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In this chapter, we focus on the debate over publicly maintained racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the United States and South Africa. After pointing to some representative examples of racist monuments, we discuss ways a monument can be thought racist and neutrally categorize removalist and preservationist arguments heard in the monument debate. We suggest that both extremist and moderate removalist goals are likely to be self-defeating and that when concerns of civic sustainability are put (...) on moral par with those of fairness and justice, something like a Mandela-era preservationist policy is best: one which removes the most offensive of the minor racist monuments, but which focuses on closing the monumentary gap between peoples and reframing existing racist monuments. (shrink)

We show that the countable axiom of choice CAC strictly implies the statements “Lindelöf metric spaces are second countable” “Lindelöf metric spaces are separable”. We also show that CAC is equivalent to the statement: “If is a Lindelöf topological space with respect to the base ℬ, then is Lindelöf”.

Previous studies have offered indications that the way pre-adolescents structure their perceptions of their teacher’s interaction in terms of Agency and Communion differs from adolescents. The purpose of this study was to delineate previous findings by thoroughly examining the structure of pre-adolescents’ perceptions of their teacher’s interpersonal behaviour, and by investigating the extent to which this structure relates to pre-adolescents’ learning outcomes. A mixed methods research design was implemented including a qualitative instrument adaptation procedure followed by a quantitative large-scale administration. (...) Participants for the latter were a random sample of 504 pre-adolescents and 36 teachers. Results showed that participants placed significantly more emphasis on their teachers’ Communion behavioural dimension and this emphasis was illustrated on the association of perceived teacher interaction and students’ learning outcomes. Implications for theory, research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical survey of recent approaches to Athenian democracy. Typically, modern interpretations start from the assumption that Athenian democracy can be a useful resource for rethinking contemporary political issues. To be useful presupposes that it is well understood. Thus the results of new methods of historical-philological source criticism are brought forward to assist in the reconstruction of the ideology and cultural discourse that underpinned the working of Athenian democracy. What is highly problematic in this effort, the author (...) concludes, is that by stressing the time-bound actualities of Athenian political experience, the historicist approach is eventually unsuited to produce paradigms worthy of emulation. (shrink)

This is the second paper of an essay in two parts. The first paper (Part I) is a critical discussion of Mark Risjord's conception of nursing knowledge where I argued against the conception of nursing knowledge as a kind of nursing science. The aim of the present paper (Part II) is to explicate and substantiate the thesis of nursing as a kind of concrete philosophy. My strategy is to elaborate upon certain themes from Wittgenstein's Tractatus in order to canvass a (...) general scheme of philosophy based on a distinction between reality and the world. This distinction will be employed in the appropriation of certain significant features of nursing and nursing knowledge. By elaborating on the contrast between the abstract and the concrete, I will suggest that nursing may be seen as a kind of concrete philosophy, being primarily concerned with reality (and secondarily with the world). This thesis, I will argue, implies that philosophy is the kind of theory that is essential to nursing (which is not so much a theory than a certain kind of activity). (shrink)

This essay addresses the problem of the essentiality of nursing knowledge and what kind of theory, if any, is essential to nursing practice. The overarching aim of the essay was to argue for the thesis that nursing may be described as a kind of philosophical activity, and, consequently, that philosophy is the kind of “theory” that is essential to nursing practice and to the nursing discipline at large. The essay consists of two papers. The present paper, Part I, is a (...) critical examination of Mark Risjord's discussion of the problem of the theory‐practice gap in his Nursing Knowledge: Practice, Science, Philosophy, from 2010. According to Risjord, the cause of the theory‐practice gap originates in an erroneous conception of science (logical positivism) which had a decisive influence upon the way nursing scholars appropriated theoretical frameworks for the nursing discipline. This philosophical influence is considered in effect to have generated the theory–practice gap. In order to bridge the gap, Risjord suggests, the nursing discipline needs to adopt a standpoint epistemology conjoined with a postpositivist conception of scientific theory. In this way, a legitimate brand of nursing science may be developed and the theory–practice gap overcome. I will argue that neither Risjord's diagnosis of the problem, nor his recommended cure, may succeed in rescuing the nursing discipline from the theory–practice gap. Rather, the real cause of the theory–practice gap, I will claim, derives from an erroneous conception of nursing (not of science), namely the conception of nursing as a kind of science (roughly speaking). On my view, to overcome the gap, the nursing discipline needs to make salient the inherently philosophical character of nursing. In the second paper (Part II), I will continue the discussion of nursing knowledge and delineate the thesis of nursing as a kind of concrete philosophy. (shrink)

