The following study tries to elucidate the connection between the discourse of natural philosophy in the late eighteenth century and Wilhelm von Humboldt's anthropological, aesthetic and linguistic writings. The concepts of force, organism and, most significantly, of generation, as they were developed in the natural sciences, are shown to have strongly influenced Humboldt's philosophy. ;The first chapter reconstructs the scientific discussion about biological generation in the 18th century. At the end of the century, the widely accepted theory of preformationism is (...) challenged and replaced by the epigenetic model of generation, according to which each organism is individually produced by both parents and the workings of a formative force. ;The second chapter interprets the significance of this change for the philosophy of German Idealism, most notably in the works of Kant and Fichte. Epigenesis and its key concepts, such as "formative impulse" , organism and individuality is shown to provide a biological base for the idealist theories of subjectivity and freedom. ;The third chapter investigates Humboldt's involvement in the discourse and practice of natural philosophy during his studies at Gottingen and Jena. He discussed these problems frequently with his brother Alexander and his friends Schiller, Goethe and Fichte. His famous articles on the significance of sexual difference can be understood as a philosophical interpretation of his own scientific studies. ;The fourth chapter shows the main concepts of natural philosophy at work in Humboldt's mature writings about the philosophy of language. Against the backdrop of Goethe's scientific work, Humboldt's linguistic theory appears as an application of scientific notions to the "organism" of language. ;The fifth chapter concentrates on Humboldt's account of the mutual dependence and the mutual generation of language and thought. With his epigenetic account he tries to overcome the impasses of earlier 18th century theories of language. ;The last chapter focuses on the essential element in Humboldt's linguistic theory, the problem of articulation. Humboldt interprets articulation seen from the side of the subject as an act of violence, opposed to the material power of historically given languages. This interplay between violence and power is also shown to be at the center of Humboldt's hitherto unnoticed poetic works. (shrink)

ExcerptHans Blumenberg's sprawling and seemingly esoteric work is driven by factors that are buried deep in the moonscape of postwar (West) German intellectual history. Philosophical anthropology, Husserl's phenomenology (in contrast to Heidegger's history of being), the re-introduction of French thought and literature (especially the writings of Paul Valéry), the activation of theological and scholastic thought, the debate with political theologians and their concept of secularization: these are just a few of the motivations that shaped the philosopher's early work and continue (...) to be important for an understanding of his first mature books. Three of these books, The Legitimacy of the…. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic account of F. H. Bradley's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to an understanding of his conception of the nature and criterion of truth. I argue that, for Bradley, the nature of truth is the identity of thought with reality given in immediate experience. There is no absolute separation between thought and its object. Bradley therefore rejects both the correspondence theory and epistemological realism. Thought is not just a (...) mirror which reflects an independently existing reality. ;Concerning the criterion of truth, I argue that his criterion for our ordinary and scientific beliefs is practice, and the criterion for philosophical positions is a kind of coherence based on the doctrine of relative truth. For Bradley, some positions are truer than others, and the best philosophy is a comprehensive system which contains the truth of all different positions. ;Bradley does not accept the coherence theory of justification as it is understood today, since it is based on the standard account of negation and the doctrine of absolute truth. Bradley has a different approach to negation and inconsistency, according to which there are no absolutely inconsistent beliefs. Further, he insists that truth is not absolute but "relative," a matter of degree. All philosophical positions contain some truth, and none is completely false. The truth in philosophy is a position which accounts for the whole of reality and includes all apparently inconsistent positions within it. ;I explain Bradley's place in the history of philosophy and show his connections with the British empiricist tradition. I believe one of Bradley's central concerns is to explain the nature and criterion of truth in philosophy within the constraints of empiricism. I also contrast Bradley's positions on important issues with those of philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, such as Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Quine, Churchland, Lehrer and Campbell. I argue that most recent commentators on Bradley overlook the importance of understanding his philosophy as a system constructed according to the doctrine of relative truth. (shrink)

The concept of experience has been central to European philosophy since Descartes. He was the first to use experience to distinguish between two kinds of substance, mental and material, on the basis of the fact that one kind of substance is extended but does not think, while the other kind thinks, doubts, wills, imagines and feels, but is not extended. Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume, made the concept of experience the basis of their analysis of knowledge. These (...) ideas have become part of common sense, and provide the background for a range of philosophical problems from Descartes’ time to the present. While the concept of experience is important for philosophy, philosophers do not all have the same understanding of the nature of experience. (shrink)

