U prvom, nacelnom delu, autor polazi od toga da jedna mala zemlja, kao sto je nasa, ne moze realisticki ocekivati jednakost, pa cak ni punu ravnopravnost u odnosima sa SAD kao planetarno dominantnom silom. Zato se, prema njemu prema SAD moramo odnositi pragmaticno. To za njega ne znaci da nema nikakvih sansi da sa uspehom otvoreno i odlucno postavimo pitanje i nasih nacionalno-drzavnih interesa i prava kad nastojimo da ih sto vise uskladimo sa interesima i pravima te najmerodavnije i najsilodavnije (...) zemlje. Ekstremni pragmaticari kod nas potcenjuju opasnost principijelisticke reakcije dobrog dela naroda ako snishodljivo preteruju sa popustanjem i prilagodjavanjem. Za nas je najrelevantniji slucaj i najbolji primer za ugled Grcka. U nasim odnosima sa SAD, prema autoru, cesto dolazi do nesporazuma izmedju ostalog i zbog sustinskih razlika u shvatanjima nacije i religije kao i njihovog odnosa sa drzavom. Tim razlikama i nesporazumima posvecena su dva preostala dela ovog teksta. (shrink)

This article argues the main following points. (1) Communism was fatefully dependent upon the action or inaction of its top leaders because of the vulnerability of the hyper-centralized power and hyper-centralized defense of the ruling class and the ruling party. No one was really able to seriously predict the historical contingencies such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin that played a decisive role. The most that social scientists and analysts could safely claim was that communism had become unsuccessful and problematical to such (...) an extent that force alone could maintain it. However, given the overall history of communism, who could have anticipated that such force would not be used. (2) The United States is toiling now in an overwhelmingly difficult and dangerous transition, not only from a ‘superpower’ to ‘merely’ a big power, but from a totalistic and laissez-faire capitalism to a limited and state-regulated capitalism. It is the most efficacious way of production and primary distribution. However, unless capitalism, national and global, becomes regulated and combined with some kind of socialism (solidarism) that is yet to be established, global crises will keep recurring. The best chance for enlightened socialist (solidaristic) humanism lies in secondary distribution based on equality and justice as its fundamental principles. (3) The very term ‘superpower’ suggests a kind of superhuman, almost divine power. The United States does not have such power because (among other things) apocalyptic weapons are at the disposal of some considerably weaker states (in every other respect). (4) The possibility of the self-destruction of humankind has become the over-determination of all other over-determinations in history. It follows that auto-apocalypse must be separated from the categorical and epochal dichotomy between modernity/ modernism and postmodernity/postmodernism and given an absolute priority, both theoretical and practical. This break should be characterized as post-postmodernity and reflection upon it as post-postmodernism. We are in vital need of a total anti-apocalyptic turnaround in overall thought, sensitivity, activity and organization. Unfortunately, it can now safely be predicted that more and more states and societies, even those founded on (internal) freedoms and desirous to maintain them, will become transformed into states and societies focused on the struggle for survival in the face of auto-apocalyptic threats. I believe that confronted more and more with such threats liberalism will actually, and later probably also explicitly, yield the place of the fundamental operative (unlike declarative) view of the world, ideology, imagology, and principle of social organization — to humankind existentialism. We have entered an existentialist ‘end of history’ instead of the proclaimed liberalistic ‘end of history’. (shrink)

