In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Continental and Feminist Philosophical PedagogiesConditionsSina KramerIn thinking through what it means to teach continental and feminist philosophy, I keep coming back to a somewhat enigmatic line from Adorno’s essay, “Why Still Philosophy?”: “Because philosophy is good for nothing, it is not yet obsolete” (Adorno 2005, 15). I believe that this dialectical aphorism has everything to do with the conditions under which we as teachers practice philosophy today, and continental (...) and feminist philosophy in particular.On the one hand, Adorno’s remark is made in the context of the specific conditions—political, economic, philosophical, etc.—of his own time. On the other hand, Adorno writes that if philosophy is still necessary (and we should always take seriously this “if,” as well as the “not yet” of the quote above) then it is for the same reasons that philosophy has always been necessary: as critique. Philosophy is thus both spatially and temporally specific in that it plays particular roles in particular places and times, and it is universal in that its operation as critique has always been the same. We must therefore spell out the particular conditions of our historical moment in order for philosophy to play the critical role that it has purportedly always played. What are the conditions under which we teach continental and feminist philosophy today?I would point here to a few phenomena. First, President Barack Obama announced in his 2011 “State of the Union” address that in order for America to “win the future” we must invest in education, to reach the goal of having the [End Page 68] highest proportion of college graduates in the world by the end of the decade (Obama 2011). The president described investment in education as part of the larger of goal of supporting the competitive advantage of American workers. The president cast education in entirely economic terms: a greater quantity of graduates for the sake of a more economically prosperous nation.At the same time, some universities, especially those that depend in part upon dwindling state resources, have chosen to cut programs in the humanities in general or in philosophy in particular: at UNLV, at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, or at Middlesex University.1 Under the logic of fiscal austerity, universities are deciding that they can no longer “afford” to keep departments that are losing money or, which may amount to the same thing, programs that are no longer central to the mission of the university.Finally, recent research indicates that only about one-third of all teachers in higher education in the United States are tenured or on the tenure track; teaching has been farmed out, outsourced, or subcontracted to a contingent labor force with less job security, lower wages, and fewer benefits than those on the tenure track.2 And shortly after the president’s “State of the Union” address, the book Academically Adrift and accompanying articles in the Chronicle of Higher Education and the New York Times argued that college students are learning less, according to measurable metrics, even as they are paying more—that is, going into greater debt—for a degree that is less and less a guarantee of a stable middle-class income (Arum and Roksa 2011; Glenn 2011a, 2011b).In his dialectical aphorism, Adorno seems to set up a contradiction between philosophy and utility, between learning as an end in itself, and learning as an instrument toward some other end—a contradiction that goes back as far as philosophy’s stories about its own origins, to Thales and the olive-press. But this contradiction must be examined in each context in which it is raised. For instance, W. E. B. Du Bois seems to set up the same contradiction in The Souls of Black Folk, when he writes that “the true college will ever have one goal: not to earn meat, but to know the end and aim of that life which meat nourishes” (Du Bois 1997, 86). While this seems like the statement of a universal truth, it must be understood in the context of the larger argument in Souls, in which Du Bois argues that black people have a right to an education as... (shrink)

In his provocative book Matthew Kramer offers a systematic theory of freedom that challenges most of the other major contemporary treatments of the topic.

Substantivalists believe that spacetime and its parts are fundamental constituents of reality. Relationalists deny this, claiming that spacetime enjoys only a derivative existence. I begin by describing how the Galilean symmetries of Newtonian physics tell against both Newton's brand of substantivalism and the most obvious relationalist alternative. I then review the obvious substantivalist response to the problem, which is to ditch substantival space for substantival spacetime. The resulting position has many affinities with what are arguably the most natural interpretations of (...) special and general relativity. I move on to consider and reject two recent antisubstantivalist lines of thought. The interim conclusion is that the best argument for relationalism is an appeal to Ockham's razor. However, for this to be successful there must be genuine relationalist theories that share the theoretical virtues of their substantivalist rivals but without the additional ontological commitment. The bulk of the paper is therefore an investigation of various concrete relationalist proposals. I distinguish three options for the relationalist in the face of the success of Galilean invariant physics and trace how these generalise to relativistic physics. One of the options is particularly promising but, since its basic objects end up being spacetime points, this does not help the prospects of relationalism as traditionally conceived. I end with some reflections on the fate of substantivalism in the aftermath of the Hole Argument, concluding that we have as yet to be given good reasons to abandon the natural, substantivalist interpretation of current physics. (shrink)

This paper reviews the hole argument as an argument against spacetime substantivalism. After a careful presentation of the argument itself, I critically review possible responses.

