RÉSUMÉ: Cet article analyse le traitement du problème du scepticisme qui est mené au §43 d’Être et temps afin de proposer une nouvelle interprétation de la position philosophique de Heidegger par rapport au conflit entre le réalisme et l’idéalisme. La position heideggérienne à l’égard du scepticisme a souvent été négligée par les commentateurs comme s’il s’agissait d’une question subsidiaire ou d’un fauxproblème, attitude qui est peut-être responsable d’une perception assez répandue dans le monde philosophique qui verrait précisément s’exprimer chez Heidegger (...) une forme de scepticisme. En soulignant certaines ambiguïtés du §43, je soutiens que Heidegger, dans Être et temps, s’attache à l’élaboration d’une réfutation du scepticisme radicale et authentique, bien que celle-ci n’ait été entièrement complétée que plus tard, dans les Beiträge zur Philosophie.ABSTRACT: In this article, I wish to shed a new light on Heidegger’s philosophical position toward idealism and realism. This will be accomplished through an analysis of Heidegger’s account of the problem of scepticism in §43 of Sein und Zeit. Heidegger’s position toward scepticism has often been overlooked or treated candidly by scholars and, as a result, misunderstood in the larger philosophical world, who frequently equated Heidegger’s philosophy with some form of scepticism. By highlighting some crucial ambiguities in the unfolding of §43, I show that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger is elaborating a radical refutation of scepticism even though it will ultimately only be accomplished in the Beiträge zur Philosophie. (shrink)

La 4ème de couv. indique : "Avec "Hors sujet", Emmanuel Levinas revient et approfondit sa réflexion sur le noyau dur de sa philosophie : la relation avec l’Autre. Méditation superbe qui entraîne vers l’analyse des "Droits de l’homme et droits d’autrui", une approche singulière du "Langage quotidien" et de la "rhétorique sans éloquence", ou encore de "La Transcendance des mots". En chemin, le philosophe retrouve la trace de ceux auprès desquels il a fortifié sa propre pensée – Merleau-Ponty, Jankélévitch, (...) Leiris, mais aussi Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig ou Jean Wahl. Une magistrale leçon de philosophie.". (shrink)

Les soixante-dix nations : tel était le thème choisi par le 27e colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue française. Quel sens prenait pour le judaïsme, conscient de procéder de l'Histoire sainte, sa présence à l'Histoire universelle, auprès des nations et parmi elles? Ce thème avait déjà été approché au cours de quatre rencontres précédentes. Le présent ouvrage reproduit les cinq " lectures talmudiques " qu'Emmanuel Levinas donna devant cet auditoire de 1981 à 1986. S'y ajoutent des textes consacrés à (...) l'exégèse rabbinique touchant l'amour du prochain et de l'étranger, au concept de " kénose ", mais aussi aux problèmes de l'intégration et de la distance que pose au judaïsme l'Europe issue du siècle des Lumières. Un débat réunissant en Hollande des penseurs juifs et chrétiens permet de souligner la féconde originalité, sur ce plan, de la pensée de Franz Rosenzweig. Et un entretien avec Françoise Armengaud aborde quelques thèmes essentiels de la philosophie juive dans le cadre de la philosophie générale. (shrink)

Résumé Franz von Baader, « le philosophe romantique par excellence », a lui-même désigné ses Leçons de philosophie religieuse de 1827 comme la porte d’entrée « logique » de son système de pensée. Développant un commentaire fouillé de ce texte déconcertant et difficile, l’A. décrit la théorie baadérienne de la connaissance qui s’y exprime comme une reprise puissante de l’épistémologie thomiste face à la critique kantienne. L’originalité profonde de Baader se prend du cadre théosophique dans lequel il inscrit sa (...) lecture de l’Aquinate, ainsi confronté à la vision trinitaire de Boehme en particulier.Franz von Baader, “the romantic philosopher par excellence”, saw his own Lectures on Religious Philosophy of 1827 as the “logical” entrance into his system of thought. The author of this article attempts a thorough commentary of that difficult and disconcerting text, in which he sees Franz von Baader’s theory of knowledge expressed in those lectures as a powerful return to Aquinas’s epistemology in the face of the Kantian critique. Baader’s profound originality stems from the theosophical frame into which he sets his reading of Aquinas, confronting it to Jacob Boehme’s Trinitarian vision in particular. (shrink)

