En el presente artículo se analiza el concepto del perdón en contraste con los presupuestos y limitaciones de una política del perdón en sociedades en conflicto, en las que el perdón se reduce al mero cálculo político, la víctima deja de ser parte activa del proceso de reconciliación y el perdón corre el riesgo de convertirse en un instrumento de garantía oficial de impunidad. Dicho análisis es posible gracias a la reconstrucción de la dimensión éticoexistencial del perdón como correctivo de (...) la dimensión política. Así, con la vinculación de estas dos dimensiones se busca (1) resaltar el aporte de un concepto más amplio del perdón que, (2) lo libere de su tratamiento exclusivamente político y jurídico. (shrink)

La exigencia ética es uno de los conceptos centrales del pensamiento de Kierkegaard. Él lo introduce como correctivo contra las tendencias nihilistas de su época. En este artículo se presentan los aspectos más importantes del desarrollo del concepto, partiendo del diagnóstico crítico de la modernidad que hace Kierkegaard y de su dialéctica de la comunicación ética y de su dialéctica de la comunicación ético-religiosa. La tesis central es que el amor, entendido como la exigencia radical hecha al individuo de superar (...) el egoísmo y ayudar al otro a ser independiente, posee un contenido normativo fuerte que fomenta el desarrollo positivo de las relaciones interpersonales. (shrink)

La exigencia ética es uno de los conceptos centrales del pensamiento de Kierkegaard. Él lo introduce como correctivo contra las tendencias nihilistas de su época. En este artículo se presentan los aspectos más importantes del desarrollo del concepto, partiendo del diagnóstico crítico de la modernidad que hace Kierkegaard y de su dialéctica de la comunicación ética y de su dialéctica de la comunicación ético-religiosa. La tesis central es que el amor, entendido como la exigencia radical hecha al individuo de superar (...) el egoísmo y ayudar al otro a ser independiente, posee un contenido normativo fuerte que fomenta el desarrollo positivo de las relaciones interpersonales. (shrink)

En este artículo se ofrece un acercamiento riguroso a la ética existencial de Kierkegaard, a la vez que se muestra en qué momento se separa de la filosofía moral de Kant y opera como un correctivo de la misma. A partir de ambas concepciones de la ética es presentado el problema del actuar moral, tanto en su dimensión pura práctica (Kant y Kierkegaard), como en su dimensión existencial constitutiva (Kierkegaard), resaltando la importancia de la elección del sí mismo en conexión (...) con los principios de la moralidad. (shrink)

O presente artigo oferece-nos uma abordagem da concepção kierkegaardiana do Ético, tal como a mesma nos é apresentada na obra Alternativa, sublinhando de modo particular a importância que a vida ética tem na formação da personalidade. Por outro lado, o autor do artigo mostra sobretudo que uma tal concepção não se refere apenas ao indivíduo isolado, tal como frequentemente se pensa, antes se trata do indivíduo enquanto inserido numa teia de comunicação, ou seja, num processo de relação social com os (...) outros. Mostra-se também que esta concepção da ética atribui à dimensão social como horizonte de realização do ético um significado normativo que fomenta o desenvolvimento positivo das relações interpessoais: ser Si-mesmo significa, antes de mais, relacionar-se responsavelmente com os outros, assumir concretamente na vida as formas da Eticidade, querer expressar o geral no particular. Deste modo, o artigo propõe a ideia de Personalidade, ou de Subjectividade, como um correctivo contra as tendências negativas e niilistas da Modernidade. /// This article approaches the kierkegaardian conception of the Ethical such as it is presented in the work Either/Or, whereby special attention is given to the importance of the ethical life in the formative process of human Personality. On the other hand, the author of the article emphasizes the fact that such a concept of the ethical life does not refer, as it is often believed, to the isolated Individual, but always refers to the Individual as much as it is integrated in a communicational network, i.e., as much as it is engaged in a process of social relations with others. It is also shown that the kierkegaardian conception of the ethical attributes to the social dimension as horizon of realization of the ethical a normative meaning that is particularly important for the positive development of the interpersonal relations: To become a Self implies, before all else, to relate oneself responsibly with others, to assume the concrete forms of Ethicity in life, to be willing to express the general in the particular. In this way, the article suggests that the idea of Personality, or Subjectivity, can function as a corrective to the more negative and nihilistic tendency of Modernity. (shrink)

