Why should we become posthuman? There is only one morally compelling answer to this question: because posthumanity will be a more beneficial state, better than present humanity. This is the Posthuman Beneficence Argument, the centerpiece of the liberal transhumanist defense of “directed evolution.” In this article, I examine PBA and find it deficient on a number of lethal counts. My argument focuses on the writings of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has developed the most articulate defense of PBA and disclosed (...) its metaethical framework. I begin by locating PBA in the context of wider transhumanist claims for the desirability of posthumanity. I identify two crucial components: a model of deliberative rationality, requiring reasons to endorse claims; and the reasons themselves. I examine these two conditions, in turn, specifying the claims that they ask us to accept. Following Bostrom, I argue that there is a need for a foundationalist approach that assures us of some universality in the process of valuation. This is required to appropriately ground the moral continuity and appeal to universality that PBA demands. I examine the reasons why this approach ultimately fails, leaving posthumanity as an unintelligible concept with no moral force. I conclude by identifying a more mature approach to the debate on human enhancement, one that forfeits the grandiose but baseless claims too often found in transhumanist defenses of directed evolution. In short, posthumanity may be a good science fiction trope, but it has no normative force in the moral philosophy of human enhancement. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions in the dominant version of extended cognition theory grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? (...) And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism ; and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology. I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings. (shrink)

In this article I respond to Yuk Hui by revisiting the crossroads in the philosophy of technology as represented by the philosophies of Stiegler and Ihde. Whereas Hui proposes the concept of cosmotechnics as an integrating perspective, I conceive of the crossroads in other terms, namely from the perspective of substantivism. I characterize our present situation, what a philosophy of technology should address and then examine Hui’s notion of cosmotechnics from this alternative perspective. My main concern is to show future (...) paths of development for cosmotechnical thought. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the forays into metaphysics of The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (henceforth, DNP). I argue that the work of DNP is a valuable contribution to the epistemology of certain aspects of artifact design and use, but that it fails to advance a persuasive metaphysic. A central problem is that DNP approaches ontology from within a functionalist framework that is mainly concerned with ascriptions and justified beliefs. Thus, the materiality of artifacts emerges only as the external (...) conditions of realizability of function ascription. The work of DNP has a strong programmatic aspect and much of its foray into metaphysics is tentative, so the intent of my argument is partly synthetic: to sum up these issues as they are presented in the literature and highlight some recognized problems. But I also go beyond that, suggesting that these problems are foundational, arising from the very way in which DNP poses the question of artifact metaphysics. Although it sets out to incorporate objective aspects of technology, DNP places a strong focus on the intentional side of the purported matter-mind duality, bracketing off materiality in an irretrievable manner. Thus, some of the advantages of dualism are lost. I claim that DNP is dualistic, not merely based on “duality”, but that its version of dualism does not appropriately account for the material “nature” of artifacts. The paper ends by suggesting some correctives and alternatives to Dual Nature theory. (shrink)

Yuk Hui refers to cosmotechnics as the deep interweaving of human action and technology as shaped by diverse moral universes. In this article, I pit two views of cosmotechnics against each other. I...

This paper is an enquiry into the philosophical fault-line that leads from mechanicism to posthumanism. I focus on a central aspect of posthumanism: the erosion of the distinction between organism and machine, nature and art, and the biological and engineering sciences. I claim that this shift can be placed in the seventeenth century, in Descartes’s biology. The Cartesian fusion of the natural and technological opened the door to distinctly posthuman understandings of the living body, its relation to technological extensions, and (...) the possibility of its drastic alteration. Descartes’s mechanicism demanded a reconceptualization of bodily boundaries, organismic unity, natural finality, causation, and bio/technological instrumentality; all of which Descartes boldly theorized in terms of the wondrous technologies of his day. This radical proposal obscured the possibility of thinking the human as ontologically unique, or as having an ideal unity. This paper will examine the posthuman ramifications of these aspects of Descartes’s philosophy. (shrink)

