In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and (...) that plants should not have the same moral status as animals, plants should not have any moral status. Put in simpler terms: it is not as bad to eat plants than to eat, say, pigs. While there are still uncertainties around comparative moral and policy implications between animals and plants, given a gradualist account of quasi-sentience and partial moral status, both of which we claim are a matter of degree, we may not have to abolish our convictions by declaring that plants have no sentience or moral status at all. Indeed, we can hold two things at the same time: that animals and plants have moral status, but animals have prima facie more moral status than plants. (shrink)

While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.

Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living and happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful albeit unrealistic. However, recent scienti c breakthroughs in genetic engineering, namely CRISPR/Cas bring the question into public discourse, how the genetic enhancement of humans should be evaluated morally. In 2001, when preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilisation (IVF), enabled parents to select between multiple embryos, Julian Savulescu introduced the principle of procreative bene cence (PPB), stating that parents have the obligations to choose (...) the child that is expected to have the best life. In this paper I argue that accepting the PPB and the consequentialist principle (CP) that two acts with the same consequences are morally on par, commits one to accepting the parental obligation of genetically enhancing one's children. (shrink)

In order to develop a true biological science of consciousness, we have to remove humans from the center of reference and develop a bottom-up comparative study of animal minds, as Donald Griffin intended with his call for a “cognitive ethology.” In this article, I make use of the pathological complexity thesis (Veit 2022a, b, c ) to show that we can firmly ground a comparative study of animal consciousness by drawing on the resources of state-based behavioral life history theory. (...) By comparing the different life histories of gastropods and arthropods, we will be able to make better sense of the possible origins of consciousness and its function for organisms in their natural environments. (shrink)

In their thoughtful article, Malm and Navin (2020) raise concerns about a potentially unjust generational welfare tradeoff between children and adults when it comes to chicken pox. We share their c...

In this article, Walter Parker brings structure and agency to the foreground of the current tumult of public schooling in the United States. He focuses on three structures that are serving as rules and resources for creative agency. These are a discourse of derision about failing schools, a broad mobilization of multiculturalism, and an enduring nationalism. Drawing on Anthony Giddens's structuration theory, Parker examines how these discourses figure in redefining school reform, redefining school curricula, and requiring schools once again (...) to serve nationalistic purposes. (shrink)

Not the least interesting feature in Mr. C. C. J. Webb's new edition of John of Salisbury's Policraticus are the references to the passages of Roman literature from which his author has quoted or borrowed. One cannot speak too highly of the thoroughness with which the editor has carried out this part of his task; that a few cases of borrowing should have passed unnoticed, and the sources of a few quotations evaded his inquiries, was inevitable.

Only six men have written a major work on Old Testament ethics in the last hundred years, and only two of these works, both written before 1900, are in English.

IX. 6. 12. iacere indolem illam Romanam ablatosque cum armis animos; non reddere salutem, non salutantibus dare responsum, non hiscere quemquam prae metu potuisse.

Magni uir ingenii fuerat si illud egisset uia rectiore, si non uitasset intellegi, si non etiam in oratione difflueret. uidebis itaque eloquentiam ebrii hominis inuolutam et errantem et licentiae plenam. Maecenas De Cvltvsvo.* quid turpius ‘amne siluisque ripa comantibus?’ uide ut§ ‘alueum lyntribus arent uersoque uado Ĵ remittant hortos.’ quid? si quis ‘feminae cincinnos** crispat et labris columbatur incipitque suspirans, ut ceruice lassa fanantur nemoris tyranni.’ ‘inremediabilis factio rimantur epulis lagonaque temptant domos et spe mortem exigunt’ Sen. Epp. cxiv 4–5.

Not the least interesting feature in Mr. C. C. J. Webb's new edition of John of Salisbury's Policraticus are the references to the passages of Roman literature from which his author has quoted or borrowed. One cannot speak too highly of the thoroughness with which the editor has carried out this part of his task; that a few cases of borrowing should have passed unnoticed, and the sources of a few quotations evaded his inquiries, was inevitable.

