"--David Dickson, New York Times Book Review "The Whale and the Reactor is the philosopher's equivalent of superb public history.

Article copyright 2002. We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second (...) factor in the etiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows, but we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor. (shrink)

We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...) aetiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows. But we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor. (shrink)

In his recent book, The Human Factor, Philip Hefner proposes to deepen theological understanding of the natural world and the place of humans within it. He describes humans as products of converging streams of genes and culture, and as possessors of freedom that requires them to be “created cocreators.” In accordance with the requirements of “the way things really are” (God), humans are to become divine agents in enlarging the realm of freedom in the world through self‐sacrificing altruism. While Hefner's (...) insights are admirable, his work could be viewed, in part, as a covert expression of nineteenth century liberal beliefs in progress. In fact, human culture and freedom are more ambiguous products of both good and evil, and hence we must take more cognizance of the pervasiveness of what theology has termed sin. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical discussions about technology mirror a profound distance between technical practice and moral thought. I consider the origins of this gap as reflected in both ancient and modern writings. The philosopher's version of technocracy ? rushing forward with the analysis of moral categories in the hope that policy?makers or the public will find them decisive ? does nothing to bridge this gap and is, therefore, a forlorn strategy. The trouble is not that we lack good arguments and theories, but (...) rather that modern politics does not provide appropriate roles and institutions in which the activity of defining the common good in technology policy is a legitimate project. I find glimmerings of an alternative practice in the ?Scandinavian approach? to democratic participation in technological design. (shrink)

In his recent book, The Human Factor, Philip Hefner proposes to deepen theological understanding of the natural world and the place of humans within it. He describes humans as products of converging streams of genes and culture, and as possessors of freedom that requires them to be “created cocreators.” In accordance with the requirements of “the way things really are” (God), humans are to become divine agents in enlarging the realm of freedom in the world through self‐sacrificing altruism. While Hefner's (...) insights are admirable, his work could be viewed, in part, as a covert expression of nineteenth century liberal beliefs in progress. In fact, human culture and freedom are more ambiguous products of both good and evil, and hence we must take more cognizance of the pervasiveness of what theology has termed sin. (shrink)

In his article, “The Idea of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes,” Niels H. Gregersen has proposed an important thesis: God supports and sustains autopoietic processes in nature. This contribution underscores what Paul Tillich called theonomy, a conception of the divine presence or action as one which under‐girds, makes possible, and brings to perfection the creature's autonomy and creativity. The concept of theonomy is represented not only in contemporary Christian theology, but also in the work of Alfred North Whitehead (...) and the Japanese Buddhist thinker, Tanabe Hajime. Gregersen shows that this concept extends not only to existential realities, but also to science and the processes of nature. There are connections, as well as differences, to be noted between Gregersen and Whitehead. This train of thought would be further enhanced if it included a discussion of the concept of God as the power to be—a connection that certainly is implied in Gregersen's argument. (shrink)

. This is a brief survey of aspects of the modern scientific view of nature to see if implied therein are signs or traces of the sacred–as early religious apprehension surely supposed. Nature's power and order are discussed as is the strange dialectic of death and life, evident in modern biology as it also is in all early religion.

Fregoli delusion is the mistaken belief that some person currently present in the deluded person's environment is a familiar person in disguise. The stranger is believed to be psychologically identical to this known person even though the deluded person perceives the physical appearance of the stranger as being different from the known person's typical appearance. To gain a deeper understanding of this contradictory error in the normal system for tracking and identifying known persons, we conducted a detailed survey of all (...) the Fregoli cases reported in the literature since the seminal Courbon and Fail paper. Our preliminary reading of these cases revealed a notable lack of definitional clarity. So, we first formulated a classification scheme of different person misidentification delusions so as to identify those cases that qualified as instances of Fregoli according to the above characterization: the mistaken belief that a known person is present in the environment in a different guise to his or her typical appearance. We identified 38 clear cases of this type and set out to answer a series of questions motivated by current hypotheses about the origin of the Fregoli delusion. We asked whether the patients misidentified particular strangers, made reference to the misidentified known persons using wigs or plastic surgery , misidentified many different strangers or only one, showed other symptoms , and made inferences about the motives of the known persons in disguise. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for current hypotheses concerning the origin of the Fregoli delusion. (shrink)

