The role of metalinguistic ability in L2 development is seriously underestimated. It may be seen both (1) as a means of initiating or boosting the flow of primary linguistic data and (2) as a generator of substitute knowledge (derived, but epistemologically distinct from domain-specific knowledge) that may compete with or compensate for perceived gaps in the learners current underlying competence. It cannot serve as a simple means of distinguishing the rival theoretical positions.

Intuitionism is most commonly defined in terms of various strong epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions, e.g., that true moral principles are synthetic a priori propositions, known by some special faculty of moral reflection, and the like. I shall not here be concerned with such views. Rather my focus will be upon the program for normative investigation which I have elsewhere argued is implicit in the intuitionists’ writings and which I take to be intuitionism's salient characteristic.

William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers? Ethics Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, viii + 253 pp.

Lloyd Weinreb, Oedipus at Fenway Park: What Rights There Are and Why There Are Any Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, viii, 221 pp.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm Of Rights Harvard University Press, 1990, viii, 383pp.

Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality New York: Oxford University Press, 1987; xii, 383pp.

It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1998; see also Jackson and Pettit 1999, and Jackson 2001) have recently advanced a novel version of such an argument. They begin by noting that expressivism in its central form makes two claims—that ethical sentences are not truth evaluable, and that to assert an ethical (...) sentence is to express one’s desires or feelings rather than to report a fact. They then argue that, given some plausible premises in the philosophy of language emanating mainly from Locke, the two central claims of expressivism are contradictory: when combined with the plausible premises, they say, the second claim refutes the first. The purpose of this paper is to formulate Jackson and Pettit’s Lockean argument, and to suggest that it fails. (shrink)

Médecins Sans Frontières is not morally required to continue providing the same therapeutic and preventative interventions for lead poisoning in Nigeria in the face of conditions that negatively impact on the achievement of their objectives. Nevertheless, Médecins Sans Frontières may have reasons to revise their objectives and adopt different interventions or methods.

The traditional paradox of the stone may be interpreted as posing a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings, represented by God at two different times. The new paradox poses a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. We make use of an attractive Thomistic response to the former paradox in arguing that the latter situation is logically possible.

I argue that, If one adopts a minimal naturalism (of a kind rejected by moore, Hare, "et al".), One would adopt a methodology which yields conclusions identical to that yielded by intuitionistic methodology (of a kind employed by ross, Prichard, "et al".). I dilate upon the advantages which thus accrue to each theory, And I defend my minimal naturalism against a variety of objections.

In the recent past, several papers have pointed to the possibility that tumour removal generates a permissive environment in which tumour growth is potentiated. This phenomenon has been coined “perioperative tumour growth” and whilst it represents a departure in terms of our attitude to the surgical process, this concept was first hinted at by Paget1Sir James Paget (1814–1899) was a surgeon and physiologist who is widely held (along with Rudolph Virchow) to be the father of the science of pathology. Paget (...) described Paget's disease of the nipple as well as Paget's disease of bone. himself. Despite this, the time interval immediately before and after cancer surgery (i.e. the perioperative period) remains an underutilised interval during which chemotherapeutic regimens are rarely implemented. Herein, we present a summarised review of the literature that supports the concept that tumour removal may potentiate the growth of residual neoplastic disease. We also outline current knowledge regarding underlying mechanisms and in this manner highlight potential therapeutic entry points. Finally, we emphasise the urgent need for trials of agents that could protect patients against the harmful host–tumour interactions that may occur during the perioperative period. BioEssays 28: 433–437, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The ethical question of whether taking blood from normal children for research purposes is justified, is determined in part at least, by whether or not the children are harmed. To try to assess the risks, the effects of venepuncture on a group of healthy subjects were studied, by means of a parental questionnaire completed approximately eighteen months after the venepuncture had taken place. Ninety-two healthy children aged between 6 and 8 had a blood sample taken for non-therapeutic reasons as part (...) of a research study. Questionnaire responses reveal few negative effects, and in some cases positive effects. (shrink)

Intuitionism has for many years been a poor relation among the various metaethical theories, commonly thought both parochial and irrational. Most recent writers who attempt a survey of ethical theory mention it briefly in an embarrassed sort of way, and then dismiss it in a paragraph or two. John Rawls, however, does not share this common attitude. In his recent book he represents his own theory as being an alternative both to intuitionism and to utilitarianism, and it is apparent from (...) his discussion that he takes both of these latter theories seriously, as having substantial attraction to reasonable men. Those sympathetic to intuitionism have no doubt been cheered by Rawls’ respectful treatment; but they are likely also to have been dismayed by the fact that, because he focuses upon a somewhat unusual understanding of it, he does not make clear how his theory stands in relation to intuitionism in its most general form, nor whether there are varieties of intuitionism consistent with the whole of his theory or at least with important parts of it. I shall try to answer these questions here. (shrink)

