Cette étude prend pour objet Le monde comme volonté et comme représentation et La naissance de la tragédie. Le but est de montrer que, si Nietzsche reprend la métaphysique de Schopenhauer, il forge une métaphysique de la musique différente de celle de son maître, en sorte que ce n'est pas dans le même sens que la musique est, pour tous deux, une reproduction de la volonté originaire. This review deals with The World as Will and as Representation and The Birth (...) of Tragedy. Its aim is to show that, if Nietzsche takes over Schopenhauer's metaphysic ideas, he however builds up a metaphysic of music that differs from his master's, so that they both claim that music is the expression of will, but with a different meaning. (shrink)

Il semble tout autant irrecevable de comprendre l’Esthétique à l’aune de la Logique que de mettre sur le même plan les écrits des différentes périodes de Kant : on nie par là même le sens positif de l’Esthétique, puisque, en expliquant ce passage en rapport à ce qui suit, on en gomme la spécificité. C’est alors l’irréductibilité de la passivité et la signification véritable de l’espace et du temps qui se trouvent anéanties. Or cette passivité est pourtant attestée par l’expression (...) selon laquelle espace et temps sont des grandeurs infinies données : elles ne sont pas construites et ne relèvent pas d’une synthèse. Aussi faut-il distinguer ces grandeurs des grandeurs extensives et de celles intensives qui apparaissent dans l’Analytique des principes. Il faudra, dans cet effort pour soutenir le sens positif de l’Esthétique, s’appuyer sur la note litigieuse du paragraphe 26, afin de distinguer l’espace et le temps comme intuitions pures, donc comme quanta proprement originaires, des concepts de l’espace et du temps qui sont construits à partir de l’application des catégories à la forme de l’intuition. Pour ne parler que de l’espace, cela signifie qu’il faut distinguer deux plans: l’espace de l’Esthétique forme le sous-bassement à partir duquel sont construits les concepts mathématiques d’espace – par exemple l’espace de la géométrie euclidienne. Une telle thèse a l’avantage, comme le soulignait Joseph Moreau, qui dissocie. (shrink)

Le regain d'interet pour la philosophie kantienne est ne en Allemagne vers 1860 et provient essentiellement d'un declin de l'idealisme hegelien, d'une reaction au materialisme, et d'un climat politique qui favorise un abandon des questions morales et politiques pour retourner a des problemes theoriques. De sorte que ce qui caracterise tous les neokantiens est leur volonte de redonner a la philosophie son statut scientifique au titre de theorie de la connaissance. Mais comment construire cette theorie de la connaissance est une (...) question qui donne lieu a des oppositions entre des auteurs qui se reclament pourtant tous de Kant. Or c'est precisement la subtilite des differences entre les ecoles de Heidelberg, de Marbourg, ou encore entre les pensees de Cohen, de Natorp, de Lask ou de Rickert, que nous permet de saisir cet ouvrage en nous offrant un eclairage essentiel. (shrink)

Une mise en lumière de la spécificité du cinéma en trois parties : le cinéma et l'image, le cinéma et le langage, le cinéma et le montage. Deux textes de G. Deleuze et N. Burch complètent l'ensemble.

Here we question the mechanisms underlying the emergence of the feeling of control that can be modulated even when the feeling of being the author of one’s own action is intact. With a haptic robot, participants made series of vertical pointing actions on a virtual surface, which was sometimes postponed by a small temporal delay (15 or 65 ms). Subjects then evaluated their subjective feeling of control. Results showed that after temporal distortions, the hand-trajectories were adapted effectively but that the (...) feeling of control decreased significantly. This was observed even in the case of subliminal distortions for which subjects did not consciously detect the presence of a distortion. Our findings suggest that both supraliminal and subliminal temporal distortions that occur within a healthy perceptual–motor system impact the conscious experience of the feeling of control of self-initiated motor actions. (shrink)

Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) est le fondateur de l'ecole de Heidelberg, l'autre grand courant neokantien qui apparait au meme moment que l'ecole de Marbourg, et dont Heinrich Rickert et Emil Lask furent des representants eminents. C'est Windelband qui pose les fondements de la philosophie des valeurs qui caracterise le neokantisme de Heidelberg. Ce volume presente un choix d'opuscules, qui relevent essentiellement de la philosophie de la connaissance, fondement de toute investigation philosophique pour les neokantiens. C'est en effet sur une analyse logique (...) des processus cognitifs que sont fondes non seulement l'assimilation de la verite a une valeur - sans pour autant que la verite se dissolve, car Windelband et les autres membres son ecole cherchent a fonder la transcendance de la valeur et donc a sauvegarder la verite comme telle -, mais aussi la theorie de la science qui distigue la methode nomothetique des sciences exactes de la methode idiographique propre a l'histoire. (shrink)

Si Casque d’or est avant tout une tragédie amoureuse, c’est aussi un chef-d’œuvre de mise en scène dosant dialogues et silences, économisant les mouvements de caméra, instaurant une esthétique qui lui est propre et qui fera date. Non dénuée de critique sociale , le film se distingue d’abord par le réquisitoire lancé en faveur du bonheur contre le tragique de la vie, mettant à ce titre en scène le jeu d’une certaine fatalité.Le présent ouvrage se propose, en explorant les recoins (...) de ce film mythique, d’en sonder philosophiquement la beauté et le sens. (shrink)

Ce livre presente les films de Lynch en montrant que ce qui deja apparait dans Eraserhead trouve son prolongement et sa cle dans Inland Empire (en passant bien sur par les autres oeuvres et tout particulierement Lost Highway et Mulholland Drive). A savoir que, comme dans le premier chapitre de Matiere et memoire de Bergson, le monde est image, de sorte que la matiere se resout dans son image et que ce sont les images qui, par leur agencement, creent le (...) monde dans sa solidite et sa fixite. Avec cette difference toutefois: les films de Lynch fonctionnent sur un desenchainement des images qui, d'abord, donne une matiere a l'image, et, ensuite, a pour consequence que ces images entrent sans cesse dans de nouvelles series. Ces series produisent non seulement des mondes possibles qui annulent le privilege d'un monde reel (parce que celui-ci devient un monde possible au meme titre que les autres), mais elles entremelent aussi differentes temporalites ou la linearite passe-present-futur disparait. (shrink)

Cette etude, la premiere en France sur la philosophie de Natorp (1854-1924), met en evidence sa specificite et son evolution. Sa specificite: Natorp est le seul des neokantiens de l'ecole de Marbourg a batir, au sein de la theorie de la connaissance, une psychologie dont la version definitive, intitulee Psychologie generale, parait en 1912. Il s'agit d'en etablir la configuration, de montrer comment elle se situe relativement a la psychologie scientifique en plein essor et de mettre en evidence l'importance qu'elle (...) a eue dans la constitution de la phenomenologie. La psychologie critique de Natorp est d'abord une methodologie qui s'interroge sur les conditions d'une connaissance scientifique des processus cognitifs. Elle est ensuite une methode, la methode de reconstruction du subjectif a partir de ses objectivations, qui s'oppose a la reduction husserlienne pretendant s'appuyer sur une donation et retrouver une immediatete subjective pourtant definitivement perdue. Son evolution: Natorp se detourne en effet apres la premiere guerre mondiale de la philosophie marbourgeoise, parce que celle-ci construit sa theorie de la connaissance sur des presupposes ininterroges et reduit le donne a la pensee du donne. Il en vient a considerer, avec ses derniers textes et dans une perspective qui influencera Heidegger, que la question fondamentale est celle de l'etre. C'est pourquoi il construit une ontologie ou logique de l'etre qui tente de penser l'alterite dans son immanence au logos. (shrink)

Une interrogation sur la musique suivie de textes D'E.-T. Hoffman et de L. Wittgenstein.