In the last few years there has been a revival of interest in F.H. Bradley and particularly the account of judgment contained in The Principles of Logic. Many of those who discuss Bradley’s theory of judgment mistakenly assume that it can best be seen as a linguistic account. They insist that what Bradley says can be understood as an account of the meaning and reference of words or sentences. In this paper I will argue that Bradley’s theory of judgment is (...) essentially a psychological theory. Judgment is the union of part of the content of an image or other mental particular with our immediate experience. There is no evidence for the linguisitc interpretation and its defenders cannot make sense of Bradley’s discussion of a number of technical points, particularly his criticism of the view that judgment is the synthesis of ideas, and his comments on the idea of “this.” I will also argue that Bradley’s account of judgment cannot be separated from his later metaphysics and is essentially Hegelian in character. To explain Bradley’s theory I will begin where he does, with an examination of the nature of ideas. (shrink)

Volume 2 is made up primarily of unpublished material from the Bradley Papers held at Merton College since Bradley’s death in 1924. The 587 pages of this volume are divided into eight sections with an Introduction by the editor and an Appendix: Introduction by Editor 1. MS Book α : a notebook on metaphysical and psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 2. MS BK T ): one notebook on mainly metaphysical topics with Bradley’s index. 3. Two untitled notebooks containing sketches of (...) chapters for Appearance and Reality. 4. MS BK Z one notebook on psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 5. Draft of a reply to Alfred Sidgwick’s article “Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics” in Mind, vol. 3 ns, July 1894 6. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Alexander Shand’s article “Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action” in Mind, vol. 4 ns, October 1895. 7. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Bertrand Russell’s article “Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?” in Mind, vol. 10 ns, July 1901. 8. Selections of Bradley’s reading notes on works read from 1883–1902, taken from 5 separate notebooks. Appendix: What Bradley Read. This is a chronological list of works for which there is some positive evidence that Bradley read something from them. The evidence used to determine what he read includes “his correspondence, papers and/or publications”. An acknowledgement of receipt and a promise to read a work is not considered adequate evidence that he actually read the work in question. (shrink)

Volume 2 is made up primarily of unpublished material from the Bradley Papers held at Merton College since Bradley’s death in 1924. The 587 pages of this volume are divided into eight sections with an Introduction by the editor and an Appendix: Introduction by Editor 1. MS Book α : a notebook on metaphysical and psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 2. MS BK T ): one notebook on mainly metaphysical topics with Bradley’s index. 3. Two untitled notebooks containing sketches of (...) chapters for Appearance and Reality. 4. MS BK Z one notebook on psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 5. Draft of a reply to Alfred Sidgwick’s article “Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics” in Mind, vol. 3 ns, July 1894 6. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Alexander Shand’s article “Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action” in Mind, vol. 4 ns, October 1895. 7. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Bertrand Russell’s article “Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?” in Mind, vol. 10 ns, July 1901. 8. Selections of Bradley’s reading notes on works read from 1883–1902, taken from 5 separate notebooks. Appendix: What Bradley Read. This is a chronological list of works for which there is some positive evidence that Bradley read something from them. The evidence used to determine what he read includes “his correspondence, papers and/or publications”. An acknowledgement of receipt and a promise to read a work is not considered adequate evidence that he actually read the work in question. (shrink)

The authors sum up the central issue of ethics in the conduct of controlled clinical trials in these two paradoxes: 'first, it is unethical to use treatment the efficacy of which has not been examined scientifically; second, it is also unethical to examine the efficacy of treatment scientifically.' In this paper they set out to demonstrate how these antithetical statements apply in controlled trials conducted in psychiatric patients. In such trials the problem of obtaining informed consent may be acute, but (...) in these patients giving 'informed' consent might contribute to a further exacerbation of the illness. Nevertheless the problem cannot be evaded, and scientific judgments must be applied to treatment for it to be sound and improved for the further benefit of patients. These problems in the case of psychiatric controlled trials are a part of the methodology, and in Germany a new drug law has been drafted to attempt to clarify the issue. The authors briefly discuss its application, and its consequences if such a law were enacted. British psychiatrists have exactly the same problems to face but so far no attempts have been made to establish a legal framework. (shrink)

G. Jäger gave in Arch. Math. Logik Grundlagenforsch. 24 , 49-62, a recursive notation system on a basis of a hierarchy Iαß of α-inaccessible regular ordinals using collapsing functions following W. Buchholz in Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 32 , 195-207. Jäger's system stops, when ordinals α with Iα0 = α enter. This border is now overcome by introducing additional a hierarchy Jαß of weakly inaccessible Mahlo numbers, which is defined similarly to the Jäger hierarchy. An ordinal μ is called Mahlo, (...) if every normal-function f : μ → μ has regular fixpoints. Collapsing is defined for both Mahlo and simply regular ordinals such that for every Mahlo ordinal μ out of the J-hierarchy Ψμα is a regular σ such that Iσ0 = σ. For these regular σ again collapsing functions Ψσ are defined. To get a proper systematical order into the collapsing procedure, a pair of ordinals is associated to σ and α, and the definition of Ψσα is given by recursion on a suitable well-ordering of these pairs. Thus a fairly large system of ordinal notations can be established. It seems rather straightforward, how to extend this setting further. (shrink)