La influencia de la Teoría de la Justicia de John Rawls en el debate sobre la equidad en salud ha sido enorme. Y ello a pesar de que el tratamiento que Rawls hace de esa cuestión es escaso. Esa influencia se ha manifestado tanto en autores poco próximos a sus tesis como especialmente en quienes han intentado extender su teoría para incluir la equidad en salud. Más recientemente, el surgimiento del marco de los Determinantes Sociales de la Salud ha reactualizado (...) la vigencia de su teoría y alentado nuevos debates. (shrink)

El artículo examina algunos de los límites del derecho antidiscriminatorio en su actual configuración, a partir de las grandes tendencias que le dan soporte desde el punto de vista legislativo y jurisprudencial. El texto plantea una reflexión sobre los principios interpretativos tradicionales y los problemas de incorporación en el juicio de igualdad de estándares de orden explicativo y justificatorio que permitan captar los patrones o estructuras sociales de discriminación e identificar de forma más precisa a los sujetos. A tal efecto (...) propone la ampliación del espectro argumental de la discriminación indirecta y la igualdad material, a través de criterios interpretativos adicionales derivados de categorías como la discriminación estructural y la interseccionalidad de las discriminaciones. (shrink)

This article seeks to presents the progress in theoretical legal articulation of social rights. It underlines certain guiding ideas about them, sets out some of the most deeply rooted presuppositions and comes to valid conclusions in the field of legality and legitimacy. In the intersection between them there is a double hypothesis under which the text is examined. On one hand, a theory of fundamental rights can integrate social rights; in this sense there are no weighty theoretical reasons that justify (...) a configuration, interpretation and protection differentiating them from other rights, with which in fact they share theoretical and structural elements. On the other hand, given certain conditions, social rights are a reasonable and just response to give a new ground to the social basis of democratic citizenship. (shrink)

JAVIER DE LUCAS, Nosotros que quisimos tanto a Atticus Finch. De las raíces del supremacismo al Black Lives Matter.

This paper aims at discussing some difficulties regarding the species definition problem in biology. I will try to show that typological concept defines species as fixed, immutable entities. After this, I will consider some passages of Origin of Species in the attempt to characterize Darwinian species as populations that may be modified, through natural processes, into new species. Besides, I will present the biological concept of species, trying to discuss prroblems of not making distinctions between species as classes and species (...) as concrete individuals. Then, I will point out some different definitions, alternative to the biological concept. Finally, I will delineate some consequences of species definition discussion to own human species (Homo sapiens). (shrink)

A re-examination of the anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus, henceforth abbreviated K, is overdue. It may yet prove to be the most important document we possess for plotting the course of pre-Plotinian Platonism, and is by far the largest surviving portion of a pre-Plotinian commentary on a complete work of Plato. It offers us insights into the issues of the first century B.C. which are unparalleled in other extant Middle Platonist works, either because of the subject of the work and (...) its consequent tendency to bring to mind the epistemological debates between Philo of Larissa, Antiochus of Ascalon, and Aenesidemus, or because the author, whom we may call A, is writing at a time comparatively close to those debates. (shrink)

This article addresses how the Iranian-born philosopher Reza Negarestani has negotiated human distinctiveness in the course of his intellectual journey from speculative realism to inhuman rationalism (Rather than rationalist inhumanism, as some sources have it (Anon 2021)). Moving from challenging the correlationism of post-Kantian Western philosophy, via critiques of the Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine, Nick Land’s accelerationism, and Ray Brassier’s nihilism, Negarestani eventually turns to the neo-pragmatists of the Pittsburgh School and their reflections on reason, normativity, and praxis. The (...) mapping of this trajectory is divided into four parts: Having already discussed the political theology of Reza Negarestani elsewhere (Kersten, World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm Research, 78(2–4), 256 267, 2022), the first part of this article briefly introduces Reza Negarestani’s early theory fiction as an exponent of speculative realism (Negarestani 2008), followed by two sections dedicated to close readings of Negarestani’s investigations of the inhuman (Negarestani 2011 and 2014). The examination of these writings will demonstrate how they have served as prolegomena to his next book-length publication, Intelligence and Spirit (2018), a connection that will be briefly assessed in the final part. (shrink)