The 'nations' of the title are the 'seventy nations': in the Talmudic idiom, the whole of humanity surrounding Israel. In this major collection of essays, Levinas considers Judaism's uncertain relationship to European culture since the Enlightenment, problems of distance and integration. It also includes five Talmudic readings from between 1981 and 1986, essays on Franz Rosenzweig and Moses Mendelssohn, and a discussion with Francoise Armengaud which raises questions of central importance to Jewish philosophy in the context of general philosophy. (...) This work brings to the fore the vital encounter between philosophy and Judaism, a hallmark of Levinas's thought.". (shrink)

Levinas' thinking in Totality and Infinity is centered on the relation with the Infinite. This relation is paradoxical. To be possible, the experience of a separated subject is postulated as a transcendental presupposition. But this separation is at the same time unthinkable without the Infinite. In his main work, The Star of Redemption, Franz Rosenzweig stimulates the thinking of this relation. The renewal of Levinas' thinking of the paradox is made possible by phaenomenology. But the confrontation with Husserl indicates (...) the limit of Levinas' thinking: the asymmetrical relation with the Infinite is unthinkable without the acceptance of some kind of symmetry. (shrink)

Le présent ouvrage, rédigé par un philosophe germaniste et hébraïsant, expose l'émergence d'un Emmanuel Levinas dans son entièreté, et dont l'idée centrale consiste à présenter le judaïsme, non pas comme une confession, mais comme une authentique catégorie de l'universel. Levinas a mis en avant les sources talmudiques, notamment le Midrash dont il donne de lumineuses interprétations éthico-philosophiques. Il a refusé de reprendre les enseignements des philosophes judéo-allemands du XIXe siècle qui avaient pourtant jeté les fondements du judaïsme moderne et (...) contemporain. Et s'est placé dans le sillage et sous la tutelle bienveillante du penseur qui a réinséré Dieu au coeur même de la spéculation philosophique, Franz Rosenzweig. L'apport considérable de ce philosophe-herméneute à la pensée de son temps a transcendé les frontières confessionnelles, linguistiques et géographiques. Ni philosophe juif ni Juif philosophe, mais simplement penseur universel attaché au logos, Levinas pourrait bien résumer le résultat de toutes ses spéculations par cette brève phrase, si récurrente sous sa plume : "Le bien est antérieur à l'être"... (shrink)

In seinem Hauptwerk Totalität und Unendlichkeit räumte Levinas der von Alexandre Kojève ab 1933 in Paris vorgetragenen und schon seinerzeit gängigen Auffassung eines ‚Kampfs um Anerkennung‘ einen begrenzten Platz ein. Die Grundbegriffe dieser Auffassung kritisierte er, um eine Konzeption des Verhältnisses zum ‚Anderen‘ zu entwickeln, die eher Franz Rosenzweig verpflichtet war und nicht so sehr als Dialog-, sondern richtiger als Offenbarungsdenken beschrieben wird, denn Levinas fasste den Dialog mit anderen immer asymmetrisch. In seinem späteren Werk ging er sogar so (...) weit zu behaupten, dass die Verantwortung, die jedem Ich zugewiesen ist, bis zur „Stellvertretung“ gehen soll: „Ich bin du, wenn ich ich bin“. (shrink)

Robert Gibbs radically revises standard interpretations of the two key figures of modern Jewish philosophy--Franz Rosenzweig, author of the monumental Star of Redemption, and Emmanuel Levinas, a major voice in contemporary intellectual life, who has inspired such thinkers as Derrida, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Blanchot. Rosenzweig and Levinas thought in relation to different philosophical schools and wrote in disparate styles. Their personal relations to Judaism and Christianity were markedly dissimilar. To Gibbs, however, the two thinkers possess basic affinities with (...) each other. The book offers important insights into how philosophy is continually being altered by its encounter with other traditions. (shrink)

