective distance and a critique of (...) power. It offers an original perspective on such issues as the impact of prejudice and cultural background on scientific interpretation, the need to understand others without assimilating their otherness, and the "truth" of interpretation. (shrink)

(1997). Alienation as epistemological source: Reflexivity and social background after Mannheim and Bourdieu. Social Epistemology: Vol. 11, New Directions in the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 141-164.

The Institute for Social Research, or Frankfurt School, is an interdisciplinary research center associated with the University of Frankfurt in Germany and responsible for the founding and various trajectories of Critical Theory in the contemporary humanities and social sciences. Three generations of critical theorists have emerged from the Institute. The first generation was most prominently represented in the twentieth century by Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Leo Löwenthal, and also for some time Erich Fromm. The so-called (...) ‘second generation’ of the Institute is centrally represented by Jürgen Habermas, whose work has functioned as the focal point of a wide range of critical theorists. The third generation of the Frankfurt School is represented by Axel Honneth who emerged as a new center, with different strands or readings of who else belongs to the third generation, some in Germany, some internationally, and some more in sociology and social and political theory than philosophy. (shrink)

Democratic politics might be defined as the agonistic struggle of different parties, groups or individuals over resources, recognition and influence under reciprocal and inclusive conditions. It is based on an unconditional orientation to equality as well as freedom of all those involved to consent to - or dissent from - the norms, policies and practices that are established in the process of public dialogue. This article reconstructs the general agent-based capabilities required for a democratically defined public sphere under conditions of (...) globalization. Making capabilities central is intended to correct a certain over-emphasis regarding institutional macro-structures in the discourse on globalization and cosmopolitanism. After setting the stage with a critical analysis of Martha Nussbaum’s concept of capabilities, the analysis proceeds in two major steps. In the first part, a notion of hermeneutic agency is introduced that avoids a Foucauldian reduction of agency to power structures, while thoroughly situating agency in a symbolically mediated social context. The symbolic mediation of agency is, in the second part, taken as a ground of potentiality for reflexive capabilities that, once actualized and enacted, allow for a normatively satisfying process of public deliberation. The aim of the analysis is to relate a normative model of value-orientation to the linguistically grounded empirical resources of social agents. The core argument lays out as basic capabilities (1) to be able to normatively orient oneself at contextually defined yet universally open postconventional commitments, (2) to be able to engage in an interpretive and dialogical perspective-taking vis-a-vis differently situated agents and backgrounds, and (3) to be able to critically distance oneself from one’s taken-for-granted assumptions and background structures via a power-alert social reflexivity. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Das Kapitel artikuliert Rortys Hauptthesen seiner hermeneutischen Wirkungsgeschichte: Dass die Vorverständnisabhängigkeit des Verstehens jede philosophische oder metaphysische Grundlegung obsolet macht, sowie dass Verstehen nicht auf Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften eingrenzbar ist und vielmehr alles wissenschaftliche und philosophische Erkennen situativ bestimmt. In Auseinandersetzung mit Hans-Georg Gadamers und Jürgen Habermas’ Wahrheits-, Verständigungs- und Philosophiebegriffen werden Rortys Herausforderungen für die Hermeneutik anhand folgender Fragestellungen behandelt: Müssen bzw. sollten wir in der Hermeneutik an einem Begriff der Wahrheit festhalten? Ist Verstehen notwendig ethnozentrisch? Kann es nach (...) Rortys post-metaphysischer Destruktion der Philosophie und Wahrheit noch einen Ort für ontologische Selbstreflexion geben? (shrink)

The central question of the essay is: How is a hermeneutic ethic possible, given that its conditions of possibility may seem in crisis if explicit criteria for normative evaluation are rejected and the interpreting subject seems fully integrated into a process of open-ended contextual understanding. The emerging possibility of a situated ethos of dialogue, however, is challenged by the administrative and instrumental destruction of tradition. In response, a careful reinterpretation of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s claim that interpretation is per se ethical provides (...) us with the normative ideal of dialogical openness. Yet Gadamer’s broad-brushed rejection of social-scientific research is replaced by the subtle proposal for a reflective co-operation between dialogical understanding and sociological thought. Now the social sciences and social theory either reconstruct empirical sources of the ethos of dialogue, or they deconstruct the forces of discursive and social power that undermine the realization of our ethical potential. (shrink)

The essay begins by addressing the analytic frame that Adorno opens up for a critical theory of music, to then focus on a hermeneutic-pragmatic account of music as aesthetic agency, followed by a reconstruction of the uniquely transgressive potentials that this account of musical experience entails for popular music. The new account is motivated by the impasse created by Adorno’s own philosophy of music to provide a grounding for the cognitive capacities necessary to understand autonomous music. The hermeneutic-pragmatic reconstruction of (...) aesthetic features of music as structurally similar to experiential dimensions of agency overcomes Adorno’s dilemma by allowing us to see music as a socializing medium that enables reflexive experiences. The musical dimensions of rhythm, harmony, and melody are reconstructed as exemplifying features of situated agency. Against this background, popular music is shown to enable experiences of bodily transgression, cultural transcendence, as well as individualized attentiveness, thus continuing Adorno’s project of reconstructing the critical cognitive value of music. (shrink)

