My reflection is dedicated to a universalist and personalistic conception of Andrzej Grzegorczyk and his main idea on deriving the sphere of spiritual values from vital ones. I try to interpret Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s ethics in a broad way, that is, as a universalistic philosophy of life. I mean by “philosophy of life” the basic aspect of the practical realization of values, that is, social life as an attitude to fate. I use Martin Heidegger’s concept of human handiness, filtered through its (...) use by Grzegorczyk, as a tool of exposing vitality values which grow into universal spiritual values. (shrink)

The paper presents Professor Janusz Kuczyński’s life as well as his intellectual and organizational activities, his achievements as a publisher and his efforts to establish an environment of followers of his special kind of universalism.

This comparative essay about two kinds of interpersonal-centric humanism is dedicated to the memory of professor Janusz Kuczyński and his conception of dialogical universalism as a metaphilosophy, and shows Immanuel Kant’s thought as a ceaseless source of inspiration for all anti-conservatives and universalists. Kant’s philosophy gave man an unforgettable sense of freedom, because it not only posed the imperative of building a pan-human community of all rational beings, but also revealed the above-natural sense of the human species’ imposition of purposefulness (...) upon itself, and the realisation of this purposefulness in the form of a republican federation of free states dedicated to co-creating eternal peace. Kantian ethics did not reach beyond the obligations people had towards one another, hence it was functionally anthropological and uninfluenced by religion, which re-situated philosophy with regard to scientific cognition and religious experience, giving rise to a metaphysics of anthropological responsibility for the condition of the spiritual freedom this ethic propounded. Kant revealed the existence of a metaphysical difference in the sphere of being—between the determinism of nature and the moral kingdom of freedom—without direct reference to the transcendental source of these two essentially different worlds. Kant was the first to set morality rooted in the autonomy and unanimous will of all rational beings—or true humanity—against legal and religious legalism. Kant laid weight on the processual character of man’s self-education to social life through the sense of commitment to self-improvement for the benefit of the solidary co-existence of all rational beings that he developed in himself as a rational being. Thus created freedom is founded on the selflesness of goodness and represents a new quality of being that only manifests itself and evolves in community, interpersonalcentrically. It is a universalistic approach capable of gradually neutralising the human inclination towards radical evil.My attempt to compare these two interpersonalcentric humanism conceptions aims to add some substance to this very delicate element in Kuczyński’s universalism as a metaphilosophy construct. (shrink)

The present volume contains the proceedings of an international conference that was held at the Faculty of Theology of the Catholic University of Leuven, October 28 to 31, 2008. Poetics' and religion' take an important place in Ricoeur's oeuvre; yet they still require further investigation. The common link between these two concepts may well be found in the creative dimension of language. Poetics reflect upon it; religion turns to it for help in expressing the experience of the transcendent. Ricoeur has (...) explored and offered ways for reflecting precisely upon this junction. Contributors have studied the many ways these concepts function in the earlier and in the later work, and how they have been used and received in various in various fields and disciplines, including theology. Scholars have been working with Ricoeur in anthropology, ethics, Biblical studies, systematic and practical theology, intercultural philosophy, spirituality, and other disciplines, which together makes for a wide palette of interpretations. Ricoeur's audacious explorations on the intersection of creative language, religion, and philosophical reflection continue to open new ways for reflection in many different fields. (shrink)

We report the identification of a recurrent, 520-kb 16p12.1 microdeletion associated with childhood developmental delay. The microdeletion was detected in 20 of 11,873 cases compared with 2 of 8,540 controls and replicated in a second series of 22 of 9,254 cases compared with 6 of 6,299 controls. Most deletions were inherited, with carrier parents likely to manifest neuropsychiatric phenotypes compared to non-carrier parents. Probands were more likely to carry an additional large copy-number variant when compared to matched controls. The clinical (...) features of individuals with two mutations were distinct from and/or more severe than those of individuals carrying only the co-occurring mutation. Our data support a two-hit model in which the 16p12.1 microdeletion both predisposes to neuropsychiatric phenotypes as a single event and exacerbates neurodevelopmental phenotypes in association with other large deletions or duplications. Analysis of other microdeletions with variable expressivity indicates that this two-hit model might be more generally applicable to neuropsychiatric disease. © 2010 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Professor Bochenski, as he himself points out in the prologue, is a logician; he is best known in England and the United States for his work in the history of logic, and more recently in Soviet and East European philosophy. But he has taught philosophy for many years - in Rome, in Switzerland, and on a number of visits to the United States - and in this book provides an elementary introduction to contemporary work in the field. As a means (...) to this end he has chosen to deal with four alternative methods employed by philosophers in the twentieth century. Philosophical methodology has not attracted much attention, in English speaking circles, as a distinct branch of the discipline of philosophy; the term "methodologist", if used at all, would ordinarily be taken to refer to somebody concerned with scientific rather than philosophical method. When, therefore, Professor Bochenski refers, as he frequently does, to "contemporary methodologists", meaning people who debate the re spective merits of phenomenology and mathematical logic as ways of approaching the world, the phrase has an odd ring. But philosophical methodology really makes a great deal more sense than scientific method ology. In science methodology is almost superfluous; given all the avail able information and a reasonably clear idea of what is wanted, there is usually not much ambiguity as to the means of getting it, or not much that could be resolved by mere argument. (shrink)