Jacques Lafitte occupies an odd place in the philosophy of technology. He was a French engineer who made a significant and conceptually innovative contribution to this field, yet his influence has been elusive and largely ignored until relatively recently. Many of Lafitte’s ideas find echoes in the work of later philosophers, yet, notably in the case of Simondon, apparently without any direct line of influence. Lafitte placed the machine at the centre of his thinking about technology and articulated various layers (...) of analysis around it; for example, he considered machines in the broader context of an artificial world or “mechanosphere”, which encompassed certain aspects of philosophical anthropology. In this work we seek to reconstruct Lafitte’s ideas and briefly trace some of their later impact. We identify three dimensions in Lafitte’s analysis: epistemological, ontological and anthropological. We argue that the most remarkable fact about Lafitte’s thought is the way it inaugurates, and anticipates, the approach of later currents, not just in the “French tradition”, who also made an effort to integrate machine theory into broader philosophical, anthropological and political aspects, in terms that echo Lafitte’s. In particular, we will focus on Gilbert Simondon and cybernetics. (shrink)

This paper is an enquiry into the philosophical fault-line that leads from mechanicism to posthumanism. I focus on a central aspect of posthumanism: the erosion of the distinction between organism and machine, nature and art, and the biological and engineering sciences. I claim that this shift can be placed in the seventeenth century, in Descartes’s biology. The Cartesian fusion of the natural and technological opened the door to distinctly posthuman understandings of the living body, its relation to technological extensions, and (...) the possibility of its drastic alteration. Descartes’s mechanicism demanded a reconceptualization of bodily boundaries, organismic unity, natural finality, causation, and bio/technological instrumentality; all of which Descartes boldly theorized in terms of the wondrous technologies of his day. This radical proposal obscured the possibility of thinking the human as ontologically unique, or as having an ideal unity. This paper will examine the posthuman ramifications of these aspects of Descartes’s philosophy. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende evaluar las consecuencias de la tesis de la cognición extendida para la antropología filosófica. Dicha interrogación se enmarca en lo que denominamos el “giro tecnológico” en las ciencias sociales y humanas, un fenómeno relativamente reciente que produce una reorientación en clave posthumanista de la pregunta antropológica. De acuerdo con este giro, la tecnología adquiere una importancia central para la comprensión de lo humano, tanto en su dimensión ontológica como en su presente condición histórica. A su vez (...) este giro tecnológico tiende a rechazar la idea misma de una naturaleza humana ahistórica e inviolable, y postula en su lugar a la figura del “humano distribuido”, íntimamente constituido por su relación con los artefactos y la cultura material. En este contexto, el principal objetivo de este trabajo es rastrear la evolución de la tesis de la cognición extendida a lo largo de cuatro “olas” que marcan su despliegue con el objeto de ofrecer una cierta reinterpretación de esta tesis en el ámbito de la pregunta antropológica. (shrink)

Este trabajo presenta el esquema básico de una “teoría de los realizadores”, una propuesta programática que busca establecer una alternativa al modelo dominante en los debates actuales sobre la ontología de los artefactos. Nuestra posición es que podemos comprender mejor el mundo artificial si nos acercamos a los artefactos en términos de "realizadores" y sus correspondientes "realizaciones" en lugar de como objetos esencialmente "funcionales". Con este objetivo en mente, el artículo desarrolla en primer lugar la caracterización de los artefactos como (...) "realizadores" y, en segundo lugar, defiende esa idea en el contexto de la ontología de los artefactos y otras discusiones en filosofía de la tecnología. La última sección reconstruye a nuestros adversarios intelectuales: una serie de dualismos que estructuran los debates actuales tales como materialidad-función, material-simbólico, estructura-función. Sostenemos que la teoría de los realizadores / realizaciones puede superar estos dualismos dominantes y ofrecer una versión mucho más rica de la vida de los artefactos. (shrink)