Franz Rosenzweig is widely regarded today as one of the most original and intellectually challenging figures within the so-called renaissance of German-Jewish thought in the Weimar period. The architect of a unique kind of existential theology, and an important influence upon such philosophers as Walter Benjamin, Martin Buber, Leo Strauss, and Emmanuel Levinas, Rosenzweig is remembered chiefly as a "Jewish thinker," often to the neglect of his broader philosophical concerns. Cutting across the artificial divide that the traumatic memory (...) of National Socialism has drawn between German and Jewish philosophy, this book seeks to restore Rosenzweig's thought to the German philosophical horizon in which it first took shape. It is the first English-language study to explore Rosenzweig's enduring debt to Hegel's political theory, neo-Kantianism, and life-philosophy; the book also provides a new, systematic reading of Rosenzweig's major work, _The Star of Redemption._ Most of all, the book sets out to explore a surprising but deep affinity between Rosenzweig’s thought and that of his contemporary, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Resisting both apologetics and condemnation, Gordon suggests that Heidegger’s engagement with Nazism should not obscure the profound and intellectually compelling bond in the once-shared tradition of modern German and Jewish thought. A remarkably lucid discussion of two notably difficult thinkers, this book represents an eloquent attempt to bridge the forced distinction between modern Jewish thought and the history of modern German philosophy—and to show that such a distinction cannot be sustained without doing violence to both. (shrink)

Quelles sont les conditions pour une rencontre éthique avec l’autre? Cet article porte sur une question précise, à savoir si les spécificités historiques d’un ordre ontologique donné ―comme le colonialisme― peuvent empêcher la possibilité d’une telle rencontre. Est-ce qu’une relation éthique est toujours possible, lorsque l’autre se trouve être réifié, ontologiquement amoindri, voire dépourvu de son humanité? L’auteure propose d’affronter ce problème en instituant un dialogue entre la philosophie de Franz Fanon et celle d’Emmanuel Levinas. Dans un premier (...) temps, l’article explique la difficulté que la pensée de Fanon pose à l’éthique levinassienne; ensuite, il tâche de montrer comment l’éthique levinassienne pourrait fonctionner dans le cadre (ou au-delà du cadre) de l’ontologie négative de Fanon. Dans un troisième temps, une critique de certains aspects de la philosophie levinassienne de l’altérité nous amènera à interroger le problème du tiers et de l’ennemi, afin de réfléchir sur les limites de la réponse éthique au problème proprement politique de Fanon: l’inévitabilité de la cruauté et de la violence politique. (shrink)

The act of thought-thought as an act-would precede the thought thinking or becoming conscious of an act. The notion of act involves a violence essentially: the violence of transitivity, lacking in the transcendence of thought... Totality and Infinity The work of Emmanuel Levinas revolves around two preoccupations. First, his philosophical project can be described as the construction of a formal ethics, grounded upon the transcendence of the other human being and a subject's spontaneous responsibility toward that other. Second, Levinas (...) has written extensively on, and as a member of, the cultural and textual life of Judaism. These two concerns are intertwined. Their relation, however, is one of considerable complexity. Levinas' philosophical project stems directly from his situation as a Jewish thinker in the twentieth century and takes its particular form from his study of the Torah and the Talmud. It is, indeed, a hermeneutics of biblical experience. If inspired by Judaism, Levinas' ethics are not eo ipso confessional. What his ethics takes from Judaism, rather, is a particular way of conceiving transcendence and the other human being. It owes to the philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber a logos of the world and of the holy, which acknowledges their incom mensurability without positing one as fallen and the other as supernal. (shrink)

Franz Rosenzweig's The Star of Redemption comes before the Shoah and Maurice Blanchot's The Writing of the Disaster comes after it. The one addresses itself with hope to the figure of a star; the other meditates on the state of being without a guiding star. The figure of Emmanuel Levinas stands between these two works, since Totality and Infinity is marked by Rosenzweig's critique of totality and The Writing of the Disaster is in part a response to Levinas's (...) philosophy. Both Rosenzweig and Blanchot propose a new way of thinking, one that calls unity into question. This essay seeks to clarify what ‘thought’ means for Rosenzweig and for Blanchot. In what ways do Rosenzweig and Blanchot converge? In what ways do they diverge? (shrink)

