Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of (...) free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God. (shrink)

The most recent and by far the best edition of this work is that of H. M. Hine , to which I refer for full bibliographical information. Many passages of the text are most helpfully discussed in the same scholar's Studies in the Text of Seneca's Naturales Quaestiones . ut nubes infici possint, … sol ad hoc apte ponendus est; non enim idem facit undecumque effulsit, et ad hoc opus est radiorum idoneus ictus. Seneca is dealing with rainbows. Hine shares (...) Axelson's suspicion of ictus, but is unhappy both with Axelson's situs and with my tractus, ‘direction’ ; very tentatively he suggests angulus. Much more credible palaeographically and still yielding good sense and a good clausula would be i etus, a noun which is very common in this work of Seneca's. Hostius fuit Quadra obscenitatis in scaenam usque perductae. (shrink)

The most recent and by far the best edition of this work is that of H. M. Hine, to which I refer for full bibliographical information. Many passages of the text are most helpfully discussed in the same scholar's Studies in the Text of Seneca's Naturales Quaestiones. ut nubes infici possint, … sol ad hoc apte ponendus est; non enim idem facit undecumque effulsit, et ad hoc opus est radiorum idoneus ictus. Seneca is dealing with rainbows. Hine shares Axelson's suspicion (...) of ictus, but is unhappy both with Axelson's situs and with my tractus, ‘direction’ ; very tentatively he suggests angulus. Much more credible palaeographically and still yielding good sense and a good clausula would be i etus, a noun which is very common in this work of Seneca's. Hostius fuit Quadra obscenitatis in scaenam usque perductae. (shrink)

In CQ 45 , 547–50, S. J. Harrison and M. Winterbottom propose a series of emendations to the text of the recently discovered passage of Donatus which contains his commentary on Aen. 6.1–157. I offer some further emendations.

In CQ 45, 547–50, S. J. Harrison and M. Winterbottom propose a series of emendations to the text of the recently discovered passage of Donatus which contains his commentary on Aen. 6.1–157. I offer some further emendations.

The pseudo-Ciceronian Epistula ad Octavianum enjoys the unmerited distinction of being preserved not only in most of the manuscripts which contain the Ad Atticum letters but also in some of those which contain the second half of the Ad Familiares letters; the former tradition is usually designated Ω, the latter I shall designate X. It was on the Ω tradition that the earliest printed texts were based. In the sixteenth century Cratander and Turnebus introduced a number of readings from the (...) X tradition; some of these were incorporated in the vulgate, but the printed editions from that of Lambinus to that of Purser still continued to be based mainly on Ω. In 1913, in an article in Eranos, xiii. 136–46, Sjögren set himself to prove that the value of Ω had been overrated in the establishment of the text, and that greater importance should be attached to X than to Ω; and in accordance with this view, in his 1914 Teubner text, Sjögren follows X, as against Ω, about twice as often3 as Purser does. This view of Sjögren's, I believe, will not stand examination, and to disprove it is the purpose of the present article. (shrink)

‘Ist die zweite Stelle des Satzes bereits durch ein anderes Enklitikon besetzt, so tritt enim auch in klassischer Prosa oft an die 3. und 4. Stelle zurück’ . How often, and in what circumstances, does enim in Cicero occupy any place but the second? The answer to this question is sometimes relevant to the establishment of the text. And the answer is: there are many instances which fall into categories A and B below; in all other categories, C-G below, there (...) are comparatively few. (shrink)

‘Ist die zweite Stelle des Satzes bereits durch ein anderes Enklitikon besetzt, so tritt enim auch in klassischer Prosa oft an die 3. und 4. Stelle zurück’. How often, and in what circumstances, does enim in Cicero occupy any place but the second? The answer to this question is sometimes relevant to the establishment of the text. And the answer is: there are many instances which fall into categories A and B below; in all other categories, C-G below, there are (...) comparatively few. (shrink)

Agr. 2.53. ‘Te volo curare ut mihi Sinopae praesto sis auxiliumque adducas, dum eos agros quos tuo labore cepisti ego mea lege vendam.’ an Pompeium non adhibebit? in eius provincia vendet manubias imperatoris?

Agr. 2.53. ‘Te volo curare ut mihi Sinopae praesto sis auxiliumque adducas, dum eos agros quos tuo labore cepisti ego mea lege vendam.’ an Pompeium non adhibebit? in eius provincia vendet manubias imperatoris?