Is the objective passage of time compatible with relativistic physics? There are two easy routes to an affirmative answer: (1) provide a deflationary analysis of passage compatible with the block universe, or (2) argue that a privileged global present is compatible with relativity. (1) does not take passage seriously. (2) does not take relativity seriously. This paper is concerned with the viability of views that seek to take both passage and relativity seriously. The investigation proceeds by considering how traditional A-theoretic (...) conceptions of passage might be generalized to relativistic space-times without incorporating a privileged global present. I argue that the most promising position marries the idea that open possibilities for the future are settled as time passes with a ‘non-standard’ interpretation of the relevant formal models. (shrink)

In his paper ``What is Structural Realism?'' James Ladyman drew a distinction between epistemological structural realism and metaphysical (or ontic) structural realism. He also drew a suggestive analogy between the perennial debate between substantivalist and relationalist interpretations of spacetime on the one hand, and the debate about whether quantum mechanics treats identical particles as individuals or as `non-individuals' on the other. In both cases, Ladyman's suggestion is that an ontic structural realist interpretation of the physics might be just what is (...) needed to overcome the stalemate. The main thesis of this paper is that, whatever the interpretative difficulties of generally covariant spacetime physics are, they do not support or suggest structural realism. In particular, I hope to show that there is in fact no analogy that supports a similar interpretation of the metaphysics of spacetime points and of quantum particles. (shrink)

Diffeomorphism invariance is sometimes taken to be a criterion of background independence. This claim is commonly accompanied by a second, that the genuine physical magnitudes (the ``observables'') of background-independent theories and those of background-dependent (non-diffeomorphism-invariant) theories are essentially different in nature. I argue against both claims. Background-dependent theories can be formulated in a diffeomorphism-invariant manner. This suggests that the nature of the physical magnitudes of relevantly analogous theories (one background free, the other background dependent) is essentially the same. The temptation (...) to think otherwise stems from a misunderstanding of the meaning of spacetime coordinates in background-dependent theories. (shrink)

We make some remarks on the mathematics and metaphysics of the hole argument, in response to a recent article in this journal by Weatherall ([2018]). Broadly speaking, we defend the mainstream philosophical literature from the claim that correct usage of the mathematics of general relativity `blocks' the argument.

This book is an uncompromising defense of legal positivism that insists on the separability of law and morality. After distinguishing among three facets of morality, Kramer explores a variety of ways in which law has been perceived as integrally connected to each of those facets. The book concludes with a detailed discussion of the obligation to obey the law--a discussion that highlights the strengths of legal positivism in the domain of political philosophy as much as in the domain of (...) jurisprudence. (shrink)

The implications for the substantivalist–relationalist controversy of Barbour and Bertotti's successful implementation of a Machian approach to dynamics are investigated. It is argued that in the context of Newtonian mechanics, the Machian framework provides a genuinely relational interpretation of dynamics and that it is more explanatory than the conventional, substantival interpretation. In a companion paper (Pooley [2002a]), the viability of the Machian framework as an interpretation of relativistic physics is explored. 1 Introduction 2 Newton versus Leibniz 3 Absolute space versus (...) an affine connection 4 Anti-relationalist arguments 5 Rehabilitating relationalism 6 Dynamics on the relative configuration space 7 Intrinsic particle dynamics 8 Conclusion. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper a relational account of incongruent counterparts is defended against an argument due to Kant. I then consider a more recent attack on such an account, due to John Earman, which alleges that the relationalist cannot account for the lawlike left--right asymmetry manifested in parity-violating phenomena. I review Hoefer's, Huggett's and Saunders' responses to Earman's argument and argue that, while a relationalist account of parity-violating laws is possible, it comes at the cost of non-locality.

