El presente documento aborda el tema enunciado en el título de manera general; ofrece los principios de un tratado más externo, que habrá de hacerse estudiando mejor las aportaciones de las Escrituras y de la tradición cristiana. Sin embargo, más que un estudio abstracto, lo importante es el estudio de la vida, del compromiso de amor y gracia, en el Espíritu de Cristo.

There are many different kinds of model and scientists do all kind of things with them. This diversity of model type and model use is a good thing for science. Indeed, it is crucial especially for the biological and cognitive sciences, which have to solve many different problems at many different scales, ranging from the most concrete of the structural details of a DNA molecule to the most abstract and generic principles of self-organization in networks. Getting a grip (or more (...) likely many separate grips) on this range of topics calls for a teeming forest of techniques, including many different modeling techniques. Barbara Webb’s target article strikes us as a proposal for clear-cutting the forest. We think clear-cutting here would be as good for science as it is for non-metaphorical forests. Our argument for this is primarily a recitation of a few of the ways that diversity has been useful. Recently, looking at the actual practice of artificial life modelers, one of us distinguished four uses of simulation models classified in terms of the position the models take up between theory and data (see Figure 1). The classification is not exhaustive, and the barriers between kinds are not absolute. Rather, the purpose of the taxonomy is to open up the view for an epistemic ecology of modeling practices. First, and closest to the empirical domain, there are mechanistic models, in which there is an almost one-to-one correspondence between variables in the model and observables in the target system and its environment. Webb’s.. (shrink)

The concept of agency is of crucial importance in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and it is often used as an intuitive and rather uncontroversial term, in contrast to more abstract and theoretically heavy-weighted terms like “intentionality”, “rationality” or “mind”. However, most of the available definitions of agency are either too loose or unspecific to allow for a progressive scientific program. They implicitly and unproblematically assume the features that characterize agents, thus obscuring the full potential and challenge of modeling agency. (...) We identify three conditions that a system must meet in order to be considered as a genuine agent: a) a system must define its own individuality, b) it must be the active source of activity in its environment (interactionalasymmetry) and c) it must regulate this activity in relation to certain norms (normativity). We find that even minimal forms of proto-celular systems can already provide a paradigmatic example of genuine agency. By abstracting away some specific details of minimal models of living agency we define the kind of organization that is capable to meet the required conditions for agency (which is not restricted to living organisms). On this basis, we define agency as an autonomous organization that adaptively regulates its coupling with its environment and contributes to sustaining itself as a consequence. We find that spatiality and temporality are the two fundamental domains in which agency spans at different scales. We conclude by giving an outlook to the road that lies ahead in the pursuit to understand, model and synthesis agents. (shrink)

Both the irreducible complexity of biological phenomena and the aim of a universalized biology (life-as-it-could-be) have lead to a deep methodological shift in the study of life; represented by the appearance of ALife, with its claim that computational modelling is the main tool for studying the general principles of biological phenomenology. However this methodological shift implies important questions concerning the aesthetic, engineering and specially the epistemological status of computational models in scientific research: halfway between the well established categories of theory (...) and experiment. ALife models become powerful epistemic artefacts allowing the simulation of emergent phenomena, the interaction between different levels of organization and the integration of different causal factors in the very same manipulable object. The use of computational models in ALife can be classified in four main categories depending on their position between theoretical and empirical practices: generic, conceptual, functional and mechanistic. For each of these categories we analyse their epistemic value and select paradigmatic examples that illustrate how ALife models can be fruitfully inserted in the study of life. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la (...) luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de superveniencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demos-trado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general. (shrink)

The concept of “autonomy”, once at the core of the original enactivist proposal in The Embodied Mind, is nowadays ignored or neglected by some of the most prominent contemporary enactivists approaches. Theories of autonomy, however, come to fill a theoretical gap that sensorimotor accounts of cognition cannot ignore: they provide a naturalized account of normativity and the resources to ground the identity of a cognitive subject in its specific mode of organization. There are, however, good reasons for the contemporary neglect (...) of autonomy as a relevant concept for enactivism. On the one hand, the concept of autonomy has too often been assimilated into autopoiesis and the implications are not always clear for a dynamical sensorimotor approach to cognitive science. On the other hand, the foundational enactivist proposal displays a metaphysical tension between the concept of operational closure, deployed as constitutive, and that of structural coupling ; making it hard to reconcile with the claim that experience is sensorimotorly constituted. This tension is particularly apparent when Varela et al. propose Bittorio as a model of the operational closure of the nervous system as it fails to satisfy the required conditions for a sensorimotor constitution of experience. It is, however, possible to solve these problems by re-considering autonomy at the level of sensorimotor neurodynamics. Two recent robotic simulation models are used for this task, illustrating the notion of strong sensorimotor dependency of neurodynamic patterns, and their networked intertwinement. The concept of habit is proposed as an enactivist building block for cognitive theorizing, re-conceptualizing mental life as a habit ecology, tied within an agent’s behaviour generating mechanism in coordination with its environment. Norms can be naturalized in terms of dynamic, interactively self-sustaining, coherentism. This conception of autonomous sensorimotor agency is put in contrast with those enactive approaches that reject autonomy or neglect the theoretical resources it has to offer for the project of naturalizing minds. (shrink)

Living agency is subject to a normative dimension (good-bad, adaptive-maladaptive) that is absent from other types of interaction. We review current and historical attempts to naturalize normativity from an organism-centered perspective, identifying two central problems and their solution: (1) How to define the topology of the viability space so as to include a sense of gradation that permits reversible failure, and (2) how to relate both the processes that establish norms and those that result in norm-following behavior. We present a (...) minimal metabolic system that is coupled to a gradient-climbing chemotactic mechanism. Studying the relationship between metabolic dynamics and environmental resource conditions, we identify an emergent viable region and a precarious region where the system tends to die unless environmental conditions change. We introduce the concept of normative field as the change of environmental conditions required to bring the system back to its viable region. Norm-following, or normative action, is defined as the course of behavior whose effect is positively correlated with the normative field. We close with a discussion of the limitations and extensions of our model and some final reflections on the nature of norms and teleology in agency. (shrink)

