In the 1980s, philosophical, historical and social studies of science underwent a change which later evolved into a turn to practice. Analysts of science were asked to pay attention to scientific practices in meticulous detail and along multiple dimensions, including the material, social and psychological. Following this turn, the interest in scientific practices continued to increase and had an indelible influence in the various fields of science studies. No doubt, the practice turn changed our conceptions and approaches of science, but (...) what did it really teach us? What does it mean to study scientific practices? What are the general lessons, implications, and new challenges? This volume explores questions about the practice turn using both case studies and theoretical analysis. The case studies examine empirical and mathematical sciences, including the engineering sciences. The volume promotes interactions between acknowledged experts from different, often thought of as conflicting, orientations. It presents contributions in conjunction with critical commentaries that put the theses and assumptions of the former in perspective. Overall, the book offers a unique and diverse range of perspectives on the meanings, methods, lessons, and challenges associated with the practice turn. (shrink)

Featuring contributions from the world’s leading experts on the subject and based partly on several detailed case studies, this volume is the first comprehensive analysis of the scientific notion of robustness as well as of the general ...

The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history and philosophy of (...) physics, and an emphasis on developments in cognitive sciences as well as on the claims of “new experimentalists”. The book constitutes fully revised versions of papers which were originally presented at the international colloquium held at the University of Nancy, France, in June 2004. (shrink)

This paper deals with calibration in scientific practices which investigate relatively well-understood natural phenomena by means of already standardized instrumental devices. Calibration is a crucial topic, since it conditions the reliability of instrumental procedures in science. Yet although important, calibration is a relatively neglected topic. We think more attention should be devoted to calibration. The paper attempts to take a step in this direction. The aims are two-fold: (1) to characterize calibration in a relatively simple kind of scientific practices; (2) (...) to provide conceptual and taxonomic tools of broader scope that help to get a better understanding of calibration in more complex cases and other kinds of scientific practices. For this purpose, we first provide indications for why a conceptual framework is needed. Second, a bibliographic survey of works dealing with calibration is attempted. Third, we introduce different tools to enable a better understanding of calibration. Fourth, we turn to the elaboration of what we call a “simple exemplar” of calibration, illustrated through the case of the calibration of an equal-arm balance. Fifth, the tools previously introduced, and the framework of the simple exemplar, are applied to a more complex case of calibration: calibration procedures in X-ray experiments. This serves to show the work accomplished by the simple exemplar and to emphasize features of more complex cases of calibration. Eventually, we revisit and specify the nature, status, scope and value of the proposed framework. (shrink)

Introduction Harry Collins is internationally recognized as a distinguished sociologist of science who writes creatively on a substantial number of varied subjects. He is acknowledged as one of the prominent specialists on the topic of tacit knowledge and has played an important role in the introduction of this topic into science studies. He has investigated the topic extensively, most famously through several case studies of physics [Collins 1974, 1984, 1985, 1990, 2001a,b, 2004], [Collins &...

Introduction Harry Collins is internationally recognized as a distinguished sociologist of science who writes creatively on a substantial number of varied subjects. He is acknowledged as one of the prominent specialists on the topic of tacit knowledge and has played an important role in the introduction of this topic into science studies. He has investigated the topic extensively, most famously through several case studies of physics [Collins 1974, 1984, 1985, 1990, 2001a,b, 2004], [Collins &...