We examine the question of material agency as raised in material engagement theory (MET). Insofar as MET tends to highlight the causal roles played by extra-bodily material flows in human practices, the term “material agency” does not sufficiently distinguish cases in which these flows are part of an agentive engagement from cases in which they are not. We propose an operational criterion to effect such a distinction. We claim this criterion is organizational, i.e., systemic, and not causal. In the enactive (...) account, agency requires three organizational conditions: self-individuation, interactional asymmetry, and normativity. These conditions can have organic, sensorimotor, and sociomaterial realizations. The dance of human productive practices is indeed spread between brains, bodies, and the world, as MET claims, but it is distributed in an organized manner that involves constraints and norms at various scales. We put forward a relational and non-anthropocentric perspective toward an enactive approach to productive practices. We discuss some aspects of agentive ensembles rendered more intelligible by our proposal, including incorporation, soft assembly and non-decomposability, and the grounding of teleology normative processes at multiple scales. In this manner, we seek to continue the dialog between MET and enactive theory, beginning with the view that a situated system must realize certain minimal organizational conditions to be called an _agent_. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article intends to study the concepts of forgetting and remembering in Kafka’s literature, based on Walter Benjamin’s interpretation. In addition to the well-known essay “Franz Kafka: on the tenth anniversary of his death”, other lesser-known essays by Benjamin on Kafka will also be covered, such as “Knight moral” and “Franz Kafka: On the construction of the Chinese wall”. The aim of the article is not only to expose Benjamin’s interpretation of Kafka, but also to show the extent to (...) which Kafka’s work illuminates central points of Benjamin’s thought, especially with regard to the categories of forgetfulness, remembrance, negativity and criticism of notion of progress. (shrink)

Presenting a fascinating analysis of the idea of what can't be said, this book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion. The author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't be said. The first part looks at the question of whether ineffability is a coherent idea. Part two evaluates two families of arguments regarding whether ineffable states of (...) affairs actually exist: the argument from mysticism and the argument from epistemic boundedness. Part three looks more closely at the relation between mystic and non-mystic stances. In the fourth and final part the author distinguishes five qualitatively different types of ineffability. _Ineffability and Philosophy_ is a significant contribution to this area of research and will be essential reading for philosophers and those researching and studying the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make (...) it clear that McDowell’s work paves the way for an original reading of Hegel’s texts. His conceptual framework allows for new interpretive possibilities in Hegel’s philosophy which, until now, have remained largely unexplored. Moreover, these interpretations shed light on various aspects of continuity and discontinuity between the philosophies of these two authors, thus defining more clearly their positions on specific issues. In addition, they allow us to see Hegel’s thought as containing a number of conceptual tools that might be useful for advancing McDowell’s own philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la 'déconstruction'? Quelles sont les origines philosophiques de ce mot magique, brandi par tous ceux dont le but, déclaré ou non, est de criminaliser l'Occident en le réduisant à une expression du racisme, de l'esclavagisme, de l' 'hétéro-patriarcat' et de l'impérialisme colonial? Cette civilisation redoutable dont les proies seraient les peuples dominés, racisés, opprimés, et les minorités essentialisées en tant que victimes systémiques? Ainsi la civilisation occidentale se trouve-t-elle convoquée devant un nouveau grand Tribunal de l'Histoire pour répondre (...) de ses crimes, imaginaires ou réels, et, surtout, elle est la seule civilisation à être mise au banc des accusés. Au croisement de la recherche universitaire et du militantisme politique, le décolonialisme, l'intersectionnalité, la 'théorie critique de la race', la 'théorie queer', la 'théorie du genre', mais aussi le 'wokisme', né d'une corruption idéologique de l'antiracisme et du féminisme importée des campus étatsuniens, se sont peu à peu diffusés dans les médias et dans la société tout entière grâce à une propagande violente et culpabilisante puisant dans un imaginaire victimaire. Dans ce livre incisif et documenté, qui part d'une réflexion sur la pensée de Nietzsche et sur ses mésusages par les disciples français de Heidegger, Pierre-André Taguieff analyse ces théories aussi foisonnantes qu'inconsistantes et dénonce l'émergence de ce nouvel esprit totalitaire qu'il faut se garder de réduire à ses effets les plus médiatisés, comme ces 'déboulonnages' spectaculaires illustrant la violence purificatrice de la 'cancel culture'. De fait, ce néo-puritanisme obscurantiste, inquisitorial et punitif représente, dans les démocraties occidentales, un défi majeur pour les défenseurs de la liberté d'expression, de pensée et de création."--Back cover. (shrink)