The existence of differences in time, meant to be structure ‹T,<›, where the earlier-later relation < is a linear ordering, dense and without the first and the last element, is a sine qua non condition of changes taking place at any temporal instant. Therefore it is impossible to give a definition of the operator of change ↑ (the intended meaning of the phrase „↑α” is „it is changing now what a states”) in the language Lͭ of Tense Logic calculi containing, (...) besides classical sentential connectives, temporal categories: G, H, F, P. The paper contains the proof of this statement. (shrink)

Une œuvre intitulée Expositio libri de anima a été publiée dans le volume III des œuvres philosophiques de Pierre d'Espagne éditées par le père M. Alonso. Mais tandis que les deux premiers volumes de la série contiennent des œuvres que les manuscrits attribuent explicitement à cet auteur, à savoir la Scientia libri de anima et le Commentaire précédé de Questions sur le De anima , l'Expositio libri de anima n'atteste aucun nom d'auteur dans le seul témoin du texte sur lequel (...) est basée l'édition d'Alonso, c'est-à-dire le manuscrit Madrid, B.N. 3314, fol. 68ra-89rb. Selon l'éditeur, l'absence d'un nom d'auteur est due au fait que le texte est incomplet. Celui-ci commence effectivement ex abrupto par les mots «ergo anima est actus ut scientia» qui, comme nous le verrons plus loin, se situent au milieu de l'explication du passage II 1.412a21. (shrink)

W spisanych przez L. Wittgensteina pod koniec życia Bemerkungen über die Farben znajdujemy kilka 'zagadek' dotyczących kolorów, np.: 1. „Jak to się dzieje, że coś przezroczystego może być zielone, ale nie może być białe". 2. „niepodobna sobie wyobrazić czystą białą wodę". 3. „Ale kolor świeci za sprawą swego otoczenia, w swym otoczeniu. Szary jednak nie świeci. 4. „? W obrazie biel musi być najjaśniejszym kolorem". „Nieprawda, że w obrazie biel zawsze musi być najjaśniejszym kolorem. Z pewnością jednak jest nim w (...) płaskiej kombinacji plam barwnych". 5. „Dlaczego nie ma brązowego światła ani szarego?" „Dlaczego niepodobna sobie wyobrazić szarego żaru". 6. „Czyż nie mogliby istnieć ludzie, dla których istnieje niebieskawy żółty, czerwonawy zielony? A zatem tacy ludzie, których pojecia o kolorach odbiegają od naszych pojęć?". (shrink)

W liście do B. Russella z 19 VIII 1919 r. L. Wittgenstein pisze: „Zasadniczy sprawy jest teoria o tym, co można wypowiedzieć w zdaniach - to znaczy za pomocy języka -, a czego nie można wyrazić w zdaniach lecz tylko pokazać. Jest to, moim zdaniem, główny problem filozofii." Tym właśnie problemem zajmuje się w swojej pracy H. Watzka, wykładowcy historii filozofii w Wyższej Szkole Filozoficzno-Teologicznej Sankt Georgen we Frankfurcie nad Menem. Omawiana książka jest skróconą wersją rozprawy doktorskiej: Logik und Metaphysik. (...) Zur Statusbestimmung der Philosophie bei Wittgensein, obronionej przez Autora w 1997 roku w Uniwersytecie Humboldta w Berlinie. (shrink)

Cet essai développe une approche «trichotomique» du désir transcendantal de l'être humain pour la croissance et le développement. Le but principal de l'article est de s'enquérir du monde «après la vertu», pour citer les paroles de Alasdair MacIntyre. On le fait en montrant qu'après la réalisation légitime du bien-être psycho-physique, la recherche de la justice humaine poussera l'humanité jusqu'au point où cette recherche se supprime elle-même. Les biens, en effet, auxquels nous ne pouvons qu'aspirer - comme une connaissance définitive, une (...) jouissance inconditionnée d'une identité authentique, une justice pleinement satisfaisante - sont en soi et pour soi au-delà de notre capacité. De cette façon, la recherche produit un résultat strictement mystico-théologique: nous sommes incapables de nous assurer du Dieu que nous cherchons naturellement. Dans l'angoisse qui s'ensuit, il ne reste qu'une option, et elle est radicale: l'abandon aimant de soi-même en Dieu ou l'entretien moral de soi-même. Nous nous trouvons donc devant la porte qui ouvre sur le chemin de la forme la plus radicale du péché, qui n'est pas seulement morale, mais proprement théologique: il devient impossible de vivre avec le Dieu vivant, et l'humanité s'installera dans l'idolâtrie et l'athéisme comme options religieuses. Mais laissée à soi-même, la religiosité humaine deviendra une recherche troublante, capable de rendre acceptable des actes immoraux inouïs: 'Tantum religio p. (shrink)