In this essay Walter Okshevsky addresses the question of whether a certain form of dialogically derived agreement can function as an epistemic criterion of moral judgment and ground of moral authority. Okshevsky examines arguments for and against in the literature of educational philosophy and develops Jürgen Habermas's affirmative answer as presented in his discourse theory of morality. Habermas's position is articulated as a moral epistemology and is developed through his critique of the “monologism” of certain aspects of Immanuel Kant's (...) moral theory. Okshevsky concludes with a consideration of some educational implications of Habermas's position. (shrink)

X. 13. 10, with X. 33. 3. Et ille quidem in recusando perstabat: quid ergo attineret leges ferri rogitans quibus per eosdem, qui tulissent, fraus fieret; iam regi leges non regere.

v. 2. ‘Don't parade philosophy: avoid asperum cultum et intonsum caput et quidquid aliud ambitionem peruersa uia sequitur.’ So the MSS. Hense adopts Gertz's ingenious conjecture ambitio nempe. I have before me a list containing some thirty examples of the use of nempe by Seneca. It is very definitely a dialogue particle and is used to introduce the answer to a question, where it is implied that the answer is obvious, to introduce a clause which shews that a statement just (...) urged by the interlocutor though true in itself in no way weakens the original speaker's point ‘Yes, but’ or ‘After all said and done’ and to introduce a premiss the truth of which the interlocutor must grant‘I take it,’ ‘You know.’For examples I may refer to Ira 3.26.1 quare fers aegri rabiem... puerorum proteruas manus? nempe quia etc.; Ep. 4.9 ‘ at uictor te duci iubebit?’ eo nempe quo duceris.; Ep. 124.6 nempe uos... dicitis. There is absolutely no parallel in Seneca to the parenthetical use which Gertz assumes here, and for which I should expect rather the concessive sine dubio. (shrink)

Magni uir ingenii fuerat si illud egisset uia rectiore, si non uitasset intellegi, si non etiam in oratione difflueret. uidebis itaque eloquentiam ebrii hominis inuolutam et errantem et licentiae plenam. Maecenas De Cvltvsvo.* quid turpius ‘amne siluisque ripa comantibus?’ uide ut§ ‘alueum lyntribus arent uersoque uado Ĵ remittant hortos.’ quid? si quis ‘feminae cincinnos** crispat et labris columbatur incipitque suspirans, ut ceruice lassa fanantur nemoris tyranni.’ ‘inremediabilis factio rimantur epulis lagonaque temptant domos et spe mortem exigunt’ Sen. Epp. cxiv 4–5.

liii. 6. Seneca says that we try to conceal from ourselves the fact that we are ill, and can do this for a time. ‘Dubio et incipiente morbo quaeritur nomen, qui ubi ut talaria coepit intendere et utrosque dextros pedes fecit, necesse est podagram confiteri.’.

liii. 6. Seneca says that we try to conceal from ourselves the fact that we are ill, and can do this for a time. ‘Dubio et incipiente morbo quaeritur nomen, qui ubi ut talaria coepit intendere et utrosque dextros pedes fecit, necesse est podagram confiteri.’.

Current views of the control of complex, purposeful movements acknowledge that organizational processes must reconcile multiple concerns. The central priority is of course accomplishing the actor's goal. But in specifying the manner in which this occurs, the action plan must accommodate such factors as the interaction of mechanical forces associated with the motion of a multilinked system (classical mechanics) and, in many cases, intrinsic bias toward preferred movement patterns, characterized by so-called “coordination dynamics.” The most familiar example of the latter (...) is the symmetry constraint, where spatial trajectories and/or temporal landmarks (e.g., reversal points) of concurrentlymoving body segments (limbs, digits, etc.) exhibit mutual attraction. The natural coordination tendencies that emerge through these constraints can facilitate or hinder motor control, depending on the degree of congruency with the desired movement pattern. Motor control theorists have long recognized the role of classical mechanics in theories of movement organization, but an appreciation of the importance of intrinsic interlimb bias has been gained only recently.Although detailed descriptions of temporal coordination dynamics have been provided, systematic attempts to identify additional salient dimensions of interlimb constraint have been lacking. We develop and implement here a novel method for examining this problem by exploiting two robust principles of psychomotor behavior, the symmetry constraint and the Two-Thirds Power Law. Empirical evidence is provided that the relative spatial patterns of concurrently moving limbs are naturally constrained in much the same manner as previously identified temporal constraints and, further, that apparent velocity interference is an indirect, secondary consequence of primary spatial assimilation. The theoretical implications of spatial interference are elaborated with respect to movement organization and motor learning. The need to carefully consider the appropriate dimensions with which to characterize coordination dynamics is also discussed. (shrink)