The present article reviews the state of public debate and legal provisions concerning end‐of‐life decision‐making in Italy and offers an evaluation of the moral and legal issues involved. The article further examines the content of a recent law concerning informed consent and advance treatment directives, the main court pronouncements that formed the basis for the law, and developments in the public debate and important jurisprudential acts subsequent to its approval. The moral and legal grounds for a positive evaluation of this (...) law, which attests that the patient may withhold or withdraw from life‐prolonging treatment, will be offered with reference to liberal approaches and particularly to the frameworks of care and virtue ethics; but reasons will also be offered in order to consider not only the latter but also broader range of end‐of‐life treatment decisions as morally apt options. In this light, we argue in favour of a further development of the Italian legislation to encompass forms of assisted suicide and active euthanasia. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Podemos ver na ausência de luz, e ouvir na ausência de som? Em seu livro Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008), Roy Sorensen defende que sim, que podemos ver a escuridão na ausência de luz, e ouvir o silêncio na ausência de som. Neste artigo, defendo que (...) na escuridão nada vemos, no silêncio nada ouvimos, e que experienciar a ausência de luz e som é uma questão afetiva, e não perceptual. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a position that I call erotetic amelioration, according to which we must evaluate and, eventually, improve our answers to questions of the form “What is x?”. My focus will be on cases where x stands for a strongly social kind, such as marriage. Such a position is offered as an alternative to the idea-sometimes called conceptual engineering-according to which we should evaluate and, eventually, seek to improve our concepts. After introducing the idea of erotetic amelioration, (...) I will show how it can be put into work to deal with what I call the topic preservation challenge, and what advantages it has in relation to a similar position available in the literature, namely, Cappelen’s (2018) Austerity Framework. (shrink)

It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to (...) the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. (shrink)

The existence of causal explanations in science has been an issue of interest in Western philosophy from its very beginnings. That is the reason this work, following an idea of Mario Bunge, makes a historical review of this matter. The modern treatment of this subject takes place since the postulation by Popper and Hempel of the D-N model of scientific explanation, whose viability is scrutinized here from different points of view in the current philosophy of science. The main object of (...) this paper is to present two arguments against the possibility of causal explanations in theoretical physics. The first one concerns the existence, in certain cases, of inter-theoretical incompatibilities, and the second refers to the need to resort, in other cases, to concatenations of laws of different theories and disciplines. The final conclusion will be the defence of a form of theoretical explanation, which follows the Popper-Hempel model, but devoid of any ontological and metaphysical connotations. (shrink)

But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.

IN the last decade deliberative democracy has developed rapidly from a “theoretical statement” into a “working theory.”1 Scholars and practitioners have launched numerous initiatives designed to put deliberative democracy into practice, ranging from deliberative polling to citizen summits.2 Some even advocate deliberation as a new “revolutionary now.”3 Deliberative democracy has also experienced the beginning of an empirical turn, making significant gains as an empirical (or positive) political science. This includes a small, but growing body of literature tackling the connection between (...) the normative standards of deliberation, how well they are met, and the empirical consequences of meeting them.4 This trend has, for instance, included the use of methods and frameworks borrowed from other fields, such as political and social psychology. Such studies suggest that cases approaching ideal deliberation are rare, but that group interaction sometimes works surprisingly well according to such ideals.5. (shrink)

The first purpose of this article is to present a new theory of libertarian free will—the boundary theory of libertarian free will—which provides a new framework by means of employing boundaries as a “conceptual scheme” for understanding libertarian free will. This theory consists of two parts. One part suggests that the agent’s will should be viewed as the intermediate boundary between an agent’s reasons and his alternative choices. The second part is a model where the agent’s will is a faculty (...) that solely operates by permitting or resisting reasons (that are potential causes) to become actual causes for the agent’s choices. The second purpose of the paper is to argue that the boundary theory of libertarian free will has several advantages, the most important of which are: (a) it defeats the charge that libertarian free will is a mystery; (b) it defeats the standard objections against the compatibility of libertarian free will and indeterminism (that is, the luck argument, the roll-back argument, the difference argument, the assimilation argument, etc.); and (c) it is simultaneously an argument for indeterminism as such (that is, that determinism is false). (shrink)

