In the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics, the term “autonomy” is generally used to mean the capacity of an artificial agent to operate independently of human guidance. It is thereby assumed that the agent has a fixed goal or “utility function” with respect to which the appropriateness of its actions will be evaluated. From a philosophical perspective, this notion of autonomy seems oddly weak. For, in philosophy, the term is generally used to refer to a stronger capacity, namely the (...) capacity to “give oneself the law,” to decide by oneself what one’s goal or principle of action will be. The predominant view in the literature on the long-term prospects and risks of artificial intelligence is that an artificial agent cannot exhibit such autonomy because it cannot rationally change its own final goal, since changing the final goal is counterproductive with respect to that goal and hence undesirable. The aim of this paper is to challenge this view by showing that it is based on questionable assumptions about the nature of goals and values. I argue that a general AI may very well come to modify its final goal in the course of developing its understanding of the world. This has important implications for how we are to assess the long-term prospects and risks of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

The thinkers who have reflected on the problem of a coming superintelligence have generally seen the issue as a technological problem, a problem of how to control what the superintelligence will do. I argue that this approach is probably mistaken because it is based on questionable assumptions about the behavior of intelligent agents and, moreover, potentially counterproductive because it might, in the end, bring about the existential catastrophe that it is meant to prevent. I contend that the problem posed by (...) a future superintelligence will likely be a political problem, that is, one of establishing a peaceful form of coexistence with other intelligent agents in a situation of mutual vulnerability, and not a technological problem of control. (shrink)

In recent European philosophy, and especially in Heidegger, Arendt, Derrida, and Badiou, the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary, or between normality and “event,” has played a very prominent role. In the present paper, I raise a challenge to this distinction, a challenge inspired by Deleuze’s conception of repetition and difference. Is it not the case that every occurrence in some ways reproduces and in some ways deviates from the past, such that nothing is entirely extraordinary and nothing completely (...) normal? The purpose of the paper is to examine whether the ordinary/extraordinary distinction—or the notion of event, respectively—can be defended against this challenge, i.e., whether it can be given a rigorous definition. Drawing on and departing from the named philosophers, I show that there are three alternative responses—the route of subjective experience, of transcendence, and of negation—and assess their respective merits. (shrink)

Arendt claims that our natality (i.e., our condition of being born) is the “source” or “root” of our capacity to begin (i.e., of our capacity to initiate something new). But she does not fully explain this claim. How does the capacity to begin derive from the condition of birth? That Arendt does not immediately and unambiguously provide an answer to this question can be seen in the fact that her notion of natality has received very different interpretations. In the present (...) paper, I seek to clarify the notion. I bring together and examine Arendt’s scattered remarks about natality and propose a new interpretation that responds to the stated question. Along the way, I show how the various existing interpretations have arisen and argue that, in view of that question, they are inadequate. (shrink)

Political action is unpredictable because it unfolds among a plurality of independent actors. This unpredictability generates a fundamental puzzle: If an actor cannot know where her initiative will lead, what motivates and guides her in her doings? The aim of this paper is to develop and defend the solution to the puzzle that we can find in the thought of Hannah Arendt, namely the idea that political action is – or should be – motivated and guided by principles, principles like (...) justice, equality, or honour. Such principles must be distinguished from goals because they do not designate a specific state of affairs, but are general ideas that allow for diverse implementations. I show that this distinction is of great practical importance for the actors involved, since their outlook and their attitude towards others will differ depending on whether they see their activity as aimed at a goal or as guided by a principle. (shrink)

The Stoics offer us a very puzzling conception of causation and an equally puzzling ontology. The aim of the present paper is to show that these two elements of their system elucidate each other. The Stoic conception of causation, I contend, holds the key to understanding the ontological category of incorporeals and thus Stoic ontology as a whole, and it can in turn only be understood in the light of this connection to ontology. The thesis I defend is that the (...) Stoic incorporeals are to be understood as effects, as effects of the causality of bodies. What is gained by this thesis? First, it explains how the seemingly heterogeneous item of ‘sayables’ (lekta) fits into the category of incorporeals. Second, it allows for a new interpretation of the two verbs with which the Stoics characterize the way of being of incorporeals, huphistanai and huparchein. And, third, it sheds light on the peculiar features of the Stoic conception of causation. (shrink)

Many researchers are working toward the goal of finding a treatment that halts or even reverses the aging process of the human body, a treatment that would make the recipient potentially immortal. The hope that they will succeed in the relatively near future is gaining ground among academics and laypeople alike. What will happen if this hope becomes reality? Specifically, how will our political and social institutions and practices be affected by that discovery? These are the questions raised in the (...) present paper. Concretely, I will discuss three political and social problems that the invention of an immortality treatment is likely to provoke, namely the struggle for access to that treatment, the threat of overpopulation, and the friction between potentially immortal individuals. (shrink)

