In this detailed study of the republican tradition in the development of the Enlightenment, the central problem of utopia and reform is crystallized in a discussion of the right to punish. Describing the political situation in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the author shows how the old republics in Italy, Poland and Holland stagnated and were unable to survive in the age of absolutism. The Philosophes discussed the ideal of republicanism against this background. They were particularly influenced by (...) the political and religious radicalism of John Toland, which had survived the English Restoration and was then reaching Europe. Professor Venturi traces the debate on the penal laws and the attempt to relate utopian ideas of society to the practical problem of dealing with man in society, which culminated in the assertion by many Philosophes that an unjust social system necessitated harsh penal laws, thereby rejecting the possibility of reform. (shrink)

This article has two aims. The first is to outline Franco Venturi's ideas on absolutist monarchy and to highlight new analytical perspectives of his interest in the achievements of the reformist sovereigns. The second is to help shed light on his complex intellectual life. The article begins by underlining how Venturi's historical insights make it difficult to single out a unanimous understanding of absolutist monarchy, and then develops by reconstructing different notions of monarchy. These are: (1) monarchy (...) as a dynamic impetus capable of renewing society in the ancien régime, (2) monarchy as a fundamental, albeit complex, collaboration between power and the intellectual, (3) monarchy as the ground in which libertarian ferment matured, (4) monarchy as a force that provoked revolts and rebellions. Focusing particularly on this last idea, the article suggests how Venturi's interest in the sovereigns’ actions grew in part from his sympathy for and appreciation of the rebellions to which their reformist policies gave rise. This particular perspective makes it possible to observe an ever-present streak of radicalism in Venturi's ideas. (shrink)

In his 1969 Trevelyan Lectures, Franco Venturi argued that Kant's response to the question ?What is Enlightenment?? has tended to promote a ?philosophical interpretation? of the Enlightenment that leads scholars away from the political questions that were central to its concerns. But while Kant's response is well known, it has been often misunderstood by scholars who see it as offering a definition of an historical period, rather than an attempt at characterizing a process that had a significant implications. (...) This article seeks (1) to clarify, briefly, the particular question that Kant was answering, (2) to examine ? using Jürgen Habermas? work as a case in point ? the tension between readings that use Kant's answer as a way of discussing the Enlightenment as a discrete historical period and those readings that see it as offering a broad outline of an ?Enlightenment Project? that continues into the present, and (3) to explore how Michel Foucault, in a series of discussions of Kant's response, sketched an approach to Kant's text that offers a way of reframing Venturi's distinction between ?philosophical? and ?political? interpretations of the Enlightenment. ??Thanks to an invitation from Karlis Racevskis, an earlier version of this article was delivered as the George R. Havens Lecture at Ohio State University in May 2007. I have also benefitted from discussions at a workshop arranged by Kenneth Baynes at Syracuse University in November 2009. (shrink)

Despite their controversial ontological status, the discussion on arbitrary objects has been reignited in recent years. According to the supporting views, they present interesting and unique qualities. Among those, two define their nature: their assuming of values, and the way in which they present properties. Leon Horsten has advanced a particular view on arbitrary objects which thoroughly describes the earlier, arguing they assume values according to a sui generis modality, which he calls afthairetic. In this paper, we offer a general (...) method for defining the minimal system of this modality for any given first-order theory, and possible extensions of it that incorporate further aspects of Horsten’s account. The minimal system presents an unconventional inference rule, which deals with two different notions of derivability. For this reason and the failure of the Necessitation rule, in its full generality, the resulting system is non-normal. Then, we provide conditional soundness and completeness results for the minimal system and its extensions. (shrink)

"Die vorliegende Fassung des Textes wurde anhand des englischen Originalmanuskriptes von Franco Selleri unter Mitarbeit von Roman U. Sexl erstellt."--T.p. verso.

In the Tractatus, it is stated that questions about logical formatting cannot be meaningfully formulated, since it is precisely the application of logical rules which enables the formulation of a question whatsoever; analogously, Wittgenstein’s celebrated infinite regress argument on rule-following seems to undermine any explanation of deduction, as relying on a logical argument. On the other hand, some recent mathematical developments of the Curry-Howard bridge between proof theory and type theory address the issue of describing the “subjective” side of logic, (...) that is, the concrete manipulation of rules and proofs in space and time. It is advocated that such developments can shed some light on the question of logical formatting and its apparently unintelligible paradoxes, thus reconsidering Wittgenstein’s verdict. (shrink)

Spingersi ai confini dell'esperienza del corpo - amore, sofferenza, vecchiaia, morte - attraverso la letteratura, la filosofia, le arti figurative, eventi etico-politici e personali, frammenti di racconto.