In "moral arguments" ("mind", 1958), Philippa foot displayed what she claimed to be a deduction of an evaluative conclusion from a non-Evaluative premise. In "freedom and reason", R m hare attacks foot-Style deductions on two grounds: he first offers a "reductio", Comparing them to a racist deduction; he then offers an explanation of where all of these arguments go awry. I argue in my paper's first part that hare's explanation rests upon a defective criterion of entailment. In passing I show (...) how this counts against certain noncognitivist arguments that purport to show that moral judgments cannot be factual. In the second part I show that foot-Style deductions--And the racist deduction as well--Are either unsound or else superfluous to the naturalist's enterprise. From this I draw certain morals as to what conditions a successful naturalism must satisfy. (shrink)

In the recent spate of philosophers' writing on legal ethics, most contend that lawyers' professional role exposes them to great risk of moral wrongdoing; and some even conclude that the role's demands inevitably corrupt lawyers' characters. In assessing their arguments, I take up three questions: (1) whether philosophers' training and experience give them authority to scold lawyers; (2) whether anything substantive has emerged in the scolding that lawyers are morally bound to take to heart; and (3) whether lawyers ought to (...) defer to philosophers' claims about moral principle. I return a negative answer to each. (shrink)

Psychologists of my generation will recognize the implicit reference in my title immediately: to Kurt Lewin's classic paper that introduced most of us to the excitement of his ideas when we read it as the initial chapter of A Dynamic Theory of Personality . When Lewin wrote about "The Conflict Between Aristotelian and Galilean Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology" over a half a century ago, it was indeed a breath of fresh air. Along with a very few other books (...) and papers, it stands out saliently in my memory as having had a large part in forming my enduring perspective in psychology. It surely played a similar role for many others, by no means just Lewinians. We cannot readily recall its content since we've absorbed it, and built it into the fabric of our thought. I turn back to Lewin's essay because it represents the psysicalist tradition in psychological theory at its best, free of many faults that tainted the behavioristic expressions of positivism. All the same, the hermeneutic and contextualist critique of positivism should leave us dissatisfied with Lewin's version of a Galilean strategy for psychology. In one respect, thus, I am using this occasion for my own "me-too" endorsement of post-positivist theorizing. My second concern here is to focus attention on the need for a culturally and historically contextualized approach in personality theory. Finally, this occasion lets me talk some sense about post-positivist perspectives in psychology. As usual, the conceptual innovators have not been very reasonable. If a contextualized psychology of persons is to be advanced, we need a more plausible version of contextualism than is being argued by the leading polemicists. This is also an effort, therefore, to domesticate a contextualized approach, to accommodate it to its prospective role of defining a new mainstream of theorizing at the softer, more human end of the psychological spectrum. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Mr. F. is a fifty‐year‐old father of two school‐aged daughters. Six years ago, he received a double lung transplant because he was suffering from interstitial lung disease, a fatal illness that causes suffocation by progressive scarring of the lungs. He is now experiencing chronic rejection of the transplant and is being considered to receive another. Without it, he is expected to survive only a year and a half. With it, his prognosis will improve, but the numbers are still not good. (...) Three years after his lung transplant, Mr. F. stopped attending his office visits. For a period of sixteen months he went without the studies and attention essential to posttransplant care. He stopped performing the required daily self‐monitoring of his lung function about eight months after his transplant, but he has maintained a regular exercise regimen. While lost to follow‐up, he continued to take his immunosuppressant medications, but he stopped taking medicine to control his high blood pressure because of its expense. (shrink)

In rejecting the ethical authority of those social institutions that attempt to define and impose norms of belief and behavior, radical environmentalism has many parallels with past antinomian protests. It is characterized by a 'hermeneutics of suspicion' directed towards the establishment in all its forms and extending to all its attempts to 'lay down the law.' Those nomothetic models which represent environmentalists as, (a) seeking to extend current legal/bureaucratic frameworks to 'nature,' or (b) drawing moral conclusions from 'natural laws' are (...) guilty of ignoring radical environmentalism's antinomian ethos. (shrink)