Top scholars address Hegel’s History of Philosophy.

This essay examines and criticizes G. A. Cohen's interpretation of Marx's materialistic conception of history as presented in Cohen's book Karl Marx's Theory of History. In particular, the author attacks Cohen's Primacy Thesis, the claim that (for Marx) human technology is the primary explanatory factor for economic and social change and for historical development generally. The focus of the attack is Cohen's way of distinguishing between the material and social characteristics, or the content and form, of a system of production. (...) The argument is that Cohen's distinctions are defective and therefore fail to provide adequate support for the Primacy Thesis and that, moreover, the position that Cohen defends is not Marx's. (shrink)

The basic argument of this paper is that Feuerbach’s “materialist critique” of Hegel’s speculative philosophy was misguided, and that the source of some of Feuerbach’s confusions about Hegel lie in the former’s early discipleship of the latter. In particular, I examine certain purported Hegelian themes in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel and argue that they are distortions of Hegel’s views. Next I explore two stages in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, the first dealing largely with the issue of presuppositions and starting points (...) in philosophy, and the second concerning the transformative method by which Feuerbach “inverts” Hegel’s philosophy. In the first case I argue that Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel is really only a self-critique, and in the second that his subject-predicate analysis of the relation of thought and being is incoherent. Finally, I offer an interpretation of Hegel’s speculative logic which views it as non-mystifying. (shrink)

The thesis of this study is that the methodology in Marx that is appropriate for viewing socio-historical development in a structured framework, and also for capturing the dynamic role of practice in history, is one which goes beyond the ordinary traditional methods of empirical science and which has its roots in Hegel’s system of philosophy. In my view, the mistake of the traditional Marxist handling of Hegel lies in the attempt to divorce his method from his system, with the aim (...) of salvaging a dialectics that could be wedded to a philosophical materialism. However, Marx’s own statement of his opposition to Hegel did not imply the rejection of a systematically controlled form of explanation but instead was aimed at Hegel’s method in order to criticize its particular systematic standpoint as expressed in the self-legitimating “Idea.” Properly understood, the inversion of Hegel, this placing of Hegel “on his feet,” leads not to a “dialectical materialism,” which ostensibly substitutes the material for the ideal as the concern of dialectics, but rather results in the grounding of the ideal in the critical endeavor of political economy, as opposed to what Marx saw as Hegel’s uncritical enterprise of a cultural ideology. (shrink)

While Hegel scholars overall have acknowledged that the concept of Geist (Spirit or Mind) is central to Hegel’s comprehension of history, there is some degree of controversy among commentators concerning the interpretation of this concept. Lack of clarity about whether the principles Hegel presents fall on the speculative or on the historical level can result in charges of mystification. In this essay I attempt to clarify the concept of Geist by 1) defining the speculative transcendental meaning of Geist , which (...) will involve articulating the principles that structure Geist ’s essential features, especially as presented in Hegel’s Logic; 2) explicating the historical and existential dimension of Geist , which will focus on the nature of its action and embodiment, specifically attending to the nation state as the true historical individual, and 3) explaining the essential connection between the speculative and the historical in such a way as to address their dialectical unity in difference, and thus to alleviate the problem of ontology overcoming Geist ’s temporality. (shrink)

This book attempts to articulate the role of Hegelian dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital and to defend Marx against certain Hegelian critics, most notably Klaus Hartmann, who has systematically criticized Marx’s theory of capitalism, and Richard Winfield. According to Smith, the role of dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital has been underappreciated and little explored, which deals throughout with Marx’s use of Hegel’s dialectical logic in the critique of political economy). Moreover, Smith is concerned with establishing why Marx “needed” to employ (...) dialectical logic and the full extent of the Hegelian legacy here. We are told, initially, that dialectical logic was important for Marx in order to establish his categories of reflection, to develop his theory of fetishism, to present strong claims of necessity, and to ground revolutionary politics. These issues are addressed at various places in the book. (shrink)

This book attempts to articulate the role of Hegelian dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital and to defend Marx against certain Hegelian critics, most notably Klaus Hartmann, who has systematically criticized Marx’s theory of capitalism, and Richard Winfield. According to Smith, the role of dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital has been underappreciated and little explored, which deals throughout with Marx’s use of Hegel’s dialectical logic in the critique of political economy). Moreover, Smith is concerned with establishing why Marx “needed” to employ (...) dialectical logic and the full extent of the Hegelian legacy here. We are told, initially, that dialectical logic was important for Marx in order to establish his categories of reflection, to develop his theory of fetishism, to present strong claims of necessity, and to ground revolutionary politics. These issues are addressed at various places in the book. (shrink)

In his article “The State At Dusk” David MacGregor provides, in this writer’s view, a somewhat odd rendering of the significance of Minerva’s Owl as it relates to Hegel’s view of philosophy, and in particular to his philosophy of civil society. I am especially puzzled by MacGregor’s choosing to see dusk as the hour of prophecy at which Hegel the theorist is taken “to discern in the shape of the present the promise of a different way of life”. Is (...) this what Hegel intends in the preface to the Philosophy of Right where he says “that only in the ripeness of actuality does the ideal appear over against the real, and that only then does this ideal comprehend this same real world in its substance and build it up for itself into the configuration of an intellectual realm”? (shrink)

