In this paper, I ask how we, as linguistically constituted subjects, form communities that respect difference. Whatever “commonality” we find in our multicultural society cannot be grounded in a narrow concept of reason, a singular method of inquiry, or an a priori logic, but in language. By examining Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of linguisticality, we see that there can be a universal ground of meaning that will foster the formation of communities without recourse to the traditional foundations of thinking. Gadamer contends (...) that language presents philosophy an infinite task that urges us to consider our fundamental linguisticality, the linguistic experience from which languages develop. By examining Augustine’s notion of the “innerword”, Gadamer explains our capacity to understand others, even when understanding seems least likely. Gadamer’s hermeneutics encourages us to understand the Other’s language. I conclude that a Gadamerian community allows us to understand each other without requiring that the Other become like us. (shrink)

In this paper, I ask how we, as linguistically constituted subjects, form communities that respect difference. Whatever “commonality” we find in our multicultural society cannot be grounded in a narrow concept of reason, a singular method of inquiry, or an a priori logic, but in language. By examining Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of linguisticality, we see that there can be a universal ground of meaning that will foster the formation of communities without recourse to the traditional foundations of thinking. Gadamer contends (...) that language presents philosophy an infinite task that urges us to consider our fundamental linguisticality, the linguistic experience from which languages develop. By examining Augustine’s notion of the “innerword”, Gadamer explains our capacity to understand others, even when understanding seems least likely. Gadamer’s hermeneutics encourages us to understand the Other’s language. I conclude that a Gadamerian community allows us to understand each other without requiring that the Other become like us. (shrink)

In _The Body in Late-Capitalist USA_, Donald M. Lowe explores the varied social practices that code and construct the body. Arguing that our bodily lives are shaped by a complex of daily and ongoing practices—how we work, what we buy and consume—Lowe contends that as a result of the commodification of these and other social practices in the late-twentieth century, what we often understand to be the needs of the body are in fact means for capital accumulation. Moving beyond (...) studies of representations and images of the body, Lowe focuses on the intersection of body practices, language, and the Social to describe concretely the reality of a lived body. His strongly synthetic work brings together Marxist critique, semiotics, Foucaultian discourse analysis, and systems and communications theory to examine those practices that construct the body under late capitalism: habits of work and consumption, the ways we give birth and raise children, socialization, mental and physical healing, reconstructions and contestations of sexuality and gender. Lowe draws upon a wide range of sources, including government and labor studies and statistics, diagnostic and statistical manuals on mental illness, computer manuals, self-help books, and guides to work-related stress disorders, to illustrate the transformation of the body into a nexus of exchange value in postmodern society. (shrink)

Donald Broom argues that morality and the central components of religion are of great value, and presents two central ideas. He asserts that morality has a biological foundation and has evolved as a consequence of natural selection, and that religions are essentially the structures supporting morality. Many philosophers and theologians write about morality and its origins without reference to biological processes such as evolution. Likewise, biologists discuss phenomena of importance to human morality and religion without taking account of the (...) thoughts of others on these subjects. (shrink)

The claim that faith is creative of its objects resides primarily in the conviction that the richness of the life of faith demands that it shall be subject only to its own laws. Its very diversity of expression is indication that it should not be fettered or confined by a restrictive model that outlaws the marvellously unexpected quality of its explorations. Yet that metaphor itself suggests caution; for exploration is necessarily of a territory that the explorer does not bring into (...) being by his voyage or journey. His travels have their own richness; thus Shackleton's famous boat journey has its place in the records of human endurance. But travel assumes a ground to be traversed, and the journey of Ernest Shackleton and the men who sailed with him was not conjured out of nothing, but an achievement made necessary as response to a situation that was itself in no sense of the explorer's contriving. Yet of course we are impatient with the suggestion that it was a mere, largely passive reaction to natural emergency, and only marginally regarded as humanly creative. (shrink)

This paper sets out to give sufficient detail to the notion of mental simulation to allow an appraisal of its contribution to ‘mindreading’ in the context of the ‘false-belief tasks’ used in developmental psychology. We first describe the reasoning strategy of ‘modified derivation’, which supports counterfactual reasoning. We then give an analysis of the logical structure of the standard false-belief tasks. We then show how modified derivation can be used in a hybrid strategy for mindreading in these tasks. We then (...) formulate the hypothesis that children become able (around the age of 4 years) to pass these tasks when they acquire the counterfactual reasoning ability required in this strategy. We find this to be consistent with various empirical findings. We then discuss the implications for the theory/simulation debate, meta-representation and pretence. (shrink)