This volume brings together philosophical perspectives on emotions, imagination and moral reasoning with contributions from neuroscience, cognitive science, social psychology, personality theory, developmental psychology, and abnormal psychology. The book explores what we can learn about the role of emotions and imagination in moral reasoning from psychopathic adults in the general community, from young children, and adolescents with callous unemotional traits, and from normal child development. It discusses the implications for philosophical moral psychology of recent experimental work on moral reasoning in (...) the cognitive sciences and neurosciences. Conversely, it shows what cognitive scientists and neuroscientists have still to learn from philosophical perspectives on moral reasoning, moral reflection, and moral responsibility. Finally, it looks at whether experimental methods used for researching moral reasoning are consistent with the work in social psychology and with philosophical thought on adult moral reasoning in everyday life. The volume's wide-ranging perspectives reflect the varied audiences for the volume, from students of philosophy to psychologists working in cognition, social and personality psychology, developmental psychology, abnormal psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

Recent attempts to rename the geological epoch in which we live, now called the “Holocene,” have produced a number of impressive suggestions. Among these the leading contender at present is the “Anthropocene.” Despite its possible advantages, there are a number of reasons why this term is ultimately misleading and unhelpful in both philosophical and policy deliberations. Especially off-putting is the word’s tendency to identify the human species as a whole as the culprit in controversial changes in Earth’s biosphere whose proximate (...) sources can be more accurately identified. The new candidate term echoes discussions of “Man and...” in countless twentieth-century publications, an outmoded conceit rightly overcome in more recent writings on science, technology and society. (shrink)

Recent studies of Reinhold Niebuhr's life and work demonstrate his continued importance in theology, ethics, and political thought. Historical studies by Heather Warren, Mark Kleinman, and Normunds Kamergrauzis provide new assessments of Niebuhr's role as a political and religious leader in his own time and trace the consequences of the movements in which he participated. They also show us more clearly how his work was connected to the ideas and programs of his contemporaries. Colm McKeogh offers a more systematic treatment (...) of Niebuhr's political realism in relation to just war theory. Niebuhr's intellectual legacy remains disputed, with Stanley Hauerwas and Langdon Gilkey offering radically different assessments of his theology. Hauerwas sees in Niebuhr a close connection to the religious liberalism of William James that precludes any authentic Christian witness. Niebuhr's empiricism reduces God to a necessary feature of human consciousness. Gilkey notes Niebuhr's early use of James' psychology, but discerns a theology of history that is central to Niebuhr's mature work. In that theology, the ground of hope necessarily lies beyond human consciousness, and indeed beyond history itself. (shrink)

Gilkey's paper had two parts. Part I, Analysis and Theses, is reproduced here only slightly altered. Part II, Narrative, though extremely rich and moving, is heavily summarized. Then his concluding remarks are presented practically in the precise form in which he presented them.

Gilkey's paper had two parts. Part I, Analysis and Theses, is reproduced here only slightly altered. Part II, Narrative, though extremely rich and moving, is heavily summarized. Then his concluding remarks are presented practically in the precise form in which he presented them.