Universal Human Rights brings new clarity to the important and highly contested concept of universal human rights. This collection of essays explores the foundations of universal human rights in four sections devoted to their nature, application, enforcement, and limits, concluding that shared rights help to constitute a universal human community, which supports local customs and separate state sovereignty. The eleven contributors to this volume demonstrate from their very different perspectives how human rights can help to bring moral order to an (...) otherwise divided world. (shrink)

In the twenty-first century, the debate about life on other worlds is quickly changing from the realm of speculation to the domain of hard science. Within a few years, as a consequence of the rapid discovery by astronomers of planets around other stars, astronomers very likely will have discovered clear evidence of life beyond the Earth. Such a discovery of extraterrestrial life will change everything. Knowing the answer as to whether humanity has company in the universe will trigger one of (...) the greatest intellectual revolutions in history, not the least of which will be a challenge for at least some terrestrial religions. Which religions will handle the discovery of extraterrestrial life with ease and which will struggle to assimilate this new knowledge about our place in the universe? Some religions as currently practiced appear to only be viable on Earth. Other religions could be practiced on distant worlds but nevertheless identify both Earth as a place and humankind as a species of singular spiritual religious importance, while some religions could be practiced equally well anywhere in the universe by any sentient beings. Weintraub guides readers on an invigorating tour of the world's most widely practiced religions. It reveals what, if anything, each religion has to say about the possibility that extraterrestrial life exists and how, or if, a particular religion would work on other planets in distant parts of the universe. (shrink)

Jared Diamond and other leading scholars have argued that the domestication of animals for food, labor, and tools of war has advanced the development of human society. But by comparing practices of animal exploitation for food and resources in different societies over time, David A. Nibert reaches a strikingly different conclusion. He finds in the domestication of animals, which he renames "domesecration," a perversion of human ethics, the development of large-scale acts of violence, disastrous patterns of destruction, and growth-curbing (...) epidemics of infectious disease. Nibert centers his study on nomadic pastoralism and the development of commercial ranching, a practice that has been largely controlled by elite groups and expanded with the rise of capitalism. Beginning with the pastoral societies of the Eurasian steppe and continuing through to the exportation of Western, meat-centered eating habits throughout today's world, Nibert connects the domesecration of animals to violence, invasion, extermination, displacement, enslavement, repression, pandemic chronic disease, and hunger. In his view, conquest and subjugation were the results of the need to appropriate land and water to maintain large groups of animals, and the gross amassing of military power has its roots in the economic benefits of the exploitation, exchange, and sale of animals. Deadly zoonotic diseases, Nibert shows, have accompanied violent developments throughout history, laying waste to whole cities, societies, and civilizations. His most powerful insight situates the domesecration of animals as a precondition for the oppression of human populations, particularly indigenous peoples, an injustice impossible to rectify while the material interests of the elite are inextricably linked to the exploitation of animals. Nibert links domesecration to some of the most critical issues facing the world today, including the depletion of fresh water, topsoil, and oil reserves; global warming; and world hunger, and he reviews the U.S. government's military response to the inevitable crises of an overheated, hungry, resource-depleted world. Most animal-advocacy campaigns reinforce current oppressive practices, Nibert argues. Instead, he suggests reforms that challenge the legitimacy of both domesecration and capitalism. (shrink)

Poverty, inequality, violence, environmental degradation, and tyranny continue to afflict the world. Ethics of Global Development offers a moral reflection on the ends and means of local, national, and global efforts to overcome these five scourges. After emphasizing the role of ethics in development studies, policy-making, and practice, David A. Crocker analyzes and evaluates Amartya Sen's philosophy of development in relation to alternative ethical outlooks. He argues that Sen's turn to robust ideals of human agency and democracy improves on (...) both Sen's earlier emphasis on 'capabilities and functionings' and Martha Nussbaum's version of the capability orientation. This agency-focused capability approach is then extended and strengthened by applying it to the challenges of consumerism and hunger, the development responsibilities of affluent individuals and nations, and the dilemmas of globalization. Throughout the book the author argues for the importance of more inclusive and deliberative democratic institutions. (shrink)

On the evolution of mind Harry J. Jerison Most of us think of mind as a little person in the head, the 'knower' of reality (cf. Attneave,). ...

A detailed treatment regarding the diverse properties and uses of evidence and the judgmental tasks they entail. Examines various processes by which evidence may be developed or discovered. Considers the construction of arguments made in defense of the relevance and credibility of individual items and masses of evidence as well as the task of assessing the inferential force of evidence. Includes over 100 numerical examples to illustrate the workings of diverse probabilistic expressions for the inferential force of evidence and the (...) subtleties they reveal. (shrink)