Among the works on ethics in the Aristotelian corpus, there is no serious dispute among scholars that the "Eudemian Ethics "is authentic. The "Eudemian Ethics "is" "increasingly read and used by scholars as a useful support and confirmation and sometimes contrast to the "Nicomachean Ethics." Yet, it remains a largely neglected work in the study of Aristotle's ethics, both among scholars and moral philosophers. Peter L. P. Simpson provides an analytical outline of the entire work together with summaries of (...) each individual section, making the overall structure and detailed argument clear. His translation and explanatory notes include the common books that the "Eudemian" "Ethics" shares with the "Nicomachean." This translation contains renderings of words and phrases, and proposals for emending the text that differ from what other translators and scholars have adopted. This translation is literal, without expansion or paraphrase, and yet also readable. A readable but literal translation is necessary because in the "Eudemian Ethics," more than usual in Aristotle's writings, the logic of the argumentation can turn on the peculiar wording or order. Simpson explains the argumentation where necessary in notes and separate explanatory comments. This book is a fresh, twenty-first-century rendition of the work of one of the most eminent philosophers of all time. (shrink)

An attempt is made to clarify a thought experiment introduced by P. T. Landsberg concerning the relativistic heat flow between bodies in relative motion. It is shown that if the problem is analyzed within the covariant thermodynamics developed by R. Balescu, supplemented by the second law of thermodynamics as proposed here, then such heat flow considerations do not fix the transformation of temperature as Landsberg contends. Instead, the transformation of temperature is left as being purely a matter of definition.

It has been maintained that we are quite able to express (1*)–(4*) without the introduction of a dyadic deontic operator, provided only that we supply our standard deontic logic with a stronger conditional than material implication. The lesson learned from Chisholm's paradox has been the eminently convincing, indeed obvious, one: that what we ought to do is not determined by what is the case in some perfect world, but by what is the case in the best world we can ‘get (...) to’ from this world. What we ought to do depends upon how we are circumstanced. (shrink)

This paper began with the simple object of finding an account that allowed us to compare incompatible false theories. This we achieved with ρ. But that relation is language — or interest — dependent. ρ' is free from this limitation; though thus liberated it is perhaps rather unconcerned about what is true, and further fails to deliver certain intuitive comparisons. Whether ρ is to be preferred to ρ' or vice versa, seems to me a largely fruitless question: In fact it (...) might be that as we seek to free the idea of verisimilitude from any dependence on language, interests or problems, so we gradually collapse it to nothing more than logical power. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In this paper we examine how ethical values contribute to national economic prosperity. We extend the concept of an ethical wealth of nations first introduced by Donaldson in which he proposed four categories of ethical values—fairer distribution of goods, better government, ingrained social cooperation, and inculcation of economic duties—that can drive economic performance, but only if citizens ascribe “intrinsic value” to them independent of their economic interests. Our analysis draws on institutional economics and sociology research to show that if ethical (...) values are to drive economic performance, they must also be supported by the institutional fabric of the nation. We embed an expanded set of ethical values in a set of democratic, free market and civil society institutions spanning three sectors of society—political, economic and cultural respectively. We conclude by discussing the implications of our institutional framework for moral education. (shrink)

This book emphasizes that analysis of broad economic changes treats people abstractly, while a personalist view sees them as human agents who, while needing and generating economic goods, must still be responsive to others and be aware of values and goals beyond temporal well-being. Visit our website for sample chapters!

In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism —as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2, cognitive (...) processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems. Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism.. (shrink)

The income and careers that come with building wind turbines have become a lifeline for many factory towns and farming communities. Generating electricity from the wind puts increasingly cheap power on the grid, saving consumers billions a year. And it is one of the biggest, fastest, cheapest ways to reduce carbon pollution, reducing the threat of climate change. Yet as wind farms have rapidly spread to forty‐one states, their developers must make their case anew with each community that hosts them. (...) Facts matter, but so do empathy, honoring deep connections to neighbors and landscape, and developing mutual respect. Successful wind farm developers listen first for shared values and speak with inclusive language, to communicate with potential opponents across divides of misunderstanding and motivate local residents to adapt to and benefit from change. (shrink)