English summary: Michael Haneke social criticism in his cinematographic work leaves no one indifferent. His films shed cruel light on the pathologies violence, medias, genres of neoliberal society. Each of his films examines the gaze he brings upon his subjects, one that places him in the very world he critiques. French description: Pourquoi l'oeuvre cinematographique de Michael Haneke ne laisse-t-elle aucun de nous indifferent? Parce qu'il y pratique a l'envi, et de maniere frontale, la critique sociale. Ses films mettent cruellement (...) au jour ces figures du mal qui fondent les pathologies de la societe neoliberale - la violence, les medias, les genres, etc. Prend-il pour autant quelque facile position de surplomb? Pas du tout. Chacun de ses films interroge le regard meme qu'il porte sur son objet - la critique a beau etre radicale, en effet, son auteur fait bel et bien partie du monde qu'il met en question. (shrink)

Erwin Panofsky explicitly states that the first half of the opening chapter of Studies in Iconology—his landmark American publication of 1939—contains ‘the revised content of a methodological article published by the writer in 1932’, which is now translated for the first time in this issue of Critical Inquiry.1 That article, published in the philosophical journal Logos, is among his most important works. First, it marks the apogee of his series of philosophically reflective essays on how to do art history,2 that (...) reach back, via a couple of major pieces on Alois Riegl, to the 1915 essay on Heinrich Wölfflin.3 Under the influence of his colleague at Hamburg Ernst Cassirer, the principal interpreter of Kant in the 1920s, Panofsky from 1915 on exhibits in his work ever more Kantian thinking and language.4 But Logos was not an art-historical review or one dedicated to aesthetics but a principal mainstream journal of the philosophy of culture. So ‘On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts’ has a good claim to be the culmination of Panofsky's philosophical thinking in his German period under the Weimar Republic. · 1. Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance , p. xv; hereafter abbreviated SI. See Panofsky, ‘Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsdeutung von Werken der bildenden Kunst’, Logos 21 : 103–19; trans. Jaś Elsner and Katharina Lorenz under the title ‘On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts’, Critical Inquiry 38 : 467–82; hereafter abbreviated ‘P’.· 2. See the discussion in Carlo Ginzburg, ‘From Aby Warburg to E. H. Gombrich: A Problem of Method’, Myths, Emblems, Clues, trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi , pp. 17–59, esp. pp. 36–41.· 3. See Panofsky, ‘Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden Kunst’, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, ed. Karen Michels and Martin Warnke, 2 vols. , 2:1009–18; ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’,Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, 2:1019–34, trans. Kenneth J. Northcott and Joel Snyder under the title ‘The Concept of Artistic Volition’, Critical Inquiry 8 : 17–33; and ‘Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie: Ein Beitrag zu der Erörterung über die Möglichkeit kunstwissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe’, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, 2: 1035–63, trans. Lorenz and Elsner under the title ‘On the Relationship of Art History and Art Theory: Towards the Possibility of a Fundamental System of Concepts for a Science of Art’, Critical Inquiry 35 : 43–71.· 4. On neo-Kantianism in pre-Nazi Germany, see Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger , pp. 25–37; Éric Dufour and T. Z. R. Créteil, ‘Le Statue du singulier: Kant et le néokantisme de l’École de Marbourg', Kantstudien 93 : 324–50; Edward Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture , pp. 22–51; and Peter E. Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos , pp. 52–86. Specifically on the Cassirerian Kantianism of Panofsky, see Michael Podro, The Critical Historians of Art , pp. 181–82; Michael Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History , pp. 91–92, 147–52; Silvia Ferretti, Cassirer, Panofsky, and Warburg: Symbol, Art, and History, trans. Richard Pierce , pp. 174–77, 182–84; David Summers, ‘Meaning in the Visual Arts as a Humanistic Discipline’, in Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from the Outside, ed. Irving Lavin , pp. 9–24; Mark A. Cheetham, Kant, Art, and Art History: Moments of Discipline , pp. 68–77; Paul Crowther, The Transhistorical Image: Philosophizing Art and Its History , pp. 70–73; Allister Neher, ‘“The Concept of Kunstwollen”, Neo-Kantianism, and Erwin Panofsky's Early Art Theoretical Essays', Word and Image 20 : 41–51; Georges Didi-Huberman,Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art, trans. John Goodman , pp. 4–6, 90–138; and Lorenz and Elsner, ‘Translators’ Introduction', Critical Inquiry35 : 33–42, esp. pp. 38, 40–42. (shrink)

This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.