The review highlights how Habermas reconstructs the historically constitutive function of religious thought regarding essential categories through which to appropriate our practical freedom. It articulates the three essential bifurcations taken along the way: to opt for Judeo-Christian dialogism versus other axial age world religions; for a Lutheran Kantianism of an unconditional normativity versus an empiricist naturalism; and for the hermeneutic discovery of a validity-oriented communicative agency versus a Hegelian metaphysics. Recognizing our normative indebtedness to religious roots in modernity is to (...) enable the renewal of an unabashed commitment to 'rational freedom,' thus serving as a bulwark against currently fashionable scientistic worldviews. Such a hermeneutic genealogy may also provide one promising resource to reconstruct shared normative ideals in a cross-cultural dialogue. (shrink)

The title of the paper productively suggests a double-meaning of truth vis-à-vis dialogue. The claim is both that the concept of truth is essential for a comprehensive conception of dialogue, and that dialogue points toward a concept of truth beyond dogmatic infallibity or doxastic relativism. At stake is to show how truth entails an essentially dialogical moment, and dialogue, if conceived philosophically, must entail the concept of truth.In theological as well as philosophical dogmatism, a final truth is assumed. Interesting are (...) positions such as Cardinal Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI’s or Karl-Otto Apel’s “transcendental pragmatics” since they attempt to engage in dialogue yet assume an “infallible” or “ultimately grounded” foundation for their own assumptions. Radically opposed to this infallibilism is the postmodern relativistic view according to which the “groundless grounds” of human understanding make all claims to truth meaningless. Since understanding and dialogue are situated in contingent cultural contexts, as Richard Rorty argues, no ascent to truth is ever possible. The result of our analysis suggests that both positions lead to an insulation of experience from true dialogicalchallenge. Dogmatic positions miss the dialogical core of truth, as they believe that insulated truth-content remains “true” regardless of engaged and challenged reassertions. Doxastic conceptions miss the truth-relation of dialogue, as they fail to capture the seriousness and intentionality of intersubjective and intercultural dialogue.From these critical points emerges a productive concept of dialogue that entails truth as an open-ended and dynamic, and thereby indispensable, concept. Moreover, our analysis lays out that the basic dialogical notions involve truth, openness, and reciprocity in an interconnected way. Dialogue is unavoidable for truth, as much as truth is intrinsic to dialogue. But the new synthesis of truth and dialogue allows for a pluralistic understanding of truth that still, we hope, remains truthful to its content. As such, it alone can ground a non-relativistic notion of multiculturalism. (shrink)

The paper explores the extent to which 'postmodernism' has affected our conception of social theory, especially with regard to the normative assumptions involved in cultural and social interpretation. It makes a proposal about how to redefine normativity after the postmodern challenge. Postmodernist theorists engage in the rejection of trans-contextual notions of truth and universalistic moralities. Yet since these efforts themselves involve commitments to truth and normativity, we might be inclined to reject them as inherently incoherent. A different, more promising road (...) would consist in taking seriously the postmodern critique of reason, and to inquire whether, instead of necessarily implying a total rejection of reason, it suggests a reformulation of the scope and nature of truth and normativity. In this paper, I prepare such a reconceptualization with regard to the issue of normativity. The aim is to sketch a theory of normative commitment as built into our interpretive practices, if understood as the dialogical reconstruction—and thus recognition—of the other's beliefs and assumptions. To make the case for this proposal, I first present, by means of a comparison between modern and postmodern conceptions of social science, an interpretation of the relevance of the postmodern challenge with regard to modern social theory. Based on this, I will sketch a fourfold discursive field of positions addressing the justification of normative perspectives after postmodernism. This discussion will serve as a backdrop against which the concept of a hermeneutic competence of dialogical perspective-assumption can emerge as a plausible candidate for grounding our normative intuitions. (shrink)