Rational Powers in Action presents a conception of instrumental rationality as governing actions that are extended in time with indeterminate ends. Tenenbaum argues that previous philosophical theories in this area, in focusing on momentary snapshots of the mind of idealized agents, miss central aspects of human rationality.

In this paper we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects”, i.e., projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.

It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good. This paper identifies several distinct arguments in favour of the possibility that one can act under the guise of the bad. GG seems to face more serious difficulties when trying to answer three different, (...) but related, arguments for the possibility of acting under the guise of the bad. The main strategies available to answer these objections end up either undermining the motivation for GG or failing to do full justice to the nature of perverse motivation. However, these difficulties turn out to be generated by focusing on a particular version of GG, what I call the “content version”. But we have independent reasons to prefer a different version of GG; namely, the “attitude version”. The attitude version allows for a much richer understanding of the possibility of acting on what we conceive to be bad. Drawing on an analogy with theoretical akrasia and theoretical perversion, I try to show how the attitude version can provide a compelling account of perverse actions. (shrink)

Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends (...) on a reading of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III, and on an interpretation of Kant’s claim that we “act under the idea of freedom”, that is implausible on textual and on philosophical grounds. I then present an alternative interpretation of what Kant means by “acting under the idea of freedom” and of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III. I argue that the only substantive conclusion of these paragraphs is that no theoretical proof of freedom is necessary. Moreover I argue that although these paragraphs raise concerns about the validity of the moral law, these concerns and Kant’s answers to them, do not give rise to any significant conflict with his views in the Critique of Practical Reason. (shrink)

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - the view that desire (...) (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues. (shrink)

Recent research on algebraic models of _quasi-Nelson logic_ has brought new attention to a number of classes of algebras which result from enriching (subreducts of) Heyting algebras with a special modal operator, known in the literature as a _nucleus_. Among these various algebraic structures, for which we employ the umbrella term _intuitionistic modal algebras_, some have been studied since at least the 1970s, usually within the framework of topology and sheaf theory. Others may seem more exotic, for their primitive operations (...) arise from algebraic terms of the intuitionistic modal language which have not been previously considered. We shall for instance investigate the variety of _weak implicative semilattices_, whose members are (non-necessarily distributive) meet semilattices endowed with a nucleus and an implication operation which is not a relative pseudo-complement but satisfies the postulates of Celani and Jansana’s strict implication. For each of these new classes of algebras we establish a representation and a topological duality which generalize the known ones for Heyting algebras enriched with a nucleus. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Planning, Time, and Self-Governanace, Bratman argues that the notion of self-governance plays an important role in grounding the rational principles such as means-ends coherence in the synchronic case, and principles of stability and coherence through time in the case of self-governance over time. In this paper, I grant Bratman’s claim for the synchronic case, however I argue that it is not clear that one can extend the reasoning to the diachronic case. More specifically, I raise a number of (...) doubts about whether any notion of diachronic self-governance can play the role in the theory of practical rationality that Bratman assigns to it. (shrink)