What is objectivity? What is the rule of law? Are the operations of legal systems objective? If so, in what ways and to what degrees are they objective? Does anything of importance depend on the objectivity of law? These are some of the principal questions addressed by Matthew H. Kramer in this lucid and wide-ranging study that introduces readers to vital areas of philosophical enquiry. As Kramer shows, objectivity and the rule of law are complicated phenomena, each comprising (...) a number of distinct though overlapping dimensions. Although the connections between objectivity and the rule of law are intimate, they are also densely multi-faceted. (shrink)

A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either (...) have to reject the extremely plausible idea that experience is as it seems, or we are forced to provide an account of temporal experience that isn’t compatible with the phenomenology. I conclude by noting that the only plausible interpretation of the slogan is the weak interpretation, and outline a positive account of temporal experience, according to which an appearance of succession requires a succession of appearances. (shrink)

Over the last 60 years the idea of human dignity has become increasingly prominent in the political discourse on human rights. In United Nations documents, for instance, human dignity is currently presented as the justification for human rights. In this paper I shall argue that the contemporary way in which human dignity is thought to ground human rights is very different from the way human dignity has been understood traditionally. My aim is to contrast the contemporary paradigm of dignity to (...) a different one that has been prominent historically from Cicero onwards. My conclusion is that if one wants to use the contemporary conception of dignity, one cannot refer to the history of philosophy for support of this conception, and if one wants to use this history in support, one would have to employ a different conception of dignity that uses a different pattern of thought. (shrink)

How are law and morality connected, how do they interact, and in what ways are they distinct? In Part I of this book, Matthew Kramer argues that moral principles can enter into the law of any jurisdiction. He contends that legal officials can invoke moral principles as laws for resolving disputes, and that they can also invoke them as threshold tests which ordinary laws must satisfy. In opposition to many other theorists, Kramer argues that these functions of moral (...) principles are consistent with all the essential characteristics of any legal system. Part II reaffirms the legal positivist argument that law and morality are separable, arguing against the position of natural-law theory, which portrays legal requirements as a species of moral requirements. Kramer contends that even though the existence of a legal system in any sizeable society is essential for the realization of fundamental moral values, law is not inherently moral either in its effects or in its motivational underpinnings. In the final part, Kramer contests the widespread view that people whose conduct is meticulously careful cannot be held morally responsible for harmful effects of their actions. Through this argument, he reveals that fault-independent liability is present even more prominently in morality than in the law. Through a variety of arguments, Where Law and Morality Meet highlights both some surprising affinities and some striking divergences between morality and law. (shrink)

The study of human-human communication and the development of computational models for human-agent communication have diverged significantly throughout the last decade. Yet, despite frequently made claims of “super-human performance” in, e.g., speech recognition or image processing, so far, no system is able to lead a half-decent coherent conversation with a human. In this paper, we argue that we must start to re-consider the hallmarks of cooperative communication and the core capabilities that we have developed for it, and which conversational agents (...) need to be equipped with: incremental joint co-construction and mentalizing. We base our argument on a vast body of work on human-human communication and its psychological processes that we reason to be relevant and necessary to take into account when modeling human-agent communication. We contrast those with current conceptualizations of human-agent interaction and formulate suggestions for the development of future systems. (shrink)

This paper pursues a thorough-going instrumentalist, or means-ends, approach to the theory of inductive inference. I consider three epistemic aims: convergence to a correct theory, fast convergence to a correct theory and steady convergence to a correct theory (avoiding retractions). For each of these, two questions arise: (1) What is the structure of inductive problems in which these aims are feasible? (2) When feasible, what are the inference methods that attain them? Formal learning theory provides the tools for a complete (...) set of answers to these questions. As an illustration of the results, I apply means-ends analysis to various versions of Goodman's Riddle of Induction. (shrink)

John Earman's recent proposal that a substantive version of general covariance consists in the requirement that diffeomorphism invariance be a gauge symmetry is critically assessed. I argue that such a principle does not serve to differentiate general relativity from pre-relativistic theories. A model-theoretic characterization of two formulations of specially-relativistic theories is suggested. Diffeomorphisms are symmetries of only one such style of formulation and, I argue, Earman's proposal does not provide a reason to deny diffeomorphisms the status of gauge transformations relative (...) to this formulation. Carlo Rovelli's distinction between "passive" and "active" diffeomorphism invariance is also clarified. (shrink)

Ontologies, as the term is used in informatics, are structured vocabularies comprised of human- and computer-interpretable terms and relations that represent entities and relationships. Within informatics fields, ontologies play an important role in knowledge and data standardization, representation, integra- tion, sharing and analysis. They have also become a foundation of artificial intelligence (AI) research. In what follows, we outline the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO), which covers multiple areas in the domain of coronavirus diseases, including etiology, transmission, epidemiology, pathogenesis, diagnosis, (...) prevention, and treatment. We emphasize CIDO development relevant to COVID-19. (shrink)

Doubts are raised concerning Rickles' claim that ``an exact analog of the hole argument can be constructed in the loop representation of quantum gravity'' (Rickles, `A new spin on the hole argument', Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36 (2005) 415–434).