In this paper, we discuss and extend the taxonomy of tacit knowledge proposed by Collins in his 2010 book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. First, we question the definition and the name of one of Collins’s three categories of TK, namely Relational Tacit Knowledge (RTK). After having explained the true fundamental principle that individuates RTK as one category distinct from the two others (Somatic Tacit Knowledge STK and Collective Tacit Knowledge CTK), we suggest an alternative name for RTK, which fits this (...) principle better. Second, our analyses identify a possible ambiguity in the interpretation of RTK, STK and CTK, and indicate how to avoid the related possible confusions. For this purpose, we introduce several notations that specify Collins’s ones. The corresponding developments strengthen and specify a point implicitly suggested in Collins’s book, namely the existence of a serious asymmetry between RTK on the one hand, and STK/CTK on the other. Third, the paper attempts to elaborate and complete Collins’s framework. In this vein, we introduce the possibility of different sub-types of RTK. One of these sub-cases raises the issue of individual, intellectual tacit knowledge—a case that does not seem to have any place in Collins’s picture. We also look at Collins’s framework in a dynamical perspective, and discuss the possibility—not considered by Collins—of dynamic transformations between some of the three categories. Finally, we make two suggestions in order to avoid confusions or misunderstandings when using Collins’s distinctions. When the qualities “explicit”, “explicable” or “tacit” are attributed to some knowledge, these qualities should always be accompanied by the specification for whom and when. Moreover, the attributions “explicit” and “explicable” should always indicate which of Collins’s four senses is meant—elaboration, transformation, mechanization or scientific explanation. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss and extend the taxonomy of tacit knowledge proposed by Collins in his 2010 book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. First, we question the definition and the name of one of Collins’s three categories of TK, namely Relational Tacit Knowledge (RTK). After having explained the true fundamental principle that individuates RTK as one category distinct from the two others (Somatic Tacit Knowledge STK and Collective Tacit Knowledge CTK), we suggest an alternative name for RTK, which fits this (...) principle better. Second, our analyses identify a possible ambiguity in the interpretation of RTK, STK and CTK, and indicate how to avoid the related possible confusions. For this purpose, we introduce several notations that specify Collins’s ones. The corresponding developments strengthen and specify a point implicitly suggested in Collins’s book, namely the existence of a serious asymmetry between RTK on the one hand, and STK/CTK on the other. Third, the paper attempts to elaborate and complete Collins’s framework. In this vein, we introduce the possibility of different sub-types of RTK. One of these sub-cases raises the issue of individual, intellectual tacit knowledge—a case that does not seem to have any place in Collins’s picture. We also look at Collins’s framework in a dynamical perspective, and discuss the possibility—not considered by Collins—of dynamic transformations between some of the three categories. Finally, we make two suggestions in order to avoid confusions or misunderstandings when using Collins’s distinctions. When the qualities “explicit”, “explicable” or “tacit” are attributed to some knowledge, these qualities should always be accompanied by the specification for whom and when. Moreover, the attributions “explicit” and “explicable” should always indicate which of Collins’s four senses is meant—elaboration, transformation, mechanization or scientific explanation. (shrink)

The philosophical goal is to characterize ‘path dependence’ (PAD) in science by comparison to PAD in technology where the concept was initially introduced. I rely on quantum mechanics to substantiate the analyses, exploiting the contrast between standard versus Bohmian quantum physics (NQP/BQP). To achieve the goal, counterfactual history is mobilized as a means to generate instructive virtual alternatives to the actual scientific path: I design a ‘permuted-situations counterfactual scenario’ in which it is BQP, instead of NQP, that first acquires a (...) monopoly on physics and is exclusively practiced in science education, before NQP is introduced. Then, I endeavor to ‘reenact’ – as forensic investigators carry out the re-enactment of a crime scene – how virtual mainstream Bohmians would assess NQP. Contrasting the two ‘views from inside’ – ‘what it is like to be’ a standard quantum physicist in our world (a physicist trained in NQP) and what it would be like to be a physicist exclusively trained in BQP – I attempt to come as close as possible to an ‘experience’ of the gestalt switch involved when shuttling back and forth between one scientific worldview to the other. The effects of PAD in physics are discussed on this basis. (shrink)