When Emmanuel Levinas writes (in the preface of Totality and Infinity) that Franz Rosenzweig’s Stern der Erlösung is “a work too often present in this book to be cited,” he effectively names his debt to F. W. J. Schelling as well, for Rosenzweig’s work was a sustained attempt to carry to completion Schelling’s great philosophical fragment, the Weltalter. Scholars of Levinas have explored Levinas’s relationship to Schelling, but I confess that, as a Schelling scholar, I knew nothing of (...) this connection until rather recently. I credit above all the energetic work of Jason Wirth for helping me see its importance — and more generally the importance of reading Schelling in the context of recent work in continental philosophy. None of this has been easy. The very thing that Schelling and Levinas have in common, their resistance to the implicit solipsism of overcoming mystery with clarity, make them poor candidates for quick appropriation and comparison. Indeed, Schelling anticipated Nietzsche by openly mocking the scholars who make it their business to “appropriate and compare.” Mockery and ridicule is, ofcourse, not Levinas’s way of going about things. Even so, he too is so relentless in his polemic against the totalizing desire to know that he forces his reader to pause and question just what a proper scholarly response to his work might be. As such, the very first result of taking up the question of Schelling and Levinas might be that we are forced to set aside the scholarly mask, testimony of one’s acquiescence to the order of the same, in order to step forth as the human beings that we are. Whether this is an act of humility or of arrogance is not at all clear. Dispensing with the pretense of knowledge takes a kind of boldness on our part — for what but knowledge might give us a claim to the attention of others? (shrink)

When Emmanuel Levinas writes that Franz Rosenzweig’s Stern der Erlösung is “a work too often present in this book to be cited,” he effectively names his debt to F. W. J. Schelling as well, for Rosenzweig’s work was a sustained attempt to carry to completion Schelling’s great philosophical fragment, the Weltalter. Scholars of Levinas have explored Levinas’s relationship to Schelling, but I confess that, as a Schelling scholar, I knew nothing of this connection until rather recently. I credit (...) above all the energetic work of Jason Wirth for helping me see its importance — and more generally the importance of reading Schelling in the context of recent work in continental philosophy. None of this has been easy. The very thing that Schelling and Levinas have in common, their resistance to the implicit solipsism of overcoming mystery with clarity, make them poor candidates for quick appropriation and comparison. Indeed, Schelling anticipated Nietzsche by openly mocking the scholars who make it their business to “appropriate and compare.” Mockery and ridicule is, ofcourse, not Levinas’s way of going about things. Even so, he too is so relentless in his polemic against the totalizing desire to know that he forces his reader to pause and question just what a proper scholarly response to his work might be. As such, the very first result of taking up the question of Schelling and Levinas might be that we are forced to set aside the scholarly mask, testimony of one’s acquiescence to the order of the same, in order to step forth as the human beings that we are. Whether this is an act of humility or of arrogance is not at all clear. Dispensing with the pretense of knowledge takes a kind of boldness on our part — for what but knowledge might give us a claim to the attention of others? (shrink)

Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel Levinas are three of the most prominent Jewish philosophers of the 20th century. This paper looks at the different understandings each author offers of intersubjectivity and authentic self-hood and questions the extent to which for each author God plays a role in interpersonal relationships.

Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel Levinas are three of the most prominent Jewish philosophers of the 20thcentury. This paper looks at the different understandings each author offers of intersubjectivity and authentic self-hood and questions the extent to which for each author God plays a role in interpersonal relationships.

This elevating pull of an ethics that can account for the relation of self and other without reducing either term is the central theme of these essays.

This paper will address the topic of “tradition” by exploring the ways that Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida each looked to return to traditional texts in order to overcome a perceived crisis or delimiting fault in the contemporary thought of their respective presents. For Heidegger, this meant a return to the pre-Socratics of “early Greek thinking.” For Levinas, it entailed a return to the sacred Jewish texts of the Talmud. For Derrida, it was the return to texts (...) that embodied the “Western metaphysical tradition,” be it by Plato, Descartes, Rousseau, or Marx. I then want to ask whether these reflections can be turned so as to shed light on three resilient trends in the practice of history that I will label positivist, speculative or teleological, and constructivist. By correlating the ways that Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida utilize and employ “tradition” with the historical trends of positivism, speculative/teleological history, and constructivism, I hope to produce an engagement between theorists whose concerns implicate history even though they may not be explicitly historical, and historians who may not realize the ways that their work coincides with the claims of these theorists. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) -- Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) -- Martin Buber (1878-1965) -- Leo Strauss (1899-1973) -- Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995).

Lectures on philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas, Franz Rosenzweig,1886-1929, and Paul Ricoeur.