The “paradox of forgiveness” can be described as follows: Forgiving, unlike forgetting, is tied to reasons. It is a response to considerations that lead us to think that we ought to forgive. On the other hand, acts of forgiveness, unlike excuses, are responses to instances of culpable wrongdoing. If, however, the wrongdoing is culpable, there is (or seems to be) no reason to forgive it. So two mutually exclusive theses about forgiveness both seem to be equally warranted: Forgiveness is related (...) to reasons, but there can be no reasons for forgiveness. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I argue that the paradox arises as a result of a too narrow conception of “reason” and that it can be dissolved if we acknowledge different kinds of reasons for forgiveness. More specifically, I examine three kinds of reasons for forgiving an act of wrongdoing: (1) Moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory. (2) Prudential reasons for forgiveness. (3) Moral reasons that pertain to the character of the forgiver and that favor forgiveness without making it morally mandatory. I show that while the paradox of forgiveness arises when we consider reasons of the first kind, it can be dissolved with recourse to reasons of the second and third kind. The upshot of the argument is that we can be rational in deciding to overcome our feelings of resentment towards an act of unjustified and unexcused wrongdoing—and this is a strong point in favor of forgiveness. (shrink)

Formal learning theory is the mathematical embodiment of a normative epistemology. It deals with the question of how an agent should use observations about her environment to arrive at correct and informative conclusions. Philosophers such as Putnam, Glymour and Kelly have developed learning theory as a normative framework for scientific reasoning and inductive inference.

In a companion paper (Pooley & Brown 2001) it is argued that Julian Barbour's Machian approach to dynamics provides a genuinely relational interpretation of Newtonian dynamics and that it is more explanatory than the conventional, substantival interpretation. In this paper the extension of the approach to relativistic physics is considered. General relativity, it turns out, can be reinterpreted as a perfectly Machian theory. However, there are difficulties with viewing the Machian interpretation as more fundamental than the conventional, spacetime interpretation. Moreover, (...) this state of affairs provides little solace for the relationist for, even when interpreted along Machian lines, general relativity is a substantival theory although the basic entity is space, not spacetime. (shrink)

This article considers how the new finds have affected one's view of Empedocles, and suggests how interpretation of that material might help solve some longstanding problems about the structure and content of Empedocles' writings. A basic account of the teachings of Empedocles would distinguish between two main components. On the one hand, there is a “Presocratic” physics, including a theory of principles, a cosmology, and a biology. On the other hand, there is a mythical law, clearly inspired by Orphic or (...) Pythagorean legends, which imposes on guilty gods a punishment consisting in their transmigration through a series of mortal beings. The purpose of this article is to show that Empedocles has the habit of referring to divine entities of his physical system both in a physical and in a mythological way and that his uses of the word daimon form part of this twofold language. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to defend a modified version of the report given by Strabo about the transmission of the writings of Aristotle during the Hellenistic period. The basic dilemma was pointed out by Dom Jean Liron in 1717: The existence of our Corpus Aristotelicum entails that Strabo must be exaggerating either in assuming that the manuscripts brought by Neleus to Scepsis were the only manuscripts of the Aristotelian and Theophrastean writings, or in asserting that these manuscripts were (...) severely damaged. Many writings of our Corpus are missing in the Hellenistic catalogue of Aristotle's works while they are listed in the later catalogue of Ptolemy al-Gharïb; furthermore, the single books of the transmitted treatises are labelled by means of the pre-Hellenistic system of 24 letter labels, whereas in the Hellenistic catalogue the single books are numbered by means of the Hellenistic system of 27 alphabetic numerals. This suggests that the treatises missing in the Hellenistic catalogue formed part of a collection which was inaccessible in Hellenistic times and which, therefore, preserved the pre-Hellenistic system of book-labelling. After the rediscovery of the collection its system of book-labelling was maintained by the editors who laid the foundations of our Corpus. The same criterion reveals the Eudemian Ethics in eight books to be a later compilation. (shrink)

