In this paper we examine the concept of waiting from a phenomenological point of view. In order to do so, we start with a definition from Andreas Göttlich and contextualize it within the theoretical framework provided by Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter L. Berger. Additionally, we discuss waiting on the basis of our previous research, specifically within the context of a field extract from an earlier life-world analytical ethnography on the parents of pre-adolescent, non-professional soccer players. The field vignette (...) depicts a mother who has problematic possibilities of conflicting preferences due to the apperception of her soccer playing child, who was injured during the match. This negotiation within projects of action will be outlined as a specific facet of waiting. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions PARMENIDES THE PROPHET~ The latest word on Parmenides comes from a recent and exhaustive study by Leonardo Tar~n. 1 Among other illuminating and novel interpretations, Tarhn argues that Parmenides was not, after all, guilty of the confusion between the existential and copulative senses of "to be," that he did not identify thinking with Being, and that he had no conception of atemporal reality.~ In these and (...) other respects Tar~n's volume makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of Parmenides. One might judge, however, that Tars work is unusually insensitive to the religious element in Parmenides' poem, and in this respect his analysis seems to echo Reinhardt's unfortunate judgment which calls Parmenides "einen Denker, der keinen Wunsch kennt als Erkenntnis, keine Fessel ffihlt als Logik, den Gott und Geffihl gleichgiiltig lassen." s This inadequacy of TarAn's approach to Parmenides is evident in his treatment of the poem in general, and especially the prologue. The prologue to Parmenides' poem has always been a source of debate. After exploring and rejecting the allegorical interpretation of Sextus (the main source for the proem), Tar~n then systematically examines and rejects the modern interpretations which (among others) make it out to be a shamanistic rapture (Diels, Cornford), Orphic apocalypse (Burnet), religious revelation (Jaeger, Bowra), and mystical experience (Verdenius).4 TarAn judges that Parmenides did not intend his journey to be taken as a reality in any sense, largely on the grounds (1) that Parmenides speaks of his journey as a repeated experience. To take seriously the iterative expressions of the prologue (e.g. fr. 1, lines 1, 3, 8) is incompatible with interpretations which construe it to refer to a specific occasion.6 He supports the conclusion that the proem is nothing more than a literary device with the observations (2) that symbolic interpretations are incongruous with the fact that the goddess expounds her doctrine without symbols, and (3) that the appeal is to Logos, the rational, critical faculty; (4) that the goddess remains anonymous shows that she stands for no religious figure at all ("the 'revelation' is the truth discovered by Parmenides himself"); and (5) that Parmenides could hardly expect us to take seriously the reality of the goddess and other elements in the proem, the reality of which would be entirely incompatible with the thesis of the poem, viz. that reality is One and that all multiplicity and distinction is unreal. ~ z Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays (Princeton, 1965). See my review of this work in The Classical Journal, LXII (1967),232ff. aParmenides und die Geschiehtc der griechischen Philosophic (Bonn, 1916),p. 256. 4TarGn,p. 17ft.Guthrie believes that Parmenides recognized an affinity between his search for truth, and his religious activity and mystical experience, and that he reflected this in his mystical-allegorical prologue (History of Greek Philosophy [Cambridge, 1965],II, 13). Guthrie was not, apparently, aware of Ta~n's work when he wrote his second volume; and on the matter of the prologue he favors the work of Mansfeld (Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschlichc Welt [Assen, 1964],chap. IV), and Bowra ("The Proem of Parmenides," Classical Philology, XXXII [1987],97ff). Tar~n, p. 30. * P. 30f. [67] 68 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY It is probably true that interpretations which find all sorts of religious elements in the proem (and the poem as a whole) go too far. On the other hand, Tar~n gives the impression that Parmenides was nothing more than a pedantic academician, and in this respect he tends to sin in the opposite direction. First, the possible religious significance of the prologue does not depend on its being taken to refer to a literal experience; but even if it did, it need not refer to a specific event; and even if that were so, it is a little forced to exclude a specific event in view of the iterative expressions which may be no more than a function of poetic style. As for his second charge, Tar~n seems unaware that the main part of the poem hardly lends itself to symbolic expression, and afortiori the prologue, with its symbolism, sets the religious mood for... (shrink)

The final section of the book considers two features of the world which transcend the categories, existence and negation.