In anticipatory governance and responsible innovation, anticipation is a key theoretical and practical dimension for promoting a more responsible governance of new and emerging sciences and technologies. Yet, anticipation has been subjected to a range of criticisms, such that many now see it as unnecessary for AG and RI. According to Alfred Nordmann, practices engaging with ‘the future’, when performed under certain conditions, may reify the future, diminish our ability to see what is happening, and/or reproduce the illusion of control (...) over the future. Several authors have stressed that these critiques fail to capture the heterogeneous character of anticipatory practices, and yet research on the question of what particular kind of socio-epistemic engagements with ‘the future’ AG and RI aim to enact through anticipation remains fragmentary and their underlying rationale under-theorised. This article aims to advance the theoretical characterisation and problematisation of anticipation as key interventive tools for AG and RI. By distinguishing between four modes of anticipation and heuristically testing them against Nordmann’s critiques, the article argues that despite his assessment failing to recognise the heterogeneity of anticipatory practices considered valuable for AG and RI, it reinforces the relevance of performing certain modes of anticipatory exercises, namely critical-hermeneutic ones. Thus, anticipation continues to be a necessary heuristic dimension for AG and RI. More concretely, the article maintains that such anticipatory heuristics may find their radical constructive and critical-reflective character in the dynamics of inclusive scrutiny and negotiation about the plausibility and desirability of the envisioned or created futures. (shrink)

The present paper introduces and studies the variety WH of weakly Heyting algebras. It corresponds to the strict implication fragment of the normal modal logic K which is also known as the subintuitionistic local consequence of the class of all Kripke models. The tools developed in the paper can be applied to the study of the subvarieties of WH; among them are the varieties determined by the strict implication fragments of normal modal logics as well as varieties that do not (...) arise in this way as the variety of Basic algebras or the variety of Heyting algebras. Apart from WH itself the paper studies the subvarieties of WH that naturally correspond to subintuitionistic logics, namely the variety of R-weakly Heyting algebras, the variety of T-weakly Heyting algebras and the varieties of Basic algebras and subresiduated lattices. (shrink)

Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis, he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only p...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new system of logic for existence and essence, in which the traditional distinctions between essential and accidental properties, abstract and concrete objects, and actually existent and possibly existent objects are described and related in a suitable way. In order to accomplish this task, a primitive relation of essential identity between different objects is introduced and connected to a first order existence property and a first order abstractness property. The basic idea is (...) that possibly existent objects are completely determinate and that essentially identical objects are just different individuations of the same individual essence. Accordingly, essential properties are defined as properties that are invariant with respect to this kind of identity, while abstract objects are determined by being characterized by essential properties only. Once such ideas are implemented, a number of classical intuitions about objects, their essence, and their way of existence can be consistently interpreted. (shrink)

The traditional concept of sovereignty is largely independent of democratic legitimacy and completely indifferent to any obligation towards non-national citizens. But can this traditional concept meet the normative expectations of a post-traditional understanding of political authority as well as the challenges of an ever more interconnected world? In order to respond to this question, the Article analyzes the conceptual presuppositions that lie at the basis of the notion of “sovereignty,” first regarding its sources, and second regarding the ideas of rationality (...) that are applied when sovereign actors operate. As far as the sources of sovereignty are concerned, it is argued that both of them - the “ascending” and the “descending” - although decisive for determining the quality of the legitimacy of political power, have little influence on a positive attitude of sovereigns towards aliens’ interests. To clarify the conditions for an opening of sovereign powers to solidarity, an assessment of the rationalities which are implemented when a sovereign puts actions into effect is therefore required. Yet most rationality concepts - or uses of practical reason - prove to be negative or at least useless when it comes to the question of supporting solidarity: the gamut ranges from open hostility towards the idea of taking the interests of aliens into account, through substantial indifference, to a positive approach which presupposes, however, non-provable metaphysical assumptions or an individual mindset with no pretension of issuing norms of general validity. Only the communicative conception of reason meets the criteria for a convincing justification of solidarity towards aliens as an obligation. The author therefore concludes that only an “ascending” sovereignty based on a communicative understanding of rationality can be considered fully legitimate insofar as the sovereign power, in this case, first originates from the will of the citizens and, second, is morally, politically and legally obliged to a solidaristic attitude towards the justified interests of non-citizens. (shrink)