A key factor for the acceptance of robots as regular partners in human-centered environments is the appropriateness and predictability of their behaviors, which depend partially on the robot behavior’s conformity to social norms. Previous experimental studies have shown that robots that follow social norms and the corresponding interactions are perceived more positively by humans than robots or interactions that do not adhere to social norms. However, the conducted studies only focused on the effects of social norm compliance in specific scenarios. (...) Therefore, this paper aims to guide further research studies by compiling how researchers in relevant research fields think the perception of robots and the corresponding interactions are influenced independently of a specific scenario if a robot’s behavior conforms to social norms. Additionally, this study investigates what characteristics and metrics constitute a good general benchmark to objectively evaluate the behavior of social robots regarding its conformity to social norms according to researchers in relevant research communities. Finally, the paper summarizes how the obtained results can guide future research toward socially aware robot behavior. (shrink)

There are two different varieties of question concerning the unity of consciousness: questions about unity at a time, and unity over time. A recent trend in the debate about unity has been to attempt to provide a ‘generalized’ account that purports to solve both problems in the same way. This attempt can be seen in the accounts of Barry Dainton and Michael Tye. In this paper, I argue that there are crucial differences between unity over time and unity at a (...) time that make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. The source of these crucial differences is the phenomenon of the ‘continuity of consciousness’. I argue that accounts of unity over time have to provide an account of this continuity, and that there is no phenomenon analogous to continuity in the case of unity at a time. Attention to the continuity of consciousness reveals crucial structural differences between the two varieties of unity. These structural differences make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. I show that the problems faced by Dainton’s and Tye’s accounts in the light of the structural differences make their accounts of unity appear far less appealing than they might initially have looked. I conclude by noting that, in the light of the important differences between the two varieties of unity, it is a mistake to attempt to model accounts of unity over time on accounts of unity at a time. (shrink)

This paper develops a means–end analysis of an inductive problem that arises in particle physics: how to infer from observed reactions conservation principles that govern all reactions among elementary particles. I show that there is a reliable inference procedure that is guaranteed to arrive at an empirically adequate set of conservation principles as more and more evidence is obtained. An interesting feature of reliable procedures for finding conservation principles is that in certain precisely defined circumstances they must introduce hidden particles. (...) Among the reliable inductive methods there is a unique procedure that minimizes convergence time as well as the number of times that the method revises its conservation principles. Thus the aims of reliable, fast and steady convergence to an empirically adequate theory single out a unique optimal inference for a given set of observed reactions—including prescriptions for when exactly to introduce hidden particles. (shrink)

I argue that notions of relative fundamentality need to be invoked if there is to be something substantive at stake in the debate between proponents of Harvey Brown's dynamical approach to relativity and defenders of a more traditional interpretation of spacetime. I will review some problems that stand in the way of the advocate of the dynamical approach making good on their claim that dynamical symmetries are more fundamental than spacetime symmetries.

In medizinethischen Kontexten bezeichnet der Ausdruck „Odysseus-Verträge“ Selbstbindungen, die in der vorausschauenden Bitte von Patienten an ihre Ärzte bestehen, eigene spätere Behandlungspräferenzen nicht zu befolgen. Umstritten ist jedoch, ob eine vorhergehende Anweisung ein Handeln gegen den Patientenwillen in der aktualen Behandlungssituation rechtfertigt. In diesem Beitrag wird die Frage nach der Verbindlichkeit von Odysseus-Anweisungen erörtert. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass die Befolgung einer Odysseus-Anweisung eine Form des paternalistischen Handelns darstellt und die Frage nach der Verbindlichkeit von Odysseus-Anweisungen daher in diejenige nach der (...) Rechtfertigung paternalistischen Handelns zu überführen ist . Im Folgenden wird als Rechtfertigungsmodell für paternalistisches Handeln ein Zustimmungsmodell verteidigt , dem zufolge eine paternalisierende Maßnahme durch die antizipierte spätere Zustimmung des Patienten zu dieser Maßnahme gerechtfertigt wird . Nach einer Erörterung des Einwandes, dass damit die besonderen normativen Probleme von Odysseus-Anweisungen aus dem Blick geraten , werden abschließend Fälle untersucht, in denen aufgrund eines irreversiblen Kompetenzverlustes keine spätere Zustimmung zur paternalisierenden Maßnahme mehr möglich ist. In diesen Fällen, so die These, ist ein paternalistisches Handeln gegen den aktualen Patientenwillen nicht gerechtfertigt; kommt es hier also zu einem Konflikt zwischen dem in der Vorausverfügung dokumentierten und dem aktualen Patientenwillen, ist letzterer zu respektieren .In the context of medical ethics, the term „Ulysses contract“ denotes an advance directive by means of which a patient binds himself for the future by instructing a doctor to act against his foreseen future preferences. There is some controversy, however, about whether a person’s prior decisions should be regarded as mandatory for the doctor even when they conflict with her present desires. In this contribution, I address the questions whether and under what circumstances Ulysses instructions should be regarded as binding. In Part , I attempt to show that observing a Ulysses instruction means acting paternalistically and that therefore the question whether Ulysses contracts ought to be respected should be transformed into the question how paternalistic action can be justified. Parts and are concerned with the justification of paternalistic action. On the basis of a conception of welfare as being tied to the person’s interests and preferences, I defend a consent-based model of justification . More specifically, I suggest that the patient’s anticipated later consent to a precedent paternalistic action should count as its justification . In what follows, I attempt to rebut the objection that this account does not do justice to the specific normative problems of Ulysses contracts . Finally, I examine cases in which, due to an irreversible loss of competence, a paternalistic action cannot be assented to by the patient. I argue that in these cases, acting against the patient’s present wishes cannot be justified. If in such a case a patient’s present request runs contrary to the past request expressed in the advance directive, the former should be respected. (shrink)

