In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 265-266 [Access article in PDF] Plato. Alcibiades. Edited by Nicholas Denyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xi + 254. Cloth, $64.95. Paper, $22.95. This volume is a new addition to the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series. It offers an introduction (twenty-nine pages), a revised Greek text with apparatus criticus (fifty pages), a commentary (167 pages), and indices (general, (...) proper names, and Greek words together taking just over four pages).The editor acknowledges his dependence on the manuscripts and indirect evidence as reported by Carlini. The apparatus is second order: rather than identifying a reading to a manuscript or other source by name, the author indicates that the reading is the only one found in the manuscripts, that it is one among two or more found in the manuscripts, that it is found in the indirect evidence, or that it is conjectural. Thus the textual support is given, as he says, in a "ruthlessly summary form."The apparatus includes sixty-eight line references underneath the text. Of the passages corresponding to these references, thirty-six differ from Burnet's Oxford Classical Text, especially by deletion, rearrangement, and addition. Deletions make up a third: two of Burnet's additions to the text in acute brackets are dropped, including all of 133C8-17, and material that Burnet had printed in the text in square brackets disappears entirely in three cases; five pairs of acute brackets are dropped where Burnet's text is retained, with four of these items marked as conjectures; and finally, Burnet's unbracketed text simply is dropped in two places. The rearrangements vary in character: at one place, three lines of text are moved down "to ease the flow of the argument," and at another place a line that Burnet assigns to Alcibiades is given to Socrates. The editor's additions sometimes are presented as matters of linguistic or other intuition: at 115D2 (in his lineation), for example, an addition adopted by Burnet is dropped in favor of the author's own conjectural addition as "the easiest way to break up the very awkward double question that the manuscript tradition ascribes to Socrates"; at 128E10 the editor replaces the reading of "all the manuscripts" with a word which "was often abbreviated" and whose abbreviation "was easily misread as some shorter word beginning with alpha"; and at 131A2 the editor conjectures the addition of a word supported by neither the direct nor the indirect tradition in order to make it "possible to derive the conclusion of 131A5-6 that the professional knowledge of doctors and trainers is not knowledge of themselves." These arguments, though less than airtight, are thought provoking, even if they leave one's view of the text largely intact.The commentary offers historians of philosophy food for thought in other ways, too, since it goes beyond arguing for changes to the text. It makes extensive use of observations on grammar, style, usage, and other literary materials to shed light on the argument of the dialogue and on the dramatic elements which overlay the argumentative material and make the dialogue a coherent whole.The introduction offers something else again, especially in its twelve pages on authenticity. The editor does not prove that the dialogue is authentic, but he does show that the modern arguments against its authenticity are weak. Because of Schleiermacher's influence, he suggests, subsequent writers have not bothered to argue the case seriously against authenticity; he labels their arguments "frivolous." He notes that some argue for inauthenticity on the grounds that the Alcibiades lacks parallels with the other dialogues, [End Page 265] some on grounds that it is too similar to the other dialogues, and some ("weakest of all") on both grounds at once. He then goes on to argue that "stylometric studies cannot tell us whether or not Plato wrote the Alcibiades" and to challenge the standard chronology of the dialogues so far as it bears against authenticity. "If," he concludes, "the Alcibiades is authentically Platonic, then we need of course to abandon the conceptions, or misconceptions... (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)

Because anticipated and retrospective regret play important roles in practical deliberation and motivation, better understanding them can illuminate the contours of human agency. However, the possibility of self-ignorance and the fact that we change over time can make regret—especially anticipatory regret—not only a poor predictor of where the agent will be in the future but also an unreliable indicator of where the agent stands. Granting these, this paper examines the way in which prospective and, particularly, retrospective regret can nevertheless yield (...) important insight into the sorts of creatures we are, both generally and individually. The experience of retrospective regret can show a person she values something in a way she did not know or that she is (or was) a different person than she had thought, insights which can factor into forward-looking, or prospective, deliberation. Such instances of revelatory regret reveal something to the agent about herself as agent. I examine two cases of agential self-ignorance. In the first, the experience of regret reveals what the agent values, not only to others but even to the agent himself. In the second, the agent anticipates experiencing regret for an action but does not experience the regret, suggesting that the agent did not value the rejected alternative in the way she thought. Anticipatory regret is forward-looking and can play an important role in practical deliberation. But insofar as anticipatory regret flows from one’s imperfect judgment and prospection about oneself, retrospective regret can be an important corrective in helping the agent understand her own standpoint. (shrink)

