RésuméEst présentée une démonstration élémentaire et intuitive de ľ inégalité de Bell, démonstration accessible aux non‐spécialistes et en particulier aux philosophes. Cette inégalité, dont les prémisses sont dégagées, est valable pour toutes les théories à variables cachées locales. Or, la mécanique quantique la viole. Les conséquences qui on peut tirer de cette violation sont envisageées.

Prenons par exemple une source de lumière et plaçons devant elle un filtre. Par quoi sera déterminée la lumière après le filtre, par la source ou par le filtre? Cette question triviale en soi peut conduire à des problèmes analogues d'un certain intérêt.

RésuméInterprétation de ľépistémologie gonséthienne qui à la fois prend une certaine liberté et vise une comprehension profonde. Selon cette interprétation, Gonseth propose une connaissance à deux étages: a) une étage intuitif, informel, proche des préoccupations quotidiennes et de Paction, qui s'exprime en langage naturel et dont les concepts gardent une certaine souplesse: c'est, dans la métaphore du béton, le ciment; b) un étage de théorie ou de schémas simplificateurs, plus rigides, qui ne représentent jamais totalement ľétage inférieur: c'est les cailloux (...) du béton, qui ne sont pas autonomes, mais sont plongés dans la connaissance intuitive dont ils sont issus et qui leur donne leur sens. A ces deux étages, il faut encore ajouter un étage qui serait la ≫réalité≪, car ľétage intuitif est déjà une schématisation. Entre ces trois étages s'établissent des ≫correspondances schématiques≪ et les schémas sont jugés selon leur idonéité.SummaryAn interpretation of Gonseth's epistemology that takes certain liberties as well as aiming at deeper understanding. On this interpretation, Gonseth suggests that there are two levels of knowledge: an intuitive and informal level close to everyday concerns and to action, which ist expressed in natural language and involves concepts that retain a certain flexibility ; a level of theory or of simplifying schemes, which are more rigid and never entirely represent the lower level. In addition to these two levels, there is a further one which would be ≫reality≪, for the intuitive level is already a schematization. ≫Schematic correspondanee≪ is established between the three levels, and the schemes are judged according to their idoneity. (shrink)

SummaryA concept of reality is sketched which claims to be metaphysically neutral. It is based on the criterion of invariance, invariance with respect to the observer, the reference frame, the state of the subject, time, mode of perception, kind of experience or language. This criterion is here used negatively: all that is invariant is not necessarily real, but in the explaining schema we make of the world, that which changes depending on the point of view, the mode of perception or (...) the knowledge of the subject cannot be considered real. The search for invariants allows efficient storage of information and prevision of events which have never been experienced. The concept of‘invariant limit' is introduced and the need of a suitable topology is stressed in order to speak of convergence of successive theories toward reality. (shrink)

SummaryAfter exposing certain confusions , 1 give a sketch of a non‐metaphysical realism which involves the construction of a world‐O, mainly by means of criteria of invariance and of independence of variables.This world‐O facilitates description of the relationships of sensations among themselves and with actions. It includes the subject objectivized with his subjectivity , which makes it possible to describe without difficulty the relationship between this subject and the world. This realism reconstructs as it were realism from an idealist standpoint, (...) but allows for all the distinctions characteristic of realism: between illusion and reality, between that which represents and that which is represented, etc. Finally, the world‐O is not its own standard: the sensations for which it makes prediction are compared with those that are actually perceived, thus allowing its appropriateness to be verified. (shrink)

RésuméL'auteur montre que si l'argumentation d'Einstein paraǐt classique sur presque tous les points, elle ne l'est pas sur un point fondamental, qui est l'égalité de la vitesse de la lumière dans toutes les directions. Si l'on laisse tomber ce postulat, on retombe sur la simultanéité absolue. D'autre part, ce « classicisme » est légitime et apparaǐt au contraire comme une habileté didactique. Enfin, il montre que le point qui déroute M. Evans, c'est la relativité de la vitesse relative, qui n'existe (...) pas en physique classique.The author shows that although Einstein's argument seems classical in almost all points, it fails to be in one very important point: the equality of the velocity of light for all observers. When setting aside this postulate, one returns to the absolute simultaneity. On the other hand, this almost classical argument is perfectly valid from the relativistic point of view and appears as a didactic cleverness. The author shows finally that the point deceiving Mr. Evans is the relativity of the relative velocity, that does not exist in classical physics. (shrink)