The paper presents some essential heuristic and constructional elements of Free Process Theory (FPT), a non-Whiteheadian, monocategoreal framework. I begin with an analysis of our common sense concept of activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the notion of a free process. I argue that an activity is not a type but a mode of occurrence, defined in terms of a network of inferences. The inferential space characterizing our concept of an activity entails that anything which (...) is conceived of as occurring in the activity mode is a concrete,dynamic, non-particular individual. Such individuals, which I call free processes, may be used for the interpretation of much more than just common sense activities. I introduce the formal theory FPT, a mereology with anon-transitive part-relation, which contains a typology of processes based on the following five parameters relating to: (a) patterns of possible spatial and temporal recurrence (automerity); (b) kinds of components (participant structure); (c) kinds of dynamic composition; (d) kinds of dynamic flow (dynamic shape); and (e) dynamic context. I show how these five evaluative dimensions for free processes can be used to define ontological correlates for various common sense categories,and to draw distinctions between various forms of agency(distributed, collective, reciprocal, entangled) and emergence (weak, strong,as autonomous system (Bickhard/Christensen)). (shrink)

In order to fight massive vandalism the English- language Wikipedia has developed a system of surveillance which is carried out by humans and bots, supported by various tools. Central to the selection of edits for inspection is the process of using filters or profiles. Can this profiling be justified? On the basis of a careful reading of Frederick Schauer’s books about rules in general (1991) and profiling in particular (2003) I arrive at several conclusions. The effectiveness, efficiency, and risk-aversion of (...) edit selection all greatly increase as a result. The argument for increasing predictability suggests making all details of profiling manifestly public. Also, a wider distribution of the more sophisticated anti-vandalism tools seems indicated. As to the specific dimensions used in profiling, several critical remarks are developed. When patrollers use ‘assisted edit- ing’ tools, severe ‘overuse’ of several features (anonymity, warned before) is a definite possibility, undermining profile efficacy. The easy remedy suggested is to render all of them invisible on the interfaces as displayed to patrollers. Finally, concerning not only assisted editing tools but tools against vandalism generally, it is argued that the anonymity feature is a sensitive category: anons have been in dispute for a long time (while being more prone to vandalism). Targeting them as a special category violates the social contract upon which Wikipedia is based. The feature is therefore a candidate for mandatory ‘underuse’: it should be banned from all anti-vandalism filters and profiling algorithms, and no longer be visible as a special edit trait. (shrink)

This paper follows Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophy and his non-religion and non-theology to suggest anon-philosophical approach to the sociology of religious pluralism. The entanglements of experiences of the religious end-user are analysed vis-a-vis Laruelle’s thought and a dogma free inclusive approach to religion is envisaged.

This case note considers the availability in the United Kingdom of the provocation defence in cases of intimate homicide in the context of the recent House of Lords decision in Rv. Smith [2000] 3 W.L.R. 654. The note argues that the expansion of the objective component of the defence to encompass the mental infirmities of individual defendants is dangerous for women. Although it has the potential to help some abused women who kill to use the defence, it has, at the (...) same time, exposed women who are abused by sexually possessive, violent men to even greater danger. It is thus argued that the defence should be restricted in the way envisaged by the minority judgement of Lord Millett so that abused women will still be able to use the defence, but by anon-medical route. Alternatively, the defence should be abolished and defences which pose no risk of encompassing violent men should be developed to accommodate abused women. (shrink)