Distinguished philosopher Hilary Putnam, who is also a practicing Jew, questions the thought of three major Jewish philosophers of the 20th century—Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas—to help him reconcile the philosophical and religious sides of his life. An additional presence in the book is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who, although not a practicing Jew, thought about religion in ways that Putnam juxtaposes to the views of Rosenzweig, Buber, and Levinas. Putnam explains the leading ideas of each of these (...) great thinkers, bringing out what, in his opinion, constitutes the decisive intellectual and spiritual contributions of each of them. Although the religion discussed is Judaism, the depth and originality of these philosophers, as incisively interpreted by Putnam, make their thought nothing less than a guide to life. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas is one of the most important figures of twentieth-century philosophy. Exerting a profound influence upon such thinkers as Derrida, Lyotard, Blanchot, and Irigaray, Levinas's work bridges several major gaps in the evolution of continental philosophy--between modern and postmodern, phenomenology and poststructuralism, ethics and ontology. He is credited with having spurred a revitalized interest in ethics-based philosophy throughout Europe and America. _Entre Nous_ (Between Us) is the culmination of Levinas's philosophy. Published in France a few years before his (...) death, it gathers his most important work and reveals the development of his thought over nearly forty years of committed inquiry. Along with several trenchant interviews published here, these essays engage with issues of suffering, love, religion, culture, justice, human rights, and legal theory. Taken together, they constitute a key to Levinas's ideas on the ethical dimensions of otherness. Working from the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Levinas pushed beyond the limits of their framework to argue that it is ethics, not ontology, that orients philosophy, and that responsibility precedes reasoning. Ethics for Levinas means responsibility in relation to difference. Throughout his work, Levinas returns to the metaphor of the face of the other to discuss how and where responsibility enters our lives and makes philosophy necessary. For Levinas, ethics begins with our face to face interaction with another person--seeing that person not as a reflection of one's self, nor as a threat, but as different and greater than self. Levinas moves the reader to recognize the implications of this interaction: our abiding responsibility for the other, and our concern with the other's suffering and death. Situated at the crossroads of several philosophical schools and approaches, Levinas's work illuminates a host of critical issues and has found resonances among students and scholars of literature, law, religion, and politics. _Entre Nous_ is at once the apotheosis of his work and an accessible introduction to it. In the end, Levinas's urgent meditations upon the face of the other suggest a new foundation upon which to grasp the nature of good and evil in the tangled skein of our lives. (shrink)

In its central use “phenomenology” names a movement in twentieth century philosophy. A second use of “phenomenology” common in contemporary philosophy names a property of some mental states, the property they have if and only if there is something it is like to be in them. Thus, it is sometimes said that emotional states have a phenomenology while belief states do not. For example, while there is something it is like to be angry, there is nothing it is like to (...) believe that Paris is in France. Although the two uses of “phenomenology” are related, it is the first which is the current topic. Accordingly, “phenomenological” refers to a way of doing philosophy that is more or less closely related to the corresponding movement. Phenomenology utilizes a distinctive method to study the structural features of experience and of things as experienced. It is primarily a descriptive discipline and is undertaken in a way that is largely independent of scientific, including causal, explanations and accounts of the nature of experience. Topics discussed within the phenomenological tradition include the nature of intentionality, perception, time-consciousness, self-consciousness, awareness of the body and consciousness of others. Phenomenology is to be distinguished from phenomenalism, a position in epistemology which implies that all statements about physical objects are synonymous with statements about persons having certain sensations or sense-data. George Berkeley was a phenomenalist but not a phenomenologist. -/- Although elements of the twentieth century phenomenological movement can be found in earlier philosophers—such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Franz Brentano—phenomenology as a philosophical movement really began with the work of Edmund Husserl. Following Husserl, phenomenology was adapted, broadened and extended by, amongst others, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Phenomenology has, at one time or another, been aligned with Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental philosophy, existentialism and the philosophy of mind and psychology. -/- This article introduces some of the central aspects of the phenomenological method and also concrete phenomenological analyses of some of the topics that have greatly exercised phenomenologists. (shrink)

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This article investigates difficulties in defining the concept of God by focusing on the question of what it means to understand God as a ‘person.’ This question is explored with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard, in dialogue with Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. Thereby, the following three questions regarding divine ‘personhood’ come into view: First, how can God be a partner of dialogue if he at the same time remains unknown and unthinkable, a limit-concept (...) of understanding? Second, if God is love in person and at the same time a spiritual reality ‘between’ human agents, in what ways are his personal and trans-personal traits related to each other? Third, what exactly is revealed through God’s ‘name’? By way of an inconclusive conclusion, divine personhood is discussed in regard to prayer, where the problems of predication that arise in third-personal speech about God are linked with the second-personal encounter with God. (shrink)

