Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1095-1113 (2015)

Authors
Ian M. Church
Hillsdale College
Abstract
In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism —as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2, cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems. Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism..
Keywords Heuristics and Biases  Intellectual Arrogance  Intellectual Humility  Virtue Epistemology
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2014.904197
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.
Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.

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Citations of this work BETA

Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
Intellectual Humility and the Curse of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2021 - In Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), Arrogance and Polarisation. Routledge.

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