In his recent article, ``Self-Consciousness'’, George Bealer has set outa novel and interesting argument against functionalism in the philosophyof mind. I shall attempt to show, however, that Bealer's argument cannotbe sustained.In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be defending three main theses.The first is connected with the problem of defining theoreticalpredicates that occur in theories where the following two features arepresent: first, the theoretical predicate in question occurswithin both extensional and non-extensional contexts; secondly, thetheory in question asserts that the relevant (...) theoretical states enterinto causal relations. What I shall argue is that a Ramsey-styleapproach to the definition of such theoretical terms requires twodistinct quantifiers: one which ranges over concepts, and theother which ranges over properties in the world.My second thesis is a corollary: since the theories on whichBealer is focusing have both of the features just mentioned, and sincethe method that he employs to define theoretical terms in his argumentagainst functionalism does not involve both quantifiers that range overproperties and quantifiers that range over concepts, that method isunsound.My final thesis is that when a sound method is used, Bealer's argumentagainst functionalism no longer goes through.The structure of my discussion is as follows. I begin by setting out twoarguments – the one, a condensed version of Bealer's argument, andthe other, an argument that parallels Bealer's argument very closely.The parallel argument leads to a conclusion, however, that, rather thanbeing merely somewhat surprising, seems very implausible indeed. Forwhat the second argument establishes, if sound, is that there can betheoretical terms that apply to objects by virtue of their first-orderphysical properties, but whose meaning cannot be defined via aRamsey-style approach.Having set out the two parallel arguments, I then go on to focus uponthe second, to determine what is wrong with it. My diagnosis will bethat the problem with the argument arises from the fact that it involvesdefining a theoretical term that occurs both inside and outside ofopaque contexts, for the method employed fails to take into account thefact that the types of entities that are involved in the relevanttruthmakers are different when a sentence occurs within an extensionalcontext from those involved when a sentence occurs within anon-extensional context.I then go on to discuss how one should define a theoretical term thatoccurs within such theories, and I argue that in such a case one needstwo quantifiers, ranging over different types of entities – on theone hand, over properties and relations, and the other, over concepts. Ithen show that, when such an approach is followed, the argument inquestion collapses.I then turn to Bealer's argument against functionalism, and I show,first, that precisely the same method of defining theoretical terms canbe applied there, and, secondly, that, when this is done, it turns outthat that argument is also unsound.Next, I consider two responses that Bealer might make to my argument,and I argue that those responses would not succeed.Finally, I conclude by asking exactly where the problem lies in the caseof Bealer's argument. My answer will be that it is not simply the factthat one is dealing with a theoretical term that occurs in bothextensional and non-extensional contexts. It is rather the combinationof that feature together with the fact that the theory in questionasserts that the relevant type of theoretical state enters into causalrelations. For the first of these features means that the Ramseysentence for the theory must involve quantification over concepts, whilethe presence of the second feature means that the Ramsey sentence mustinvolve quantification over properties in the world, and so no attemptto offer a Ramsey-style account of the meaning of the relevanttheoretical term can succeed unless one employs both quantification overconcepts and quantification over properties. Bealer, however, in hisargument against functionalism, uses a method of defining theoreticalterms that does not involve both types of quantification, and it isprecisely because of this that his argument does not in the end succeed. (shrink)

Do the deviant acts carried out by the collective known as Anonymous qualify as vigilante activity, and if so, can they be justified? Addressing this question helps expose the difficulties of morally evaluating technologically enabled deviance. Anonymous is a complex, fluid actor but not as mysterious as popularly portrayed. Under a definition of vigilantism that includes reprobative punishment rather than violence as a key element, Anonymous are vigilantes. Many of its Ops can be justified in view of the mismatch between (...) formal norm enforcement practice and Internet natives’ experience of it. Anons are more like eco-warriors than terrorists. While their actions are contentious, their force is framed in a vision of common good that is not unreasonable. Engaging with online deviants is shown to be a productive way of identifying the weaknesses in concepts underpinning moral evaluation of Internet-enabled phenomena. (shrink)

The Genre Legong is a secular (balih-balihan) Balinese dance genre (Anon. 1971).[1] Though originally associated with the palace,[2] legong has long been performed in villages, especially at temple ceremonies, as well as at Balinese festivals of the arts. Since the 1920s, abridged versions of legong dances have featured in concerts organized for tourists and in overseas tours by Balinese orchestras. Indeed, the dance has become culturally emblematic, and its image is used to advertise Bali to the world. Traditionally, the dancers (...) are three young girls; the servant (condong), who dances a prelude, and two legong. All wear elaborate costumes of gilded cloth with ornate accessories and frangipani-crowned headdresses.[3] The core repertoire consists of about fifteen dances (some of which are now lost), ranging in their longest versions from thirty to sixty minutes. Some of these are narrative, while others are abstract or general representations of nature, birds, insects, or plants. Those that involve narratives are, nevertheless, highly stylized, and the presentation of the drama is always secondary to the beauty of the dance. The genre is regarded as a treasury of the movements for Balinese women’s dance, and no dancer’s training is complete if she lacks a solid grounding in legong. The dance is accompanied by a gamelan of twenty-five or more players.[4] Though the legong dance remains popular in areas of traditional strength, and despite efforts to revive it, it is generally in decline (Davies 2006). (shrink)