How is metaphysics related to the empirical sciences? Should metaphysics in general be guided by the sources, methods and results of the sciences? And what about the special case of the metaphysics of the social world: should it likewise be guided by the sources, methods and results of the social sciences? In her paper “Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics?”, K. Hawley raises the question: If we are sympathetic to the project of naturalising metaphysics, how should we approach (...) the metaphysics of the social world? She proceeds by discussing three approaches to social metaphysics: inference to the best explanation from current social science, descriptive conceptual analysis, and normative, especially ‘ameliorative’ projects. At the end of her discussion, she reaches a rather pessimistic conclusion, especially as regards the IBE approach: “a number of phenomena indicate that the prospects for securely basing social metaphysics via inference to the best explanation from social science are currently faint. […] We need to look elsewhere if we are to develop a metaphysics of the social world.” In my comments on her paper, I try to re-animate the program of an inductive metaphysics by defending the idea that the method of inference to the best explanation should be the central method of justification for metaphysics in general and for social metaphysics in particular. (shrink)

John Locke's labor theory of property is one of the seminal ideas of political philosophy and served to establish its author's reputation as one of the leading social and political thinkers of all time. Through it Locke addressed many of his most pressing concerns, and earned a reputation as an outstanding spokesman for political individualism - a reputation that lingers widely despite some partial challenges that have been raised in recent years. In this major new study Matthew Kramer offers (...) an extensive critique of the labor theory and investigates the consequences of its downfall. With incisive analyses of the merits and failings of many aspects of Locke's political thought, Kramer advances a powerful challenge to Locke's image as an individualist. Employing a rigorously philosophical methodology, but remaining aware of the insights generated by historical approaches to Locke, Kramer concludes that Locke's political vision was in fact profoundly communitarian. (shrink)

Albert Camus is one of the best known philosophers of the twentieth century, as well as a widely read novelist. This book contextualises Camus in his troubled and conflicted times, and analyses the enduring popularity of his major philosophical and literary works in connection with contemporary political, social, and cultural issues.

Contemporary approaches to “non-market accounting” depend critically on methods of “monetization,” i.e., determining prices for goods outside the market. Monetization constitutes a case of economic measurement in a narrow sense that has not yet been analyzed in the literature on measurement in economics. Monetization, I will argue, uses homo economicus—originally created as a model to explain existing prices—as a measuring device, one that generates new prices for goods that are not traded on markets. Homo economicus, though long contested in microeconomics, (...) is thus enjoying a dubious revival in non-market accounting. (shrink)

This study examines whether journalists and bloggers label paid content. In Germany, as in many other countries, advertorials have to be designated as advertising to enable the target audience to identify the promotional character of the content. This applies both to the traditional mass media and to blogs, for which advertorials provide a key source of income. To date, there have been no empirical findings on the designation practice based on a comparison of journalists and bloggers. The present study presents (...) an online survey in Germany completed by 936 journalists and 463 bloggers in 2017. The results indicate that, in fact, bloggers do not label advertorials less frequently than journalists do: 91.6 % of bloggers and 91.7 % of journalists stated that they label paid content as advertising. (shrink)