Il s'agit de déterminer le statut des normes chez les nouveaux casuistes . On indique d'abord quelles sont les circonstances de cette nouvelle casuistique ; on suggère ensuite qu'elle exporte dans le domaine de l'éthique certaines thèses de T. Kuhn, comme le « modèle déductiviste », qu'elle prétend détrôner, s'alimentait au schéma Hempel-Oppenheim de l'explication scientifique. On suggère enfin que les nouveaux casuistes procèdent, de façon plus ou moins radicale, à une naturalisation des normes.It is intented to investigate about the (...) status of norms in the thought of the new casuists . First, the circumstances of the new casuistry are set out; then it is suggested that the new casuists have integrated in their argument concepts from T. Kuhn, just as the “deductivist model” they so sharply criticize integrates concepts from C.G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim. With regard to the initial question, it is shown that the new casuists uphold a kind of norms-naturalizing constructivism. (shrink)

Les animaux peuvent-ils avoir des droits? La souffrance animale a-t-elle une importance morale? Les animaux sont-ils dotes de conscience? Telles sont les questions abordees dans cet ouvrage, qui se propose d'approfondir quelques pistes de reflexion a travers la lecture commentee de deux textes, l'un de John Stuart Mill (extrait de L'utilitarisme), l'autre de Donald Davidson (sur la cognition animale).

Goffi and Roux are interested in what makes some thought experiments work, while others do not work. They do not attempt to draw an a priori line between two types of thought experiments, but rather ask the following question: inasmuch as thought experiments are arguments, and notwithstanding the fact that some of them might involve the contemplation of an imaginary scenario, how is it that some of them work, while others do not? Taking inspiration from a counterfactual thought experiment (...) presented by Nicholas Rescher, they treat thought experiments as argumentative procedures resembling tests of consistency, which invite the experimenter to seek the weakest link in her body of beliefs. Equipped with this method, they examine two well-known successful thought experiments (Galileo’s two bodies strapped together, and Thomson’s violinist) and discuss Mach’s notion of thought experiments. Thus they reach the hypothesis that successful thought experiments respect the three following conditions: they do not deal with things, but with beliefs; they mobilise a set of beliefs shared by the interlocutors; and this set of beliefs has a hierarchical structure. Using once again examples written at different periods and taken from various disciplines (Descartes’ receding bodies, Aristotle’s weaving shuttles), Goffi and Roux argue that each of those conditions is individually necessary for a thought experiment to work. They finally conclude on the limits and consequences of their approach. (shrink)

Contre une interprétation déconstructiviste de la question de l'animalité, on s'attache à montrer, par une présentation précise des objections adressées à P. Singer par G. Francione, que l'éthique animale « classique » comporte en elle-même les ressources d'une pensée critique extrêmement audacieuse.

French ethics of technology has followed a most peculiar path. Generally speaking, French philosophers of technology have dismissed the methodology of Applied Ethics as widely practiced. As a result, the most notorious thinkers have been those who have expressed the most considerable reservations about the “technical phenomenon.” I here attempt to establish that the most promising attempts to overcome this situation do not rise from social philosophy, but from a long-standing French tradition in the field of philosophy of life, supported (...) by an overriding project of integration of technology into culture. (shrink)

De la morale du système financier international à la bioéthique en passant par la moralisation de la politique environnementale, les questions autour de la morale sont aujourd'hui omniprésentes dans l'actualité, touchant tous les ...

On se propose de fédérer les questions relevant de la bioéthique, des générations futures et de l’éthique environnementale autour du thème de la communauté morale. On examinera certains problèmes théoriques posés par l’élargissement de celle-ci. On soutiendra qu’il n’est possible d’y faire face qu’en se ralliant à une forme d’anthropocentrisme. Toutefois, il s’agit d’un anthropocentrisme méta-axiologique, pas d’un anthropocentrisme normatif: il ne saurait être question de soutenir que les intérêts des être humains ont, toujours et partout, priorité sur les intérêts (...) des autres créatures. (shrink)

As it is commonly used, the concept of dignity applies to people as well as to groups of people. It is sometimes supposed to encapsulate such widely different notions as privacy, physical or mental integrity and personality. There is something puzzling in such a situation. This article argues, firstly, that the concept of dignity is best understood when applying ‹only› to autonomy, perfectibility and rationality. Belonging to the language of morals, the concept of dignity has something strongly prescriptive built into (...) it: its function is to justify prohibitions in our ways of dealing with persons. But if interpreted as depending on the actual possession of some capacities, it fails to do its job, because it applies to too few people; and if interpreted as expressing an essence, it fails because it gives way to some form of discrimination. It is suggested that a two-level use of the notion of dignity could improve things, albeit at the cost of trivialising the notion. (shrink)

Après avoir rappelé, à la lumière des analyses de W. N. Hohfeld, ce que peut signifier le concept de droits, on montre que la notion d'obligations envers les générations futures est plus intelligible dans une théorie qui fonde les droits sur la possession d'intérêts que dans une théorie qui les reconduit à l'expression d'une volonté. Cette approche de la question génère toutefois le paradoxe suivant : la génération présente a l'obligation de prendre en compte les intérêts de générations futures sans (...) avoir pour autant l'obligation de faire en sorte qu'il existe des générations futures. On en conclut que les obligations envers les générations futures ne peuvent être que conditionnelles. (shrink)

A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament, being Grimm's Wilke's Clavis Novi Testamenti. Translated, Revised and Enlarged by Joseph Henry Thayer, D.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in the Divinity School of Harvard University. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1886. 4to. pp. 726. 36s.Biblico Theological Lexicon to New Testament Greek. by Hermann Cremer, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Greifswald. Third English Edition. With Supplement. Translated from the latest German Edition by William Uewick, M.A. (...) Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1886. 4to. pp. 943. 38s. (shrink)

This essay argues that normative judgments, in general, and moral judgments, in particular, are "truth apt" and can be objects of belief. Other main claims are: judgments about reasons, if interpreted as true, do not have metaphysical implications that are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. Two kinds of normative claims should be distinguished: substantive claims about what reasons people have and structural claims about what attitudes people must have insofar as they are rational. Employing this distinction, the (...) practical significance of substantive normative judgments is explained, and critical analysis of expressivist and Kantian views on this question is offered. (shrink)