We are nowadays so often reminded that we live in times of crisis that no controversy is likely to arise on that score, but the knowledge of its source and nature is not so easy to come by as the awareness of the fact. Macmurray is not the first to suggest that the crisis springs from the oversight or suppression of personality. Max Horkheimer, for instance, some years back deplored the submergence of the individual in a totalitarian mass civilization; but (...) whereas Horkheimer traces back the salient characteristics of the crisis situation to the subversion of reason as an objective standard, Macmurray's diagnosis seems, at least prima facie, just the opposite--the substitution of thought for practice as our philosophical presupposition and of the subject for the agent in our idea of the person. This opposition of the two analyses is, however, only apparent as I shall try to show anon. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend that the historiographical category of eclecticism is a correct way to describe the epistemology and the exegetical activity of the Anonymous commentator on Plato’s Theaetetus. In addition, I show that the interpretation of the platonic philosophy presented in this text not only presupposes an eclectic philosophical attitude, but also offers a conscious defense of a positive and philosophically relevant form of eclecticism. By eclecticism, I understand a method of inquiry based on the deliberate use of (...) hypotheses and arguments from different philosophical traditions. My claim is that Anon. intends to lay ground of his way of doing philosophy by attributing it to Plato and the platonic tradition. In doing so, Anon. provides us with a positive understanding of eclecticism as a legitimate methodology of philosophical investigation. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa elucidar as relações entre Fernando Pessoa, Schopenhauer e a questão do livre arbítrio, tendo por base a leitura que o autor português fez da obra schopenhaueriana. Com efeito, ao longo dos escritos de Pessoa encontramos múltiplos testemunhos da leitura que o poeta e pensador português fez do pensamento schopenhaueriano. Um importante indício para o estudo da reapropriação pessoana do pensamento de Schopenhauer constata-se, desde logo, na Biblioteca Particular de Fernando Pessoa, onde encontramos uma tradução francesa do (...) texto Über die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens [Sobre a liberdade da vontade] de Schopenhauer. A leitura deste livro viria a ocasionar a produção de uma multiplicidade de escritos filosóficos que Fernando Pessoa atribui a duas das suas personalidades literárias fictícias inglesas do universo pré-heteronímico: Charles Robert Anon e Alexander Search. Assim, tendo por base todos estes indícios, pretendemos mostrar o impacto da leitura de Schopenhauer no universo literário pessoano. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Outcomes-basedEducation is conceptually trapped in aninstrumentally justifiable view of education. Icontend that the notion of Outcomes-basedEducation is incommensurable with anon-instrumental justification of educationview as explained by RS Peters (1998). Theprocess of specifying outcomes in educationaldiscourse lends itself to manipulation andcontrol and thereby makes the idea ofOutcomes-based Education educationallyimpoverished. In this article an argument ismade for education through rational reflectionand imagination which can complement anOutcomes-based Education system for the reasonthat it finds expression in a non-instrumentaljustifiable (...) view of education. (shrink)

Agnosticism has had some bad press in recent years. Nonetheless, I hope to show that agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism. This is not a mere philosophical exercise; for, as it happens, the formulated position is--I think--the one to which I subscribe. I include a qualification here since it may be that the position to which I subscribe is better characterised as fallibilist atheism--but more of that anon.