This article contrasts the cognitive neuropsychiatric approach with the traditional psychiatric approaches to delusions to develop testable cognitive theories of delusions so as to render the generation of delusions psychologically understandable. It illustrates how cognitive neuropsychiatrists use the Bruce and Young model of face processing to explain the generation of misidentification delusions. The study of facial expression highlights that future cognitive neuropsychiatric study of self and non-self face processing using different representational media in patients with mirrored-self misidentification delusions will likely (...) be informative with regard to advancing scientific understanding of the putative differences between self and non-self recognition. It reviews cognitive neuropsychiatric research into the Capgras delusion and shows the distinction between overt face recognition and person identity authentication, and suggests the need for further modification of Bruce and Young's model to remove direct pathways between the person's identity module and the affective response system and to incorporate a separate integrative device. (shrink)

What is the relationship between democracy and technology? And what should that relationship be? This book explores these questions, drawing upon a wide range of philosophical, historical and sociological points of view. In stark contrast to technology's promise as a wellspring of equality, freedom and self-government, its development now poses a host of problems for political society: an alarming concentration of power over global production, a widening gap between rich and poor, multiple environmental crises, trivialization of politics in the mass (...) media, decline of citizen competence in decision making, and the disproportionate influence of scientific and technical elites. As the writers discuss these issues, they investigate new avenues for democratic politics, possibilities that emerge as modernist ideas about progress, justice and the common good lose their ability to guide contemporary thought and action. This book will be of interest to philosophers, political scientists, those doing research on technology and society, engineers studying human factors, environmental scientists, sociologists. (shrink)

Although Ludwig Wittgenstein did not offer a fully developed philosophy of technology, his writings contain an approach to inquiry that can be employed to explore situations in which people contend with technological devices and systems. His notions of ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’ as well as the dramatic, imaginary dialogues in his later writings offer ways to transcend the sometimes rigid theoretical frameworks in contemporary technology studies. Especially as applied to rapidly moving infusions of computing and digital electronics in (...) contemporary society, Wittgenstein’s writings offer possibilities for fresh insight and even some practical alternatives. (shrink)

Much attention has been paid recently to the role of anomalous experiences in the aetiology of certain types of psychopathology, e.g. in the formation of delusions. We examine, instead, the top-down influence of pre-existing beliefs and affective factors in shaping an individual’s characterisation of anomalous sensory experiences. Specifically we investigated the effects of paranormal beliefs and alexithymia in determining the intensity and quality of an altered state of consciousness . Fifty five participants took part in a sweat lodge ceremony, a (...) traditional shamanic ritual which was unfamiliar to them. Participants reported significant alterations in their state of consciousness, quantified using the ‘APZ’ questionnaire, a standardized measure of ASC experience. Participants endorsing paranormal beliefs compatible with shamanic mythology, and those showing difficulty identifying feelings scored higher on positive dimensions of ASC experience. Our findings demonstrate that variation in an individual’s characterisation of anomalous experiences is nuanced by pre-existing beliefs and affective factors. (shrink)

Students with autism spectrum disorder are accessing college in increasing numbers. Within this cohort are students who are twice exceptional—those who are both academically talented and diagnosed with ASD. Little is known about factors and experiences that impact their successful transition to college. Parents play a critical role in the secondary transition process, but currently, there is a paucity of research that examines their perceptions of this experience. This study presents the results of semi-structured interviews with the parents of 10 (...) college students with ASD who were enrolled in postsecondary institutions in the United States. The parents provided perceptions of their student’s best and most challenging aspects of high school, as well as of the transition preparation the student received. Suggestions were offered in regard to how transition services can be improved for this group of students. Implications for planning and practice are presented. (shrink)

_Any assistance an author receives with writing a scientific article that is not acknowledged in the article is described as ghost-writing. Articles ghost-written by medical writers engaged by pharmaceutical companies who have a vested interest in the content have caused concern after scandals revealed misleading content in some articles. A key criterion of authorship in medical journals is final approval of the article submitted for publication. Authors are responsible for the content of their articles and for acknowledging any assistance they (...) receive. Action taken by some journals and medical writer associations to encourage acknowledgement is an uphill task in the light of disinterest from the pharmaceutical industry and ignorance or similar lack of interest by those who agree to be named authors. However, acknowledgment alone is not sufficient to resolve medical ghost-writing; issues of how the acknowledgement is formulated, permission to acknowledge and access to raw data also need to be tackled._. (shrink)

