This provocative study revives a classical idea about rationality by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in the philosophy of mind, ehtics, decision theory, and social choice theory.

Tens of thousands of students have learned to be more discerning at constructing and evaluating arguments with the help of Patrick J. Hurley. Hurley’s lucid, friendly, yet thorough presentation has made A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC the most widely used logic text in North America. In addition, the book’s accompanying technological resources, such as CengageNOW and Learning Logic, include interactive exercises as well as video and audio clips to reinforce what you read in the book and hear in class. In (...) short, you’ll have all the assistance you need to become a more logical thinker and communicator. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version. (shrink)

Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

it has recently been discovered that propranolol — a beta-blocker traditionally used to treat cardiac arrhythmias and hypertension — might disrupt the formation of the emotionally disturbing memories that typically occur in the wake of traumatic events and consequently prevent the onset of trauma-induced psychological injuries such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. One context in which the use of propranolol is generating interest in both the popufor and scientific press is sexual violence. Nevertheless, feminists have so far not weighed in on (...) propranolol. I suggest that the time is ripe for a careful feminist analysis of the moral and political implications of propranolol use in the context of sexual violence. In this paper, I map the feminist issues potentially raised by providing propranolol to victims of sexual assault, focusing in particufor on the compatibility of propranolol use and avaüability with an understanding of the social and systematic dimensions of rape s harms. I do not deliver a final verdict on propranolol; in fact, I show that we do not yet have enough information about propranolol's effects to do so. Rather, 1 provide a feminist framework for evaluating the possibilities and penis opened up by therapeutic memory manipuktion in the context of sexual violence against women. (shrink)

Many consequentialists take their theory to be anchored by a deeply intuitive idea, the “Compelling Idea” that it is always permissible to promote the best outcome. I demonstrate that this Idea is not, in fact, intuitive at all either in its agent-neutral or its evaluator-relative form. There are deeply intuitive ideas concerning the relationship of deontic to telic evaluation, but the Compelling Idea is at best a controversial interpretation of such ideas, not itself one of them. Because there is no (...) Compelling Idea at the heart of consequentialism, there is no initial burden of proof to be discharged nor any air of paradox to be cleared away by its opponents. (shrink)

Teleological theories of reason and value, upon which all reasons are fundamentally reasons to realize states of affairs that are in some respect best, cannot account for the intuition that victims in non-identity cases have been wronged. Many philosophers, however, reject such theories in favor of alternatives that recognize fundamentally non-teleological reasons, second-personal reasons that reflect a moral significance each person has that is not grounded in the teleologist’s appeal to outcomes. Such deontological accounts appear to be better positioned to (...) identify the wrong committed against non-identity victims because a person wrongs another on such accounts if she violates his second-personal claims -- overall benefit to victims presents no obstacle to the identification of second-personal wrongdoing. Derek Parfit argues that non-identity is a problem for these deontological theories as well because the alleged victims are properly understood as consenting to the action in question, thereby waiving any such second-personal claim. But his arguments misrepresent the role of consent on such theories by articulating it through appeal to the very teleological theory of reasons that their advocates dismiss as inadequate. Properly understood, Parfit’s appeal to consent understood as retroactive endorsement only provides the answer on such deontological accounts to the question of whether, given that the non-identity victim is second-personally wronged, he is nonetheless better off existing. Indeed, it becomes clear that it is teleological theories for which non-identity poses a particular problem: they cannot -- while their deontological counterparts can – account for the intuition that non-identity victims have been wronged. (shrink)

Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and another to resent her for the insult; one thing to believe that someone did you a favor and another to feel gratitude toward her for her kindness. While all of these ways of responding to another's conduct are forms of moral appraisal, the reactive attitudes are said to 'go beyond' beliefs in some way. We think this claim is adequately explained only when we (...) take seriously the fact that reactive attitudes are emotions. In this paper, we appeal to insights of the emotions literature to highlight one key way in which reactive attitudes go beyond beliefs: beliefs about a person and her morally significant conduct merely ascribe to the person the property of having performed a morally significant action, while reactive attitudes are ways of experiencing that person as having performed a morally significant action. We then suggest that appreciating this is a crucial first step toward understanding why reactive emotions play roles in our practices around responsibility that beliefs do not. (shrink)