Il est assez rare qu’un concept philosophique s’échappe de l’arène académique. C’est pourtant le cas du concept de spécisme, qui a fait une entrée remarquée dans la sphère publique au cours de la dernière décennie. Il est désormais au cœur du débat de société sur nos devoirs envers les animaux non humains. Hélas, ce concept et les enjeux qu’il soulève sont souvent mal compris. Nombreux sont les auteurs qui contestent sa légitimité alors qu’ils le maitrisent mal. D’autres l’utilisent plus volontiers (...) sans toutefois mieux le comprendre. Les confusions qui entourent cette notion l’empêche de contribuer à la discussion autant qu’elle le pourrait. Le présent ouvrage entend remédier à cet état de faits en donnant de la notion de spécisme une présentation à la fois assez précise pour rendre justice aux discussions philosophiques dont elle fait l’objet et suffisamment claire pour être accessible à quiconque s’intéresse au statut moral des animaux. Il se divise en deux parties. La première aborde des questions ontologiques : Qu’est-ce exactement que le spécisme ? À quelles conditions existe-t-il ? Ces conditions sont-elles remplies dans les faits ? Quant à la seconde, elle porte sur des questions éthiques : Le spécisme peut-il être justifié ? Faut-il au contraire le condamner au même titre que le racisme et le sexisme ? (shrink)

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed (...) to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not thesufficient and necessaryconditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...) the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand. (shrink)

Plato’s works have been the object of countless interpretations and recuperations ever since Greek antiquity. In the context of prenazi Germany, the writer Hans F.K. Günther published a work in defence of eugenic theories (aiming to improve man through authoritarian laws), allegedly based on the work of the Athenian philosopher and entitled Platon als Hüter des Lebens (“Plato as Protector of Life”). The present article tries to set forth what is at stake in that propaganda piece, its historical context, as (...) well as the disquieting implications of such an “appropriation” of classical philosophy to purely political ends. (shrink)

Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethic without sentience.

In May 1968, Gilles Deleuze was an established philosopher teaching at the innovative Vincennes University, just outside of Paris. Félix Guattari was a political militant and the director of an unusual psychiatric clinic at La Borde. Their meeting was quite unlikely, yet the two were introduced in an arranged encounter of epic consequence. From that moment on, Deleuze and Guattari engaged in a surprising, productive partnership, collaborating on several groundbreaking works, including _Anti-Oedipus_, _What Is Philosophy?_ and _A Thousand Plateaus_. (...) class='Hi'>François Dosse, a prominent French intellectual known for his work on the Annales School, structuralism, and biographies of the pivotal intellectuals Paul Ricoeur, Pierre Chaunu, and Michel de Certeau, examines the prolific if improbable relationship between two men of distinct and differing sensibilities. Drawing on unpublished archives and hundreds of personal interviews, Dosse elucidates a collaboration that lasted more than two decades, underscoring the role that family and history—particularly the turbulent time of May 1968—play in their monumental work. He also takes the measure of Deleuze and Guattari's posthumous fortunes and the impact of their thought on intellectual, academic, and professional circles. (shrink)

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead (...) us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb. (shrink)

La philosophie bergsonnienne a rendu le monde de ses contemporains moins opaque, les aidant à lui trouver un sens. Si la France cartésienne coïncide avec les partisans de la démocratie parlementaire ancrée à gauche, celle de Bergson recrute ses plus gros bataillons dans la droite nationale, conservatrice, mais également dans une gauche antiparlementaire, révolutionnaire.

Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...) of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: Notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem,” which I think is a part of the illusion problem. In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion. (shrink)

The variety-of-evidence thesis has been criticized by Bovens and Hartmann. This article points to two limitations of their Bayesian model: the conceptualization of unreliable evidential sources as randomizing and the restriction to comparing full independence to full dependence. It is shown that the variety-of-evidence thesis is rehabilitated when unreliable sources are reconceptualized as systematically biased. However, it turns out that allowing for degrees of independence leads to a qualification of the variety-of-evidence thesis: as Bovens and Hartmann claimed, more independence does (...) not always imply stronger confirmation. (shrink)

This article maintains that an important class of scientific generalizations should be reinterpreted: they have typically been understood as ceteris paribus laws, but are, in fact, generics. Four arguments are presented to support this thesis. One argument is that the interpretation in terms of ceteris paribus laws is a historical accident. The other three arguments draw on similarities between these generalizations and archetypal generics: they come with similar inferential commitments, they share a syntactic form, and the existing theories to make (...) sense of them are alike. Once these generalizations are properly understood as generics, the recent cognitive approach to generics can be extended to the study of the relevant sciences. The last section indicates ways in which this extension is fruitful for the two strands of research that we combine: the philosophy of science literature on generalizations and the semantics literature on generics. (shrink)