L'article propose une analyse comparative des positions de Popper et de Kuhn sur quatre points liés : la comparaison des « cadres théoriques » ou des « paradigmes scientifiques » ; le pouvoir contraignant que sont susceptibles d'avoir les arguments invoqués dans les discussions critiques ; les éléments qui, en fin de compte, pèsent ou doivent peser sur les praticiens lorsqu'il s'agit d'élire un cadre théorique au détriment d'un autre ; et enfin, la conception qu'ont chacun des deux auteurs de (...) ce que Kuhn a nommé la « science normale ». On commence par discuter en détails les comptes-rendus dans lesquels Popper explique pourquoi les choix scientifiques de Galilée et de Kepler sont conformes à la méthodologie falsificationniste. On montre de là, premièrement, qu'à suivre à la lettre ces comptes-rendus, il faut conclure que les données expérimentales non problématiques – les énoncés de base unanimement acceptés – ne suffisent pas à elles seules à imposer en droit la falsification empirique (puisque sur la base des mêmes mesures de Tycho Brahé, Kepler a eu raison d'admettre que l'hypothèse des orbites circulaires était empiriquement réfutée, tandis que Galilée a eu raison d'admettre le contraire). On montre alors, deuxièmement, qu'au-delà des différences importantes entre Popper et Kuhn au niveau des lexiques et de l'idéal de scientificité, la méthodologie poppérienne, bien qu'elle se revendique « logique », ne donne concrètement pas plus que la conception kuhnienne pourtant si souvent stigmatisée comme « sociologique », lorsqu'il s'agit d'indiquer ce qu'un bon scientifique devrait faire, que ce soit en période « révolutionnaire » ou en période de « science normale ». (shrink)

L’article, tout d’abord critique certains aspects de la manière dont Martin Carrier caractérise l’incommensurabilité sémantique à partir d’une théorie contextuelle du langage, puis introduit des distinctions et fait des propositions en vue de poursuivre le même projet. On soutient que deux conceptions différentes de la notion de ‘conditions d’application’, et corrélativement deux acceptions distinctes de la clause ‘préservation des relations inférentielles’, sont à l’œuvre dans la caractérisation de Carrier, et que sa thèse centrale ne tient que grâce aux déplacements de (...) sens correspondants. On suggère de remplacer cette thèse — selon laquelle les concepts incommensurables sont ceux qui sont intraduisibles au sens spécifique où ils ont soit mêmes conditions d’application soit mêmes relations inférentielles mais jamais les deux à la fois –, par une caractérisation qui, d’un point de vue méthodologique, accorde une primauté aux relations inférentielles. Cette caractérisation est pour l’essentiel constituée : d’une part de la thèse (kuhnienne) selon laquelle les concepts incommensurables sont avant tout ceux qui présentent des relations inférentielles largement non superposables ; d’autre part d’une analyse des liens existant entre relations inférentielles et conditions d’application, en particulier d’une réflexion sur les conditions auxquelles certaines relations inférentielles peuvent et doivent être identifiées à des conditions d’application. (shrink)

L’article, tout d’abord critique certains aspects de la manière dont Martin Carrier caractérise l’incommensurabilité sémantique à partir d’une théorie contextuelle du langage, puis introduit des distinctions et fait des propositions en vue de poursuivre le même projet. On soutient que deux conceptions différentes de la notion de ‘conditions d’application’, et corrélativement deux acceptions distinctes de la clause ‘préservation des relations inférentielles’, sont à l’œuvre dans la caractérisation de Carrier, et que sa thèse centrale ne tient que grâce aux déplacements de (...) sens correspondants. On suggère de remplacer cette thèse — selon laquelle les concepts incommensurables sont ceux qui sont intraduisibles au sens spécifique où ils ont soit mêmes conditions d’application soit mêmes relations inférentielles mais jamais les deux à la fois –, par une caractérisation qui, d’un point de vue méthodologique, accorde une primauté aux relations inférentielles. Cette caractérisation est pour l’essentiel constituée : d’une part de la thèse (kuhnienne) selon laquelle les concepts incommensurables sont avant tout ceux qui présentent des relations inférentielles largement non superposables ; d’autre part d’une analyse des liens existant entre relations inférentielles et conditions d’application, en particulier d’une réflexion sur les conditions auxquelles certaines relations inférentielles peuvent et doivent être identifiées à des conditions d’application. (shrink)

