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  1. Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility.Owen Ware - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. -/- I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s (...)
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  • On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
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  • Spontaneity and Self-Consciousness in the Groundwork and the B-Critique.Yoon Choi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):936-955.
    ABSTRACTAccording to some influential readings of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the view presented there of the kind of spontaneity we are conscious of through theoretical reason and...
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  • Kant’s Deductions of Morality and Freedom.Owen Ware - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):116-147.
    It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no (...)
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  • The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant.Dennis Schulting (ed.) - 2015 - Bloomsbury Academic.
  • Duality of Motivation and the Guise of the Good in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):75-92.
    Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis, he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only p...
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  • Bolstering the Keystone: Kant on the Incomprehensibility of Freedom.Timothy Aylsworth - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (2):261-298.
    In this paper, I give an explanation and defense of Kant’s claim that we cannot comprehend how freedom is possible. I argue that this is a significant point that has been underappreciated in the secondary literature. My conclusion has a variety of implications both for Kant scholars and for those interested in Kantian ideas more generally. Most notably, if Kant is right that there are principled reasons why freedom is beyond our comprehension, then this would release his ethical views from (...)
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  • Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities.Étienne Brown - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):571-590.
    Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately (...)
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  • The Deductions of Freedom/Morality-as-Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III and Their Problems.Fernando Rudy Hiller - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 50:61-94.
    El primer objetivo de este artículo es presentar una interpretación del tercer capítulo de la Fundamentación para establecer dos puntos: primero, que Kant ofrece ahí una deducción de la libertad/moralidad como autonomía a partir de premisas provenientes exclusivamente de la filosofía teórica. Segundo, que Kant ofrece también una deducción distinta del imperativo categórico. El segundo objetivo del artículo es examinar y criticar en detalle un paso crucial en estas deducciones, a saber, la inferencia de la existencia noumenal del sujeto como (...)
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  • Formalism and Constitutivism in Kantian Practical Philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):163-176.
    Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot (...)
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  • Forms of Rational Agency.Douglas Lavin - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:171-193.
    A measure of good and bad is internal to something falling under it when that thing falls under the measure in virtue of what it is. The concept of an internal standard has broad application. Compare the external breed standards arbitrarily imposed at a dog show with the internal standards of health at work in the veterinarian's office. This paper is about practical standards, measures of acting well and badly, and so measures deployed in deliberation and choice. More specifically, it (...)
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  • How Can Common Rational Capacities Confirm the Correctness of the Deduction in Groundwork III—and Why Does It Matter?Martin Sticker - 2014 - Hegel Bulletin 35 (2):228-251.
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