En lo que sigue esbozo tres posibles vías de desarrollo de la propuesta de Pérez y Gomila sobre la perspectiva de la segunda persona de la atribución mental que, en su conjunto, dejan ver la importancia de caracterizar finamente las relaciones entre lo mental y lo normativo en la perspectiva de la segunda persona. Las tres vías que propongo parten, aunque van más allá, de algunos hallazgos de la teoría de la pragmática afectiva. Me centraré en los casos de interacción (...) en segunda persona más que en las atribuciones en segunda persona y adoptaré como caso paradigmático la relación que se establece entre un bebé y su cuidadora. (shrink)

El libro de María González Navarro se presenta a sí mismo como una “nueva hermenéutica” (23). La novedad involucra dos aspectos: uno que llamaremos metateórico y otro hermenéutico en propiedad. Hablando metateóricamente, el libro presenta una hermenéutica gadameriana vigorizada y robustecida por las teorías pragma-dialécticas de la argumentación. Desde el punto de vista hermenéutico propiamente dicho, la novedad reposa en que se considera que la interpretación correcta está indesligablemente vinculada a la argumentación abductiva.

Este trabajo examina parte del pensamiento de Kant de cara a precisar en qué sentido puede pensarse la universalidad como una exigencia para la filosofía moral y cómo las investigaciones de ese autor pueden contribuir a esclarecer esta cuestión. El análisis de los argumentos muestra algunas inconsistencias lógicas en el desarrollo del problema de la universalización moral que los especialistas han tratado de explicar, a partir de las cuales sugerimos que una alternativa de análisis gramatical al estilo de Wittgenstein puede (...) ayudar a clarificar. El trabajo es, pues, crítico y pro positivo y conlleva una interpretación programática de tesis kantianas. (shrink)

Se busca rastrear la imagen que Platón tiene de Heráclito y articularla con la estructura argumentativa del Cratilo, para comprender las necesidades textuales a las que responde la doctrina del flujo perpetuo, es decir, la discusión sobre la corrección (ὀρθότης) del nombre. Gracias a la inclusión del testimonio heraclíteo, resulta posible rastrear la presunta consolidación de la tesis sobre los nombres primarios y los secundarios como el eje de la separación entre dos planos de realidad (uno estable y uno móvil) (...) y de la teoría de las Ideas -es decir, como la base de la epistemología platónica presente en los diálogos de madurez-. The article seeks to trace the image Plato has of Heraclitus and connect it with the argumentative structure of the Cratylus in order to understand the textual needs that give rise to the doctrine of perpetual flux, that is, the discussion regarding the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names. The inclusion of Heraclitus's testimony makes it possible to trace the alleged consolidation of the thesis regarding primary and secondary names as the axis of separation between two levels of reality (one stable, the other, changing) and the theory of Ideas -that is, as the basis of Plato's epistemology as set forth in the late dialogues-. (shrink)

L’impasse dans laquelle se trouve aujourd’hui le Venezuela ne peut être abordée sans une prise en compte préalable du chemin démocratique que le pays a parcouru jusqu’à la situation qu’il connaît de nos jours. Cette situation est l’expression d’une division radicale de la population en deux parties, « chavistas » et « anti-chavistas »1. En effet, comment expliquer ce paradoxe..

This paper criticizes genetic naturalism, namely, the task of explaining how reason emerges from nature. We take into account Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism and his analogy of triangulation. Our aim is to criticize both the metaphysical suppositions of anomalous monism and its consequences for genetic naturalism. We propose that those suppositions and those consequences prevent the genetic question to be appropriately raised and, therefore, mislead the research for a reasonable answer to that.

This work was my theses to get the MA in Philosophy. Their focus is the ethics implied in digital culture and networked society. Themes are Ethics, culture, technology, political control, autonomous systems.