L’article propose une analyse comparative des positions de Popper et de Kuhn sur quatre points liés : la comparaison des « cadres théoriques » ou des « paradigmes scientifiques » ; le pouvoir contraignant que sont susceptibles d’avoir les arguments invoqués dans les discussions critiques ; les éléments qui, en fin de compte, pèsent ou doivent peser sur les praticiens lorsqu’il s’agit d’élire un cadre théorique au détriment d’un autre ; et enfin, la conception qu’ont chacun des deux auteurs de (...) ce que Kuhn a nommé la « science normale ». On commence par discuter en détails les comptes-rendus dans lesquels Popper explique pourquoi les choix scientifiques de Galilée et de Kepler sont conformes à la méthodologie falsificationniste. On montre de là, premièrement, qu’à suivre à la lettre ces comptes-rendus, il faut conclure que les données expérimentales non problématiques — les énoncés de base unanimement acceptés — ne suffisent pas à elles seules à imposer en droit la falsification empirique (puisque sur la base des mêmes mesures de Tycho Brahé, Kepler a eu raison d’admettre que l’hypothèse des orbites circulaires était empiriquement réfutée, tandis que Galilée a eu raison d’admettre le contraire). On montre alors, deuxièmement, qu’au-delà des différences importantes entre Popper et Kuhn au niveau des lexiques et de l’idéal de scientificité, la méthodologie poppérienne, bien qu’elle se revendique « logique », ne donne concrètement pas plus que la conception kuhnienne pourtant si souvent stigmatisée comme « sociologique », lorsqu’il s’agit d’indiquer ce qu’un bon scientifique devrait faire, que ce soit en période « révolutionnaire » ou en période de « science normale ». (shrink)

L’article propose une analyse comparative des positions de Popper et de Kuhn sur quatre points liés : la comparaison des « cadres théoriques » ou des « paradigmes scientifiques » ; le pouvoir contraignant que sont susceptibles d’avoir les arguments invoqués dans les discussions critiques ; les éléments qui, en fin de compte, pèsent ou doivent peser sur les praticiens lorsqu’il s’agit d’élire un cadre théorique au détriment d’un autre ; et enfin, la conception qu’ont chacun des deux auteurs de (...) ce que Kuhn a nommé la « science normale ». On commence par discuter en détails les comptes-rendus dans lesquels Popper explique pourquoi les choix scientifiques de Galilée et de Kepler sont conformes à la méthodologie falsificationniste. On montre de là, premièrement, qu’à suivre à la lettre ces comptes-rendus, il faut conclure que les données expérimentales non problématiques — les énoncés de base unanimement acceptés — ne suffisent pas à elles seules à imposer en droit la falsification empirique (puisque sur la base des mêmes mesures de Tycho Brahé, Kepler a eu raison d’admettre que l’hypothèse des orbites circulaires était empiriquement réfutée, tandis que Galilée a eu raison d’admettre le contraire). On montre alors, deuxièmement, qu’au-delà des différences importantes entre Popper et Kuhn au niveau des lexiques et de l’idéal de scientificité, la méthodologie poppérienne, bien qu’elle se revendique « logique », ne donne concrètement pas plus que la conception kuhnienne pourtant si souvent stigmatisée comme « sociologique », lorsqu’il s’agit d’indiquer ce qu’un bon scientifique devrait faire, que ce soit en période « révolutionnaire » ou en période de « science normale ». (shrink)

This is one of the attractions of the volume.

In recent decades many sociologists and philosophers of science, especially the so-called ‘new experimentalists’, have stressed the need for detailed studies of real, ongoing experimental practices, and have claimed that a new image of science results from such an approach. Among the new objects of interest that have emerged from laboratory studies, an important one is the tacit dimension of scientific practices. Harry Collins, in particular, has insisted that irreducibly tacit presuppositions and skills are inevitably involved in experimental practices, and (...) that these tacit resources play an essential role in the stabilization of successful scientific achievements. What I will call the ‘opacity of experimental practices’ has been analyzed in different ways, but on the whole, it has been claimed to have harmful epistemological consequences with respect to crucial issues such as the nature of experimental facts, scientific realism, scientific rationality, and the contingency of what acquires the status of an established scientific result in practitioners’ eyes. Such claims remain highly controversial. The aim of this paper is to discuss the epistemological implications of the involvement of tacit resources in experimental practices and to provide helpful conceptual tools with respect to the issue of tacit resources in science. Specifically, the paper provides an analytical clarification of the relation between the opacity of experimental practices and the principle of experimenters substitutability, the latter being a principle commonly viewed as a necessary feature of any good science. Serious doubts are finally raised about the validity of the experimenters substitutability principle, and the impact of these doubts with respect to the contingency of scientific facts and results is considered. (shrink)

Gperhard Heinzmann, Rédacteur en chef La philosophie est la mère des sciences. Il faut avoir une bonne mémoire pour se le rappeler. Quel bonheur lorsque ce rappel vient d’une collègue qui ne l’a pas appris, mais qui éprouve la nécessité de questionner sa pratique scientifique et actualise ainsi l’ancienne métaphore! C’était le cas de Catherine Dufour. On se connaissait vaguement depuis l’école maternelle des Trois Maisons que fréquentaient nos enfants. Je fus donc très heureux de découvrir,...

