Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to analyse what (...) exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A propositional temporal logic is introduced whose operators quantify over intervals of a reference time line. The intervals are specified symbolically, for example ?next week's weekend?. The specification language for the intervals takes into account all the features of real calendar systems. A simple statement which can be expressed in this language is for example: ?yesterday I worked for eight hours with one hour lunch break at noon?. Calendar Logic can be translated into propositional logic. Satisfiability is therefore decidable. (...) Since the translation is exponential, a tableau decision procedure for checking decidability is presented as an alternative. (shrink)

Quasi-equational logic concerns with a completeness theorem, i. e. a list of general syntactical rules such that, being given a set of graded quasi-equations Q, the closure Cl Q = Qeq Fun Q can be derived from by the given rules. Those rules do exist, because our consideration could be embedded into the logic of first order language. But, we look for special (quasi-equational) rules. Suitable rules were already established for the (non-functorial) case of partial algebras in Definition 3.1.2 of (...) [27], p. 108, and [28], p. 102. (For the case of total algebras, see [35].) So, one has to translate these rules to the (functorial) language of partial theories .Surprisingly enough, partial theories can be replaced up to isomorphisms by partial Dale monoids (cf. Section 3), which, in the total case are ordinary monoids. (shrink)

In the children's book ``The Phantom Tollbooth'' by Norton Juster one can find the following passage:``Yes, please,'' said Milo. ``Can you show me the biggest number there is?''.

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Unitary field theories and “SUPER-GUT” theories work with an universal continuum, the structured spacetime of R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, B. Riemann, and A. Einstein, or a (Machian (1–3) ) structured vacuum according the quantum theory of unitary fields (Dirac, (4,5) and Heisenberg (6–8) ). The atomistic aspect of the substantial world is represented by the fundamental constants which are invariant against “all transformations” and which “depend on nothings” (Planck (9–11) ). A satisfactory unitary theory has to involve these constants like (...) the mathematical numbers. Today, Planck's conception of the three elementary constants ħ, c, and G may be the key to general relativistic quantum field theory like unitary theory. However, the elementary constants are a question of measurement-theory, also.According to Popper's theory (12–16) of induction, such unitary theories are “universal explaining theories.” The fundamental constants involve the complementarity between the universal statements in unitary theory and the “basic statements” in the language of classical observables. (shrink)

The generally covariant Lagrangian densityG = ℛ + 2K ℒmatter of the Hamiltonian principle in general relativity, formulated by Einstein and Hilbert, can be interpreted as a functional of the potentialsg ikand φ of the gravitational and matter fields. In this general relativistic interpretation, the Riemann-Christoffel form Γ kl i = kl i for the coefficients г kl i of the affine connections is postulated a priori. Alternatively, we can interpret the LagrangianG as a functional of φ, gik, and the (...) coefficients г kl i . Then the г kl i are determined by the Palatini equations. From these equations and from the symmetry г kl i = г lk i for all matter fields with δℒ/δΓ=0 the Christoffel symbols again result. However, for Dirac's bispinor fields, δℒ/δΓ becomes dependent on the Dirac current, essentially with a coupling factor ∼Khc. In this case, the Palatini equations define a new transport rule for the spinor fields, according to which a second universal interaction results for the Dirac spinors, besides Einstein's gravitation. The generally covariant Dirac wave equations become the general relativistic nonlinear Heisenberg wave equations, and the second universal interaction is given by a Fermi-like interaction term of the V-A type. The geometrically induced Fermi constant is, however, very small and of the order 10−81erg cm3. (shrink)

The Galilei invariance of classical dynamics does not automatically imply the third Newtonian axiom and the center of mass theorem. For the deduction of these theorems from Galilei invariance we must have, generally, a “kinematical potential” (Helmholtz) and a “potential function” (Clausius), respectively. In celestial mechanics it is possible to have conservation of the motion of the center of gravity but not of the mass center. In this case, the active and the passive masses are different quantities.

Reminiscing on the fact that E. Schrödinger was rooted in the same physical tradition as M. Planck and A. Einstein, some aspects of his attitude to quantum mechanics are discussed. In particular, it is demonstrated that the quantum-mechanical paradoxes assumed by Einstein and Schrödinger should not exist, but that otherwise the epistemological problem of physical reality raised in this context by Einstein and Schrödinger is fundamental for our understanding of quantum theory. The nonexistence of such paradoxes just shows that quantum-mechanical (...) effects are due to interference and not to interaction. This line of argument leads consequently to quantum field theories with second quantization, and accordingly quantum theory based both on Planck's constant h and on Democritus's atomism. (shrink)

The gauge-invariant relativistic wave mechanics corresponds to relativistic magneto-hydrodynamics according to Planck's version of the correspondence principle.