Dehaene et al. (2003) showed an absence of conscious, but not masked, conflict effects when patients with schizophrenia performed a number-categorisation priming task. We aimed to replicate these influential results using a different word-categorisation priming task. Counter to Dehaene et al.'s findings, 21 patients and 20 healthy controls showed similar congruence effects for both masked and visible primes. Within patients, a reduced congruence effect for visible primes associated with longer duration of illness and more severe behavioural disorganisation. Patients, unlike controls, (...) were no slower to respond to targets that followed visible compared to masked primes. Conscious conflict effects on priming tasks are not universally reduced in schizophrenia but may associate with chronicity and behavioural disorganisation. That patients were no slower when the preceding primes were clearly visible accords with evidence elsewhere that information processing in schizophrenia is driven more by immediate conscious experience and constrained less by prior events. (shrink)

In autumn 1839 George Dunn found himself traveling across the rain-swept open fen land of Cambridgeshire. His journey south from Warrington had taken fifteen hours, and he was now nearing his destination, a farm on the banks of the Old Bedford River. The flat, exposed landscape must have seemed particularly desolate in such weather, and while he was no doubt glad to be reaching his destination, Dunn's thoughts turned to the Slough of Despond.1 That he should have recalled a passage (...) from Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress may have been particularly apt, not only for the dismal weather but for what lay at his journey's end. Dunn had traveled all this way to join Manea Fen, a community established along lines laid out by .. (shrink)

This article outlines the transformations of yajé shamanism among the Siona Indians of the Northwest Amazon Basin of Colombia. The shaman's role and the political and sacred use of yajé rituals have changed since colonial times and can be seen as a result of adaptive strategies for survival. This study examines the factors that have contributed to the current revitalization due to state and popular representations of the ecological and wise Indian. Although Gow and Taussig argue that ayahuasca shamanism in (...) Peru and folk healing in Colombia rose out of colonial domination and proletarian concerns, Siona shamanic practices are best understood as a transfiguration and result of their particular response to outside forces. Their contemporary use of yajé reflects this past and the discourse, aesthetics, expectations, and demands of the larger society. (shrink)

The Philosophy Outreach Project gets high school students across Indiana thinking. POP creates alternative spaces for learning in classrooms, clubs, online, and conference settings. By curating philosophical content and fostering philosophical discussion, POP provides high school students with tools and a platform to engage with each other and the world. POP is run by three teams of Ball State students with a variety of different interests and backgrounds. POP's team includes students studying philosophy, psychology, English, communications, criminal justice, and more. (...) This diversity of interests and knowledge allows for an impressive level of collaboration, which is ultimately what makes POP successful in promoting and facilitating pre-college philosophy. (shrink)

Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that one's own reflection in the mirror is a stranger. In two experiments, we tested the ability of hypnotic suggestion to model this condition. In Experiment 1, we compared two suggestions based on either the delusion's surface features (seeing a stranger in the mirror) or underlying processes (impaired face processing). Fifty-two high hypnotisable participants received one of these suggestions either with hypnosis or without in a wake control. In Experiment 2, we examined the extent (...) to which social cues and role-playing could account for participants' behaviour by comparing the responses of 14 hypnotised participants to the suggestion for impaired face processing (reals) with those of 14 nonhypnotised participants instructed to fake their responses (simulators). Overall, results from both experiments confirm that we can use hypnotic suggestion to produce a compelling analogue of mirrored-self misidentification that cannot simply be attributed to social cues or role-playing. (shrink)