The contingency/inevitability (C/I) problem consists in questions about the extent to which science is contingent or inevitable, what parts of it are contingent or inevitable, and whether alternative scientific trajectories might be just as successful as the one we have. It is relatively new as a well-delineated object of philosophical inquiry, dating to Ian Hacking’s observation in The Social Construction of What? (1999) that the social construction movement raises questions about contingency and inevitability that can be understood as distinct from, (...) and perhaps more promising than, longstanding debates about scientific realism and anti-realism. In the years since Hacking defined the key terms of the C/I problem, a group of scholars has coalesced around the questions he posed. Those questions motivated, for example, a 2009 workshop at the Fondation Des Treilles in Tourtour, France, and this book synthesizes its results. (shrink)

Review of Soler et al. (eds.) Characterizing the robustness of science: After the practice turn in philosophy of science.

What kinds of norms constrain mechanistic discovery and explanation? In the mechanistic literature, the norms for good explanations are directly derived from answers to the metaphysical question of what explanations are. Prominent mechanistic accounts thus emphasize either ontic or epistemic norms. Still, mechanistic philosophers on both sides agree that there is no sharp distinction between the processes of discovery and explanation. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that ontic and epistemic accounts of explanation will be accompanied by ontic and epistemic (...) accounts of discovery, respectively. As we will show here, however, recent discovery accounts implicitly rely on both ontic and epistemic norms to characterize the discovery process. In this paper, we develop an account that makes explicit that, and how, ontic and epistemic norms work together throughout the discovery process. By describing mechanism discovery as a process of pattern recognition we demonstrate that scientists have to develop epistemic activities to distinguish a pattern from its background. Furthermore, they have to determine which epistemic activities successfully describe how the pattern is implemented by identifying the pattern’s components. Our approach reveals that ontic and epistemic norms are equally important in mechanism discovery. (shrink)

Der Band widmet sich vor diesem Hintergrund mit Blicken auf verschiedene Bereiche der Kultur Menschenbildern im historischen und heutigen China. Er vereint die Beitrage einer Tagung der Deutschen Vereinigung fur Chinastudien.

This article examines the recent transformations of the Italian welfare state from a familist welfare model to what I term transnational market familism. In this model, families buy in care labour, commonly provided by migrant workers. There is now a growing literature exploring both the transformations of the Italian welfare model and the experiences of migrant workers providing care in Italy. However, what has been overlooked in the current literature is the ethical aspect of this model of welfare provision, which (...) is part of the transnational political economy of care. The article analyses the ethical implications of the migrant-in-the-family model, which transforms the care relationship between the caregiver and care receiver into a complex relationship between the family member organising care, the migrant caregiver and the dependent care receiver. The context of such welfare provision is transnational. Examining this care triangle, I draw on care ethics and individualization perspective for an analysis of how social policies safeguard, or overlook, human interaction and care relationships in the context of global hierarchies. The article draws on ethnographic data gathered in Naples, Italy, during 2004–2005, including interviews with Neapolitan employers and elderly care-receivers, interviews with migrant workers, as well as participant observations. (shrink)

The Element reconstructs, analyses and compares different derivational routes to a grounding of the Arrow of Time in entropy. It also evaluates the link between entropy and visible disorder, and the related claim of an alignment of the Arrow of Time with a development from order to visible disorder. The Element identifies three different entropy-groundings for the Arrow of Time: (i) the Empirical Arrow of Time, (ii) the Universal Statistical Arrow of Time, and (iii) the Local Statistical Arrow of Time. (...) The Element will also demonstrate that it is unlikely that high entropy states will always coincide with visible disorder. Therefore, it will dispute that there is a strong link between the Arrow of Time and visible disorder. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION My underlying concern in this work is with the sociological analysis and description of members' practical activities and their practical ...