In this essay I attempt to tease out and assess two arguments that pervade Sellars's writings on the practical sphere. The first is an argument that categorical reasonableness must be a part of any adequate account of practical reason. The second argues that, nonetheless, the Kantian's strong connection between morality and practical reasonableness cannot be defended. I argue that the former argument is a powerful and ingenious defense of a role for something more than hypothetical reasonableness in the practical sphere, (...) while the latter argument against a strong conceptual connection between morality and reason fails. (shrink)

Our intention in this brief article is to explore the idea of what it means to be a 'good' manager. We discuss some of the dilemmas faced by managers seeking to define their role performance in terms additional to those of organizational effectiveness and efficiency. To do this, we describe critical aspects of the contemporary context. We propose that the changes we are experiencing give organiza tions a central role in how people define their personal and social well-being. Our contention (...) is that in this central role organizations will be faced with situations requiring solutions of fundamental value conflicts. This means that the nature of the question as to what it means to be a 'good' manager will become both increasingly important and increasingly complex. Further, the exploration of the issue can no longer be limited to operational efficiency, but must include the manager's capacity to conceptualise both his own role and that of the organization within the broader socio-environmental context. We contribute to the dialogue by proposing that being 'good' will involve on the part of the manager an awareness of the values involved in a decision and an alignment of action with what Erich Fromm has called 'life-giving' values. This approach in no way diminishes the requirement that a manager be competent in the fullest sense of the word; it requires, however, a deeper understanding of competence and of the commitment a manager will need to act justly, fairly and with care. (shrink)

Robert Myers’ interpretation of Davidson’s practical philosophy gets Davidson right in many fundamental respects. He rightly argues that Davidson avoids inconsistencies among internalism, ethical objectivity, and the belief-desire theory by modifying central elements of the Humean belief-desire theory, and that Davidson’s alternative legitimizes the extension of his interpretation and triangulation arguments into the practical sphere. But at a crucial fork in the interpretive road Myers loses his way. Davidson follows Anscombe down a different path, one that takes individual desires to (...) be constituted in part by evaluative judgements. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that a rationale for a circumscribed form of desire-based justification can be developed out of a contemporary Kantian account as a natural extension of that account. It maintains that certain of Christine Korsgaard's recent arguments establish only that desires must have certain features antithetical to instrumentalism in order to justify. Other arguments purport to establish the standard (stronger) result: that because desires do not have these features, they cannot justify. Her arguments for this strong result, it contends, (...) cannot be reconciled with central commitments in her epistemology and philosophy of mind. The consistent implementation of these commitments opens up a surprising space within what is still readily recognizable as a Kantian ethics--the space for desire-based justification. (shrink)

This paper argues that Donald Davidson''s account ofassertions of evaluative judgments contains ahere-to-fore unappreciated strategy forreconciling the meta-ethical ``inconsistenttriad.'''' The inconsistency is thought to resultbecause within the framework of thebelief-desire theory assertions of moraljudgments must have conceptual connections withboth desires and beliefs. The connection withdesires is necessary to account for theinternal connection between such judgments andmotivation to act, while the connection withbeliefs is necessary to account for theapparent objectivity of such judgments.Arguments abound that no class of utterancescan coherently be understood (...) as having suchconceptual connections to attitudes of bothsorts, hence that an inconsistency results. Buton Davidson''s account assertions of evaluativejudgments have just such connections to boththe relevant desire and a belief concerning anevaluative matter of fact. I argue that thisaccount has the resources to respond tostandard objections, and at least meritsconsideration as one among other plausiblealternatives. (shrink)

