Jérôme Ravat | : Cet article vise à souligner la place centrale qu’occupe l’analogie au sein de l’éthique animale, à la fois d’un point de vue descriptif, explicatif et normatif. Nous montrons que l’analogie joue un rôle décisif dans la compréhension du statut moral de l’animal, puisqu’elle permet d’éclairer ce qui est moins connu à partir de ce qui est plus connu. Nous soulignerons le fait que l’analogie revêt deux fonctions significatives : une fonction critique et une fonction (...) intégratrice. Nous montrons également que l’analogie, en vertu de sa dimension interprétative, suscite également de nombreux désaccords, et produit des représentations morales divergentes de l’animal. | : This paper aims at emphasizing the key role played by analogy in animal ethics, from a descriptive, explicative, and normative point of view. I show that analogy is decisive for the understanding of animals’ moral status, since it can shed light on the unknown thanks to what is known. I will emphasize that analogy has two significant functions: a critical function and an integrative function. Furthermore, I demonstrate that analogy, because of its interpretative dimension, begets many disagreements and produces divergent moral conceptions of animals. (shrink)

Cet article développe une analyse critique de deux théories majeures en bioéthique : le principisme et la « néo-casuistique ». À la lumière de cette critique, nous défendons une troisième position, un « pragmatisme interactionnel ». Nous montrons que cette approche, inspirée des travaux de John Dewey, se démarque des théories reposant sur l’expertise et rend possible l’émergence de ce que nous avons nommé un « public bioéthique ».

Cet article constitue une analyse critique de l’analogie établie par Richard Boyd entre le réalisme scientifique et le réalisme moral. Selon Boyd, l’évolution des théories et des pratiques morales est étroitement analogue à l’évolution de la connaissance scientifique, car dans les deux cas la connaissance est guidée par une réalité indépendante progressivement découverte.Dans cet article, nous rejetons cette analogie, en raison des multiples dissemblances entre connaissance morale et connaissance scientifique. Nous nous efforcerons de cerner les spécificités de la connaissance morale, (...) à partir de travaux empiriques dans le champ interdisciplinaire de la naturalisation de l’éthique (anthropologie cognitive, psychologie expérimentale, psychologie morale…). Nous défendrons ainsi l’idée selon laquelle les propriétés morales ne sont pas découvertes mais projetées. (shrink)

Cet article constitue une analyse critique de l’analogie établie par Richard Boyd entre le réalisme scientifique et le réalisme moral. Selon Boyd, l’évolution des théories et des pratiques morales est étroitement analogue à l’évolution de la connaissance scientifique, car dans les deux cas la connaissance est guidée par une réalité indépendante progressivement découverte.Dans cet article, nous rejetons cette analogie, en raison des multiples dissemblances entre connaissance morale et connaissance scientifique. Nous nous efforcerons de cerner les spécificités de la connaissance morale, (...) à partir de travaux empiriques dans le champ interdisciplinaire de la naturalisation de l’éthique (anthropologie cognitive, psychologie expérimentale, psychologie morale…). Nous défendrons ainsi l’idée selon laquelle les propriétés morales ne sont pas découvertes mais projetées. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer expérimentalement que le "sens commun" n'est en matière moral ni complètement objectiviste ni complètement relativiste, mais qu'un même individu peut être tantôt objectiviste tantôt relativiste. De même, nous montrons que les jugements de goût portant sur le prédicat "dégoûtant" ne sont pas toujours relativiste mais peuvent varier selon le contexte entre objectivisme et relativisme.

This volume focuses on the role language plays at all levels of the argumentation process. It explores the effects that specific linguistic choices may have in the production and the reception of arguments and in doing so, it moves beyond the first, necessary, descriptive stance provided by current literature on the topic. Each chapter provides an original take illuminating one or more of the following three issues: the range of linguistic resources language users draw on as they argue; how cognitive (...) processes of meaning construction may influence argumentative practices; and which discursive devices can be used to fulfil a number of argumentative goals. The volume includes theoretical and empirical or applied stances, providing the reader both with state-of-the-art reflections on the relationship between argumentation and language, and with concrete examples of how this relationship plays out in naturally occurring argumentative practices, such as classroom interaction, and political, parliamentary or journalistic discourse. This is a very original, timely and welcome contribution to the study of argumentation conducted with the tools of the language sciences. The collection of papers relevantly tackles key linguistic, discursive and cognitive aspects of argumentative practices whose treatment is underrepresented in mainstream argumentation studies by offering new and exciting linguistically-grounded theoretical accounts. As such, the volume testifies both to the vigour of the linguistic current within the discipline and to the high standards of scholarly commitment and quality that the younger generation is pushing forward. Without question, this book marks an important milestone in the relationships between linguistics and argumentation theory. Christian Plantin, Professor Emeritus. (shrink)