Passionate readers both, Olivia Langdon and Mark Twain courted through books, spelling out their expectations through literary references as they corresponded during their frequent separations. Surprisingly, in the process Olivia Langdon reveals herself not as a hypochondriacal hysteric, as many twentieth-century critics have portrayed her, but as a thoughtful intellectual, widely read in literature, history and modern science. Not so surprisingly, Samuel Clemens reveals himself as a critic and a sceptic, lampooning Langdon's physics lessons and her literary (...) heroines. He also shows himself as an astute strategist, carefully manipulating Langdon and her parents. At the same time, Clemens's letters exhibit his own conservatism about women's nature and women's roles, while Langdon's show her carefully choosing from her culture's array of possible role models. (shrink)

This article critiques how the chromosomal condition ‘trisomy 21’ (‘T21’) (‘Down syndrome’) was originally conceptualised using colonial, scientific and medical discourses on ‘race’ and ‘idiocy’. Nineteenth century discourses surrounding ‘degeneracy’ commonly intertwined the notions of ‘race’ and ‘idiocy’. In Observations of an Ethnic Classification of Idiots, Down categorises people with T21 as ‘Mongolians’ because of their purported similarities to ethnic ‘Mongolians’. The discourse-historical approach (DHA) to critical discourse analysis (CDA) is used in this article to examine how the ‘Mongolian idiot’ (...) is constructed by Down as the ‘other’, being simultaneously a ‘racial other’, a ‘disabled other’, and an ‘idiotic other’. Down theorises that ethnic ‘Caucasians’ with ‘idiocy’ have ‘retrogressed’ to primitive forms as characterised by the ‘Mongolian family’. His report also essentialises the ‘Mongolian idiot’, defining their ‘degeneracy’ and ‘otherness’ in terms of their physical, behavioural, and mental characteristics. Whilst Down’s ‘mongolism’ has since been refuted, aspects of his report are reproduced in some contemporary medical and scientific discourses. Although these discourses are less essentialist than Down’s, they persist in constructing the ‘otherness’ of T21, by foregrounding its ‘abnormalities’ and ‘disorders’. Significantly, facets of ‘degeneracy’ appear in evolutionary developmental biology, connecting T21 with ‘atavisms’, though without the racial framework. (shrink)

After reviewing factors implicated in the generation of delusional beliefs, we conclude that whilst a perceptual aberration coupled with a particular type of attri‐butional bias may be necessary to explain the specific thematic content of a bizarre delusion, neither of these factors, whether in isolation or in combination, is sufficient to explain the presence of delusional beliefs. In contrast to bias models (theories which explain delusion formation in terms of extremes of normal reasoning biases), we advocate a deficit model of (...) delusion formation–that is, delusions arise when the normal cognitive system which people use to generate, evaluate, and then adopt beliefs is damaged. Mere bias we think inadequate to explain bizarre delusions which defy commonsense and persist despite overwhelming rational counter‐argument. In particular, we propose that two deficits must be present in the normal cognitive system to explain bizarre delusions: (1) there must be some damage to sensory and/or attentional‐orient‐ing mechanisms which causes an aberrant perception–this explains the bizarre content of the causal hypothesis generated to explain what is happening; and (2) there must also be a failure of normal belief evaluation–this explains why a hypothesis, implausible in the light of general commonsense, is adopted as belief. This latter deficit occurs, we suggest, when an individual is incapable of suspending the natural favoured status of direct first‐person evidence in order to critically evaluate hypotheses, given equal pri‐ority whether based on direct or indirect sources of information. In contrast, delusions with ‘ordinary’ content may arise when a single deficit of normal belief evaluation occurs in the context of an extreme (but normal) attentional bias, thus causing failure to critically evaluate hypotheses based on misperceptions and misintrepretations of ambiguous (but ordinary) first‐person experience. (shrink)

In controversies about technology and society, there is no idea more pro vocative than the notion that technical things have political qualities. At issue is the claim that the machines, structures, and systems of modern material culture can be accurately judged not only for their contributions of efficiency and pro-ductivity, not merely for their positive and negative environmental side effects, but also for the ways in which they can embody specific forms of power and authority. Since ideas of this kind (...) have a persistent and troubling presence in discussions about the meaning of technology, they deserve explicit attention... (shrink)