Présentation d'une pensée qui synthétise les savoirs des Lumières et prépare les idéologies contemporaines, du socialisme au libéralisme industriel, et des disciplines comme la sociologie, le management ou la science politique. Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, surtout, peut être considéré comme le fondateur de la religion scientifique, industrielle et technologique contemporaine.

L’article entend répondre à la question suivante : en quoi le catastrophisme dans la pensée écologique peut-il inciter à agir afin de préserver au mieux les conditions d’habitabilité de la Terre? Dans cette perspective, sont analysées les pensées catastrophistes de Hans Jonas, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Pierre-Henri Castel, et des collapsologues, avec en filigrane celles de Günther Anders et de Simone Weil. Pour répondre, il convient de prêter attention à la temporalité dans laquelle ils (ou elle) pensent la catastrophe (...) (est-elle à venir ou déjà en cours?) et à l’inscription ontologique de la catastrophe dans cette temporalité (est-elle inéluctable ou évitable?). La conclusion est la suivante : la perspective de la catastrophe est effectivement mobilisatrice, pour celles et ceux qui se reconnaissent un devoir d’agir, quand la catastrophe est pensée comme inéluctable et déjà en cours, portant en germe une fin inévitable mais dont le contenu demeure incertain : la disparition de la vie ou le dépassement du facteur déterminant de la catastrophe, la Technique. (shrink)

We study one way in which stable phenomena can exist in an NIP theory. We start by defining a notion of ‘pure instability’ that we call ‘distality’ in which no such phenomenon occurs. O-minimal theories and the p-adics for example are distal. Next, we try to understand what happens when distality fails. Given a type p over a sufficiently saturated model, we extract, in some sense, the stable part of p and define a notion of stable independence which is implied (...) by non-forking and has bounded weight. (shrink)

This paper has two parts. In the first one, we prove that an invariant dp-minimal type is either finitely satisfiable or definable. We also prove that a definable version of the -theorem holds in dp-minimal theories of small or medium directionality.In the second part, we study dp-rank in dp-minimal theories and show that it enjoys many nice properties. It is continuous, definable in families and it can be characterised geometrically with no mention of indiscernible sequences. In particular, if the structure (...) expands a divisible ordered abelian group, then dp-rank coincides with the dimension coming from the order. (shrink)

Parmi les nombreuses lettres de Pierre Teilhard, celles envoyées aux Bégouen, près d'une centaine, occupent une place privilégiée. C'est en 1913, avec la rencontre du comte Henri Bégouën, passionné de préhistoire, que commence la relation de Teilhard avec cette famille. Durant la guerre, cette relation s'ouvre à Max, le fils aîné, et, par la suite, à Simone, son épouse. Dans sa correspondance, Teilhard témoigne d'une amitié profonde et fidèle tout particulièrement à l'égard du couple, qu'il compte parmi ses (...) intimes. En toute liberté, il lui fait part du cheminement de sa pensée et de l'état d'avancement de ses écrits, il lui confie ses difficultés avec les autorités religieuses et prend position sur les courants politiques et idéologiques qui secouent la France et le monde. Grâce aux nombreux souvenirs rassemblés par Max et à quelques copies de ses lettres à Teilhard, se perçoit l'influence déterminante du jésuite sur sa vie et sur son activité professionnelle en Afrique. S'y révèle aussi la riche personnalité du couple qui a contribué au rayonnement de la pensée de Teilhard. Dès 1928, Simone reproduit et diffuse les essais envoyés de Chine par Teilhard. Initiative, peu connue jusqu'à présent, qui a facilité l'édition rapide des oeuvres complètes. En postface, quatre spécialistes de l'oeuvre de Teilhard, Jean-Pierre Demoulin, François Fuvé, Henri Madelin et Gustave Martelet, mettent en lumière l'apport de ces lettres à la compréhension de la personnalité et de la vision clu monde du jésuite. De cet ensemble, il ressort clairement que la pensée teilhardienne déborde des cercles scientifiques et peut éclairer les chrétiens soucieux de construire une société plus juste et plus fraternelle. Les éditions Lessius ont aussi publié la Correspondance de Pierre Teilhard avec Lucile Swan (2008) et Teilhard de Chardin prophète d'un Christ toujours plus grand de Gustave Martelet (2005). (shrink)

Before broaching our main subject, and exploring why, among all disorders of the mind, obsessive-compulsive disorders have a place apart, I would like to start from a dilemma that is well-known to historians interested in mental disorders. According to one approach, a mental illness X is considered as a bona fide or ‘genuine’ illness if, and only if, it originates from a disturbance of the brain. Its neurobiological form is in this case considered as invariant, whatever cultural veneer might give (...) it a different aspect in accord with historical and local settings. The assumption is that this veneer does not, properly speaking, have any deep grounding in reality... (shrink)

We show basic facts about dp-minimal ordered structures. The main results are: dp-minimal groups are abelian-by-finite-exponent, in a divisible ordered dp-minimal group, any infinite set has non-empty interior, and any theory of pure tree is dp-minimal.

