Ein eben erschienenes Buch „Der Typenbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik“ (von C. Hempel und P. Oppenheim) wird zum Anlass genommen, methodologische Probleme der Verwendung von Typenbegriffen zu diskutieren. Drei verschiedene Arten von Attributen werden unterschieden : klassifizierende Merkmale, abstufbare Merkmale und Massgrössen. Abstuf- bare Begriffe können standardisiert werden. So entstandene Standards werden als Quasi-Typen bezeichnet. Echte Typen entstehen aus Merkmalkombinationen. Diese Kombinationen werden in einem Merkmalsraum vorgenommen mit Hilfe sogenannter Reduktionen. Drei Arten von Reduktionen werden unterschieden. Die für die (...) empirische Sozialforschung wichtigste Reduktion ist die pragmatische : sie fasst Klassen von Merkmalkombinationen so zusammen, wie es ein vorliegendes Erhebungsproblem erfordert. Im allgemeinen werden Typen intuitiv gebildet, und erst nachher wird die ihnen entsprechende Merkmalskombination aufgedeckt. Dieses Verfahren heisst Substruktion. An Beispielen wird seine Bedeutung für die Praxis dargestellt. Es wird betont, dass die typologischen Operationen (Reduktion, Substruktion und Transformationen) nichts darüber aussagen, was ein Typus ist und wie er gefunden wird. Sie weisen nur gewisse formale Eigenschaften auf, die allen typologischen Systemen gemeinsam sind.Un livre récemment paru „Le concept de type à la lumière de la nouvelle logique“ (de C. Hempel et P. Oppenheim : „Der Typenbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik“ ) fournit Toccasion de discuter quelques-uns des problèmes que pose l'emploi des concepts de type. On distingue trois catégories de caractères : caractères classificatoires, caractères gradués et mesures de grandeur. Les concepts gradués peuvent être standardisés de telle manière que naissent des standards que l'on peut qualifier de quasi-types. Les types authentiques naissent par combinaison de caractères. Ces combinaisons s'opèrent dans un „lieu de caractères“ (Merkmalsraum) à l'aide d'un procédé nommé réduction. On distingue trois sortes de réduction. La réduction la plus importante pour la recherche sociale est la réduction pragmatique : elle embrasse des classes de caractères combinés en fonction des exigences d'une enquête donnée. En général, les types sont formés intuitivement, ensuite seulement on découvre la combinaison de caractères correspondante. Cette démarche s'appelle substruction. On en montre la signification pour la pratique dans une série d’exemples. On souligne que les opérations typologiques (réduction, substruction, transformations) ne nous permettent nullement de dire ce qu'est un type et comment il a été découvert. Elles indiquent seulement certains caractères formels qui sont communs à tous les systèmes typologiques. (shrink)

During the 1960s Paul F. Lazarsfeld, co-founder of the renowned Columbia school, worked to promote a useful new research methodology. This paper analyses these activities. In a series of papers, Lazarsfeld demonstrated that the roots of empirical research, the useful methodology he developed, lie in the work of early European scholars. Building on his belief that quantification does not need numbers, he showed that Hermann Conring, with his “classificatory statistics,” had predated Frédéric Le Play and his “ (...) family budgets” and Adolphe Quételet and his “probability statistics” by almost two centuries. In another paper he highlighted the importance of Max Weber’s empirical studies on agrarian and industrial workers within the frame of his life work. His seminars at Columbia University with Robert K. Merton and at the Sorbonne with Raymond Boudon opened up transatlantic cooperation on empirical research between New York and Paris for decades to come. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...) in cognitive science. I demonstrate that Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims about Marr’s theory are false. Marr’s computational theory contains a mathematical theory of visual content, based on empirical psychophysical evidence. It also contains mathematical descriptions of distal physical surfaces and objects, and of their optic projection to the perceiver. Much computational research on vision contains these types of intentional and externalist components within the formal, mathematical, theories. Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims demonstrate inadequate study and understanding of Marr’s work and other research in this area. Computational theories of vision, by containing empirically based mathematical theories of visual content, to this extent present naturalizations of semantics. (shrink)

We are witnessing increasing use of the Internet, particular social media, to criticize (perceived or actual) moral failings and misdemeanors. This phenomenon of so-called ‘online public shaming’ could provide a powerful tool for reinforcing valuable social norms. But it also threatens unwarranted and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. This paper analyses the dangers associated with the informal enforcement of norms, drawing on Locke, but also highlights its promise, drawing on recent discussions of social norms. We then consider two (...) crucial conditions that online public shaming must meet in order to be justifiable: proportionality and accountability. We argue that these requirements are in fact frequently violated, rendering most cases of online public shaming unjustified. While the use of online public shaming against others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified, given its own vices. (shrink)

How should we make choices when we know so little about our futures? L. A. Paul argues that we must view life decisions as choices to make discoveries about the nature of experience. Her account of transformative experience holds that part of the value of living authentically is to experience our lives and preferences in whatever ways they evolve.