In this paper the author seeks to shed light on the political and philosophical context of the second half of 20th century in which he intellectually came of age. In his intellectual and political development the author distinguishes three main phases. He characterizes the first phase of his development as Praxis, revisionist, dissident Marxism and reformist communism. The second phase was post-Marxism and post-communism, while in the last decade of the 20th century the author defines his theoretical views as non-Marxist. (...) The author defines his latest philosophical-political standpoint as social democratic which, after his own self-understanding, comes closest to West European social democracy.. Autor u ovom radu pokusava da osvetli politicki i filozofski kontekst druge polovine XX veka u kome je intelektualno delovao i sazrevao. U svom intelektualnom i politickom razvitku on razmatra tri glavne faze. Prvu fazu svog razvitka autor karakterise kao praksisticki, revizionisticki, disidentski marksizam i reformisticki komunizam. Drugu fazu predstavlja postmarksizam i postkomunizam, a u poslednjoj deceniji XX veka autor svoje teorijsko stanoviste odredjuje kao nemarksisticko. Svoje najnovije filozofsko-politicko stanoviste autor smatra socijal-eko-demokratskim koje je po njegovom vlastitom samorazumevanju najblize zapadnoevropskoj socijaldemokratiji. (shrink)

As the military dictatorship was being imposed on Poland, Enrico Berlinguer declared: “The model set in motion by the October revolution has run out of steam.” I would add: “The Yugoslav model of that archetype (otherwise progressive and meaningful), symbolized by Stalin's break with Tito in 1948 even though it actually began with Tito's break with Stalin a year or two later, ran out of steam in terms of its ability to generate innovation among the people and to motivate and (...) mobilize them as early as the end of the 1960s.” Ever since then, the Yugoslav system has been caught in a vicious circle. (shrink)

Mogućnost samouništenja čovečanstva čini stalnu prateću temu u svim knjigama Svetozara Stojanovića napisanim posle njegovog doktorata o metaetici. Kakve god da su teme inače obrađivane, našlo bi se ponešto i o ovome, isprva kao usputno zapažanje i mogući ugao gledanja na glavnu temu, a kasnije, sve više kao posebna oblast razmatranja ili čak kao vodeća perspektiva. U ovom radu rekonstruišem Stojanovićevo tretiranje ove teme. Pošto je kod Stojanovića reč o apokalipsi u sekularnom smislu, ja za nju predlažem, u otvorenoj protivrečnosti (...) sa izvornim značenjem reči, izraz apokalipsa bez otkrivenja. Reč je o apokalipsi u kojoj je preostao samo još kataklizmički aspekt, i utoliko ovaj izraz dobro sledi Stojanovićeve izvorne intencije. U radu izlažem i komentarišem sve faze Stojanovićevog rada na ovoj temi tvrdeći da ona čini jedinu konstantu u filozofskim i političkim menama njegovog mišljenja. (shrink)

Progres i otkrice apokaliptickih sredstava doveli su covjeka u radikalno novu situaciju moguceg samounistenja. Zivot u sjenci samoapokalipse otvara nove osnovne dileme i pitanja razumjevanja smisla covjekovog djelovanja i namece kao najvazniji cilj sam opstanak covjecanstva. Da li postojeca etika i moderna politicka filosofija mogu da odgovore na izazove apokaliptickog ruleta sa kojim se covjecanstvo suocava, ili su potrebni sasvim novi principi politickog organizovanja, sredisnje je pitanje na koje se trazi odgovor.

In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn, according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much more than notational variants of one another. In other words, given any sentence (...) containing a taste predicate, and given any assignment of values to the relevant parameters, the two accounts predict the same truth value and are, in that sense, equivalent. I also look at possible reasons for preferring one account over the other. The phenomenon of "faultless disagreement" is often believed to be one such reason. I argue, against Kölbel and Lasersohn, that disagreement is never faultless: either the two parties genuinely disagree, hence if the one is right then the other is wrong, or the two parties are both right, but their apparent disagreement boils down to a misunderstanding. What is more, even if there were faultless disagreement, I argue that relativism would fail to account for it. The upshot of my paper, then, is to show that there is not much disagreement between a contextualist account that models the judge parameter as an implicit argument to the taste predicate, and a relativist account that models it as a parameter of the circumstances of evaluation. The choice between the two accounts, at least when talking about taste, is thus, to a large extent, a matter of taste. (shrink)