W spisanych przez L. Wittgensteina pod koniec życia Bemerkungen über die Farben znajdujemy kilka 'zagadek' dotyczących kolorów, np.: 1. „Jak to się dzieje, że coś przezroczystego może być zielone, ale nie może być białe". 2. „niepodobna sobie wyobrazić czystą białą wodę". 3. „Ale kolor świeci za sprawą swego otoczenia, w swym otoczeniu. Szary jednak nie świeci. 4. „? W obrazie biel musi być najjaśniejszym kolorem". „Nieprawda, że w obrazie biel zawsze musi być najjaśniejszym kolorem. Z pewnością jednak jest nim w (...) płaskiej kombinacji plam barwnych". 5. „Dlaczego nie ma brązowego światła ani szarego?" „Dlaczego niepodobna sobie wyobrazić szarego żaru". 6. „Czyż nie mogliby istnieć ludzie, dla których istnieje niebieskawy żółty, czerwonawy zielony? A zatem tacy ludzie, których pojecia o kolorach odbiegają od naszych pojęć?". (shrink)

W liście do B. Russella z 19 VIII 1919 r. L. Wittgenstein pisze: „Zasadniczy sprawy jest teoria o tym, co można wypowiedzieć w zdaniach - to znaczy za pomocy języka -, a czego nie można wyrazić w zdaniach lecz tylko pokazać. Jest to, moim zdaniem, główny problem filozofii." Tym właśnie problemem zajmuje się w swojej pracy H. Watzka, wykładowcy historii filozofii w Wyższej Szkole Filozoficzno-Teologicznej Sankt Georgen we Frankfurcie nad Menem. Omawiana książka jest skróconą wersją rozprawy doktorskiej: Logik und Metaphysik. (...) Zur Statusbestimmung der Philosophie bei Wittgensein, obronionej przez Autora w 1997 roku w Uniwersytecie Humboldta w Berlinie. (shrink)

Józef Alojzy [Josephus Aloisius] Dmowski was one of the precursors of the nineteenth century renewal of Thomism and this was a few dozen years before the promulgation of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, Aeterni Patris. He was one of the most famous Christian philosophers of the nineteenth century. His work was also the first extensive philosophy textbook of that time which included a l l the disciplines of the time, published by the Jesuits after the re-establishment of the Order in (...) 1814.. Until now Dmowski's philosophy has not been the subject of an extensive study. I aim to remedy this in the present article. (shrink)

Józef Alojzy [Josephus Aloisius] Dmowski was one of the precursors of the nineteenth century renewal of Thomism and this was a few dozen years before the promulgation of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, Aeterni Patris. He was one of the most famous Christian philosophers of the nineteenth century. His work was also the first extensive philosophy textbook of that time which included a l l the disciplines of the time, published by the Jesuits after the re-establishment of the Order in (...) 1814.. Until now Dmowski's philosophy has not been the subject of an extensive study. I aim to remedy this in the present article. (shrink)

Józef Alojzy [Josephus Aloisius] Dmowski was one of the precursors of the nineteenth century renewal of Thomism and this was a few dozen years before the promulgation of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, Aeterni Patris. He was one of the most famous Christian philosophers of the nineteenth century. His work was also the first extensive philosophy textbook of that time which included a l l the disciplines of the time, published by the Jesuits after the re-establishment of the Order in (...) 1814.. Until now Dmowski's philosophy has not been the subject of an extensive study. I aim to remedy this in the present article. (shrink)

The Struggle for Nature outlines and examines the main aspects of current environmental philosophy including deep ecology, social and political ecology, eco-feminism and eco-anarchism. It criticizes the dependency on science of these philosophies and the social problems engendered by them. Jozef Keulartz argues for a post-naturalistic turn in environmental philosophy. The Struggle for Nature presents the most up-to-date arguments in environmental philosophy, which will be valuable reading for anyone interested in applied philosophy, environmental studies or geography.

The presented paper focuses on the analysis of strategic documents at the level of the European Union concerning the regulation of artificial intelligence as one of the so-called disruptive technologies. In the first part of the article, we outline the basic terminology. Subsequently, we focus on the summarizing and systemizing of the key documents adopted at the EU level in terms of artificial intelligence regulation. The focus of the paper is devoted to issues of personal data protection and cyber security (...) included in these strategic documents. The final part contains recommendations for future research and evaluation of its key features. (shrink)

The author takes the contemporary theatre performance of Mátohy [The Spooks] and maps out the use of original folk theatre masks in a new theatrical context. He describes and characterizes the changes that occur as a consequence of transposing folk masks from their traditional environment to the contemporary stage.

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)