The paper explores the extent to which 'postmodernism' has affected our conception of social theory, especially with regard to the normative assumptions involved in cultural and social interpretation. It makes a proposal about how to redefine normativity after the postmodern challenge. Postmodernist theorists engage in the rejection of trans-contextual notions of truth and universalistic moralities. Yet since these efforts themselves involve commitments to truth and normativity, we might be inclined to reject them as inherently incoherent. A different, more promising road (...) would consist in taking seriously the postmodern critique of reason, and to inquire whether, instead of necessarily implying a total rejection of reason, it suggests a reformulation of the scope and nature of truth and normativity. In this paper, I prepare such a reconceptualization with regard to the issue of normativity. The aim is to sketch a theory of normative commitment as built into our interpretive practices, if understood as the dialogical reconstruction—and thus recognition—of the other's beliefs and assumptions. To make the case for this proposal, I first present, by means of a comparison between modern and postmodern conceptions of social science, an interpretation of the relevance of the postmodern challenge with regard to modern social theory. Based on this, I will sketch a fourfold discursive field of positions addressing the justification of normative perspectives after postmodernism. This discussion will serve as a backdrop against which the concept of a hermeneutic competence of dialogical perspective-assumption can emerge as a plausible candidate for grounding our normative intuitions. (shrink)

This essay develops the core intuition that we need to transform the objective condition of globalization into a reflexive consciousness of a cosmopolitan connectedness. We require a cosmopolitan self-understanding that allows us to respond in a normatively guided way to objective processes that undermine the usual venues of political will formation. Since our global connectedness in terms of economic and political integration is ongoing and seemingly inevitable, we need a similarly inclusive and global approach to critically respond to the challenge (...) of these unconstrained forces. The proposal is to develop a dialogical cosmopolitanism which is not based on a new meta-level of abstract universal norms, but grounded in agentive capabilities. Hermeneutic capabilities which comprise contextual perspective-taking are introduced, developing shared yet fallible norms, and critically reflecting on the power relations involved. These agent-based capabilities would allow the situated agents themselves to understand the objective forces that define current globalization and provide normative resources for a different, cosmopolitan globalization. (shrink)

By engaging Robert Pippin's Hegelian account of ?rational agency as ethical life?, the essay explores the consequences of an intersubjectivist conception of ethical agency. Pippin's core project consists of showing that intentional agency must be conceived within the social context of reason-giving practices which provide the necessary sense-making background of action. This socially grounded meaningfulness of action requires us to redefine agency as a social achievement, as real only if socially recognized. For Pippin, this means that ethical agency essentially becomes (...) the identifying expression of the situated agent with rationally acceptable and socially actualized modes of self-realization. In contrast, I argue that core features of agency such as intentional causality and reflexivity need to be more fully integrated into a social conception of agency. By drawing on a hermeneutic appropriation of G. H. Mead's intersubjective account, we come to see that the developing self emerges via processes of perspective-taking which involve intentional causality as well as reflexivity. The presumed opposition between an intentional-causalist and an expressivist account of agency thus becomes obsolete. The new account is put to a comparative test with Pippin's approach with regard to the issues of analyzing social power, approaching cultural difference, and conceiving of the relation between critical theory and the agents' everyday social self-understanding. (shrink)

The essay probes the limits of social ontology as a grounding project for interpretation and explanation in the social sciences. The argument proceeds by challenging the exemplary and influential ontology of John Searle by means of Jim Bohman’s hermeneutic approach. While both share the interest in establishing the validity basis of social-scientific claims, Bohman reconstructs in this regard the situated standpoint of the hermeneutic interpreter, in contrast to Searle’s building block approach to social reality. A careful analysis of Bohman’s argumentation (...) reveals the need for differentiating a variety of interpretive stances, which leads back to important revisions of the intentionality-based social ontology of Searle. The discussion results in the need to ground methodological pluralism in a universal hermeneutics of interpretive capabilities to safeguard the social sciences against relativistic as well as metaphysical challenges. (shrink)

Redefining the canon and the core curriculum is a popular topic in the current debate concerning multiculturalism. The focus on education is indeed crucial, insofar as it creates a symbolic ground for a democratic society, implying the possibility of universal dialogue across cultural and social differences. Yet to overcome the fragmenting dissensus among radical, conservative, and liberal positions, we need a concept of "general education" that reconciles the normative ideals of equality and freedom with the social reality of ethnic, social, (...) and sexual diversity. I argue that we can develop such a new philosophy of education in the spirit of a grounded cosmopolitanism by showing how a shared and still culturally sensitive understanding can emerge from different cultural backgrounds. The goal of democratic education consists thus in the creation of a culturally grounded yet reflexively open self, as the precondition for democratic participation in the multicultural public sphere. (shrink)

[Constructing a cosmopolitan public sphere: hermeneutic capabilities and universal values].