The recent proliferation of types and accounts of experimentation in sustainability science still lacks philosophical reflection. The present paper introduces this burgeoning topic to the philosophy of science by identifying key notions and dynamics in sustainability experimentation, by discussing taxonomies of sustainability experimentation and by focusing on barriers to the transfer of evidence. It integrates three topics: the philosophy of experimentation; the sustainability science literature on experimentation; and discussions on values in science coming from the general philosophy of science, the (...) social sciences, and sustainability science. The aim is to improve understanding of how sustainability experimentation has evolved, from a broader picture of the history and philosophy of science, with a specific focus on understanding evidence production and how evidence traveling in and from sustainability experiments can be improved, particularly in the context of complex and pervasive normative commitments of the research. By engaging in these topics, this research is one of the first philosophical accounts of sustainability experimentation, contributing both to the knowledge on specific philosophies of science and to the further development of an evidence-based sustainability science through a better understanding of the barriers to more relevant and usable knowledge. (shrink)

The paper’s main purpose is to show that the new recognition paradigm could have a great impact on the philosophy of education. The author demonstrates that impact by a comparative analysis of both Axel Honneth’s theory of intersubjectively founded self-realisation and Robert Brandom’s concept of socially mediated propositional articulation. The focus of the analysis is the question of the social prerequisites and intersubjective mechanisms of the development of propositional thinking as a core dimension of subjectivity. On the ground of the (...) analytic work carried out by the paper some basic features of development-supportive pedagogical interactions can be formulated. (shrink)

Among semanticists and philosophers of language, there has been a recent outburst of interest in predicates such as delicious, called predicates of personal taste (PPTs, e.g. Lasersohn 2005). Somewhat surprisingly, the question of whether or how we can distinguish aesthetic predicates from PPTs has hardly been addressed at all in this recent work. It is precisely this question that we address. We investigate linguistic criteria that we argue can be used to delineate the class of specifically aesthetic adjectives. We show (...) that there are, in fact, good motivations for keeping PPTs and aesthetic predicates apart: the semantic structure of the former, but not the latter, entails an experiencer. There are many adjectives whose semantic structure arguably also entails an experiencer, yet which are readily used in expressing aesthetic judgments. Adjectives such as provocative or moving are a case in point, since as adjectives they arguably maintain the experiencer argument from the verb they are derived from. Nevertheless, when we describe, say, a sculpture as provocative, or a theater performance as moving, we clearly make aesthetic judgments. The difficult question, then, is to articulate the relationship between an aesthetic predicate (of which beautiful and ugly are paradigms) and other predicates that just happen to be used in making an aesthetic judgment. Tightly related to this point is the more general question of the relationship between an evaluative predicate and a predicate that occurs in an evaluative judgment. One of our aims is to make some progress in addressing these questions. (shrink)

It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977 ; Noûs 13: 3–21, 1979 , Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981 ) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself , call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan ( 1989 ), has it that if Alma says (...) “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said , is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. (shrink)

In this paper, the authors present a presuppositional account for a class of evaluative terms that encode both a descriptive and an evaluative component: slurs and thick terms. The authors discuss several issues related to the hybrid nature of these terms, such as their projective behavior, the ways in which one may reject their evaluative content, and the ways in which evaluative content is entailed or implicated (as the case may be) by the use of such terms.

The economist Armen Alchian said once that ever since the fiasco in the Garden of Eden, we have been living in a world in which what we want exceeds what is available. The desire for more satisfaction is a predictable behavioral implication of the fact of scarcity. In fact, it might have helped mankind to survive against competition from other forms of life. Man's desire for more utility gives rise to two interdependent issues that each and every society has to (...) face: how to increase the value of the community's wealth, and how to allocate the increment in wealth. We generalize those issues as the demand for economic development. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a class of terms, or uses of terms, that are best accounted for by an expressivist account. We put forward two sets of criteria to distinguish between expressive and factual terms. The first set relies on the action-guiding nature of expressive language. The second set relies on the difference between one's evidence for making an expressive vs. factual statement. We then put those criteria to work to show, first, that the basic evaluative adjectives such (...) as ‘good’ have expressive as well as factual uses and, second, that many adjectives whose primary meanings are factual, such as ‘powerful’, also have expressive uses. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue against a growing tendency to assimilate moral disagreements to disagreements about matters of personal taste. The argumentative strategy adopted in the paper appeals to a battery of linguistic criteria that reveal interesting and important differences between predicates of personal taste and moral predicates. The paper further argues that these semantically tractable differences have an impact on the nature of the corresponding disagreements.