In this article, we develop tame topology over dp-minimal structures equipped with definable uniformities satisfying certain assumptions. Our assumptions are enough to ensure that definable sets are tame: there is a good notion of dimension on definable sets, definable functions are almost everywhere continuous, and definable sets are finite unions of graphs of definable continuous “multivalued functions.” This generalizes known statements about weakly o-minimal, C-minimal, and P-minimal theories.

We study invariant types in NIP theories. Amongst other things: we prove a definable version of the [Formula: see text]-theorem in theories of small or medium directionality; we construct a canonical retraction from the space of [Formula: see text]-invariant types to that of [Formula: see text]-finitely satisfiable types; we show some amalgamation results for invariant types and list a number of open questions.

The Silk Road that crosses Mongolia is unique in that it is the most northerly of all, skirting Siberia. Some authors call it the Altai Road, because it crosses the immense Altai mountain range which begins in western Mongolia and whose peaks, snow-covered and icy year round, rise more than five thousand meters above sea level. The official name of this fourth expedition of the Silk Roads project, which took place between 10 July and 5 August 1992, was "The Nomads' (...) Road." The account given below, although expressing only my personal expe rience, reflects, I believe, an experience shared by many of my colleagues. (shrink)

Les rencontres « Science & citoyens » du CNRS, lancées il y a vingt ans par Edgar Morin, constituent une expérimentation en vraie grandeur de l’interdisciplinarité et de l’interaction du débat entre scientifiques et entre scientifiques et citoyens. Une telle démarche devient de plus en plus nécessaire à une époque où les échanges entre sciences de la nature et sciences humaines deviennent primordiaux pour l’avenir de notre société.Meetings «Science & citizens" CNRS launched twenty years ago by Edgar Morin, is a (...) full-scale experimentation of interdisciplinary interaction and debate between scientists and between scientists and citizens. Such an approach becomes more necessary at a time when exchanges between the natural sciences and the humanities become crucial for the future of our society. (shrink)

"Sommes-nous entrés dans l'ère du déclin démocratique, voire dans un âge postdémocratique? Admettons au moins l'existence d'une triple déception : la démocratie libérale souffre d'une terrible crise de la représentation, d'une grave impuissance publique et d'un profond déficit de sens. Autrement dit, elle aurait perdu, en cours de route, à la fois le peuple qui la fonde, le gouvernement qui la maintient et l'horizon qui la guide. " P.-H. T. Pour Pierre-Henri Tavoillot, ce que nous avions pris pour (...) un progrès acquis — la démocratie — se révèle en réalité un vertigineux chantier. Avec ce livre qui renoue avec la tradition oubliée des traités d'art politique, il nous invite à réfléchir à ce qui fait le secret de l'obéissance volontaire. Car, en démocratie, l'art de gouverner est surtout un art d'être gouverné. Comment l'envisager aujourd'hui? Entre le cauchemar de l'impuissance publique et le spectre de l'autoritarisme, comment réconcilier la liberté du peuple et l'efficacité du pouvoir? (shrink)

We prove in particular that, in a large class of dp-minimal theories including the p-adics, definable types are dense amongst nonforking types.

Résumé L’art musical suscite la question de l’interprétation en sa complexité dans la mesure où il superpose et emmêle les trois sens que généralement nous accordons à l’interprétation : traduction, exécution et manifestation ou recollection du sens. Ce faisant, la musique engendre avec une très grande acuité la question suivante : en quels sens et à quel degré l’interprétation est-elle constitutive de l’œuvre d’art musicale? Sans doute aussi laisse-t-elle l’ensemble des problèmes qu’elle engendre à ses apories. Ce sont quelques-unes de (...) ses apories que l’article voudrait relever avec l’hypothèse qu’elles sont les principes d’un travail musical infini. Ce travail interprétatif et musical infini n’est pas seulement la condition de l’œuvre ; il est l’œuvre conçue comme processus ou comme passage. (shrink)