Le présent article propose de faire le point sur la façon dont le législateur français appréhende le conflit d’intérêts dans le milieu sanitaire, partagé entre droit commun et déontologie, au moment même où des scandales médiatiques l’obligent à encadrer la profession médicale. Le problème du débat juridique français est de se concentrer sur la définition essentialiste du conflit d’intérêts, alors qu’une approche pragmatique semblerait plus appropriée pour le qualifier pénalement. L’expérience française que nous relatons ici est riche d’enseignement pour d’autres (...) États. Entre déontologie et droit normatif, ce débat montre les limites du langage juridique et nous éclaire sur la bonne méthode à appliquer pour traiter les conflits d’intérêts. (shrink)

THE SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS of the History of Science is scheduled to assemble in Bucharest, Rumania, in August 1981. To mark that occasion Isis is pleased to publish two essays on Marxism and the history of science.

John Dewey’s famous early twentieth-century account of the relationship between education as growth and democratic societies, presented in Democracy and Education, was later rejected by him, because it failed to properly identify the role of societal structures in growth and experience. In the later Ethics, Dewey attempts to correct that omission, and adumbrates the argument required to reconstruct his theory, which is an appeal to the role of institutions in individual growth and experience. It is the contention of this paper (...) that the inadequacy Dewey finds in his early account is more comprehensively explained by means of recent analyses in philosophy of society, especially John Searle’s ontological analysis. Following in Dewey’s direction, a more complete analysis of the role of society in the theory of growth is presented in terms of the deontological analysis of institutions. It is suggested that the current analyses in philosophy of society provide the means for the completion of Dewey’s views of both growth and experience, making Dewey’s account more useful today than it was a century ago. (shrink)

However one conceives of the relation between a sign and its significate, referring is a communicative act in which a speaker must intentionally direct the attention of an interlocutor to some object, event, or state of affairs that the speaker has in mind. This article examines the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of acts of referring, with special concern for the possible nature of sign-significate relationships. Findings from developments psychology indicate that a group of abilities and skills underlie the ability to refer. (...) Infants follow the gaze of others to objects of attention, and enjoy joint attention with others. Interactions with caregivers in routines well known to the child enable her to achieve joint attention with the adult on a particular ingredient in the routine. In this way, the ability to refer develops from certain "language games ", interactions that combine goal-seeking and joint attention. (shrink)

The notions of “narrated time” and “narrative identity” have become, in less than three decades, commonplaces, not only for philosophers, but also for psychologists and ethicists. This would be welcomed, if only it were not used nowadays in what must be called a new dogmatic way. Now, Paul Ricœur indeed asserted, in various ways, the wealth of the notion of narrative; but he also readily acknowleged its limits – aren’t these limits those of hermeneutics itself? Normal 0 false false false (...) EN-US JA X-NONE. (shrink)

Matching bias refers to the non-normative performance that occurs when elements mentioned in a rule do not correspond with those in a test item. One aim of the present work is to capture matching bias via reaction times as participants carry out truth-table evaluation tasks. Experiment 1 requires participants to verify conditional rules, and Experiment 2 to falsify them as the paradigm employs four types of conditional sentences that systematically rotate negatives in the antecedent and consequent; and presents predominantly cases (...) having true antecedents. These experiments reveal that mismatching is linked to higher rates of incorrect responses and slower evaluation times. A second aim is to investigate the way not is processed. We compare a narrow view of negations, which argues that negation only denies information, to a search for alternatives view, which says that negations function to prime appropriate alternatives. Findings from both experiments support a narrow reading view. (shrink)