In the course of reading some of these writers I have made the following notes. Some of the suggestions have very probably been anticipated, and in such cases I can only plead the legal maxim, superflua non nocent. The references are to volume and page of Spengel's edition , and Anon. 1. 427 has been cited as Cornutus.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Self-Interest and Public Interest m Shaftesbury's Philosophy STANLEY GREAN THE SEV~NTEENTrt-CV.NTVRYproblem of the relationship of self-interest and public interest was carried over by the third Earl of Shaftesbury into the eighteenth century where it became a major issue for generations of British moralists. His own preoccupation with the problem began at an early date in his career, for the lnquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699), the first draft of (...) which he wrote in his twenties, deals with it at length,1 and it is, according to him, the "main problem" of that work. This interest must have been deepened by his knowledge and experience of the bitter and tumultuous factional strife of the seventeenth century. There was also a family tradition of public life, the first Earl having been one of the foremost statesmen in the third quarter of the seventeenth century. The third Earl himself was briefly a figure of some importance on the political scene, serving in Parliament for two sessions? Something of Shaftesbury's character and point of view is revealed in the independent position which he took on certain issues during this time. With the emergence of the Whig and Tory parties a new emphasis was being placed on party organization. The principle of party loyalty "was indeed the only loyalty that was practised by some very important statesmen in the reigns of James, William and Anne.''s Though in general Shaftesbury supported Whig principles and policies, he refused to follow the Whig "party line" on every issue even though sometimes bitterly censured for failing to do so.4 Shaftesbury held that a legislative proposal should be judged on its own merits and not by its source? While recognizing t The first publication of the Inquiry was apparently unauthorized. A revised form appeared as Treatise IV in the 1711 edition of Characteristics. 2In the Commons, 1695-1698, and the Lords, 1700-1701. Ill health forced his retirement from politics. s George M. Trevelyan, History of England (3 vols.; New York: 1952), II, 260. 4Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, ed. Benjamin Rand (London: 1900), p. 300. Referred to henceforth as LiIe, Letters. See the comment by the fourth Earl in Life, Letters, pp. xxi-xxii; also Thomas Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (New York: 1883), pp. 10-12. [37] 38 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the social value of political parties, it was consistent with Shaftesbury's theory that he insisted that party loyalty must at times be superseded by loyalties to larger interests or to the larger community of which one is a member. In his writings Shaftesbury carried on a continual campaign against the type of reductionism which seeks to explain all human behavior by "that one principle and foundation of a cool and deliberate selfishness.''8 Thus, he attacks Epicurus and Lucretius among the ancients, and Hobbes, Lord Rochester, and La Rochefoucault among the moderns. For these "narrowminded philosophers," "interest, interest comes in ever and anon, and must seem a kind of key to things with which it has nothing to do."' One of Shaftesbury's lines of attack is to point out that psychological egoism, when pressed, proves to be meaningless. If everything one does is attributed to self-interest, he asks, what meaning does the tertn "self-interest" have? If there is no real alternative to egoism, and all actions are equally egoistic, then the very term "egoism" loses significance. It would apparently be impossible to be more or less self-centered. Thus, we would lose an important practical principle of differentiation. The English philosopher pictures the defenders of egoism as saying: "Act as disinterestedly or generously as you please, self still is at the bottom, and nothing else." Now if these gentlemen who delight so much in the play of words, but are cautious how they grapple closely with definitions, would tell us only what self-interest was, and determine happiness and good, there would be an end of this enigmatical wit. For in this we should all agree, that happiness was to be pursued, and in fact was always sought after; but whether found in following Nature, and giving way to... (shrink)

Might paranoia bear some promise, not only danger, for democratic theory and politics? To suggest that we should treat paranoia with anything but disdain today, in the age of Q anon and other white-supremacist lies, seems dangerous. But three decades ago, feminist theorist Naomi Schor took the risk and defended female paranoia, arguing that paranoia is an appropriate affect for feminist theory and critique. This essay follows Schor’s invitation to risk proximity to paranoia. I argue that the political importance of (...) Schor’s essay lies in one particular attribute of female paranoia that she celebrates: its love of detail. To explore the promise and limitations of the paranoid love of detail I pair Schor with two 20th-century theorists – Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir. Each studies a paranoid woman who clings to details: Arendt’s Rahel Varnhagen counts the number of teacups that she serves in her German salon. Beauvoir’s housewife collects tufts of dust. With Schor, Arendt and Beauvoir, the article argues that love of detail is a critical component not only of paranoid indictments of the world, but also of any project that desires to repair the world in the wake of paranoia. (shrink)