1. La filosofia antica-India, Cina, Grecia -- 2. La filosofia tardo-antica e medioevale: ebraismo, cristianesimo, islamismo -- 3.1. La filosofia moderna: umanesimo, Riforma, rivoluzione scientifica (1350-1715) -- 3.2. La filosofia moderna: illuminismo, criticismo, idealismo (1715-1815) -- 4.1. La filosofia contemporanea: scientismi, sroticismi, irrazionalismi -- 4.2. La filosofia contemporanea: filosofie analitiche e continentali.

In the contemporary philosophy of set theory, discussion of new axioms that purport to resolve independence necessitates an explanation of how they come to be justified. Ordinarily, justification is divided into two broad kinds: intrinsic justification relates to how `intuitively plausible' an axiom is, whereas extrinsic justification supports an axiom by identifying certain `desirable' consequences. This paper puts pressure on how this distinction is formulated and construed. In particular, we argue that the distinction as often presented is neither well-demarcated nor (...) sufficiently precise. Instead, we suggest that the process of justification in set theory should not be thought of as neatly divisible in this way, but should rather be understood as a conceptually indivisible notion linked to the goal of explanation. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the generalization of lattice-valued models of set theory to non-classical contexts. First, we show that there are infinitely many complete bounded distributive lattices, which are neither Boolean nor Heyting algebra, but are able to validate the negation-free fragment of \. Then, we build lattice-valued models of full \, whose internal logic is weaker than intuitionistic logic. We conclude by using these models to give an independence proof of the Foundation axiom from \.

We analyze axioms and postulates as speech acts. After a brief historical appraisal of the concept of axiom in Euclid, Frege, and Hilbert, we evaluate contemporary axiomatics from a linguistic perspective. Our reading is inspired by Hilbert and is meant to account for the assertive, directive, and declarative components of modern axiomatics. We will do this by describing the constitutive and regulative roles that axioms possess with respect to the linguistic practice of mathematics.

We present a case study for the debate between the American and the Australian plans, analyzing a crucial aspect of negation: expressivity within a theory. We discuss the case of non-classical set theories, presenting three different negations and testing their expressivity within algebra-valued structures for ZF-like set theories. We end by proposing a minimal definitional account of negation, inspired by the algebraic framework discussed.

In this paper, we argue for an instrumental form of existence, inspired by Hilbert’s method of ideal elements. As a case study, we consider the existence of contradictory objects in models of non-classical set theories. Based on this discussion, we argue for a very liberal notion of existence in mathematics.

In this paper we extend to non-classical set theories the standard strategy of proving independence using Boolean-valued models. This extension is provided by means of a new technique that, combining algebras (by taking their product), is able to provide product-algebra-valued models of set theories. In this paper we also provide applications of this new technique by showing that: (1) we can import the classical independence results to non-classical set theory (as an example we prove the independence of $\mathsf {CH}$ ); (...) and (2) we can provide new independence results. We end by discussing the role of non-classical algebra-valued models for the debate between universists and multiversists and by arguing that non-classical models should be included as legitimate members of the multiverse. (shrink)

Las Lecciones sobre teoría del significado (1908) constituyen un valioso documento a la hora de estudiar el pensamiento de Edmund Husserl a propósito del lenguaje. Sin embargo, este texto ha sido escasamente considerado por la crítica. En este trabajo, intentaré mostrar que el estudio de los planteos desarrollados en dichas lecciones resulta de gran interés para el análisis de las continuidades y cambios en el pensamiento de Husserl, así como también para la discusión filosófica sobre el lenguaje. Me concentraré en (...) dos temáticas que considero fundamentales y que servirán, a mi entender, para dar cuenta de su espíritu y relevancia: 1) la distinción entre dos conceptos de significado y sus repercusiones en la distinción entre significado y objeto; 2) la relación entre nuestras dinámicas de trato con las cosas y las formas gramaticales en que dicho trato se expresa lingüísticamente. (shrink)