Until less than a century ago, the two prevailing views of dreams as well as of souls were that they are inconsequential or of divine origin. In either case it was assumed that they cannot be objects of rational inquiry. Similar views still prevail regarding mystical experiences and mysticism in general. Modern Western opinion, whether friendly or hostile, holds that the mystical falls squarely within the domain of the irrational. Mr. Staal argues that mysticism can be studied rationally, and that (...) without such study no theory of mind is complete. He exposes the grounds for the belief that mysticism cannot be studied, and shows them to be prejudices issuing from a particular historical development. While his contention has unflattering implications for the contemporary study of the humanities in general, it reveals in particular that existing academic approaches to the study of mysticism, even those that appear sound, are in fact inadequate. This conclusion applies to a variety of dogmatic inquiries and, as becomes clear in these pages, to philological, historical, phenomenological, sociological, physiological, and psychological ones as well. The illustrations in _Exploring Mysticism_ are drawn mainly from Indian forms of mysticism such as Yoga, supplemented with Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim and Christian examples. (shrink)

This paper is a design which will bring into relief certain striking and crucial similarities between things said in Spinoza's Ethics and Wang Yang-ming's Instructions for Practical Living . I am not concerned with points of close scholarship. My purpose is to deepen our understanding of The Ethics and perhaps, thereby, to make it more useful than it has been. I want also to bring this out: if we read these men as though they presented a philosophy or had worked (...) out a system of ideas, their usefulness as teachers is lost. Finally, I am trying by these means to make mysticism clearer. (shrink)

This article is concerned with frege's "sinn und bedeutung", As an examination of (1) a statement and analysis of frege's argument, And (2) specification and justification of a meaning of 'sense' which fits the data of frege's discussion and does not make 'sense' a subsistent entity. (staff).

The article relates Ch'an Buddhism, to Western thought via the philosophy of Spinoza, in particular through the concept of substance. It shows that Spinoza abandoned this concept as a fundamental metaphysical one. The consequent reuse of ?substance? requires a re?examination of the concepts of property and identity. It is seen that Spinoza made this drastic break with Western tradition by experiencing egolessness, the psychological basis for his metaphysical moves. The move is illustrated by the development of quantum physics. Egolessness and (...) a rethinking of identity are basic to a feeling for, if not an understanding of, Ch'an Buddhism. (shrink)

With the proviso that Spinoza's concerns were philosophical, not medical, we examine the Ethics with a view to bringing out those aspects of it which are of import for mental health. We find that the Ethics surrounds the idea that man can be egoless in the Buddhist sense of that term. This concept provides a criterion of mental health. Further, according to Spinoza's theory of the Affections, those which are passive include some which are based on pain. These he 'enumerates (...) among the diseases'. And for them he provides, in Part V, specific 'remedies'. This in turn leads him to equate 'Mental Freedom or beatitude' with a 'healthy Mind'. We thus have in Part V additional possible criteria of mental health. Finally, there is the suggestion that philosophy for Spinoza was a kind of therapy.' There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. — The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. — A main cause of philosophical disease — a onesided diet . . . Wittgenstein This doctrine of knowledge first and action later is not a minor disease . . . My present advocacy of the unity of knowledge and action is precisely the medicine for that disease. Wang Yang-ming When asked by two disciples which of the views of each was correct, Wang replied: both are. Which is used depends on the kind of person you are trying to help. Some persons need this one, others that. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that the Tractatus and the Investigations can be related as follows. Wittgenstein attempted in the Tractatus to avoid the conceptual realism of Frege and Russell with respect to propositions. He solved his problem by developing the picture-theory of language. This solution assumed that the units of language are words which arc names of simple objects. Because of this assumption the solution has the undesirable consequence that examples oi genuine names, atomic facts and atomic propositions (...) cannot be given although their existence is logically required by the solution. Wittgenstein had, therefore, eventually to examine the idea of a name. Thus the Philosophical Investigations in which this examination is conducted. (shrink)

The thesis of my article, 'Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation' ( Inquiry, Vol. 7 [1964], No. 4), was that Wittgenstein solved some early problems with a picture theory of language. The solution assumed that the units of language are words which are names of simple objects. Its undesirable consequences are exposed in my 'Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914-1916' ( Inquiry, Vol. 12 [1969], No. 3). Because of these consequences Wittgenstein was led to analyze the idea of a name. This analysis, together with (...) a new philosophic method, was developed in The Blue and Brown Books and the Investigations. The present article concerns this development and supports a theme of the first article that there was a central tendency in all Wittgenstein's work: radical empiricism. (shrink)

The thesis of my article, ?Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation? (Inquiry, Vol. 7 [1964], No. 4), was that Wittgenstein solved some early problems with a picture theory of language. The solution assumed that the units of language are words which are names of simple objects. Its undesirable consequences are exposed in my ?Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914?1916? (Inquiry, Vol. 12 [1969], No. 3). Because of these consequences Wittgenstein was led to analyze the idea of a name. This analysis, together with a new (...) philosophic method, was developed in The Blue and Brown Books and the Investigations. The present article concerns this development and supports a theme of the first article that there was a central tendency in all Wittgenstein's work: radical empiricism. (shrink)