Aus dem Zusammentreffen der Philosophischen Anthropologie mit der interdisziplinären Rhetorikforschung sind heute zwei neue komplementäre Tochterdisziplinen entstanden. Die eine ist die fundamentalrhetorische Anthropologie, welche den Menschen generell als homo rhetoricus definiert. Die andere klärt als rhetorische Metakritik die Philosophie selbst über ihre eigene, immanente Rhetorizität auf. Der vorliegende Band präsentiert exemplarische Beiträge zu diesem neuen rhetorischen Denken in zwei Teilen. Der erste enthält unter dem Titel „Zur Philosophie der Rhetorik“ die Arbeiten zur fundamentalrhetorischen Anthropologie. Ausgehend von grundlegenden Thesen zur Homo-rhetoricus-Anthropologie (...) behandeln sie Themen wie z.B. Pithanologie, Pathelogie, Polypersonalität, Anthropotechnik, Autoinvenienz oder die Rekonstruktion des Subjektbegriffes durch interne Rhetorik. Der zweite Teil „Zur Rhetorik der Philosophie“ umfasst die Beiträge, welche der rhetorischen Metakritik der Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte zuzurechnen sind. Hier finden sich u.a. Abhandlungen zur Topographie der klassischen Metaphysik und ihren sophistischen und pararhetorischen Gegenspielern sowie metakritische Detailstudien zu Pseudo-Longin, Kant, Hegel, Fichte und Heidegger. (shrink)

Participants of low and high hypnotic susceptibility were tested on a temporal order judgement task, both with and without hypnosis. Judgements were made of the order of presentation of light flashes appearing in first one hemi-field then the other. There were differences in the inter-stimulus intervals required accurately to report the order, depending upon which hemi-field led. This asymmetry was most marked in hypnotically susceptible participants and reversed when they were hypnotised. This implies not only that brain activity changes in (...) hypnosis, but also that there is a difference in brain function between people of low and high hypnotic susceptibility. The latter exhibited a faster-acting left hemisphere in the waking state, but faster right when hypnotised. (shrink)

Rendell and Whitehead adopt a weak definition of culture to allow low standards of evidence for marine mammals, but they do not adequately rule out genetic factors or individual versus social learning. They then use these low standards to argue that some whales have unique cultures only matched by humans. It would have been more helpful to specify data gaps and suggest critical tests.

»daß der Philosophiebegriff Fichtes viel weiter ausholt, als bisher gesehen wurde: er ist nicht nur der Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre in sich, sondern zugleich auch der Begriff der Vermittlung von Philosophie und Leben«.

In den letzten Jahren hat die Wiederentdeckung der öffentlichen Philosophie Fichtes, die in den drei großen Berliner Vortragszyklen Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, Anweisung zum seligen Leben und Reden an die deutsche Nation kulminieren, zu einer neuen Sicht der Gesamtgestalt und des Ursprungsproblems der Wissenschaftslehre geführt. Diese veränderte Sicht der Philosophie Fichtes, läßt sich auf fünf Entdeckungen fokussieren. Sie bilden insgesamt die Stationen einer Entdeckungsgeschichte, die das Ursprungsproblem und die Gesamtgestalt der Fichteschen Philosophie in einem neuen Licht erscheinen läßt.

The study of intellectual humility is still in its early stages and issues of definition and measurement are only now being explored. To inform and guide the process of defining and measuring this important intellectual virtue, we conducted a series of studies into the implicit theory – or ‘folk’ understanding – of an intellectually humble person, a wise person, and an intellectually arrogant person. In Study 1, 350 adults used a free-listing procedure to generate a list of descriptors, one for (...) each person-concept. In Study 2, 335 adults rated the previously generated descriptors by how characteristic each was of the target person-concept. In Study 3, 344 adults sorted the descriptors by similarity for each person-concept. By comparing and contrasting the three person-concepts, a complex portrait of an intellectually humble person emerges with particular epistemic, self-oriented, and other-oriented dimensions. (shrink)

»daß der Philosophiebegriff Fichtes viel weiter ausholt, als bisher gesehen wurde: er ist nicht nur der Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre in sich, sondern zugleich auch der Begriff der Vermittlung von Philosophie und Leben«.