In his newly updated version of The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case, Alan F. Westin provides a documentary portrait of historically important constitutional law case, 'Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, ' from its rise in a bargaining dispute in the steel industry during 1952 to the aftermath of its decision by the United States Supreme Court. Westin has added to his classic book additional materials and personal commentaries collected since the work was first published. The new information (...) covers what went on within the Truman administration, what went on within the Supreme Court when analyzing and resolving issues that come before it. Westin includes selections from transcripts, briefs and other official proceedings, adds notes describing each phase of the constitutional process, and a section of commentary and questions relating this case to others. (shrink)

While Aristotle adverts in the Politica to those who have declared themselves about the aristē or best politeia without qualification, he actually devotes much of his attention here to telling his intended audience how to establish and maintain the aristē politeia for each of the different places in which each of them is engaged, given the circumstances. In the face of this contrast in the Politica, scholars look to EN 1135a5 for clarification. According to the established interpretation of EN 1135a5, (...) Aristotle means that there is only one politeia that is best by nature for every place. According to the alternative interpretation, Aristotle means that, for every place, there is only one politeia that is best by nature for it. In this paper it is argued that the alternative interpretation fits both works better than does the established interpretation. (shrink)

While Aristotle adverts in the Politica to those who have declared themselves about the aristē or best politeia without qualification, he actually devotes much of his attention here to telling his intended audience how to establish and maintain the aristē politeia for each of the different places in which each of them is engaged, given the circumstances. In the face of this contrast in the Politica, scholars look to EN 1135a5 for clarification. According to the established interpretation of EN 1135a5, (...) Aristotle means that there is only one politeia that is best by nature for every place. According to the alternative interpretation, Aristotle means that, for every place, there is only one politeia that is best by nature for it. In this paper it is argued that the alternative interpretation fits both works better than does the established interpretation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the admissibility of two canons for the interpretation of philosophical texts—canons which many scholars tacitly accept but few explicitly acknowledge. Precisely how widely these canons are accepted is a question not to be dealt with here; clearly, it is not true that everyone subscribes to either of them, much less to both. The two principal spokesmen for the canons to be discussed, however, are scholars of distinguished reputation, and their words merit consideration (...) on their own account. (shrink)

In his recent provocative article, “Aristotle’s Distinction between Energeia and Kinesis,” Professor J. L. Ackrill has added fuel to the flames of a controversy at least as old as the Lyceum. Professor Ackrill avows a primarily aporetic purpose, and raises, with the aim of stimulating discussion, what he regards as several difficulties, confusions, inadvertences and lacunae in the Aristotelian text anent the ἐνέργεια-κίνησισ distinction. But perhaps it would not be untoward to take up Professor Ackrill’s challenge, in order to attempt (...) to determine, with the aid of other parties to the controversy and a reexamination of the text, whether the aporiai be not insoluble and, in fact, rather Professor Ackrill’s than Aristotle’s. Indeed, it may well be that there are grounds for arguing that, on Aristotle’s view, ἐνέργεια and κίνησισ are not only clearly distinguished, but systematically related as well. (shrink)

It is not quite as easy to see that there is in fact no formula of this modal language having the same truth conditions (in terms of S5 Kripke semantics) as (1). This was rst conjectured by Allen Hazen2 and later proved by Harold Hodes3. We present a simple direct proof of this result and discuss some consequences for the logical analysis of ordinary modal discourse.

In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In the current study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalizing” processes (Heyes, 2014). Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate (...) controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalizing processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g. arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” paradigms from infant gaze-following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalizing interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct. (shrink)

Are we witnessing progress or regress in the recent increasing popularity and electoral success of populist politicians and parties in consolidated democratic nations? ... Is the innovative use of popular referendum in Great Britain to settle fundamental constitutional questions a progressive or regressive innovation? ... Similarly, is the increasing use of constituent assemblies to change constitutions across the world evidence of progress in democratic constitutionalism, or, a worryingly regressive change back toward unmediated popular majoritarianism? ... This paper reflects on some (...) of the perils and promise of framing such questions with the conceptual couplet of progress and regress. It considers four compelling critiques of the use of ‘progress’ and its cognates in sociopolitical theory, as well as arguing that such concepts are nevertheless ineliminable for our normative theories. The paper concludes by suggesting that we can avoid the most serious problems by employing only conceptions of political progress and regress that are piecemeal, pragmatic, and processual. (shrink)

In this international and interdisciplinary collection of critical essays, distinguished contributors examine a crucial premise of traditional readings of Plato's dialogues: that Plato's own doctrines and arguments can be read off the statements made in the dialogues by Socrates and other leading characters. The authors argue in general and with reference to specific dialogues, that no character should be taken to be Plato's mouthpiece. This is essential reading for students and scholars of Plato.