The thesis of the author's article, ?Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation? (Inquiry, Vol. 7 (1964), No. 4), was that Wittgenstein solved some early problems he faced by developing a picture theory of language. This solution assumed that the units of language are words which are names of simple objects. The present article traces the development of this solution through the Notebooks, 1914?1916. This serves to substantiate another thesis of the earlier article, that Wittgenstein's work from the Tractatus to The Remarks (...) on the Foundations of Mathematics was all of one piece and that there is a continuous line of development from the earliest work through all of the Wittgensteinian material which has been published. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...) in cognitive science. I demonstrate that Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims about Marr’s theory are false. Marr’s computational theory contains a mathematical theory of visual content, based on empirical psychophysical evidence. It also contains mathematical descriptions of distal physical surfaces and objects, and of their optic projection to the perceiver. Much computational research on vision contains these types of intentional and externalist components within the formal, mathematical, theories. Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims demonstrate inadequate study and understanding of Marr’s work and other research in this area. Computational theories of vision, by containing empirically based mathematical theories of visual content, to this extent present naturalizations of semantics. (shrink)

Paul Thom's book presents Kilwardby's science of logic as a body of demonstrative knowledge about inferences and their validity, about the semantics of non-modal and modal propositions, and about the logic of genus and species. This science is thoroughly intensional. It grounds the logic of inference on "that in virtue of which" the inference holds. It bases the truth conditions of propositions on relations between conceptual entities. It explains the logic of genus and species through the notion of essence. (...) Thom interprets this science as a formal logic of intensions with its own proof theory and semantics. This comprehensive reconstruction of Kilwardby's logic shows the medieval master to be one of the most interesting logicians of the thirteenth century. (shrink)

De milieuproblematiek staat pas sinds kort op de agenda als een fenomeen dat de mensheid bedreigt. Toch blijkt het negentiende-eeuwse gedachtegoed van Karl Marx verrassende inzichten te bieden om deze actuele problemen te duiden. Marx laat zien dat het menselijk ingrijpen in de natuur leidt tot zelfvervreemding: de mens ondermijnt zijn bestaan als een wezen dat zelf deel uitmaakt van de natuur. Deze zelfvervreemding cumuleert in de kapitalistische samenleving. Marx lezend zien we dat de milieuproblematiek geen historische vergissing is, maar (...) fundamenteel samenhangt met de mens als redelijk wezen. Onze beheersingsrede heeft geleid tot de vervreemding van de natuur. Toch geeft dezelfde rede die de mens de vrijheid biedt zich boven het ecologische evenwicht te verheffen, hem de mogelijkheid zich te verzoenen met de natuur. Marx verwijst naar dit dubbele gezicht van de rede als hij stelt dat het 'rijk van de vrijheid' in de schoot van het kapitalisme wordt geboren. In dit boek onderzoekt Paul Cobben welke aanzetten de huidige samenleving biedt om vorm te geven aan de verzoening met de natuur. Paul Cobben is emeritus hoogleraar geschiedenis van de moderne filosofie aan Tilburg University. Momenteel is hij gastonderzoeker aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam en redacteur van de serie 'Critical Studies in German Idealism'. Van zijn hand verscheen o.a. 'Value in Capitalist Society. Rethinking Marx's Criticism of Capitalism' (2015)."-- Publisher information. (shrink)

The Renaissance was a period of great intellectual change and innovation as philosophers rediscovered the philosophy of classical antiquity and passed it on to the modern age. Renaissance philosophy is distinct both from the medieval scholasticism, based on revelation and authority, and from philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who transformed it into new philosophical systems. Despite the importance of the Renaissance to the development of philosophy over time, it has remained largely understudied by historians of philosophy and professional (...) philosophers. This anthology aims to correct this by providing scholars and students of philosophy with representative translations of the most important philosophers of the Renaissance. Its purpose is to help readers appreciate philosophy in the Renaissance and its importance in the history of philosophy. The anthology includes translations from philosophers from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and it ranges from works on moral and political philosophy, to metaphysics, epistemology, and natural philosophy, thereby providing historians and students of philosophy with a sense for the nature, breadth, and complexity of philosophy in the Renaissance. Each translation is accompanied by an introduction by a historian of Renaissance philosophy, as well as select secondary sources, in order to encourage further study. (shrink)

The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and (...) pragmatic goals. Hence there is no independent or uniform fact to the matter, and I advance the ‘anti-realist’ conclusion that computational descriptions of physical systems are not founded upon deep ontological distinctions, but rather upon interest-relative human conventions. Hence physical computation is a ‘conventional’ rather than a ‘natural’ kind. (shrink)

We sometimes strive to achieve difficult goals when our evidence suggests that success is unlikely – not just because it will require strength of will, but because we are targets of prejudice and discrimination or because success will require unusual ability. Optimism about one’s prospects can be useful for persevering in these cases. That said, excessive optimism can be dangerous; when our evidence is unfavourable, we should be at most agnostic about whether we will succeed. This paper explores the nature (...) and rational significance of agnostic practical commitments. Most importantly, the rationality of striving against the odds can depend on investing in a plan for failure: a plan B. I aim to make headway on an account of what backup plans are, how they are related to primary plans, and whether the standard norms of plan rationality apply to our agnostic commitments. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology contains 19 previously unpublished chapters by today's leading figures in the field. These chapters function not only as a survey of key areas, but as original scholarship on a range of vital topics. Written accessibly for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and professional philosophers, the Handbook explains the main ideas and problems of contemporary epistemology while avoiding overly technical detail.

The hatchet and the seed -- A tree with deep roots -- The critical tools -- A field crystallizes -- Destruction of nature -- Construction of nature -- Degradation and marginalization -- Conservation and control -- Environmental conflict -- Environmental identity and social movement -- Where to now?

Le philosophe, collègue et ami de Michel Foucault, fait le portrait de ce dernier et présente les grands thèmes de sa pensée philosophique et politique.