BackgroundMonitoring recovery–stress balance in sport is becoming more relevant to prevent training maladaptation and reach the optimal performance for each athlete. The use of questionnaires that identify the athlete’s recovery–stress state have much acceptance in sports due to reliability and useful, furthermore for its low cost. Identifying possible differences between sport modalities and sex is important to determine specific needs and possible intervention ways to keep a recovery–stress balance. The aim was to analyze the differences in the recovery–stress state and (...) mood states by sex and sport type during the competitive phase in young Mexican athletes. As a secondary objective, the psychometric properties of the Mexican version of the Recovery–Stress Questionnaire for Athletes were analyzed.MethodsA cross-sectional study was carried on with 461 athletes, 17.95 years old, from six sports disciplines. The RESTQ-Sport and Profile of Mood States were applied in a single moment. Differences by sex and sports modality were analyzed. RESTQ-Sport’s confirmatory factor analysis was performed after the stress and recovery theoretical structure of two stress and two recovery dimensions, and last, the concurrent validation with the POMS was carried on.ResultsSignificant differences by sex were found in the General Recovery and Sport Stress dimensions of the RESTQ-Sport as well as Vigor factor of the POMS, being higher for men; furthermore, both the Sport Recovery dimension of RESTQ-Sport and Cholera and the Fatigue and Depression factors from POMS also had differences by sport type, showing a less recovery and high stress for individual sport athletes. Goodness-of-fit indexes of the model for the RESTQ-Sport were acceptable. Pearson’s correlation between questionnaires was moderate.ConclusionThe recovery–stress state shows differences in the function of sex and sport modality. More special attention is suggested for women and individual sport athletes. The higher punctuation for men compared with women in sport stress dimension did not negatively affect the recovery–stress balance for male athletes. Finally, the Mexican context adaptation of the RESTQ-Sport provides a psychometric instrument suitable to assess the recovery–stress balance in Mexican athletes. (shrink)

The emergence of the term ‘Plebanski’ as a topic trend in the scientific literature is studied as a significant communication event resulting from its use by authors to refer to the relevant aspects of Jerzy Plebanski scientific work in the area of mathematical physics. We searched the ‘Plebanski’ topic included in the titles, abstracts and key words of the papers registered in five databases: ADS/NASA, MathSciNet, SCOPUS, SPIRES and Web of Science. Our results clearly show the evolution of the JP’s (...) scientific work from a cited reference to a recognized term in the indexes of the published literature, then to a nodal concept in the scientific communication process and finally as an eponym in the Latin American scholar literature. (shrink)

En su reciente libro Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction, Pérez y Gomila presentan una forma novedosa de entender nuestra capacidad de atribuir estados mentales a otras personas basada en lo que llaman interacciones en la segunda persona. Este artículo cuestiona la conceptualización y el papel explicativo que este tipo de interacciones pueden desempeñar.

RESUMEN En este trabajo discutimos tres formulaciones semánticas del condicional: la material, la estricta y la relevante. Defendemos que, desde un punto de vista formal, el condicional relevante responde mejor a nuestras intuiciones que los otros dos. Ahora bien, dado que la interpretación semántica del mismo es terreno disputado, proponemos hacerlo pragmáticamente. Dividimos el texto en tres secciones. En la primera proponemos el criterio de adecuación para evaluar distintas teorías de los condicionales: la teoría no debe dar lugar a los (...) casos más conocidos de sobregeneración inferencial. En la segunda mostramos que el condicional material y el condicional estricto sobregeneran, pues ambos admiten paradojas bien conocidas. En la última mostramos que si se interpreta pragmáticamente, el condicional relevante bloquea la aparición de las paradojas que los dos anteriores no pueden evitar, y, en esa medida responde mejor que ellos al criterio establecido y, por tanto, a nuestras intuiciones. ABSTRACT In this paper we discuss three semantic formulations of conditional: material, strict and relevant. Our aim is to show that the relevant conditional shapes our intuitions better than the other two. Since the semantic interpretation of the relevant conditional is an unsettled issue nowadays, we propose a pragmatic interpretation of it. In the first part of the paper we present the criteria to which a theory of conditionals must answer, i.e. the theory must not overgenerate. In the second one, we show that the material and the strict conditionals overgenerate because both lead to paradoxes. In the last part we show that the relevant conditional with a pragmatic interpretation solves the problem of the other conditionals. (shrink)

