Wittgenstein and the naming relation

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):329 – 347 (1964)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that the Tractatus and the Investigations can be related as follows. Wittgenstein attempted in the Tractatus to avoid the conceptual realism of Frege and Russell with respect to propositions. He solved his problem by developing the picture-theory of language. This solution assumed that the units of language are words which arc names of simple objects. Because of this assumption the solution has the undesirable consequence that examples oi genuine names, atomic facts and atomic propositions cannot be given although their existence is logically required by the solution. Wittgenstein had, therefore, eventually to examine the idea of a name. Thus the Philosophical Investigations in which this examination is conducted.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,662

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Wittgenstein, Truth-Functions, and Generality.Michael Scanlan - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:175-193.
Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown Books (Part One).Paul Wienpahl - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):267 – 319.
Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown Books (Part Two).Paul Wienpahl - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):434 - 457.
Essays on Wittgenstein.Elmer Daniel Klemke - 1971 - Urbana, University of Illinois Press.
The Tractatus on Logical Consequence.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):425-442.
Clear as Mud.Dawn M. Phillips - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:277-294.
Wittgenstein's Notebooks, 1914-1916.Paul Wienpahl - 1969 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):287 – 316.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-03-05

Downloads
20 (#559,613)

6 months
1 (#419,921)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references