The fundamental open questions of general relativity theory are the unification of the gravitational field with other fields, aiming at a unified geometrization of physics, as well as the renormalization of relativistic gravitational theory in order to obtain their self-consistent solutions. These solutions are to furnish field-theoretic particle models—a problem first discussed by Einstein. In addition, we are confronted with the issue of a coupling between gravitational and matter fields determined (not only) by Einstein's principle of equivalence, and also with (...) the question of the geometric meaning of a gravitational quantum theory. In our view, all these problems are so closely related that they warrant a general solution. We treat mainly the concepts suggested by Einstein and Weyl. (shrink)

We discuss the possibility of “fifth forces” in relativistic gravitation theories of fourth order. The fifth force may be an analog to the “weak forces” in the theories of electroweak interactions.

The physical meaning of gauge groups in bimetrical, Riemannian, and Hermitian theories of gravitation is discussed. In Hermitian relativity, Einstein's A-invariance means a super-gauge group which characterizes the Einstein-Schrödinger equations as the only nondegenerate general-relativistic field theory.

Among the many works devoted to Copernicus's five hundredth anniversary, the article published here, by the German scientist H.-J. Treder, occupies a special place in the world literature on this subject thanks to its depth of analysis of Copernican concepts. Its author, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR and Director of the Potsdam Astronomical Observatory, is known for his works on Einstein's relativity and gravitation theories. His understanding of Einstein's theory is entirely in accord with the (...) viewpoint advanced in my book The Theory of Space, Time, and Gravitation [Teoriia prostranstva, vremeni i tiagoteniia] , and he cites it repeatedly. In particular, we ascribe major and fundamental significance to the fact that Einstein's gravitation equations require for their solution certain limiting conditions which Einstein's theory, however, does not provide. In order to fill this theoretical gap, it is necessary to introduce certain supplemental hypotheses of a geometrical character concerning space as a whole. Treder very ingeniously demonstrates the similarity between these hypotheses and the ideas of Copernicus. (shrink)

The commercialization of ‘big science’ is in full swing, leading to situations in which the ethical principles of academia are beginning to be compromised. This is exemplified by the profitable business of genetic ancestry testing. The goals of this sort of ‘big science’ are not necessarily in any way novel, however. In particular, large genotyping projects have a certain start‐up time when their design is frozen in, so that the projects often lag behind the development of genetic knowledge. On the (...) other hand, extremely provisional knowledge about potential disease markers is being rapidly turned into questionable ‘tests’, purporting to determine risk factors for complex disorders, by private companies that are eager to get their share of a profitable market of the future. The flow of money generated by such concerns looks likely to erode traditional research operations and small‐scale projects, which risk becoming pebbles on the ‘big science’ landscape. BioEssays 30:1246–1251, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Praxeology is an analytical theory of action, the intention of which is a description of fundamental action-theoretical relationships that is as conceptually parsimonious as possible. The claim corresponds to that of a descriptive metaphysics. If this claim is valid, it must be possible to find at least elementary moments of such praxeological insights even in the earliest approach to a theory of action as presented by Aristotle. The analysis first looks from the insights of praxeology to Aristotle, then vice versa (...) from Aristotle's definitions of concepts to praxeological formulations. The aim is not to trace one theory back to the other, but to illuminate both approaches in a reciprocal way. (shrink)

Karl Popper versucht, das Problem zu lösen, wie erfahrungswissenschaftliche Aussagenzusammenhänge durch ein ihnen eigenes charakteristisches Merkmal von anderen Aussagenzusammenhängen, die dieses Merkmal nicht aufweisen, abgegrenzt werden können, ohne dass dabei für die Erfahrungswissenschaft wesentliche Teile mit ausgegrenzt werden. Als ein hierfür geeignetes Kriterium sieht er die Eigenschaft der empirischen Widerlegbarkeit, der Falsifizierbarkeit wissenschaftlicher Aussagen an. Sie könne als Kriterium dienen, diese von metaphysischen und pseudowissenschaftlichen Aussagen zu unterscheiden, ohne sie zugleich für sinnlos zu erklären. Genauer besehen weist das Abgrenzungskriterium jedoch (...) eine komplexere, zweidimensionale Struktur auf, die als Reformulierung und zugleich als Reform der Kantischen Unterscheidung zwischen dem Erkenntniswert von Aussagen und deren Geltungsgrundlage angesehen werden kann und es aufgrund dieser Zweidimensionalität ermöglicht, auch die Eigenart metaphysischer und pseudowissenschaftlicher Behauptungen verständlich zu machen. (shrink)