At the outset of The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel charts two paths out of the fundamental dilemma confronting metaethics. The first path rejects the claim that a persuasive account of the motivational backing of ethical judgments must involve an agent’s desires. But it is the second path, a path that Nagel charts but does not himself take, that is the focus of this essay. This path retains the standard account, upon which all motivation involves desire, but denies that desires (...) are given prior to reason. Instead, these attitudes that motivate are themselves open to rational assessment. One reason for this focus is that many philosophers, including Quinn, Raz, and Scanlon, have come to reject the claim Nagel takes to block this path – that desires are somehow given prior to reason, hence are not in the relevant way proper objects of rational assessment. A second reason is that unlike the first path, this second does not require the rejection of the belief-desire theory, only the rejection of one assumption about the nature of conative attitudes. Unlike Nagel’s chosen path, then, the second holds out the prospect of reconciling ethical objectivity, internalism, and the belief-desire theory within a unified account. I argue that the account of desire found in Quinn, Raz, and Scanlon, augmented by aspects of Davidson’s account of propositional attitudes, yields a coherent account of the involvement of reason even in basic desires, an account that is well suited to Nagel’s intriguing path not taken. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉL'interprétation de la philosophie pratique de Donald Davidson proposée par Robert Myers représente correctement maints aspects fondamentaux de sa pensée. Myers soutient à juste titre que Davidson évite les incohérences entre la position internaliste, l'objectivité éthique et le modèle croyance-désir en modifiant des éléments centraux de ce modèle, et que l'alternative proposée par Davidson rend légitime l'extension des arguments de l'interprétation et de la triangulation dans la sphère pratique. Cependant, Myers s’égare à une bifurcation cruciale de la route interprétative. Davidson (...) suit G.E.M. Anscombe sur une voie différente, une voie qui considère les désirs individuels comme constitués en partie par des jugements évaluatifs. (shrink)

This monograph is set forth in three sections. The first presents Whitehead's "La théorie Relationniste De L'Espace" in the original French. With the exception of page numerals, this reproduction is an exact duplicate of the original printing. (See the Commentary, p.65, for references.) The second section consists of an English translation of this essay. Here the aim has been the faithful rendering of Whitehead's ideas—sometimes, perhaps, at the expense of rhetorical polish. The third section, the commentary, attempts to shed some (...) light on some of the philosophical and mathematical difficulties of the essay.My thanks are extended to Librairie Armand Colin for granting me permission to reproduce the French original. (shrink)