Number words seemingly function both as adjectives attributing cardinality properties to collections, as in Frege’s ‘Jupiter has four moons’, and as names referring to numbers, as in Frege’s ‘The number of Jupiter’s moons is four’. This leads to what Thomas Hofweber calls Frege’s Other Puzzle: How can number words function as modifiers and as singular terms if neither adjectives nor names can serve multiple semantic functions? Whereas most philosophers deny that one of these uses is genuine, we instead argue that (...) number words, like many related expressions, are polymorphic, having multiple uses whose meanings are systematically related via type shifting. (shrink)

Personal identity deals with questions about ourselves qua people (or persons). Many of these questions are familiar ones that occur to everyone at some time: What am I? When did I begin? What will happen to me when I die? Discussions of personal identity go right back to the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures have had something to say about it. (There is also a rich literature on personal identity in Eastern philosophy, which I am not competent (...) to discuss. Collins 1982 is a good source.). (shrink)

Climate change and justice are so closely associated that many people take it for granted that a global climate treaty should--indeed, must--directly address both issues together. But, in fact, this would be a serious mistake, one that, by dooming effective international limits on greenhouse gases, would actually make the world's poor and developing nations far worse off. This is the provocative and original argument of Climate Change Justice. Eric Posner and David Weisbach strongly favor both a climate change agreement and (...) efforts to improve economic justice. But they make a powerful case that the best--and possibly only--way to get an effective climate treaty is to exclude measures designed to redistribute wealth or address historical wrongs against underdeveloped countries. In clear language, Climate Change Justice proposes four basic principles for designing the only kind of climate treaty that will work--a forward-looking agreement that requires every country to make greenhouse--gas reductions but still makes every country better off in its own view. This kind of treaty has the best chance of actually controlling climate change and improving the welfare of people around the world. (shrink)

Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled: What do self-deceivers want? What do self-deceivers get? I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief. This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge.

This paper argues for a noncognitiveist computationalism in the philosophy of mind. It further argues that both humans and computers have intentionality, that is, their mental states are semantical -- they are about things in their worlds.

The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.

What are the meanings of number expressions, and what can they tell us about questions of central importance to the philosophy of mathematics, specifically 'Do numbers exist?' This Element attempts to shed light on this question by outlining a recent debate between substantivalists and adjectivalists regarding the semantic function of number words in numerical statements. After highlighting their motivations and challenges, I develop a comprehensive polymorphic semantics for number expressions. I argue that accounting for the numerous meanings and how they (...) are related leads to a strengthened argument for realism, one which renders familiar forms of nominalism highly implausible. (shrink)

In this paper, we outline and critically evaluate Thomas Hofweber’s solution to a semantic puzzle he calls Frege’s Other Puzzle. After sketching the Puzzle and two traditional responses to it—the Substantival Strategy and the Adjectival Strategy—we outline Hofweber’s proposed version of Adjectivalism. We argue that two key components—the syntactic and semantic components—of Hofweber’s analysis both suffer from serious empirical difficulties. Ultimately, this suggests that an altogether different solution to Frege’s Other Puzzle is required.

According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they (...) were to take note of the conscious experience, if any, they were having at the last undisturbed moment immediately prior to the beep. Some participants were asked to report any experience they could remember. Others were asked simply to report whether there was visual experience or not (and if so, what it was). Still others were asked about experience in the far right visual field, or tactile experience, or tactile experience in the left foot. A majority of participants in the full experience and the visual conditions reported visual experience in every single sample. Tactile and peripheral visual experience were reported less often. However, the proper interpretation of these results is uncertain. (shrink)

I argue that central to Aristotle’s account of vice is a distinction between two varieties of vicious person: those for whom character change is possible (the curable), and those for whom it is not (the incurable). Recognizing this distinction and drawing out the ideas which ground it shows why Aristotle’s discussions of vice in EN vii and ix 4 are not inconsistent.