It is no easy task to answer Jerry Wakefield’s comments, for I feel at risk of merely pitting two major paradigms in the history and epistemology of psychiatry against each other: the one historical/anthropological, the other epistemological/naturalistic. Fortunately, Wakefield and I do share enough to find a middle ground. This commonality should allow me to reconcile his opinions and mine, by dissipating a few misunderstandings, and also to state more clearly why I am dubious about some of his proposals. First, (...) let me repeat that, in my argument, the lived experience of having an inner mental space is not primarily a psychological phenomenon—at least in the.. (shrink)

This work builds on previous papers by Hrushovski, Pillay and the author where Keisler measures over NIP theories are studied. We discuss two constructions for obtaining generically stable measures in this context. First, we show how to symmetrize an arbitrary invariant measure to obtain a generically stable one from it. Next, we show that suitable sigma-additive probability measures give rise to generically stable Keisler measures. Also included is a proof that generically stable measures over o-minimal theories and the p-adics are (...) smooth. (shrink)

Barthélemy Baudrand (1701 – 1787) was a Jesuit theologian and writer. One work is often cited and associated with the Abbé: Réflexions sur le tolérantisme, which is in fact an extract from L’Âme affermie dans la foi. In this part of the work, which was distributed separately, the Abbé, like the rest of Catholic apologetics, opposes the emergence of a "system of toleration", i.e. an excessive tolerance, both civil and ecclesiastical, which brings together the "enemies of God" and tends towards (...) the destructive indifference of the Christian religion. Conversely, this leads him to rehabilitate a certain religious and ecclesiastical intolerance. (shrink)

Introduction De l’extérieur, la discipline économique est encore vue comme très imposante par son apparatus théorique mais avec comme contrepartie une part limitée laissée à la vérification empirique. Cette image héritée du passé est assez largement obsolète, et ne correspond plus à l’activité réelle des économistes d’aujourd’hui et en particulier de la jeune génération. À la limite, pour nombre des économistes des années 1960, il pouvait sembler suffisant d’énoncer une proposition pour qu’el..

We prove a couple of results on NTP2 theories. First, we prove an amalgamation statement and deduce from it that the Lascar distance over extension bases is bounded by 2. This improves previous work of Ben Yaacov and Chernikov. We propose a line of investigation of NTP2 theories based on S1 ideals with amalgamation and ask some questions. We then define and study a class of groups with generically simple generics, generalizing NIP groups with generically stable generics.

We prove that in $\operatorname {NTP}_{\operatorname {2}}$ theories the dp-rank of a type can be witnessed by indiscernible sequences of tuples satisfying that type. If the type has dp-rank infinity, then this can be witnessed by singletons.

A theory [Formula: see text] is said to have exact saturation at a singular cardinal [Formula: see text] if it has a [Formula: see text]-saturated model which is not [Formula: see text]-saturated. We show, under some set-theoretic assumptions, that any simple theory has exact saturation. Also, an NIP theory has exact saturation if and only if it is not distal. This gives a new characterization of distality.

We have no reason to believe that reasons do not exist. Contra Bart Streumer’s recent proposal, this has nothing to do with our incapacity to believe this error theory. Rather, it is because if we know that if a proposition is true, we have no reason to believe it, then we have no reason to believe this proposition. From a different angle: if we know that we have at best misleading reasons to believe a proposition, then we have no reason (...) to believe it. This has two consequences. Firstly, coming close to believing the error theory is idle or pointless. Secondly, philosophers who argue that believing sweeping theories like determinism or physicalism is self-defeating because they are either false or believed for no reason pursue a worthwhile argumentative strategy. (shrink)

We prove (Proposition 2.1) that if $\mu$ is a generically stable measure in an NIP (no independence property) theory, and $\mu(\phi(x,b))=0$ for all $b$ , then for some $n$ , $\mu^{(n)}(\exists y(\phi(x_{1},y)\wedge \cdots \wedge\phi(x_{n},y)))=0$ . As a consequence we show (Proposition 3.2) that if $G$ is a definable group with fsg (finitely satisfiable generics) in an NIP theory, and $X$ is a definable subset of $G$ , then $X$ is generic if and only if every translate of $X$ does not (...) fork over $\emptyset$ , precisely as in stable groups, answering positively an earlier problem posed by the first two authors. (shrink)

Here is a skeptical trilemma. We know that we are responsible. We do not know that determinism is false. Yet, if we do not know that determinism is false, we do not know that we are responsible. If we want to avoid the skeptical conclusion of rejecting the first claim, we ought to reject the third. It does not follow that compatibilism is true. But it follows that libertarianism, the view that we are responsible even though responsibility requires indeterminism, is (...) unknowable, at least for now. To see this, we need to compare different forms of skepticism and their response. (shrink)

We prove that every ultraproduct of p-adics is inp-minimal. More generally, we prove an Ax-Kochen type result on preservation of inp-minimality for Henselian valued fields of equicharacteristic 0 in the RV language.