IntroductionRheumatologists are the primary healthcare professionals responsible for patients with rheumatic diseases and should acquire medical ethical competencies, such as the informed consent process. The objective clinical structured examination is a valuable tool for assessing clinical competencies. We report the performance of 90 rheumatologist trainees participating in a station designed to evaluate the ICP during the 2018 and 2019 national accreditations.MethodsThe station was validated and represented a medical encounter in which the rheumatologist informed a patient with systemic lupus erythematosus with (...) clinically active nephritis about renal biopsy. A trained patient–actor and an evaluator were instructed to assess ICP skills in obtaining formal informed consent, delivering bad news and overall communication with patients. The evaluator used a tailored checklist and form.ResultsCandidate performance varied with ICP content and was superior for potential benefit information but significantly reduced for potential complications and biopsy description. Only 17.8% of the candidates mentioned the legal perspective of ICP. Death was omitted by the majority of the candidates ; after the patient–actor challenged candidates, only 57.1% of them gave a clear and positive answer. Evaluators frequently rated candidate communications skills as superior, but ≥1 negative aspect was identified in 69% of the candidates.ConclusionsEthical competencies are mandatory for professional rheumatologists. It seems necessary to include an ethics competency framework in the curriculum throughout the rheumatology residency. (shrink)

Este artículo reseña: Miguel Ángel PRESNO LINERA, Derechos fundamentales e inteligencia artificial, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2022, 144 pp.

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo comentar algunas prohibiciones del padre Miguel Ángel de Tamburini y del padre Francisco Retz explicando los conceptos fundamentales de dichas prohibiciones a través de un método analítico y relacionándolos posteriormente bajo un método sintético con los argumentos presentados. Esto último permitirá realizar una reconstrucción de las prohibiciones cuyo ensamble se consolidará en argumentos breves. Asimismo, evaluar cuáles pueden ser las causas o los fundamentos que subyacen en las prohibiciones mismas, es decir, evaluar las (...) causas de su veto. Finalmente, determinar las implicaciones filosóficas de las prohibiciones desde Descartes, Leibniz y Spinoza y sus correspondientes visiones de la Creación, la voluntad, el determinismo y el principio de individuación. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’ fading qualia argument falls into it. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

In this essay we discuss recent attempts to analyse the notion of representation, as it is employed in cognitive science, in purely informational terms. In particular, we argue that recent informational theories cannot accommodate the existence of metarepresentations. Since metarepresentations play a central role in the explanation of many cognitive abilities, this is a serious shortcoming of these proposals.

Con anterioridad a la paz de Westfalia el espacio filosófico alemán había estado dominado en gran medida por la teosofía, especialmente en el ámbito protestante y en regiones como Sajonia, Silesia y Württemberg. Con la Medicina mentis de E. W. von Tschirnhaus, noble sajón de estudios universitarios en Leiden, donde entra en contacto con Spinoza y su círculo, entramos en un nuevo mundo conceptual. Bajo la apariencia de una propuesta metodológica, de corte cartesiano, de conducir la razón al descubrimiento de (...) cuanto es posible conocer por la ‘luz natural’, Tschirnhaus propone una reforma moral del sujeto humano capaz de procurarle la perfección, la felicidad y la unión con Dios, donde la impronta de Spinoza es fuerte, aunque en ningún momento son nombrados estos dos filósofos. Tras estudiar la acusación de spinozismo por Christian Thomasius y el rechazo de la imputación por Tschirnhaus, el artículo se pronuncia sobre el sentido y función de ese rechazo. (shrink)

Este artículo examina la concepción del espacio infinito y del tiempo en Hasdai Crescas, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola y Giordano Bruno. Si la presencia de Crescas es explícita en el _Examen vanitatis_ (1520) de Pico, su recepción por Bruno, que nunca lo menciona, fue postulada por Harry A. Wolfson en 1929. Más recientemente, David Harari y Mauro Zonta han afirmado el papel intermediario de un autor judío desconocido. Sin embargo, una comparación de la crítica de Aristóteles efectuada por Crescas y (...) Bruno pone de manifiesto que, excepto dos puntos, Bruno pudo alcanzar sus posiciones con independencia de Crescas, a partir de su propia lectura crítica de Aristóteles y de su conocimiento de los desarrollos de la escolástica medieval y del concepto neoplatónico del tiempo. La significativa calificación por Crescas del espacio y del tiempo como atributos de Dios en un sentido puramente metafórico, una cuestión que Pico deja a un lado, deja paso en Bruno a la calificación del espacio infinito, de la duración y también de la materia como atributos reales de Dios, que es a la vez mente e intelecto, espacio y materia, en tanto que unidad indiferente de los opuestos. (shrink)