There is an impressive literature on organizational capacities that enable specific types of performance, but no work has been done on whether such capabilities extend to an organizational capacity for trustworthiness (CFT). This paper introduces the notion of a capacity for trustworthiness (CFT) defined as the collective capability of the organization to produce positive signals of trustworthiness to stakeholders. The antecedents to the CFT are bundles of organization routines that enable the firm to manifest trustworthiness and balance attending to both (...) financial and relational goals. The consequences of a high CFT are outcomes and behaviors that are congruent with pivotal stakeholder expectations and are, therefore, trust inducing. A process model is offered that outlines how an organization’s routines and CFT change in response to feedback and pressure and increase or decrease stakeholders’ trust. Implications for the management of stakeholder relations, trust repair, and the management of organizational systems are reviewed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Diagnosing Desire: Biopolitics and Femininity into the Twenty-First Century by Alyson K. SpurgasTheodora K. Hurley (bio)Diagnosing Desire: Biopolitics and Femininity into the Twenty-First Century by Alyson K. Spurgas Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2020What are the stakes of research on women's sexuality? Alyson K. Spurgas takes on this deceptively straightforward question with an impressive examination of scientific research on women's sexuality and subsequent treatments for women with (...) low sexual desire. The result, Diagnosing Desire: Biopolitics and Femininity into the Twenty-First Century, merges analysis of clinical sex research and therapeutic discourses, data from interviews with women who consider themselves to have low sexual desire, and a wealth of critical theoretical perspectives on embodiment, sexuality, and disability. This investigation of scientific approaches to women's sexuality hinges on Spurgas's concept of the "feminized responsive desire framework," which integrates several components of "expert" information on women's sexuality: the prominence of research into the "discordance" between women's externally monitored and self-reported arousal; a receptive model of feminine sexuality in which arousal precedes sexual desire; the recent inclusion of female sexual interest/arousal disorder (FSIAD) in the DSM-5; and a suite of therapeutic interventions aimed at rehabilitating women's deficient or discordant sexuality, including mindfulness-based sex therapy. Spurgas's analysis of this multipronged framework for understanding women's sexuality innovatively considers how laypeople internalize and contend with scientific ideas, how sexological and sex therapeutic discourses contribute to neoliberal mandates of bodily improvement, and how scientific discussions of women's sexuality neglect questions of power and trauma.Spurgas opens the book with an incisive examination of how early ideas in sexology, behaviorism, evolutionary psychology, and the sex therapies they inspired framed women's sexuality as inherently responsive, fluid, and restrained. Following sexological discourses into the twenty-first century, chapter 2 examines how contemporary sex researchers and therapists argue that women's desire responds to or follows arousal. With an eye toward governmentality and selfoptimization, Spurgas considers how contemporary sex research paradigms and [End Page 232] therapeutic interventions deliver a new normative model of women's sexuality "based on receptivity, responsiveness, and a willingness to be seduced or coaxed into sex by an initiating male partner" (91). Spurgas's close reading of sexological texts provides a detailed view of the feminization of responsive desire. These texts, however, speak less clearly about why some researchers and practitioners consider the model of feminine sexual receptivity to be "feminist," as the book argues. Despite locating the responsive desire framework within regimes of gender difference and neoliberalism, the book leaves unanswered questions about how the framework fits into larger trends in neoliberal feminism (Rottenberg 2018). Despite this specific underdeveloped claim, these chapters shine in their close readings of texts produced by sex researchers and therapists, and indeed provide a template for how social science scholars might analyze scientific research articles and paradigms.The second half of the book considers how women who report low sexual desire interact with these expert ideas about their sexuality. Tracking how women come to understand their sexual desires and experiences through the prism of scientific and therapeutic discourses (what Spurgas calls "sexual difference socialization"), Diagnosing Desire argues that these discourses construct a population of "women-with-low-desire" and encourage low-desiring women's sexual rehabilitation—and compulsory sexual performance—in service of their partners, who are typically straight cisgender men. Turning the biomedical model of receptive feminine sexuality on its head, chapter 5 considers the pleasures and possibilities of agentic feminine receptivity through sexual submission. In a stirring conclusion, Spurgas insists that models of receptive feminine sexuality paint over the violence, trauma, and power relations that permeate women's experiences of sexuality, calling instead for community-based forms of care that supersede the individualistic foci of current sex research and treatment programs.Throughout the monograph, Spurgas maintains theoretical dialogues with critical lineages including feminist science studies, queer studies, and disability and madness studies; the breadth and richness of theoretical conversation allow Spurgas to robustly contribute to several areas of scholarship. Perhaps most centrally, the book offers a rare view of how patients and would-be patients internalize, modify... (shrink)

"The thesis is radical," writes Marshall Sahlins of this landmark text in anthropology and political science. "We conventionally define the state as the regulation of violence; it may be the origin of it. Clastres's thesis is that economic expropriation and political coercion are inconsistent with the character of tribal society - which is to say, with the greater part of human history."Can there be a society that is not divided into oppressors and oppressed, or that refuses coercive state apparatuses? In (...) this beautifully written book, Pierre Clastres offers examples of South American Indian groups that, although without hierarchical leadership, were both affluent and complex. In so doing he refutes the usual negative definition of tribal society and poses its order as a radical critique of our own Western state of power.Born in 1934, Pierre Clastres was educated at the Sorbonne; throughout the 1960s he lived with Indian groups in Paraguay and Venezuela. From 1971 until his death in 1979 he was Director of Studies at the fifth section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris and held the Chair of Religion and Societies of the South American Indians there.Robert Hurley is the translator of the History of Sexuality by Michel Foucault and cotranslator of Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. (shrink)