Dynamicism has provided cognitive science with important tools to understand some aspects of “how cognitive agents work” but the issue of “what makes something cognitive” has not been sufficiently addressed yet, and, we argue, the former will never be complete without the later. Behavioristic characterizations of cognitive properties are criticized in favor of an organizational approach focused on the internal dynamic relationships that constitute cognitive systems. A definition of cognition as adaptive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain is provided: (...) the compensatory regulation of a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures, is created and preserved during a historical/developmental process. We highlight the functional role of emotional embodiment: internal bioregulatory processes coupled to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. Finally, we discuss a “minimally cognitive behavior program” in evolutionary simulation modelling suggesting that much is to be learned from a complementary “minimally cognitive organization program”. (shrink)

El nacionalismo es, por un lado, un fenómeno socialmente muy variado, del que hay que detectar las "convergencias" que dan razón de lo que es. Y, por otro, es un fenómeno confrontado con mucha frecuencia con prejuicios valorativos cargados emocionalmente, que empujan a moldear las definiciones para acomodarlas a ellos.

Siendo Genet un apestado, un expulsado, un maldito de la cultura europea, alguien que en Europa (y no solo en Europa) fue perseguido y encarcelado por sus delitos, alguien que nunca se cansó de aguijonear, maltratar y maldecir la cultura oficial europea, siendo el verdadero crítico de la misma, hemos de concluir que fue la cultura oficial europea la que se alejó, la que le dio la espalda a Genet y, así, a Hegel; y, así, a sí misma. Esta habría (...) sido la verdadera tragedia europea: haber traicionado su propia vocación, su destino, que era seguir el camino que Hegel diseñó. (shrink)

En el terreno teórico y más normativo, el posracionalismo parece una propuesta razonable orientada a superar la base étnica de los órdenes políticos modernos. En una lectura más práctico-política es una propuesta, cuya razonabilidad es más discutible, orientada a diluir los nacionalismos periféricos en beneficio del central. Emparentado indirectamente con el patriotismo constitucional, comparte con éste el deseo de minimizar y neutralizar la omnipresencia del condicionamiento étnico, porque el patriotismo constitucional solicita una transferencia de lealtad del nosotros étnico a la (...) "cultura cívica" democrática y a sus instituciones políticas concomitantes, una lealtad que debe cambiar de dosel: del "ethnos" cultural al demos cívico. (shrink)

The first form of the inside-outside dichotomy appears as a self-encapsulated system with an active border. These systems are based on two complementary but asymmetric processes: constructive and interactive. The former physically constitute the system as a recursive network of component production, defining an inside. The maintenance of the constructive processes implies that the internal organization also constrains certain flows of matter and energy across the border of the system, generating interactive processes. These interactive processes ensure the maintenance of the (...) constructive processes thus specifying a meaningful outside. Upon this basic form of identity formation, the evolutionary and historical domain is open for the emergence of a whole hierarchy and ecology of insides and outsides. These which mutually subsume and collaborate in the maintenance of the essential inside-outside dichotomy that defines the conditions of possibility of the subjects and the worlds they generate. (shrink)

Decidim es una plataforma digital de democracia participativa desarrollada por el Ajuntament de Barcelona. Decidim es, además, un proyecto tecnopolítico que implica multitud de códigos más allá del informático. Distinguimos tres planos analíticos que sirven para conceptualizar de forma holística y sistemática el proyecto Decidim: un plano político, uno tecnopolítico, y un plano técnico. Decidim emerge como ejemplo de lo que denominamos “redes políticas” caracterizadas, frente a las “redes sociales”, por hacer del vínculo político y la construcción de inteligencia y (...) voluntad colectivas el centro de su diseño y estructura. A su vez, la comunidad y los espacios “Metadecidim” operan como dispositivos para la democratización del software de Decidim y de la democracia en red en un sentido más amplio, constituyendo “redes tecnopolíticas”. Estas redes de nueva generación hacen de la plataforma una infraestructura público-común (financiada con dinero público y co-diseñada con la ciudadanía), abierta y libre para la democracia participativa, un proyecto que aspira a servir de dispositivo y modelo para la transformación política en un periodo de crisis de la hegemonía neoliberal. (shrink)

In this chapter, we will take a trip around several hot-spots where Bohmian mechanics and its capacity to describe the microscopic reality, even in the absence of measurements, can be harnessed as computational tools, in order to help in the prediction of phenomenologically accessible information (also useful for the followers of the Copenhagen theory). As a first example, we will see how a Stochastic Schrödinger Equation, when used to compute the reduced density matrix of a non-Markovian open quantum system, necessarily (...) seems to employ the Bohmian concept of a conditional wavefunction. We will see that by dressing these conditional wavefunctions with an interpretation, the Bohmian theory can prove to be a useful tool to build general quantum simulation frameworks, such as a high-frequency electron transport model. As a second example, we will explain how a Copenhagen “observable operator” can be related to numerical properties of the Bohmian trajectories, which within Bohmian mechanics, are well-defined even for an “unmeasured” system. Most importantly in practice, even if these numbers are given no ontological meaning, not only we will be able to simulate (thus, predict and talk about) them, but we will see that they can be operationally determined in a weak value experiment. Therefore, they will be practical numbers to characterize a quantum system irrespective of the followed quantum theory. (shrink)