Respectively in the public andin the private spheres, both sovereignty and property are expressions of the turn to the primacy of the interests of the individual at the beginning of the Modern Ages: in the first case this primacy is related to the individual state, in the second to the individual economic actor. The centrality of individuality, as the most distinguishing feature of modern thinking, thus lies at the basis of the interconnection between the two concepts. This is developed according (...) to three distinct patterns. In the light of the first pattern, sovereignty degenerates into a mere means in the service of defending private interests, thereby eluding its fundamental public function. On the other hand, from the perspective of the second pattern, individual property leaves the private domain, claiming absoluteness and presuming to replace the public dimension. Both these patterns reflect one-sided relations in which the two terms — sovereignty and property — merge in opposite ways, but always losing their specific content and rationale in the context of the social order. The third pattern is the only one in which sovereignty and property maintain their respective functions, with the two elements synergistically contributing to a social order in which public sphere and private dimension are both recognized as essential components. Here, public sovereignty and private property are co-essential insofar as sovereignty derives from individual will, private property is fundamental for the individual to pursue the personal self-realization that lies at the basis of his/ her legitimation of sovereignty, and — finally — public power is at the service of defending the rights and interests of all individuals. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to understand more precisely what kind of irrationality involved in procrastination. The chapter argues that in order to understand the irrationality of procrastination one needs to understand the possibility and the nature of what I call “top-down independent” policies and long-term actions. A policy or long-term action) is top-down independent if it is possible to act irrationally relative to the adoption of the policy without ever engaging in a momentary action that is per se (...) irrational. involved in procrastination one needs to It argues that procrastination is one of the corresponding vices of an overlooked virtue; namely, “practical judgment.” On this account, procrastination turns out to be a failure of instrumental rationality that can be so characterized without assuming the correctness of any further norms of practical rationality. Thus this account of procrastination also constitutes an important objection to Christine Korsgaard’s claim that a purely instrumental conception of rationality is incoherent. (shrink)

Mayr’s paper is extremely interesting and compelling and I don’t plan here to address all its insights. Rather, I’ll just try to argue that there might be more unity in understanding of Raz’s accou...

In this note we introduce the variety $${{\mathcal C}{\mathcal D}{\mathcal M}_\square}$$ of classical modal De Morgan algebras as a generalization of the variety $${{{\mathcal T}{\mathcal M}{\mathcal A}}}$$ of Tetravalent Modal algebras studied in [ 11 ]. We show that the variety $${{\mathcal V}_0}$$ defined by H. P. Sankappanavar in [ 13 ], and the variety S of Involutive Stone algebras introduced by R. Cignoli and M. S de Gallego in [ 5 ], are examples of classical modal De Morgan algebras. (...) We give a representation theory, and we study the regular filters, i.e., lattice filters closed under an implication operation. Finally we prove that the variety $${{{\mathcal T}{\mathcal M}{\mathcal A}}}$$ has the Amalgamation Property and the Superamalgamation Property. (shrink)

This article examines the exchange between Montoro and Sor Juana about the nature of jealousy and its connection with romantic love. First, it shows that, while Montoro's position echoes Augustine's view of love, Sor Juana's position has strong parallels with views held in the courtly love tradition. Second, the article considers Sor Juana's responses to Montoro, which aim to establish that jealousy is not inherently wrong (as Montoro holds) and that it cannot be severed from love. Finally, the article shows (...) that Sor Juana's insights provide support for those who defend the importance of jealousy in human life. (shrink)

In this note we introduce and study algebras of type such that is a bounded distributive lattice and ⌝ is an operator that satisfies the condition ⌝ = a ⌝ b and ⌝ 0 = 1. We develop the topological duality between these algebras and Priestley spaces with a relation. In addition, we characterize the congruences and the subalgebras of such an algebra. As an application, we will determine the Priestley spaces of quasi-Stone algebras.