"The thesis is radical," writes Marshall Sahlins of this landmark text in anthropology and political science. "We conventionally define the state as the regulation of violence; it may be the origin of it. Clastres's thesis is that economic expropriation and political coercion are inconsistent with the character of tribal society - which is to say, with the greater part of human history."Can there be a society that is not divided into oppressors and oppressed, or that refuses coercive state apparatuses? In (...) this beautifully written book, Pierre Clastres offers examples of South American Indian groups that, although without hierarchical leadership, were both affluent and complex. In so doing he refutes the usual negative definition of tribal society and poses its order as a radical critique of our own Western state of power.Born in 1934, Pierre Clastres was educated at the Sorbonne; throughout the 1960s he lived with Indian groups in Paraguay and Venezuela. From 1971 until his death in 1979 he was Director of Studies at the fifth section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris and held the Chair of Religion and Societies of the South American Indians there.Robert Hurley is the translator of the History of Sexuality by Michel Foucault and cotranslator of Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. (shrink)

Theory of Religion brings to philosophy what Bataille's earlier book, The Accursed Share, brought to anthropology and history; namely, an analysis based on notions of excess and expenditure. Bataille brilliantly defines religion as so many different attempts to respond to the universe's relentless generosity. Framed within his original theory of generalized economics and based on his masterly reading of archaic religious activity, Theory of Religion constitutes, along with The Accursed Share, the most important articulation of Bataille's work.Georges Bataille, founder of (...) the French review Critique, wrote fiction and essays on a wide range of topics. His books in English translation include Story of the Eye, Blue of Noon, Literature and Evil, Manet and Erotism.Robert Hurley is the translator of The History of Sexuality by Michel Foucault and cotranslator of Anti Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Distributed for Zone Books. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Philosophers Trivialize Art: Bleak House, Oedipus Rex, "Leda and the Swan"Michael D. HurleyIIt is a Perverse but unsurprising irony that answers to the question of whether art can give us knowledge characteristically trivialize that which draws us to individual artworks in the first place. The experience of art is sidelined in favor of the apparent after-effect of that experience. Even those writing against each other tend to converge (...) on this. In an essay contesting Nelson Goodman's epistemic claims for art, Gordon Graham nonetheless agrees that, "The question to be asked of such a work is not, 'Does this effectively capture the scene portrayed?', but 'Does this make us see this sort of occasion differently?'"1 Even attempts to distinguish art as "gift" as opposed to commodity predictably figure its value in terms of what might be taken away: "I went to see a landscape painter's works, and that evening, walking among pine trees near my home, I could see the shapes and the colors I had not seen the day before."2This state of affairs is perversely ironic for two reasons. Firstly, because the possibility of art's cognitive content is only prompted at all by the immediate experience it offers: without this, art would not excite us the way it does and there would be no debate to be had. Secondly, and more significantly, because a defining part of what constitutes an interest in art is, I should like to suggest, an experience of knowledge; or, more accurately, an experience of knowing. This irony is unsurprising because it is merely another expression of a recalcitrant prejudice in western epistemology that idealizes knowledge as an objectively true, justified belief—perforce excluding the possibility of knowing as a subjective [End Page 107] experience of believing. No wonder the author of Theætetus elsewhere finds poets incapable of offering anything but lies.Plato's lingering legacy assures that the cognitive content of art be assized according to what might be extracted from the artwork—cashed in like so many casino chips—when we are done with our experience of it. This applies whether the knowledge-bearing being argued for, or against, is conceptual or propositional (e.g., Putnam, Novitz, John),3 or imaginative (e.g., Goodman, Robinson, Currie),4 as well as for the claim that art can offer us moral instruction (e.g., Beardsmore, Eldridge, Nussbaum, Sharpe, Kieran, John).5 There is less consensus as to whether the capacity of art to give us knowledge enriches the aesthetic value of that artwork, but those who would advance this position have been on the back-foot in recent years following a wave of criticisms from, among others, Beardsley, Lamarque and Olsen, Diffey, and Gaut.6This article addresses art's capacity to give us knowledge as well as the conjunct of whether such knowledge might inform its value qua art. In so doing, it presses a case that has already been disallowed by the terms in which the question of the relationship between art and knowledge is typically put. Whatever efferent knowledge art might offer, it also provides the conditions for a kind of knowing that cannot be translated beyond itself. Only such an experience of knowledge-as-knowing, which is realized through the untranslatable singularity of an artwork, may be considered constitutive of art's aesthetic value. Couched another way: epistemology meets aesthetics not where it has most often been located, in the perfective, at the congruence of the thought and the felt, but in the present continuous, in the engagement of thinking and feeling. Connecting the epistemic and the aesthetic in this way is, then, exactly the opposite proposition to that presented by Douglas Morgan, for whom, "although many words in many arts can and do give us knowledge of many kinds, nonetheless if this knowledge were the key and limit to the love of art, the world of art would be even sorrier than it now is."7IILiterature has generated by far the greatest volume of commentary in the debate on art and knowledge. This is to be expected given the bias towards categorizing knowledge as something like data... (shrink)