The authors' novel approach to some interesting mathematical concepts - not normally taught in other courses - places them in a historical and philosophical setting. Although primarily intended for mathematics undergraduates, the book will also appeal to students in the sciences, humanities and education with a strong interest in this subject. The first part proceeds from about 1800 BC to 1800 AD, discussing, for example, the Renaissance method for solving cubic and quartic equations and providing rigorous elementary proof that certain (...) geometrical problems posed by the ancient Greeks cannot be solved by ruler and compass alone. The second part presents some fundamental topics of interest from the past two centuries, including proof of G del's incompleteness theorem, together with a discussion of its implications. (shrink)

In an article on ‘The Name of the Euxine Pontus’ in C.Q.xxxiv , pp. 123 ff., A. C. Moorhouse rejects the suggestion made by M. Vasmer and supported by Boisacq that the original Greek title ξενος was a popular rendering of the Avestan adjective αχṦαệνα, ‘of dark colour’. Moorhouse raises the following objections to this theory: i. There is no direct evidence of the Avestan adjective ever being applied to the Black Sea. ii. In historical times ‘Avestan is a long (...) way from Greek’ and in prehistorical times it is doubtful whether the speakers of Avestan had any close connexion with the Black Sea. iii. Assuming πόντος to denote ‘way’, ‘the dark way’ would be a fantastic name for any sea. iv. The early Greek form is ξενος, and only metri gratia ξεινος, whereas if the word is a loan from αχṧαēνα we should expect the phonetically closer form ξενος. (shrink)

This is a concise introductory textbook for a one semester course in the history and philosophy of mathematics. It is written for mathematics majors, philosophy students, history of science students and secondary school mathematics teachers. The only prerequisite is a solid command of pre-calculus mathematics. It is shorter than the standard textbooks in that area and thus more accessible to students who have trouble coping with vast amounts of reading. Furthermore, there are many detailed explanations of the important mathematical procedures (...) actually used by famous mathematicians, giving more mathematically talented students a greater opportunity to learn the history and philosophy by way of problem solving. Several important philosophical topics are pursued throughout the text, giving the student an opportunity to come to a full and consistent knowledge of their development. These topics include infinity, the nature of motion, and Platonism. This book offers, in fewer pages, a deep penetration into the key mathematical and philosophical aspects of the history of mathematics. (shrink)

This text is organized around the distinction between finite and infinite. It includes a brief overview of what different philosophers have said about infinity, and looks at some of the arguments to the effect that one should adopt a pro-infinity attitude. Other chapters contain an exposition of the ontological schools; interactions among these schools and various theories of truth; the relationship between mathematics and values; a history of mathematics; an analysis of mathematical knowledge; the role of mathematics in eduction; the (...) implications of religion for the philosophy of mathematics; and referenc eto mathematical objects. (shrink)

By arguing that his use of representations at the core of Durkheim's sociological thought, this book makes a unique contribution to Durkheimian studies which have recently been dominated by postivist and functionalist interpretaions, and reveals a thinker very much in tune with contemporary developments in philosophy, linguistics and sociology.

Although other quasi-Kantian theories have been adapted, Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory has been largely ignored in discussions of environmental ethics. Indeed on some versions of what an environmental philosophy must entail, Habermas’s anthropocentric approach must be disqualified from the start. Yet, there are some environmentally friendly implications of his discourse theory. They may not give us everything we would wish, but in the contemporary political context we must treasure any moral theory that can draw on the still-extensive theoretical and political (...) resources of liberalism. (shrink)

In 1962 a mimeographed sheet of paper fell into my possession. It had been prepared by Ernest Adams of the Philosophy Department at Berkeley as a handout for a colloquim. Headed 'SOME FALLACIES OF FORMAL LOGIC' it simply listed eleven little pieces of reasoning, all in ordinary English, and all absurd. I still have the sheet, and quote a couple of the arguments here to give the idea. • If you throw switch S and switch T, the motor will start. (...) There fore, either if you throw switch S the motor will start, or, if you throw switch T the motor will start. • It is not the case that if John passes history he will graduate. Therefore, John will pass history. The disconcerting thing about these inferences is, of course, that under the customary truth-functional interpretation of and, or, not, and if-then, they are supposed to be valid. What, if anything, is wrong? At first I was not disturbed by the examples. Having at that time consider able personal commitment to rationality in general and formal logic in par ticular, I felt it my duty and found myself easily able (or so I thought) to explain away most of them. But on reflection I had to admit that my expla nations had an ad hoc character, varying suspiciously from example to example. (shrink)