We show that any theory of tame henselian valued fields is NIP if and only if the theory of its residue field and the theory of its value group are NIP. Moreover, we show that if is a henselian valued field of residue characteristic \=p\) such that if \, depending on the characteristic of K either the degree of imperfection or the index of the pth powers is finite, then is NIP iff Kv is NIP and v is roughly separably (...) tame. (shrink)

Let [Formula: see text] be a monster model of an arbitrary theory [Formula: see text], let [Formula: see text] be any tuple of bounded length of elements of [Formula: see text], and let [Formula: see text] be an enumeration of all elements of [Formula: see text]. By [Formula: see text] we denote the compact space of all complete types over [Formula: see text] extending [Formula: see text], and [Formula: see text] is defined analogously. Then [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see (...) text] are naturally [Formula: see text]-flows. We show that the Ellis groups of both these flows are of bounded size, providing an explicit bound on this size. Next, we prove that these Ellis groups do not depend on the choice of the monster model [Formula: see text]; thus, we say that these Ellis groups are absolute. We also study minimal left ideals of the Ellis semigroups of the flows [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. We give an example of a NIP theory in which the minimal left ideals are of unbounded size. Then we show that in each of these two cases, boundedness of a minimal left ideal is an absolute property and that whenever such an ideal is bounded, then in some sense its isomorphism type is also absolute. Under the assumption that [Formula: see text] has NIP, we give characterizations of when a minimal left ideal of the Ellis semigroup of [Formula: see text] is bounded. Then we adapt the proof of Theorem 5.7 in Definably amenable NIP groups, J. Amer. Math. Soc. 31 609–641 to show that whenever such an ideal is bounded, a certain natural epimorphism 863–932]) from the Ellis group of the flow [Formula: see text] to the Kim–Pillay Galois group [Formula: see text] is an isomorphism. We also obtain some variants of these results, formulate some questions, and explain differences which occur when the flow [Formula: see text] is replaced by [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self- defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus insightfully recognised,there is a strong connection between conduct and belief—and so (...) between thecontent of free will scepticism (since it is about conduct) and the attitude of believing it. Second, we must realise that an attitude can be self- defeating relative to certain grounds. This means that it might be self-defeating to be a free will sceptic on certain grounds, such as the putative fact that we lack leeway or sourcehood. This charge is much more interesting because of the epistemic importance of leeway and sourcehood. Ultimately, the Epicurean charge of self-defeat fails. Yet, it delivers important lessons to the sceptic. The most important of them is that free will sceptics should either accept the existence of leeway or reject the principle that ‘“ought” implies “can”’. (shrink)

No one is responsible for their conduct because free will is an illusion, say some skeptics. Even when it seems that we have several options, we only have one. Hence, says the free will skeptic, we should reform our practices which involve responsibility attributions, such as punishment and blame. How seriously should we take this doctrine? Is it one that we could live by? One thorn in the side of the skeptic concerns deliberation. When we deliberate about what to do—what (...) film to go see, whom to befriend, which doctrine to follow—we must presume that our options are open to us. But then, every time that skeptics deliberate, they presume something which is incompatible with their doctrine, i.e. that they have several options. In a word, skeptics cannot deliberate qua skeptics. Some philosophers have responded that deliberators don’t have to presume that their options are open; they only have to presume that their choice will be efficacious. I argue that this proposal uses resources which, if they are available and successful, can be employed to refute skepticism. The upshot is that free will skeptics are pushing for a doctrine that is either false or in tension with deliberation. (shrink)

A version of the principle of alternate possibilities claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s counterexamples to it. After fifty years of refined debates, progress might seem hopeless. Yet, we can make headway by asking: “what’s our reason for believing PAP?” The best answer is this: lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too high to reasonably opt for—is a good excuse. Yet, this principle is (...) subject to straightforward counterexamples, unless it is given an epistemicised reading. And in this latter case, it does not support PAP. So, PAP is unsupported, at least for now. (shrink)