Dori's narrative is a heart-touching and zany blend of actual events in the life of a young Boxer. With edgy charm, she takes us on a romp through her world in such a way we can't help but reconsider our lives. Through her we get a dog's-eye view on human exploitation of animals. This unique approach is hauntingly effective.

The Belmont Report’s three foundational ethical principles—respect for persons, beneficence, and justice—have shaped regulation, practice, and our collective thinking about research with human beings in the United States for over 40 years. While it has proven remarkably adaptable, Belmont’s framework is a product of a specific time and historical context. Both the research enterprise and society at large have changed in significant ways since its creation. For example, the last four decades have seen a general democratization of knowledge production, increasing (...) skepticism of authority and expertise, and growing demands that institutions of power be more transparent about their activities so they can be better held to account. Within the research enterprise, the emergence of community engaged- and patient-centered research reflects these changes. This chapter examines the application of Belmont’s framework to stakeholder-engaged research, both illuminating its flexibilities and identifying its limitations, in terms of the values, norms, and expectations that are central to stakeholder-engaged research but unaccounted for by Belmont. (shrink)

Classical mechanics is presented so as to render the new formulation valid for an arbitrary temporal variable, as opposed to Newton’s Absolute Time only. Newton’s theory then becomes formally identical (in a precise sense) to relativity, albeit in a three-dimensional manifold. (The ultimate difference between the two dynamics is traced to the existence of the relativistic ‘mass-shell’ condition.) A classical Lagrangian is provided for our formulation of the equations of motion and it is related to one of the known forms (...) of the corresponding relativistic Lagrangian, which is the analogue of the Polyakov Lagrangian of string theory. (shrink)

Most Anglo-American readers know Bataille as a novelist. The Accursed Share provides an excellent introduction to Bataille the philosopher. Here he uses his unique economic theory as the basis for an incisive inquiry into the very nature of civilization. Unlike conventional economic models based on notions of scarcity, Bataille's theory develops the concept of excess: a civilization, he argues, reveals its order most clearly in the treatment of its surplus energy. The result is a brilliant blend of ethics, aesthetics, and (...) cultural anthropology that challenges both mainstream economics and ethnology. (shrink)