Causal overdetermination worries arise in a number of domains, but most notably in the philosophy of mind. ln discussions of such worries, alleged examples of causal overdetermination are uniformly viewed as primajzcie problematic. While all alleged cases of overdetermination might be problematic, I aim to show that they are so for different reasons. Examples of causal overdetermination neatly divide into three varieties, corresponding to the connections between the mechanisms and the properties of the causes. Future debates over overdetermination, and mental (...) causation in particular, should pay heed to this distinction. (shrink)

Eric Martin and Daniel N. Osherson present a theory of inductive logic built on model theory. Their aim is to extend the mathematics of Formal Learning Theory to a more general setting and to provide a more accurate image of empirical inquiry. The formal results of their study illuminate aspects of scientific inquiry that are not covered by the commonly applied Bayesian approach.

There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to (most) moral questions, and the possibility (...) of knowing those answers. In the last decade, moral realism has re-entered the philosophical ring in powerful-looking naturalistic form. ln this paper we provide a dialectical overview: we situate the new wave position itself, and also our objections to it, in the context of the evolving program of philosophical naturalism in 20th century analytic philosophy. We seek to show that although this new contender might initially look like championship material, it succumbs to punches surprisingly similar to those that knocked out the old-fashioned versions of naturalist moral realism. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher has proposed a theory of explanation based on the notion of unification. Despite the genuine interest and power of the theory, I argue here that the theory suffers from a fatal deficiency: It is intrinsically unable to account for the asymmetric structure of explanation, and thus ultimately falls prey to a problem similar to the one which beset Hempel's D-N model. I conclude that Kitcher is wrong to claim that one can settle the issue of an argument's explanatory (...) force merely on the basis of considerations about the unifying power of the argument pattern the argument instantiates. (shrink)

One potentially ethically relevant feature of an utterance is that utterance's influence on the likelihoods that our future discourses wind up with one Stalnakerian ‘common ground’ or body of shared information rather than another. Such likelihoods matter ethically, so the ways our utterances influence them can matter ethically, despite the fact that such influences are often unintended, and often hard to see. By offering a relatively neutral descriptive framework that can enhance our collective sensitivity to and discussion of ethically, socially, (...) and politically important features of language use, this paper contributes to the ethics of language use. It discusses ways in which utterances can influence the likelihoods of future common grounds by deploying one system of categorization rather than another, and argues that language’s effects on the evolution of discourse can affect the paths to and probabilities of different sorts of consensus. (shrink)

I follow standard mathematical practice and theory to argue that the natural numbers are the finite von Neumann ordinals. I present the reasons standardly given for identifying the natural numbers with the finite von Neumann's (e.g., recursiveness; well-ordering principles; continuity at transfinite limits; minimality; and identification of n with the set of all numbers less than n). I give a detailed mathematical demonstration that 0 is { } and for every natural number n, n is the set of all natural (...) numbers less than n. Natural numbers are sets. They are the finite von Neumann ordinals. (shrink)

In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of (...) limited cognitive sophistication. (shrink)

In some contexts, not saying S generates a conversational implicature: that the speaker didn’t have sufficient reason, all things considered, to say S. I call this an omissive implicature. Standard ways of thinking about conversational implicature make the importance and even the existence of omissive implicatures somewhat surprising. But I argue that there is no principled reason to deny that there are such implicatures, and that they help explain a range of important phenomena. This paper focuses on the roles omissive (...) implicatures play in Quantity implicatures—in particular, in solving the symmetry problem for scalar implicatures—and on the political and social importance of omissions where apologies, objections, or other communicative acts are expected or warranted. (shrink)

As an atheist, Dawkins strives to develop a scientific alternative to theism, and while he declares that science is not a religion, he also proclaims it to be a spiritual enterprise. His books are filled with fragmentary sketches of this "spiritual atheism", resembling a great unfinished cathedral. This book systematizes and completes Dawkins' arguments, and reveals their deep roots in Stoicism and Platonism. Expanding on Dawkins' ideas, Steinhart shows how atheists can develop powerful ethical principles, compelling systems of symbols and (...) images, and meaningful personal and social practices. Believing in Dawkins is a rigorous and potent entreaty for the use of science and reason to support spiritually rich and optimistic ways of thinking and living. (shrink)