Some underlying issues of modern Jewish philosophy -- Does Judaism have universal significance? -- Death and the fear of death in Franz Rosenzweig's The star of redemption -- The Halevi book -- Into life : Rosenzweig's essays on God, man and the world -- The meaning of Hasidism : Martin Buber and Gershom Scholem -- Autobiography and the becoming of the self : Martin Buber and Joseph Campbell -- Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel Levinas : a midrash or (...) thought-experiment -- Welcoming the other : the philosophical foundation for pluralism in the works of Charles Davis and Emmanuel Levinas -- Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Soren Kierkegaard : reflections on "The lonely man of faith" -- Eliezer Schweid : the first Israeli philosopher -- Can we still stay with him? : two Jewish theologians confront the Holocaust (Emil Fackenheim and Arthur Cohen) -- Theology and community : the work of Emil Fackenheim -- Irving Greenberg : a Jewish dialectic of hope -- Feminist Jewish philosophy : a response. (shrink)

On Jewish Learning collects essays, speeches, and letters that express Rosenzweig's desire to reconnect the profound truths of Judaism with the lives of ordinary people.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 571-572 [Access article in PDF] Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, editors. The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xxx + 292. Cloth, $65.00. Paper, $23.00. The goal of the Cambridge Companion to Philosophy series has been to "dispel the intimidation" that students and non-specialists often experience when faced with the works of a "difficult and challenging (...) thinker" (i). Indeed, Emmanuel Levinas would qualify as such a thinker, whose work is firmly rooted in two traditions: (1) the admittedly abstruse and seminal phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and (2) Judaism, including the Talmudic tradition, the philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, as well as Levinas's experience with rampant anti-Semitism in twentieth-century Europe. The imminent danger in producing a collection with the express intent of making a challenging thinker accessible is that the force of the thought may become undermined by the process of simplification. The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, however, achieves its goal as a book that not only elucidates Levinas but also provides numerous essays that even the Levinasian scholar will find useful.Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi are directly responsible for the success of the Companion. These two editors have proven themselves as adept collaborators in the area of Levinasian philosophy with their earlier contribution to Indiana University Press's series Studies in Continental Thought: Re-reading Levinas (Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, editors [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991]). This new cooperative effort offers essays that introduce Levinas's thought from the perspective of some of the many fields upon which he has had an influence including the philosophy of language, art, feminism, Judaism, phenomenology, and the philosophy of religion.Even with the many tangential fields to which Levinas's thought contributes, the Companion often refers to Derrida's metaphor which describes Levinas's work as a wave, the "same" wave, crashing on the beach with increasing demand. Derrida, however, is also partly responsible for the intensifying return of Levinas's work. Derrida's critique of Levinas's Totality and Infinity was the impetus behind Levinas's subsequent focus on language and the problematic of "how" one speaks of that which is outside being. Certainly, the Companion could have spent the majority of its pages outlining this philosophical, textual conversation, but such an explication would have compromised the accessibility of this introductory text to the non-specialists to whom this series caters. The editors, instead, chose to avoid Derrida's difficult critique while having a significant concentration of essays that deal with Levinas's philosophy of language. This allows neophyte students of Levinas to discover his intricate thought on language without necessary knowledge of the context as well as provide those scholars interested in the debate access to the most contemporary thought on the matter—at least from the Levinasian perspective. Readers are assured, then, that the Companion covers the difficult concepts of the speaking face from the early period to the later distinction of the "saying" and the "said," inspired by Derrida's critique.The Companion, unfortunately, seems one sided concerning an important aspect of Levinas's philosophy. Throughout his entire corpus, Levinas attributes his thought to the seminal work of Edmund Husserl, continually inviting his readers to begin again with Husserl's phenomenology. Rudolph Bernet contributes to this collection an outstanding analysis of Levinas's critique of Husserl, describing some of the departures that Levinas makes from Husserl's phenomenology. The rest of the Companion, however, makes note to downplay Levinas's positive indebtedness to phenomenology. Hillary Putnam promises to explain Levinas with a "minimum of reliance on any prior knowledge of the two great 'H's (Husserl/Heidegger)" (40). Adhering to her word, in an otherwise insightful essay, means that the phenomenological issue remains superficial. While it is never absent, Bernet's essay seems to have set the tone, placing Levinas in a position of opposition with Husserl with a minimum of discussion of what Levinas has called his adherence to the "spirit" of phenomenology. To the Companion's credit... (shrink)