By engaging Robert Pippin's Hegelian account of ?rational agency as ethical life?, the essay explores the consequences of an intersubjectivist conception of ethical agency. Pippin's core project consists of showing that intentional agency must be conceived within the social context of reason-giving practices which provide the necessary sense-making background of action. This socially grounded meaningfulness of action requires us to redefine agency as a social achievement, as real only if socially recognized. For Pippin, this means that ethical agency essentially becomes (...) the identifying expression of the situated agent with rationally acceptable and socially actualized modes of self-realization. In contrast, I argue that core features of agency such as intentional causality and reflexivity need to be more fully integrated into a social conception of agency. By drawing on a hermeneutic appropriation of G. H. Mead's intersubjective account, we come to see that the developing self emerges via processes of perspective-taking which involve intentional causality as well as reflexivity. The presumed opposition between an intentional-causalist and an expressivist account of agency thus becomes obsolete. The new account is put to a comparative test with Pippin's approach with regard to the issues of analyzing social power, approaching cultural difference, and conceiving of the relation between critical theory and the agents' everyday social self-understanding. (shrink)

Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature presents the most thorough and sustained critique of Western epistemology and foundationalism in the second half of the twentieth Century. The work deconstructs philosophy as an autonomous discipline generating a “neutral matrix” to assess knowledge, truth, and rationality, offering philosophical analyses of the mind-body distinction, representation, reference, and truth, and ultimately the concept of knowledge as a “mirror of nature.” The deconstruction of Cartesian dualism undermines the mind as the immaterial ground of absolute (...) certainty; the deconstruction of the Kantian empirical-transcendental distinction destroys the transcendental realm as philosophy’s uniquely accessible and founding domain. Instead, Rorty invites us to reconceive philosophy as an edifying voice in the “conversation of mankind.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 303 philosophical, artistic) forms as a vivid protest "from within." If, on the contemporary scene, religion wants to actualize itself and the Church "to answer the question implied in man's very existence" (p. 49), then theology has to use the material of an "existential analysis" of the various cultural realms, confronting this material "with the answer implied in the Christian message" (p. 49). Part II gives so (...) to say instances of such a theological appreciation of cultural expressions. Successively passed in review are: religious "language" (signs and symbols), artistic "style," existential philosophy, psychoanalysis, science, morality, and education. Though each essay is illuminating, those on Existential Philosophy: its historical meaning (1944) and The Theological Significance o/Existentialism and Psychoanalysis (1955) may be called brilliant. Part III contains comparisons of theological thought in Germany and America (in which the author gives some personal reminiscences), and of religion in America and Russia, together with An Evaluation o/Martin Buber (1948). The book concludes with Part IV: Communicating the Christian Message: a Question to Christian Ministers and Teachers (1952), which appears to be relevant to Christians in general. It may be said that it has been a privilege for America to have received among the intellectual refugees of the "catastrophe" of 1933 this powerful German thinker, just as it must have bcen a privilege for Dr. Tillich to be able to elaborate his thought in a country where it received such great response in thoughtful circles. One recognizes behind this thinking the essential continental problems of the relation between philosophy of religion and theology, between religion and culture, between personal existence and industrial society: questions becoming American problems as well. In all his work, the role of religion is positively appreciated, and an appeal is made to a religious "courage to be," reminding man in his estranged life situation of his essential nature and his final destiny. It is not with the deus est esse, neither the certitudo ex se ipsis, nor the ultimate concern, nor the unconditional, that we should like to voice here some questions with regard to the author's views. Rather it is with two seemingly minor questions. Accepting his circumscription of religion as "the dimension of depth," we would be interested to see if within or beside a Theology o] culture, a Theology o] religion would also be possible, having as its subject religious expressions under and outside the authority of the Gospel. A second question arises from the author's statement: "Self is good, self-affirmation is good, self-acceptance is good, but selfishness is bad because it prevents both self-affirmation and self-acceptance" (p. 145). Although this phrase may have its particular context in Moralisms and Morality (1955), I personally wonder if the deflated Self does not risk becoming the essential prison of industrial society, in which, unfortunately, there is no Nirwana.... JACQUES WAA_RDENB URG University o[ California, Los Angeles BOOK NOTES John A. Mourant, ed., Introduction to the Philosophy oI Saint Augustine. Selected Readings and Commentaries. University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press [1964]. Pp. ix + 366. $7.50. This is an excellent introduction to the philosophy of Augustine as well as to the general Romanizing of the Platonic tradition. Professor Mourant's thirty pages of Introduction (supplemented appropriately by the great "Prayer" in which the Saint explains the world to his Creator), the bibliographical references, and the critical comments, all provide a concise exposition of the varioua ways in which Augustine attempted to organize his faith into a system of thought. The selections from the treatises, sermons, and letters are well arranged and contain several new translations into English by competent scholars. Both the editor's exposition and Augustine's own efforts to face the basic issues created by the meeting of diverse systems of doctrine and language enable the student to become aware of the amazing range of Christian philosophy created by a man who was both a busy bishop and an inquisitive truth-seeker. The reader can follow Augustine himself in dealing with his problems, instead of being confronted with the literature and context of modernization or of apologetics. 304 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Since this volume is evidently and... (shrink)