Why I thought it useful to offer an explanation of Hegel’s doctrine on the Incarnation was so that the reader may be empowered to identify Hegel’s influence in modern accounts of this mystery. Even if, in my view, Hegel’s interpretation of revealed religion differs greatly from Catholic Doctrine, it is not surprising to find the presence of some of his concepts in modern theology. In truth, what matters is not the theologian’s self-identification as Hegelian or as non-Hegelian, but whether or (...) not the theologian adopts Hegel’s concepts. This paper offers an explanation of the internal dynamism of Hegelian concepts and their relation to Christian doctrine in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This research may help to show in what way it is possible to explain Christian religious doctrine with a philosophy other than the Thomistic one and how, at least in Hegel’s case, religious doctrine is changed and reduced to an erroneous philosophical content. Also, an attempt is made to show the internal “coherence” of this Hegelian re-reading of Christianity so that theologians may become more cautious about accepting an explanation of Christian doctrine simply because the Christian language is preserved in that explanation. (shrink)

Interaction between geology and mining was a decisive element for the development of stratigraphy during the eighteenth century in Germany, Sweden, England, and also Italy. This paper analyses the importance of mining background and experience, and interest in mining, among some eighteenth-century Italian scholars who studied mountains and other terrestrial reliefs paying particular attention to their rocks, strata and formations. Several primary sources are examined, from the early case of Antonio Vallisneri-who, being a physician, used the mines and the quarries (...) as necessary tools of his 'anatomy' of the mountains-up to the geological travels in the Alps and the Apennines promoted in the late eighteenth century with mining perspectives. Rigorous empirical approaches to the study of the Earth's surface-shown by scientists such as Luigi Ferdinando Marsili, Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti and Giovanni Arduino-are here investigated in the light of their mining expertise. This practical knowledge was an essential element of their theoretical work on the 'classification' of mountains. (shrink)

The following is a paper presented for the Course Rahner and Lonergan at the University of Toronto (Winter, 2014), revised and edited Winter, 2018. Our purpose is to defend the possibility of “perceptualism,” that is to say, the position maintaining that the intelligible content of consciousness is given in perception and not posited by the activity of the subject. Assisted by the insights of Cornelio Fabro, this defense contrasts perceptualism with Bernard Lonergan’s “critical realism”. This paper focuses on the notion (...) of experience, seemingly the basis of the opposition between perceptualism and critical realism. (shrink)

Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking -- thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to (...) be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other 'critical thinkers' to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs. (shrink)

Andre Breton discusses the meaning, aims, and political position of the Surrealist movement.

Time is a traditional theme in philosophy and a fundamental theme in psychoanalysis. The wealth of studies devoted to the former contrasts strikingly with their scarcity in the latter.

Si la philosophie se laisse assez bien circonscrire a une pretention de rationaliser le monde et de proposer un canevas d'explication auquel puise les autres disciplines, la question de son application reste entiere. Comment en effet pretendre offrir des reponses concretes a ceux qui s'interrogent sur la maniere de mener leur vie, d'intervenir dans l'espace public et d'organiser cet espace dans des societes traversees par un individualisme profond? Comment offrir un cadre de reflexion acceptable pour developper des applications concretes alors (...) que les cadres de reference traditionnels et usuels s'estompent? Comment repondre a des questions si singulieres alors que la philosophie se veut, par essence, universelle? Voila ce dont les auteurs discutent en proposant un etat des lieux et des pistes de reflexion pour ramener la philosophie sur le terrain de l'application. (shrink)

Covering the basics as well as recent research results, this book provides a very readable introduction to the exciting interface of computability and ...

What is meant by "the philosophy of librarianship" -- The lack of a coherent philosophy of librarianship -- The nature of librarianship -- The ultimate aims of libraries.

