Popper is commonly considered as an analytical philosopher who focuses on epistemological and methodological aspects of scientific development, disregarding any social, cultural or political consideration. Against this popular image of Popper’s philosophy, I argue in this paper that Popper’s acco..

Reseña de la obra de Orden Jiménez, Rafael V., Humanismo Republicano Iberoamericano. Un debate. Ambrosio Velasco Gómez; José Luis Villacañas Berlanga, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2019, pp. 127.

Esta obra presenta un debate entre Ambrosio Velasco y José Luis Villacañas sobre si los teólogos y juristas defensores de los indios y los pueblos indígenas durante la colonización de América, como Vitoria o Alonso de Veracruz, defendían un concepto político propio de un humanismo republicano, contrario a uno imperial y eurocéntrico. Para ello evalúan también hasta qué punto esos escolásticos defendían un concepto de racionalidad dialógica, basada en la retórica y la dialéctica y distinta a la racionalidad (...) deductiva que triunfaría en la modernidad o, en cambio, se mantenían dentro de esta segunda."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

La tesis principal que aquí se defiende es que, para Popper, la validez del conocimiento estuvo vinculada siempre a la dimensión pragmática del contexto de descubrimiento (e incluso dependía de ella). Constituye, pues, un error afirmar que, para él, 1) dicha validez estaba ligada a un "empirismo encubierto" (opuesto a la tesis sobre la carga teórica de toda observación), según lo ha planteado Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz, y que 2) en sus ideas, los factores pragmáticos carecían de importancia epistemológica, como (...) lo ha afirmado Ambrosio Velasco. Para justificar esta tesis, se examinan tres argumentos expuestos en The Logic of Scientific Discovery, enfatizando el que se refiere al carácter disposicional de los términos con los que, para Popper, se formulan los enunciados descriptivos. The main thesis I assert here is that for Popper validity of knowledge was always linked to (and even supported by) the pragmatic dimension of the context of discovery. I hold it's wrong to claim that for this author 1) validity of knowledge was linked to a "hidden empiricism" (opposed to the theory-laden character of observation), such as Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz had propounded, and 2) pragmatic issues were epistemologically irrelevant in his philosophy, such as Ambrosio Velasco has argued. To justify my thesis I examine three arguments exposed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, emphasizing especially Popper's argument about the dispositional character of the concepts in which descriptive statements are formulated. (shrink)

We advance the thesis that the method of experimental economics can make significant contributions to normative, as opposed to descriptive, business ethics. We contend that there are two basic ways in which experimental economics may make this contribution, and we exemplify these ways by pointing to experimental support of social contract theory as rational foundation for business ethics. These two ways are: (1) adding psychological realism; and (2) testing some quasi-empirical assumptions present in normative theory. In order to make good (...) our methodological claim, we first describe the methodological rules of experimental economics, distinguishing this method from other behavioral business ethics approaches. We also contemplate the possible objection that empirical methods cannot bear on normative ethics because there is no way of bridging the gap between descriptive theory (how people behave) and normative theory (how people ought to behave). (shrink)

In Arnauld’s view, a fruitful clarification of the nature of knowledge is possible if only one pays close attention to “ce qui se passe en nous,” in such a fashion “de n’y rien mêler dont nous ne soyons certains.” In support of his position, he cites not only Descartes’ testimony but also that of St. Augustine. Consequently, he treats—first of all—of the things that any one can know about his own soul upon consulting with himself with a little attention, and (...) by so doing Arnauld shows once again his faithfulness to the spirit of Cartesianism. Yet he does more, for he is among the first thinkers fully to appreciate the value of a truly descriptive method in philosophy. (shrink)

Appearing in English for the first time, this book comprises two of Ortega’s most important works, ¿Qué es conocimiento? and the essay “Ideas y creencias.” This is Ortega’s attempt to systematically present the foundations of his metaphysics of human life and, on that basis, to provide a radical philosophical account of knowledge. In so doing, he criticizes idealism and overcomes it. Accordingly, this book goes well beyond a treatise on epistemology; in fact, as understood in modern philosophy, this discipline and (...) its questions are shown to be derivative and, in that sense, they are transcended here by Ortega’s systematic effort. Written during the time of his maturity, these works are representative of his fruitful and radical period. Both ¿Qué es conocimiento? and “Ideas y creencias” are equally decisive not only for the understanding and radical completion of Ortega’s work, but also for their relevance to the work of continental philosophers during the same period and for years to come. (shrink)