This paper proposes an application of Enrique Dussel’s ethics of liberation to an issue of crucial importance to US minorities: the debate on affirmative action. Over the past fifty years, this debate has been framed in terms of the opposition between advocates of affirmative action who claim that it is needed in order to achieve the integration and participation of traditionally oppressed groups to society without which there is no equality of rights, and critics who argue that affirmative action violates (...) equality by enforcing a double standard that undermines the ideal of a color-blind society. In this paper, I show how the basic principles of Dussel’s ethical theory (which are best expounded in his book Ethics of Liberation) allow us to address what I take to be the main demands of both advocates and critics of affirmative action in a satisfactory way. (shrink)

In recent decades, philosophers of science have devoted considerable efforts to understand what models represent. One popular position is that models represent fictional situations. Another position states that, though models often involve fictional elements, they represent real objects or scenarios. Though these two positions may seem to be incompatible, I believe it is possible to reconcile them. Using a threefold distinction between different signs proposed by Peirce, I develop an argument based on a proposal recently made by Kralemann and Lattman (...) (in Synthese 190:3397–3420, 2013) that shows that the two aforementioned positions can be reconciled by distinguishing different ways in which a model representation can be used. In particular, on the basis of Peirce’s distinction between icons, indices and symbols, I argue that models can sometimes function as icons, sometimes as indexes and sometimes as symbols, depending on the context in which they are considered and the use that they are developed for because they all have iconic, indexical and symbolic features. In addition, I show that conceiving models as signs enables us to develop an account of scientific representation that meets the main desiderata that Shech (in Synthese 192:3463–3485, 2015) presents. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the concept of ontological frame. Secondly, two models are distinguished on this structure. The first one is connected to Kant’s concept of possible object and the second one relates to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source of possibility is the mere logical consistency of the notions involved, so that possibility coincides with analytical possibility. Kant, instead, argues that consistency is only a necessary component of possibility. According to Kant, something is (...) possible if there is a cause capable of bringing it into existence; to this end consistency alone is not sufficient. Thus, while the Leibnizian notion of consistency is at the root of the concept of analytical possibility, the Kantian notion of possibility is the source of real possibility. This difference plays an important role in the discussion of Gödel’s ontological proof, which can be formally interpreted on the ontological frame of the pure perfections. While this proof, under some emendation condition, is conclusive in the context of Leibniz’s ontological model, it is not so within the Kantian one. This issue will be the subject of the second part of the present essay. (shrink)

Os sentidos da paixão foram originalmente um curso livre que o Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas da Fundação Nacional de Arte (Funarte) promoveu no Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Brasília e Curitiba e que atraiu cerca de setecentas a mil pessoas em cada cidade. Prova da fertilidade do curso é este livro apaixonado. Nele, alguns dos mais brilhantes intelectuais brasileiros discutem desde o amor em Platão até a paixão em Pasolini, passando por Freud, Walter Benjamin e Clarice Lispector, o que (...) só comprova a riqueza de um tema que até então não havia sido objeto de um debate como este.ÍndiceApresentaçãoPor que tanta paixão? Adauto NovaesOS SENTIDOS DA PAIXÃOO conceito de paixão - Gérard LebrunSobre o medo - Marilena ChauiPlatão: as várias faces do amor - José Américo Motta PessanhaO CANTO DAS PAIXÕESA glória - Renato Janine RibeiroA inveja - Renato MezanA melancolia de Ulisses - Olgária MatosPaixão da igualdade, paixão da liberdade: a amizade em Montaigne - Sérgio CardosoA paixão dionisíaca em Tristão e Isolda - José Miguel WisnikO lenço e o caos - Jorge ColiPasolini: paixão e ideologia - Michel LahudA paixão de Clarice Lispector - Benedito NunesPoesia: a paixão da linguagem - Paulo LeminskiÉdipo e a paixão - Hélio PellegrinoO Dom de Édipo - Luiz Renato MartinsLou Andreas-Salomé: a paixão viva - Luzilá Gonçalves FerreiraA PAIXÃO REVOLUCIONÁRIAA alegoria da liberdade - Jorge ColiA paixão revolucionária e a paixão amorosa em Stendhal - Renato Janine RibeiroA PAIXÃO SILENCIOSARazão e paixão - Sérgio Paulo RouanetA psicanálise e o domínio das paixões - Maria Rita KehlBenjamin: política e paixão - Katia Muricy. (shrink)