No es nuestro propósito relatar el trabajo de Hegel en sus Lecciones de la Historia universal, por el contrario, queremos aprehender el concepto de desarrollo de la historia a partir de la acción (tat) del espíritu, en tanto la historia -dice Hegel- es “la sustancia del espíritu”. Y esta temática la desarrolla tanto en la Enciclopedia, como en la Fenomenología del espíritu, así como en las Lecciones de filosofía de la religión (especialmente en 1828) y en su Filosofía del derecho. (...) Si no se concibe la historia sino por la acción del espíritu que deviene movimiento y deviene libertad y racionalidad. De tal modo, que puede decirse que la razón dirige la historia. Pero si califica la historia de divina es porque en ella la razón se historiza y pierde su condición abstracta. Pues en la historia, dice Hegel, el espíritu se encuentra en casa. Debe entenderse ese proceso de movimiento, como sustancia espiritual y el fin absoluto en el mundo, de ahí que no pueda hablarse de fin de la historia. El saber absoluto no implica un cierre al proceso infinito de un despliegue a través de las determinaciones finitas. Debe subrayarse la importancia de la eticidad y de la Filosofía del derecho, pues el Estado en cuanto sustancia ética no anula los derechos de los sujetos que devienen a través de la historia. Pudiendo considerarse a los mismos sujetos y los estados formas de objetivación del espíritu en su movimiento. No puede por ello entenderse el saber absoluto siquiera como un cierre de la historia ni como una superación de las figuras que en su movimiento produce. Más bien es lo que Hegel sostiene como Teodicea de la historia. Y en ella, la religión ya manifiesta la asunción de la negatividad y la superación de la muerte de Dios por el espíritu en la comunidad. Ahora bien, la comunidad alcanza su máxima expresión en el Estado, no es la pretensión de Hegel la exaltación del estado, sino que tiene muy en cuenta que los ciudadanos son sujetos de derecho dentro del Estado. (shrink)

Are idioms stored in memory in ways that preserve their surface form or language or are they represented amodally? We examined this question using an inci- dental cued recall paradigm in which two word idiomatic expressions were presented to adult bilinguals proficient in Russian and English. Stimuli included phrases with idiomat- ic equivalents in both languages (e.g. “empty words/пycтыe cлoвa”) or in one language only (English—e.g. “empty suit/пycтoй кocтюм” or Russian—e.g. “empty sound/пycтoй звyк”), or in neither language (e.g. “empty rain/пycтoй (...) дoждь”). If idioms are stored in a language-specific format, then phrases with idiomatic equivalents in both languages would have dual representation, and should therefore be more easily recalled than phrases with idiomatic meaning in only one language. This result was obtained. As such, the findings support the dual-coding theory of memory and are also compatible with models of the bilingual lexicon that include language tags or nodes. (shrink)

First published in 1984, this is a study of categorization practices: how people categorize each other and their actions; how they describe, infer, and judge. The book presents a sociological analysis and description of practical activities and makes a cogent contribution to the study of how the moral order actually works in practical communicative contexts. Among the issues dealt with are: collectivity categorizations, the organization of lists and descriptions, moral attribution and inferences, and the relationship between standards of morality and (...) standards of rationality. (shrink)

The biofuel boom is placing enormous demands on existing cropping systems, with the most crucial consequences in the agri-food sector. The biofuel industry is responding by initiating private governance and certification. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and the Cramer Commission, among others, have formulated criteria on “sustainable” biofuel production and processing. This article explores the legitimacy of private governance and certification by the biofuel industry, highlighting opportunities and challenges. It argues that the concept of output based legitimacy is (...) problematic in the case of biofuel as long as no consensus or commonly agreed “best” solution has been established on what sustainable biofuel production is. Furthermore, it shows that the private governance initiatives analyzed fail to adequately include actors from developing countries. Finally, the article argues that we need mechanisms for control and accountability in order to guarantee that the political output of biofuel certification serves the common welfare. (shrink)