We investigate two formalizations of Optimality Theory, a successful paradigm in linguistics.We first give an order-theoretic counterpart for the data and processinvolved in candidate evaluation.Basically, we represent each constraint as a function that assigns every candidate a degree of violation.As for the second formalization, we define (after Samek-Lodovici and Prince) constraints as operations that select the best candidates out of a set of candidates.We prove that these two formalizations are equivalent (accordingly, there is no loss of generality with using violation (...) marks and dispensing with them is only apparent).Importantly, we show that the second formalization is equivalent with a class of operations over sets of formulas in a given logical language.As a result, we prove that Optimality Theory can be characterized by certain cumulative logics.So, applying Optimality Theory is shown to be reasoning by the rules of cumulative logics. (shrink)

Opening address, by C.W. Morris.--Address of the chairman, H.W. Chase.--Spinoza: his personality and his doctrine of perfection, by E.L. Schaub.--Spinoza's political and moral philosophy, by T.V. Smith.--Spinoza and religion, by S.B. Freehof.

« Un livre de plus sur les princesses! », ne manquera-t-on pas de s’écrier en découvrant cette synthèse qui s’est, de plus, parée d’une couverture mi-partie rose vif, accentuant à l’envi l’effet « paillettes » de son sujet! Le thème est effectivement à la mode depuis quelque temps, avec une floraison d’ouvrages signés Fanny Cosandey, Bartolomé Bennassar, Denis Crouzet ou Thierry Wanegffelen, pour ne citer que les plus récents. Ces « oubliées de l’Histoire » resurgissent à la faveur d’une hi...

Elements of Folk Psychology; Outline of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind, has been considered important throughout the human history, and so that this work is never forgotten we have made efforts in its preservation by republishing this book in a modern format for present and future generations. This whole book has been reformatted, retyped and designed. These books are not made of scanned copies of their original work and hence the text is clear and readable.

This is a new release of the original 1929 edition.

In this paper, we take up two objections Raymond Geuss levels against John Rawls′ ideal theory in Philosophy and Real Politics. We show that, despite their fundamental disagreements, the two theorists share a common starting point: they both reject doing political philosophy by way of applying an independently derived moral theory; and grapple with the danger of unduly privileging the status quo. However, neither Rawls′ characterization of politics nor his ideal theoretical approach as response to the aforementioned danger is adequate (...) or so we argue. Moreover, contrary to received opinion, Geuss′ political philosophy is the more reflective and the more philosophical of the two. In a final section, we highlight another agreement: both think that political philosophers should develop conceptual innovations as a way of clarifying and overcoming practical problems. We demonstrate that Geuss could offer a number of reasons for finding Rawls′ conceptual innovations wanting. (shrink)

This study uses a “science pipeline” model and cross-national data to examine women's participation in science education and occupations in seven countries. Gender stratification in later science education and in science occupations is found in every country examined. Young women's participation in science education decreases with each stage in the science pipeline, but there is considerable cross-national variation in the extent of gender stratification in science. Findings show greater gender stratification in science occupations than in science education, suggesting factors other (...) than training help maintain inequality in high-status science occupations. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the method of normative reconstruction that is underlying Freedom’s Right undermines Critical Theory’s aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive. I start out by giving a brief account of the four premises of the method of normative reconstruction and unpack their implications for how Honneth conceptualizes social pathologies and misdevelopments, specifically that these notions are no longer linked to radical critique and normative revolution. In the second part, I demonstrate that (...) abandoning forms of radical critique and normative revolution is internally linked to adopting this method, before arguing that Freedom’s Right entails no resources to account for why abandoning them does not amount to a deficiency. In the final part, I point out two problematic implications of turning away from radical critique and normative revolution for the very project Honneth pursues in Freedom’s Right. I show that Honneth’s own view about the limited scope of application of the method of normative reconstruction and his account of the dangers associated with social misdevelopments give us reasons to consider this method to be incomplete. Finally, I contend that the explanatory power of Freedom’s Right is dubious because methodological premises that form part of normative reconstruction lead Honneth to ignore relevant alternative explanations of processes of deviation and disassociation from norms of social freedom, which he characterizes as social misdevelopments. (shrink)

Consistency-based approaches in nonmonotonic reasoning may be expected to yield multiple sets of default conclusions for a given default theory. Reasoning about such extensions is carried out at the meta-level. In this paper, we show how such reasoning may be carried out at the object level for a large class of default theories. Essentially we show how one can translate a default theory Δ, obtaining a second Δ', such that Δ has a single extension that encodes every extension of _. (...) Moreover, our translated theory is only a constant factor larger than the original. We prove that our translation behaves correctly. In the approach we can now encode the notion of extension from within the framework of standard default logic. Hence one can encode notions such as skeptical and credulous conclusions, and can reason about such conclusions within a single extension. This result has some theoretical interest, in that it shows how multiple extensions of semi-monotonic default theories are encodable with manageable overhead in a single extension. (shrink)

In this paper, we take up two objections Raymond Geuss levels against John Rawls' ideal theory in Philosophy and Real Politics. We show that, despite their fundamental disagreements, the two theorists share a common starting point: they both reject doing political philosophy by way of applying an independently derived moral theory; and grapple with the danger of unduly privileging the status quo. However, neither Rawls' characterization of politics nor his ideal theoretical approach as response to the aforementioned danger is adequate (...) - or so we argue. Moreover, contrary to received opinion, Geuss' political philosophy is the more reflective and the more philosophical of the two. In a final section, we highlight another agreement: both think that political philosophers should develop conceptual innovations as a way of clarifying and overcoming practical problems. We demonstrate that Geuss could offer a number of reasons for finding Rawls' conceptual innovations wanting. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Reiter's default logic is one of the most prominent and well-studied approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Its evolution has resulted in diverse variants enjoying many interesting properties. This process however seems to be diverging because it has led to default logics that are difficult to compare due to different formal characterizations—sometimes even dealing with different objects of discourse. This problem is addressed in this paper in two ways. One the one hand, we elaborate on the relationships between different types of (...) default logics and discuss their differences wrt some basic properties. In particular, we show how two recently proposed variants, namely rational and CA-default logic, are related to each other and existing default logics. As an interesting byproduct, we obtain a cumulative counterpart to Lukasiewicz' variant of default logic. The resulting system is insofar surprising since it necessitates to refine the canonical way of assuring cumulativity in default logics. On the other hand, we pursue an integrating approach. We give a translation embedding rational and CA-default logic into a recently developed framework for default logics. This allows us not only to classify these variants, but it moreover provides us with semantical underpinnings that have been lacking so far. (shrink)

A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament, being Grimm's Wilke's Clavis Novi Testamenti. Translated, Revised and Enlarged by Joseph Henry Thayer, D.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in the Divinity School of Harvard University. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1886. 4to. pp. 726. 36s.Biblico Theological Lexicon to New Testament Greek. by Hermann Cremer, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Greifswald. Third English Edition. With Supplement. Translated from the latest German Edition by William Uewick, M.A. (...) Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1886. 4to. pp. 943. 38s. (shrink)