This article examines two theses formulated by Russo and Williamson in their study of causal inference in the health sciences. The two theses are assessed against evidence from a specific case in the social sciences, i.e., research on the institutional determinants of the aggregate unemployment rate. The first Russo–Williamson Thesis is that a causal claim can only be established when it is jointly supported by difference-making and mechanistic evidence. This thesis is shown not to hold. While researchers in my case (...) study draw extensively on both types of evidence, one causal claim out of the three analyzed is established even though it is exclusively supported by mechanistic evidence. The second Russo–Williamson Thesis is that standard accounts of causality fail to handle the dualist epistemology highlighted in the first Thesis. I argue that a counterfactual-manipulationist account of causality—which is endorsed by many philosophers as well as many social scientists—can perfectly make sense of the typical strategy in my case study to draw on both difference-making and mechanistic evidence; it is just an instance of the common strategy of increasing evidential variety. (shrink)

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead (...) us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb. (shrink)

Content Description #Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nulle réalité du monde n'est plus familière à l'homme que l'homme, de tous les vivants le plus proche de lui-même puisque capable de se penser et de se dire, et toujours en souci de soi. Une familiarité évidente à l'existant préoccupé de souligner sa spécificité tant à l'endroit des autres vivants que de ses semblables ; et pourtant l'évidence demeure si peu sûre de sa prétention qu'elle ne parvient jamais à faire taire, en elle, l'interrogation au sujet de l'identité de (...) celui qui s'affirme comme un homme. Si l'être humain demeure problématique à lui-même, ce n'est pas dans son action ni dans le fonctionnement de son intellect, ni même dans le tumulte de ses passions individuelles et collectives, mais par le caractère incertain de son destin. Vivre, c'est être confronté à la mort, son échéance ultime, comme, également, au chaos que chaque homme porte en lui-même. De ce fait, il ne peut éprouver sa propre vie que sous le signe de la précarité, en une interrogation rendue d'autant plus aiguë que l'existence prend une conscience plus vive de sa singularité propre. Le point essentiel de la question sur l'homme a donc son centre de gravité en cette contradiction qui le constitue ainsi qu'il est. Aussi, l'être humain ne peut-il être rencontré que dans cet entre-deux où la force de sa prétention demeure inséparable de la précarité de son être dans la vie. (shrink)

Cet essai insiste avant tout sur la pluralité et la complexité de l'inscription, de l'œuvre musicale dans le temps. Si c'est incontestablement au XXe siècle que se sont multipliées les avancées, ces dernières n'en seront pas moins mises en regard d'expériences antérieures souvent décisives, comme celle du style classique par exemple. La malléabilité de sa morphologie (le temps est celui de son mode de déroutement), se lit ainsi tout autant dans la pensée grammaticale que dans les conduites formelles. Celles-ci se (...) jouent tout d'abord dans la priorité donnée à l'assise technique du langage, aux limites parfois d'une abstraction nécessaire à la définition de l'outil, mais ensuite et surtout, dans l'exploration souvent insaisissable du passé, du présent et du a futur. Les mises en perspectives (dialectiques ou non), le jeu sur les effets de la réminiscence, de la prémonition du retour, ou au contraire, la concentration sur l'instant, le moment, dévouent l'élasticité du temps que la musique modifie au gré de ses constructions, jusqu'à parfois le dissoudre aux limites de la perception qui seront invoquées en fin d'ouvrage. (shrink)

This paper analyzes recent attempts to reject reproduction with lineage formation as a necessary condition for evolution by means of natural selection :560–570, 2008; Stud Hist Philos Sci Part C Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 42:106–114, 2011; Bourrat in Biol Philos 29:517–538, 2014; Br J Philos Sci 66:883–903, 2015; Charbonneau in Philos Sci 81:727–740, 2014; Doolittle and Inkpen in Proc Natl Acad Sci 115:4006–4014, 2018). Building on the strengths of these attempts and avoiding their pitfalls, it is argued that (...) a robust formulation of evolution by natural selection without reproduction can be established. The main contribution of this paper is a reformulation of Lewontin’s three principles stating that minimal evolution by natural selection occurs when two conditions are met in a population: fitness-related variation and memory. Paradigmatic evolution by natural selection, which can generate adaptations, takes place when an additional condition is present, namely regeneration. (shrink)

Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The present (...) paper defends a negative answer to that question, based on a debunking argument. The intuitive belief that humans matter more than other animals is unjustified because it results from an epistemically defective process. It is largely shaped by tribalism, our tendency to favor ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. And this influence is distortive for two reasons. First, tribalism evolved for reasons unrelated to moral truths; hence, it would at best produce true moral beliefs accidentally. Second, tribalism generates a vast quantity of false moral beliefs, starting with racist beliefs. Once this intuition is discarded, little evidence remains that speciesism is morally acceptable. (shrink)