Reasons and reasoning were central to the work of Paul Grice, one of the most influential and admired philosophers of the late twentieth century. In the John Locke Lectures that Grice delivered in Oxford at the end of the 1970s, he set out his fundamental thoughts about these topics; Aspects of Reason is the long-awaited publication of those lectures. This immensely rich work, powerfully evocative of the mind of its author, will refresh and illuminate discussions in many areas of (...) contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This is a collection in translation of essays by Paul Ricoeur which presents a comprehensive view of his philosophical hermeneutics, its relation to the views of his predecessors in the tradition and its consequences for the social sciences. The volume has three parts. The studies in the first part examine the history of hermeneutics, its central themes and the outstanding issues it has to confront. In Part II, Ricoeur's own current, constructive position is developed. A concept of the text (...) is formulated as the implications of the theory are pursued into the domains of sociology, psychoanalysis and history. Many of the essays appear here in English for the first time; the editor's introduction brings out their background in Ricoeur's thought and the continuity of his concerns. The volume will be of great importance for those interested in hermeneutics and Ricoeur's contribution to it, and will demonstrate how much his approach offers to a number of disciplines. (shrink)

Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the (...) world are similar to scientific methods used to make claims about the world, but that the subjects of metaphysics are not the subjects of science. Those who argue that metaphysics uses a problematic methodology to make claims about subjects better covered by natural science get the situation exactly the wrong way around: metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter, not a distinctive methodology. The questions metaphysicians address are different from those of scientists, but the methods employed to develop and select theories are similar. In the first section of the paper, I will describe the sort of subject matter that metaphysics tends to engage with. In the second section of the paper, I will show how metaphysical theories are classes of models and discuss the roles of experience, common sense and thought experiments in the construction and evaluation of such models. Finally, in the last section I will discuss the way these methodological points help us to understand the metaphysical project. Getting the right account of the metaphysical method allows us to better understand the relationship between science and metaphysics, to explain why doing metaphysics successfully involves having a range of different theories, to understand the role of thought experiments involving fictional worlds, and to situate metaphysical realism in a scientifically realist context. (shrink)

The ethical issues raised by cybersecurity practices and technologies are of critical importance. However, there is disagreement about what is the best ethical framework for understanding those issues. In this paper we seek to address this shortcoming through the introduction of a principlist ethical framework for cybersecurity that builds on existing work in adjacent fields of applied ethics, bioethics, and AI ethics. By redeploying the AI4People framework, we develop a domain-relevant specification of five ethical principles in cybersecurity: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, (...) justice, and explicability. We then illustrate the advantages of this principlist framework by examining the ethical issues raised by four common cybersecurity contexts: penetration testing, distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), ransomware, and system administration. These case analyses demonstrate the utility of this principlist framework as a basis for understanding cybersecurity ethics and for cultivating the ethical expertise and ethical sensitivity of cybersecurity professionals and other stakeholders. (shrink)

Foreword William Schweiker Paul Tillich, one of the great Protestant theologians of the twentieth century, addresses in Morality and Beyond a basic problem ...

A Christian ethicist discusses such problems as organ transplants, caring for the terminally ill, and defining death.

In this chapter a new problem about rule-following is outlined, one that is distinct both from Kripke’s and Wright’s versions of the problem. This new problem cannot be correctly responsed to, as Kripke’s can, by invoking Wright’s Intentional Account of rule-following. The upshot might be called, following Kant, an antinomy of pure reason: we both must — and cannot — make sense of someone’s following a rule. The chapter explores various ways out of this antinomy without here endorsing any of (...) them. (shrink)

Feyerabrend argues that intellectual progress relies on the creativity of the scientist, against the authority of science.

In this study of space and power and knowledge in France from the 1830s through the 1930s, Rabinow uses the tools of anthropology, philosophy, and cultural criticism to examine how social environment was perceived and described. Ranging from epidemiology to the layout of colonial cities, he shows how modernity was revealed in urban planning, architecture, health and welfare administration, and social legislation.

Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory we may expect to be more powerful by far than the common-sense psychology it displaces, and more substantially (...) integrated within physical science generally. My purpose in this paper is to explore these projections, especially as they bear on (1) the principal elements of common-sense psychology: the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.), and (2) the conception of rationality in which these elements figure. (shrink)