The paper identifies the rule of law, the carriers of institutional restructuring, and the prevailing informal rules in the community as three critical determinants of the outcome of institutional restructuring in the community. The paper demonstrates that the analysis of the interaction among these three determinants – a claim I call the interaction thesis – explains why the transition from socialism to the market economy in postwar West Germany was a success, why the transition to capitalism in Eastern Europe is (...) still uncertain, and why the use of economic policies based on neoclassical economics have produced the rising strength of pro-socialist parties. The conclusion is that the interaction thesis is a powerful and perhaps necessary method for the analysis of institutional changes and their causes, directions and consequences.Cet article identifie l’état de droit, les supports des réformes institutionnelles, et les règles communautaires informelles qui y sont prévalent comme les trois facteurs explicatifs majeurs du succès ou de l’échec de la réforme institutionnelle dans un pays. Cet article démontre que l’analyse de l’interaction entre ces trois facteurs explicatifs – ce que j’appelle la thèse de l’interaction – explique, en premier lieu, le succès de la transition du socialisme vers l’économie de marché en Allemagne de l’Ouest de l’aprèsguerre, ensuite pourquoi la transition vers le capitalisme en Europe de l’Est demeure incertaine, et, enfin, pourquoi le recours à des politiques économiques fondées sur la science économique néoclassique a revigoré les partis politiques à orientation socialiste. La conclusion est que la thèse de l’interaction est une méthode féconde et peut-être nécessaire pour analyser les changements institutionnels ainsi que leurs causes, leurs directions et leurs conséquences. (shrink)

In the late 1980s, the actual accomplishments of capitalism finally made a convincing case against socialism. After several decades of experimentation with human beings, socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries died an inglorious death. To an economist, the present value of the expected future benefits from socialism fell relative to their current production costs. And Marx was finally dead and, hopefully, buried.

The main objective of this essay is to show that the process of transition from socialism to capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe is a cultural problem rather than a technical one. In pursuing that objective I analyze two interrelated issues. First, analysis shows why and how cultural differences in Central and Eastern Europe have, via transaction costs specific to the process of transition, specific and predictable effects on the results of institutional restructuring, and, consequently, on economic performance. Second, I (...) argue that spontaneous changes in the prevailing culture could, under a set of credible and stable formal rules of the game, help to close a gap between the culture supportive of capitalism and the prevailing culture in Central and Eastern Europe. a Footnotesa My colleague and friend Fred Fransen made two major contributions to this essay: he helped me identify numerous inconsistencies in the essay, and he changed a number of my perceptions on the relationship between culture and economic performance. James Buchanan, Ljubo Madzar, Henry Manne, Milic Milovanovic, and Katarina Ott gave me useful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts. I am grateful to Victor Vanberg and Ulrich Witt for the opportunity to discuss this essay with their colleagues and students at the University of Freiburg and Max Planck Institute in Jena, Germany. (shrink)

Aesthetic judgments are often expressed by means of predicates that, unlike ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’, are not primarily aesthetic, or even evaluative, such as ‘intense’ and ‘harrowing’. This paper aims to explain how such adjectives can convey a value-judgment, and one, moreover, whose positive or negative valence depends on the context.