I argue that the issues of foodquality, in the most general sense includingpurity, safety, and ethics, can no longer beresolved through ``normal'' science andregulation. The reliance on reductionistscience as the basis for policy andimplementation has shown itself to beinadequate. I use several borderline examplesbetween drugs and foods, particularly coffeeand sucrose, to show that ``quality'' is now acomplex attribute. For in those cases thesubstance is either a pure drug, or a bad foodwith drug-like properties; both are marketed asif they were foods. (...) An example of theinadequacy of old ways of thinking is obesity,whose causes are as yet outside the purview ofmedicine, while its effects constitute anepidemic disease. The new drug/food syndromeneeds a new sort of science, what we call``post-normal.'' This is inquiry at the contestedinterfaces of science and policy; typically itdeals with issues where facts are uncertain,values in dispute, stakes high, and decisionsurgent. With the perspective of post-normalscience, we can better understand some keyissues. We see that ``safety'' is different from``risk,'' being pragmatic, moral, and recursive.Also, we understand that an appropriatefoundation for regulation and ethics is not somuch ``objectivity'' as ``awareness.'' In an agewhen ``consumers'' are becoming concerned``citizens,'' the relevant science must becomepost-normal. (shrink)

The Post-Information Age will see the merger of humans and their technologies, perhaps creating an entirely new species.

L’ontologie heideggérienne de l’être-pour-la-mort a souvent servi de référence négative à Paul Ricœur. Il lui a très tôt opposé trois thèses qu’il n’aurait peut-être pas formulées s’il n’avait pas croisé la philosophie de Jaspers : a) « La naissance signifie plus que la mort » ; b) « la rencontre décisive avec la mort est la mort de l’être aimé » ; c) « la mortalité elle-même doit être pensée sub specie vitae et non sub specie mortis ». La première (...) thèse conditionne les deux suivantes. Elle introduit une phénoménologie de l’ « être-en-vie » qui en appelle de la vie reçue à la vie transmise. On objectera peut-être que la phénoménologie de l’être-en-vie suppose l’ontologie de l’être-pour-la-mort. Mais, même si c’était le cas, elle n’en transformerait pas moins profondément la signification. La compréhension de l’existence est affectée elle-même par les phénomènes de la vie reçue et transmise. C’est ce que veut dire cette expression : « exister vivant ». L’angoisse de la fin n’annule pas la joie des commencements. Peut-être même reçoit-elle de celle-ci son sens.Paul Ricoeur has often referred to Heidegger’s ontology of being-towards-death to oppose it. He early set against it three thesis that he might have formulated differently had he not studied Jasper’s philosophy : a) « birth means more than death » ; b) « the decisive encounter with death is the death of the loved one » ; c) « mortality itself must be thought sub specie vitae, not sub specie mortis ». From the first thesis, can be inferred the two others. It brings in a phenomenology of being-alive. One may raise the objection that the phenomenology of being-alive presupposes the ontology of being-towards-death. But even so it would be necessarily transform its meaning. The understanding of existence is itself affected by the phenomena of life as given and received. Such is the meaning of the phrase : « existing alive ». The distress of the end never cancels the joy of the beginnings. It may even get its sense from it. (shrink)

John Dewey's analyses of the relationships among ethical theory, intellectual-growth, and the nature of democratic societies are of continuing interest to social and political philosophers, especially those who hold an evolutionary view of these inquiries. The ontological analysis of society and social facts, recently advanced by John Searle, provides us with an alternative way to approach Dewey's thought that is at variance with traditional Deweyan scholarship. While Dewey's arguments are not changed, through Searle's social ontology we can see them differently, (...) which further reveals the complex nature of democratic intentionality. (shrink)

Growth, the central concept in Dewey's ethical naturalism, is typically ignored in commentary on his philosophic analyses. When growth is overlooked, as it is by some of Dewey's most competent reviewers, his treatment of other concepts such as democracy and equality cannot be fully appreciated or understood. Underestimating the pivotal role of growth in Dewey's thinking weakens his account of philosophic naturalism, in which there is current interest in the philosophic literature. It is Dewey's concept of growth and the analyses (...) radiating from it that makes his work significant for the present century. (shrink)