The term “cyborg” is being used in a surprising variety of ways. Some authors argue that the human being as such is—and has always been—a cyborg (Clark, Sorgner). Others see the term as describing what is peculiar about humanity in the present era (Haraway, Case). Still others reserve it for some current forms of human existence (Moe and Sandler, Warwick). Lastly, Clynes and Kline, who originally introduced the term, use it as referring to possibilities of the future. In the present (...) paper, I examine what is at stake in this disagreement. I highlight that the different uses of the term “cyborg” can be seen as being based on one and the same conception of the human being and its relationship to technology, namely, the idea that human-machine hybridization is a gradual, longstanding and ongoing process. I explain how, arising from this common idea, the existing uses of “cyborg” diverge. I then raise the question of which of these uses is the most plausible or useful. (shrink)

In On Revolution and other writings, Arendt expresses her enthusiasm for the council system, a bottom-up political structure based on local councils that are open to all citizens and so allow them to participate in government. This aspect of her thought has been sharply criticized – ‘a curiously unrealistic commitment’ (Margaret Canovan), ‘a naiveté’ (Albrecht Wellmer) – or, more often, simply ignored. How, her readers generally wonder, could Arendt in all seriousness advocate the council system as an alternative to parliamentary (...) democracy? In this paper, I will pursue two distinct but related aims. First, I want to show that Arendt’s ideal of council politics is an integral element of her thought. It is connected to – indeed, follows from – some of her most central notions, namely her concept of freedom, her valuation of ‘public happiness’ and her distinction between opinion and interest. Second, I want to defend the ideal in the face of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I seek to show that it is a cogent and pertinent proposition, not ‘a curiously unrealistic commitment’. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit den religiösen und politischen Leitvorstellungen Friedrich Naumanns, dessen Lebensweg im Wilhelminischen Deutschland reich an konzeptionellen Neuorientierungen zu sein scheint. Nach seinem anfänglichen Engagement für die christlich-soziale Bewegung, die den Reich-Gottes-Gedanken zu einem Konzept sozialer Gerechtigkeit nutzte, trat Naumann ab 1898 im Sinne des politischen Liberalismus verstärkt für eine Trennung von Religion und Politik ein, um schließlich unter Betonung nationaler und sozialdarwinistischer Interessen eine Zivilreligion zu formulieren. Diese Veränderung, daß dem christlichen Glauben für die politische (...) Ethik nur noch eine marginale Bedeutung eingeräumt wurde, wird meist als ein größerer Bruch in Naumanns Biographie bewertet. Der Aufsatz vertritt demgegenüber die Auffassung, daß trotz aller Wandlungen in der Auffassung von Religion und Politik Naumanns Ziel immer dasselbe blieb, nämlich einen Beitrag zur Förderung menschlicher Gemeinschaft zu leisten. (shrink)

In contrast to Christian theology that has ignored science, this essay suggests that a credible doctrine of God as creator must take into account scientific understandings of the world. The introduction of the principle of inertia into seventeenth‐century science and philosophy helped change the traditional idea of God as creator (which included divine conservation and governance) into a deist concept of God. To recapture the idea that God continually creates, it is important to affirm the contingency of the world as (...) a whole and of all events in the world. Reflecting on the interrelationship of contingency and natural law provides a framework for relating scientific theories of a universal field, the concept of emergent evolution, and the theological concept of eternal divine spirit active in all creation. (shrink)

Augustine thought of miracles simply as unusual events that contradict our accustomed views of the course of nature but not nature itself. According to that definition of miracle, no contradiction of natural laws need be assumed. It is sufficient to regard unusual occurrences as "signs" of God’s special activity in creation. (edited).

In this statement, the author poses a number of questions that he believes John Polkinghorne left untouched in his response to Pannenberg's article “God as Spirit—and Natural Science.” These questions include the role of philosophy in the interaction between theology and science, the concepts of space and time as prior to measurement, the relation between top‐down and bottom‐up thinking, and the concept of field.

. Philip Hefner's focus on contingency and field as the guiding concepts in my thinking and his characterization of my theological enterprise as a Lakatosian research program are appropriate and helpful.I welcome Jeffrey Wicken's holistic approach to the emergence of life. Theology can appropriate the language of self‐organizing systems exploiting the thermodynamic flow of energy degradation for interpreting organic life as a creation of the Spirit of God.However, I cannot sympathize with Lindon Eaves's equation of “hard science” with a reductionism (...) which raises the double helix to the status of icon; the “meaning” of DNA derives from its place in the total phenomenon of life—not the reverse.Frank Tipler's cosmology raises the prospect of a rapprochement between physics and theology in the area of eschatology. A Christian cosmology, however, would require at least three modifications: contingency in the history of creation; the uniqueness of Jesus' resurrection; and the relation of these to the problem of evil. (shrink)

I interpret several key events in the history of the relationship between Christianity and science and conclude that there is no reason for assuming a fundamental conflict between science and religion. Christian theologians should feel confident in using the science of our day to retell the story of God's creation of the world.