According to Diogenes Laertius, the concept of ‘appearance’ played a central role in Stoic philosophy. As staunch corporealists, the Stoics believed that appearances are physical structures in our corporeal soul which provide the foundation for all our thoughts. One of the crucial features of appearance is that it is a representational mental state that has the ability to provide us with accurate awareness of the world through causal interaction between our senses and external objects, and thus supply the means for (...) acquiring knowledge about the reality. However, the Stoics recognized that we can also be aware and think of objects that are real but are not presently affecting our senses, as well as objects that are altogether fictional and thus incapable of ever interacting with our senses. Because of this, it was important for them to distinguish between representational mental states which are and those which are not caused by external objects at the moment in which they are formed. Chrysippus was one of the Stoics who paid special attention to this distinction; in a key text, Aet. 4.12, he is reported as reserving the name ‘appearance’ only for the former states, while for the latter he used a different term, ‘imagination’. (shrink)

The nature of moral judgments, and, more specifically, the question of how they relate, on the one hand, to objective reality and, on the other, to subjective experience, are issues that have been central to metaethics from its very beginnings. While these complex and challenging issues have been debated by analytic philosophers for over a century, it is only relatively recently that more interdisciplinary and empirically-oriented approaches to such issues have begun to see light. The present chapter aims to make (...) a contribution of that kind. We will present the results of an empirical – specifically, corpus linguistic – study that offers evidence that moral predicates exhibit hallmarks of subjectivity at the linguistic level, but also, that they differ significantly from paradigmatically subjective predicates. (shrink)

In this essay Krassimir Stojanov attempts first to reconstruct the “heart” of Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics, namely the so-called “principle of universalization” of ethical norms. This principle grounds Habermas's proceduralist account of social justice via equal access of all concerned to the practices of deliberative validation of norms. Stojanov claims with regard to this account that it could only be implemented if the social actors are involved in a process of education as discursive initiation. After using R. S. Peters's educational (...) theory to distinguish discursive initiation from a traditionalist understanding of educative initiation, he discusses some central social prerequisites for the development of discursive skills in growing individuals; to identify these prerequisites, he draws on Axel Honneth's conception of the intersubjective origins of individuals' development of rational autonomy. In the final part of the essay, Stojanov briefly explores some implications of his elaborated account of discursive initiation and its social preconditions for schooling and pedagogy. (shrink)

The Stoics thought that knowledge depends on a special kind of appearances which they called ‘apprehensive’, which are by definition true. Interestingly, Sextus Empiricus reports in M 7.247 that they held that there are appearances that are true but that are not apprehensive because they are true merely by chance and thus cannot constitute knowledge. I believe that this suggests that the Stoics were aware of what is in modern literature known as the problem of epistemic luck. Unfortunately, Sextus’ report (...) leaves out a lot of important details, which makes it difficult to understand exactly which appearances the Stoics thought are true by chance, and why. I argue that the true non-apprehensive appearances in question here are imaginations, representational states which are not immediately caused by external objects through perception, but produced solely by the mind. I propose an explanation why the Stoics, who defined chance in terms of hidden causes, would have thought that imaginations can only be true by chance. The explanation stems from their view that the essential characteristic of imagination is that it leaves the actual cause of its representational content hidden from the subject. (shrink)

Political philosophy and natural science -- Political and psychological preconditions to recovering Socratic science -- The rediscovery of Socratic dialectic: Strauss on Schmitt's concept of the political 2. the fundamental political predicament: Strauss on Plato's laws, book III -- The origin and nature of philosophy -- The natural frame of reference and the possibility of a comprehensive science -- Natural right and history (ch. III) on the origin and nature of philosophy -- Divine revelation and the possibility of science -- (...) Strauss's introduction to Platonic studies in modern times -- Philosophy and revelation -- The foundations and directions of modern philosophy and science -- Science and politics in Strauss's natural right course -- An irony beyond Machiavelli's irony: a reading of the concluding six paragraphs of thoughts on Machiavelli. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: When we describe an event as sad or happy, we attribute to it a certainemotional value. Attributions of emotional value depend essentially on an agent ; and yet, people readily disagree over such values. My aim in this paper is to explain what happens in the case of “emotional disagreement”, and, more generally, to provide some insight into the semantics of value-attributions.