Starting from the analysis of the first book of De libero arbitrio, the Italian philosopher Sergio Cotta explores the relationship between law, morality and safety in Augustine’s thought. According to Cotta, Lib. arb. I contains implicitly a complete typology of the four normative judgments used in jurisprudence, philosophy of law and legal science: judgments of legality; judgments of validity; judgments of purpose; judgments of morality. The analysis of the relationship between these four types of normative judgments allows us to (...) interpret correctly Augustine’s most famous sentence: mihi lex esse non videtur quae iusta non fuerit. (shrink)

Le droit peut-il être le gardien de la paix? Telle est l'une des interrogations qui se dessine au travers de l'oeuvre du philosophe italien du droit Sergio Cotta (1920-2007). Résistant pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, puis professeur à l'Université de Rome, Sergio Cotta n'a eu de cesse d'interroger le droit et sa fonction dans les rapports entre les hommes dans une réflexion dynamique en prise avec situations actuelles et vécues. Le présent ouvrage, composé d'articles parus dans différentes revues (...) scientifiques, se présente comme une introduction à l'oeuvre de cet éminent penseur du droit. (shrink)

Subjectivism is the mainstream view of practical reason. According to subjectivism, what has value for an agent must ultimately be grounded in what the agent actually desires. Subjectivism is motivated by a conservative view of the scope and extent of practical reason. Against this view, my dissertation argues that any coherent conception of an end must endow practical reason with a scope that goes beyond anything that subjectivism could accommodate. ;Subjectivism correctly grasps that nothing can count as an end for (...) an agent if she is incapable of recognizing it as such; value cannot exist independently of our capacity to appreciate it. I argue that the right conclusion to draw from this is that practical reason constitutes its own object by properly judging on practical matters. The grounds for taking a certain object to bear value lie not in the attributes of a certain object but in the nature of the activity of pursuing ends. According to the concept of practical reason I defend in this dissertation, which I call "the constitutive conception of practical reason", practical reason must set its objects from its own resources rather than find them in an external reality. ;But if practical reason does not track any independently existing objects, how can we distinguish between correct and incorrect judgements? It seems that this conception faces a dilemma: Either the activity of reason is merely a source of formal constraints, or it is an arbitrary, ungrounded exercise. I argue that this dilemma gets its grip on us only from an illegitimate separation of the rational and non-rational parts of human nature. This separation leads us to to think of our cognitive and conative powers as independent. However, the proper understanding of practical reason requires us to see our desires, emotions, etc. as presenting us with appearances of the good, as providing perspectives on something which we represent as the proper object of our pursuit. In forming an overarching conception of the good by reflectively assessing the claims of these different perspectives, practical reason sets its object. (shrink)

Social media platforms have not ceased to play a huge role in societal interaction since their arrival. Although it is undeniable that social media opens us up to new and exciting opportunities, we should not forget that it is a catalyst for some new or already existing social problems. This chapter aims to explore some political, ethical and epistemological issues that “Nosedive,” one of the most award‐winning Black Mirror episodes, tackles. Starting from capturing the actuality of Nosedive's narrative, exploring the (...) problems of the majority rule and the influence of the “others” in our way of acting and feeling, and coming up to the problems of the reliability of digital profiles, this chapter touches upon some contemporary fears and anxieties created around Social Media. (shrink)