Originally published in 1992. The history of Western philosophy can be seen as a battle between those that insist that the "physical universe" exists and those would claim that there is a much larger "world" which contains atemporal and nonspatial things as well. The central part of this book, and the battle, concerns the existence of universals. Starting with the mediaeval definition of the issue found in Porphry and Boethius, the author then considers modern and contemporary versions of the battle. (...) He concludes that what is at stake between naturalists and ontologists is the existence and nature of a number of important categories, like structures, relations, sets, numbers and so on. (shrink)

1. „Schwache“ oder „freie Menschen“? „Weil es aber doch einem nachdenkenden und forschenden Wesen anständig ist, gewisse Zeiten lediglich der Prüfung seiner eigenen Vernunft zu widmen, hierbei aber alle Parteilichkeit gänzlich auszuziehen, und so seine Bemerkungen anderen zur Beurteilung öffentlich mitzuteilen; so kann es niemanden verargt, noch weniger verwehrt werden, die Sätze und Gegensätze, so wie sie sich, durch keine Drohung geschreckt, vor Geschworenen von seinem eigenen Stande verteidigen können, auftreten zu lassen.“ These: Wer diesen Text kritisch liest, stutzt – (...) was sollen die „schwachen Menschen“ hier? Ist nicht das bizarre „schwacher“ durch „freier“ zu ersetzen? Kant verbindet mit der Gerichtshofmetapher die gegen die Politik der Machtsprüche des Absolutismus, aber auch gegen die Gesetzlosigkeit des „status naturalis“ gerichtete Freiheit der Richter und Geschworenen, nicht aber deren Schwäche. Erst im Staat unter Freiheitsgesetzen könne ein Gerichtshof eingerichtet werden – „Zu dieser Freiheit gehört denn auch, seine Gedanken, seine Zweifel, die man sich nicht selbst auflösen kann, öffentlich zur Beurteilung auszustellen, ohne darüber für einen unruhigen oder gefährlichen Bürger verschrieen zu werden [„durch keine Drohung geschreckt“] Das liegt schon in dem ursprünglichen Rechte der menschlichen Vernunft, welche keinen anderen Richter erkennt, als selbst wiederum die allgemeine Menschenvernunft, worin ein jeder seine Stimme hat.“ Die Freiheit bezieht sich auf den Bürgerstand der Menschen und ihre Freiheitsgesetze. Wir befinden uns im Bereich einer Rechtsinstitution – was soll da der Appell an die Schwäche? Gibt es einen bürgerlichen Stand der Schwachen? Nein. Das Ergebnis der Gerichtsverhandlung wird sein, dass weder Satz noch Gegensatz gilt oder dass beide gelten könnten. Nun kommt hinzu, dass Kant zuvor den Menschen charakterisiert, der zwischen These und Antithese hin- und herschwankt – ein schwacher Mensch, dem der nachdenkende und forschende Mensch entgegengesetzt wird, der nun entschlossen vor dem Gerichtshof erfahren will, wie es um die Ansprüche der beiden Parteien steht. Auch im nachfolgenden Text wird emphatisch dafür argumentiert, dass der Mensch das Problem der Antinomie und seine Auflösung in seiner eigenen Vernunft findet und daher „die Verantwortung [Beantwortung?] nicht von sich abweisen und auf den unbekannten Gegenstand schieben kann“. (shrink)

A study of Jim Jones and the Peoples Temple. It features a prologue that considers the meaning of the tragedy for a post-Waco, post-9/11 world.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

“In France, we say ‘an angel passes by;’ in Spain, ‘a Bishop is born;’ in Portugal, ‘a poet is dead.’ I’m glad that I could place a long silence in one of my films.”In French, the expression “téléphone arabe” has two meanings: 1) An oral communication and, furthermore, a rumor or unreliable information; 2) A kid’s game which consists of whispering a word to one another in a circle: the first person whispers a phrase in the ear of the second, (...) the second tells the heard phrase to the third, and so on until the last player says it out loud, usually giving way to a collective frenzy due to the – voluntary or involuntary – deformations the initial phrase has undergone through its multiple repetitions.One day, I noticed.. (shrink)

Professor Grossman’s introduction to the revolutionary work of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre studies the ideas of their predecessors too, explaining in detail Descartes’s conception of the mind, Brentano’s theory of intentionality, and Kierkegaard’s emphasis on dread, while tracing the debate over existence and essence as far back as Aquinas and Aristotle. For a full understanding of the existentialists and phenomenologists, we must also understand the problems that they were trying to solve. This book, originally published in 1984, presents clearly how (...) the main concerns of phenomenology and existentialism grew out of tradition. (shrink)

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. In this vital new work, Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism that currently dominates moral philosophy, (...) he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists. (shrink)

What would it look like for researchers to take non-human animal rights seriously? Recent discussions foster the impression that scientific practice needs to be reformed to make animal research ethical: just as there is ethically rigorous human research, so there can be ethically rigorous animal research. We argue that practically little existing animal research would be ethical and that ethical animal research is not scalable. Since animal research is integral to the existing scientific paradigm, taking animal rights seriously requires a (...) radical, wholesale reimagining of science.Trial registration: ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT05340426. (shrink)