Loin de pouvoir être réduit à son acception contemporaine, notamment heideggérienne, le concept de finitude est un concept traditionnel. Tel est le constat qui anime cette recherche dont l'objectif est de mettre au jour certaines de ses figures dans l'histoire de la pensée. Il s'agit, en évitant toute interprétation préconçue, d'étudier, sans prétendre à l'exhaustivité, comment ce concept, d'abord présent de façon explicite dans la pensée chrétienne des premiers siècles, se renouvelle ensuite tout au long de l'histoire de la pensée. (...) Le concept de finitude apparaît inauguralement chez Grégoire de Nysse, le théologien fondamental de l'infinité divine, pour qui " le fini " - to peratoumenon - est marqué par l'imperfection radicale de ne pas être Dieu. L'essence du fini est alors pensée grâce à la liaison platonicienne entre être et non-être. Appartenant au domaine général du fini, l'homme est en effet séparé de l'être véritable, mais il possède aussi un être propre : cette double caractéristique est une constante de l'approche chrétienne du fini, que Thomas d'Aquin exprime dans le concept d'ens finitum " participant " de l'être sans restriction dans sa restriction même. Refusant la discontinuité médiévale entre l'étant fini et son créateur, encore à leurs yeux présente chez Descartes, Leibniz et Spinoza renouvellent le concept de fini par leur ambition commune d'une rationalité infinie du fini, le premier au travers de la notion de " substance finie " dérivée de l'infini, le second par celle de " mode fini ", affection de la substance infinie. C'est contre de telles approches de la finitude que la philosophie critique réagit : " l'être raisonnable fini " de Kant est un sujet originaire et ne peut donc trouver aucun appui dans une rationalité infinie. L'idéalisme allemand entreprend de dépasser cette finitude kantienne à partir de Kant lui-même, en repensant la subjectivité transcendantale. La question du statut à accorder à la finitude - Endlichkeit - est au cœur des controverses qui l'animent. Heidegger reprendra d'abord, non sans hésitation, ce concept d'Endlichkeit, ancré dans la tradition occidentale, en parlant d'une " finitude du Dasein ", puis d'une " finitude de l'Être ", mais le poids historique d'un tel concept lui apparaîtra rapidement incompatible avec la nouveauté de sa pensée. Il ressort de cette étude que la question de la finitude consiste moins à se demander si l'homme est ou non un être fini que de déterminer de quelle finitude il est fini. Cette détermination est historiquement et philosophiquement décisive car elle concerne l'essence de l'homme, qui peut et doit " se connaître lui-même ". (shrink)

Il n'existe pas d'humanité sans musique. Celle-ci vient à chacun en le précédant, en lui ouvrant son mode d'existence et en lui donnant forme et rythme. Nos affects, nos désirs et nos pensées sont musicaux. L'existence est musicale. La musique constitue donc notre condition, si bien qu'elle est plus antérieure et plus intérieure à nous que nous-mêmes. Toutefois, comme nous, elle est sans origine assignable et sans commencement. Ceci n'est donc pas un livre de musicologie. Pour le lire, nulle expertise (...) n'est requise, seulement l'expérience d'exister. Nous sommes par ailleurs nécessairement pris dans l'Histoire faite de catastrophes mais aussi de marques d'espérance. Que dit alors très concrètement la musique de nous, de nos existences actuelles et du présent? Et comment dans ces conditions recevons et entendons-nous notre être-musical?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Cette etude suppose un releve exhaustif des occurences d'aporia, et de douze autres mots etymologiquement apparentes, dans la litterature philosophique des Grecs, depuis les debuts jusqu'a Aristote. Les divers textes, que se sont repartis les collaborateurs du volume, sont etudies du point de vue de la grammaire et de la semantique. Chaque chapitre s'acheve sur des conclusions d'ordre philosophique, comme font aussi les trois grandes parties de l'ouvrage: philosophes preclassiques, Platon, Aristote. On trouvera en outre a la fin du volume (...) des etudes relatives au vocabulaire de l'aporia aussi bien dans la tradition arabe que chez les latins. Bibliographie et index des mots grecs etudies. (shrink)