Human attitudes to animals have changed as non-humans have become more widely incorporated in the category of moral agents who deserve some respect. Parallels between the functioning of humans and non-humans have been made for thousands of years but the idea that the animals that we keep can suffer has spread recently. An improved understanding of motivation, cognition and the complexity of social behaviour in animals has led in the last 30 years to the rapid development of animal welfare science. (...) Early attempts to define welfare referred to individuals being in harmony with nature but the first usable definition incorporated feelings and health as part of attempts to cope with the environment. Others considered that welfare is only about feelings but it is argued that as feelings are mechanisms that have evolved they are a part of welfare rather than all of it. Most reviews of welfare now start with listing the needs of the animal, including needs to show certain behaviours. This approach has used sophisticated studies of what is important to animals and has replaced the earlier general guidelines described as freedoms. Many measures of welfare are now used and indicate how good or how poor the welfare is. Naturalness is not a part of the definition of welfare but explains why some needs exist. In recent years, welfare has become established as one of various criteria used to decide on whether a system is sustainable because members of the public will not accept systems that cause poor welfare. The study of welfare has become part of the scientific basis upon which important political decisions are made. (shrink)

Annotation Adapted from the renowned Encyclopedia of Philosophy and its Supplement, Philosophy and Ethics provides an authoritative one-stop resource on the most-studied questions in philosophy.

The Poetic Structure of the World is a major reconsideration of a crucial turning point in Western thought and culture: the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus and Kepler. Fernand Hallyn treats the work of these two figures not simply in terms of the history of science or astronomy, but as events embedded in a wider field of images, symbols, texts, and practices. These new representations of the universe, he insists, cannot be explained by recourse to explanations of "genius" or "intuition."Instead, Hallyn (...) investigates the problem of how new scientific hypotheses are actually formed and the complex way in which certain facts and not others are selected to support a particular theory. He contends that the scientific imagination is not fundamentally different from a mythic or poetic imagination and that the work of Copernicus and Kepler must be examined on the level of rhetorical structure. Hallyn shows the sun-centered universe to be inseparable from the aesthetic, epistemological, theological, and social imperatives of both neoplatonism and mannerism in the sixteenth centuryFernand Hallyn is a Professor in the Department of French Literature at the University of Ghent. Distributed for Zone Books. (shrink)

The Poetic Structure of the World is a major reconsideration of a crucial turning point in Western thought and culture: the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus and Kepler. Fernand Hallyn treats the work of these two figures not simply in terms of the history of science or astronomy, but as events embedded in a wider field of images, symbols, texts, and practices. These new representations of the universe, he insists, cannot be explained by recourse to explanations of "genius" or "intuition."Instead, Hallyn (...) investigates the problem of how new scientific hypotheses are actually formed and the complex way in which certain facts and not others are selected to support a particular theory. He contends that the scientific imagination is not fundamentally different from a mythic or poetic imagination and that the work of Copernicus and Kepler must be examined on the level of rhetorical structure. Hallyn shows the sun-centered universe to be inseparable from the aesthetic, epistemological, theological, and social imperatives of both neoplatonism and mannerism in the sixteenth centuryFernand Hallyn is a Professor in the Department of French Literature at the University of Ghent. Distributed for Zone Books. (shrink)

Concept definitions applicable to human and non-human animals should be usable for both. Awareness is a state during which concepts of environment, self, and self in relation to environment result from complex brain analysis of sensory stimuli or constructs based on memory. There are several proposed categories of awareness. The widespread usage of the term conscious is 'not unconscious' so a conscious individual is an individual that has the capability to perceive and respond to sensory stimuli. It is confusing and (...) scientifically undesirable if conscious is also used to mean aware. Hence it is proposed that conscious should be used only as above. Fully functioning and adequately developed humans and members of many other animal species are sentient. Sentience means having the capacity, the level of awareness and cognitive ability, necessary to have feelings. The welfare of an individual is its state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment. This includes feelings, which are important coping mechanisms, and health. Since feelings involve awareness, there is overlap between welfare assessment and awareness assessment. Methods for assessing awareness, consciousness, sentience, and welfare and links to morality are briefly discussed. (shrink)

Critics have challenged agricultural scientists to address concerns for environmental quality, farm size and structure, international justice, and the health and welfare of consumers and farm labor in research planning. The goal of this research was to determine what is and what could be done to consider value-laden knowledge relevant to these concerns in research planning. Descriptions of a state agricultural experiment station and of a hierarchy of inquiry that included applied systems analysis and reductionist approaches to science revealed the (...) goal-seeking and expert-centered nature of agricultural research. Value-laden and value-free knowledge of agricultural scientists and administrators were heavily represented in broad research goals such as increased productivity and efficiency. In addition, these goals were not evaluated at the levels of inquiry typically practiced by agricultural scientists. A soft systems methodology provided a more holistic level of inquiry that could facilitate consideration of value-laden and value-free knowledge of world views more diverse than those of agricultural scientists and administrators. Scientists could function as co-learners with other participants to identify issues and to conceptualize systems that are relevant to improving research planning. Moreover, researching the practice of soft systems offers opportunities for exploring systems ideas and holistic value theory in relation to agricultural research. (shrink)