This essay addresses the problem of the essentiality of nursing knowledge and what kind of theory, if any, is essential to nursing practice. The overarching aim of the essay was to argue for the thesis that nursing may be described as a kind of philosophical activity, and, consequently, that philosophy is the kind of “theory” that is essential to nursing practice and to the nursing discipline at large. The essay consists of two papers. The present paper, Part I, is a (...) critical examination of Mark Risjord's discussion of the problem of the theory‐practice gap in his Nursing Knowledge: Practice, Science, Philosophy, from 2010. According to Risjord, the cause of the theory‐practice gap originates in an erroneous conception of science (logical positivism) which had a decisive influence upon the way nursing scholars appropriated theoretical frameworks for the nursing discipline. This philosophical influence is considered in effect to have generated the theory–practice gap. In order to bridge the gap, Risjord suggests, the nursing discipline needs to adopt a standpoint epistemology conjoined with a postpositivist conception of scientific theory. In this way, a legitimate brand of nursing science may be developed and the theory–practice gap overcome. I will argue that neither Risjord's diagnosis of the problem, nor his recommended cure, may succeed in rescuing the nursing discipline from the theory–practice gap. Rather, the real cause of the theory–practice gap, I will claim, derives from an erroneous conception of nursing (not of science), namely the conception of nursing as a kind of science (roughly speaking). On my view, to overcome the gap, the nursing discipline needs to make salient the inherently philosophical character of nursing. In the second paper (Part II), I will continue the discussion of nursing knowledge and delineate the thesis of nursing as a kind of concrete philosophy. (shrink)

In this chapter we focus on the debate over publicly-maintained racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the US (chiefly regarding the over 700 monuments devoted to the Confederacy), but to some degree also in Britain and Commonwealth countries, especially South Africa (chiefly regarding monuments devoted to figures and events associated with colonialism and apartheid). After pointing to some representative examples of racist monuments, we discuss ways a monument can be thought racist, and neutrally categorize removalist (...) and preservationist arguments heard in the monument debate. We suggest that both extremist and moderate removalist goals are likely to be self-defeating, and that when concerns of civic sustainability are put on moral par with those of fairness and justice, something like a Mandela-era preservationist policy is best: one which removes the most offensive of the minor racist monuments, but which focuses on closing the monumentary gap between peoples and reframing existing racist monuments. (shrink)

We show that some well known theorems in topology may not be true without the axiom of choice.

The British utilitarians are not generally considered explorers of classical Greek thought. This paper examines the contribution of James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and George Grote to the development of Platonic studies in nineteenth-century Britain. Their understanding of Platonic philosophy challenged prevalent interpretations, and caused a fruitful debate over long neglected aspects of Plato's thought. Grote's Platonic analysis, which comes last in order of time, cannot, of course, be considered in isolation from the relevant debates in Germany. Grote, the erudite (...) historian of ancient Greece, paid considerable attention to the arguments of the German classicists, put forward in many cases a new point of view, and prompted a radical revaluation of Platonic political thought. (shrink)

I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity . The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm? My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. The (...) results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general argument of this thesis is sound, then, on this ground, the realist conception of metaphysical essentialism is rejected. The positive thesis of this study is the articulation of certain ways to frame the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori which avoid the problems of realistic essentialism and which suggest a certain transcendental reading of modality. According to the Kripke Paradigm, any de dicto modal status derives ultimately from the de re modality inherent in the object designated, as the object is characterised by contingent and necessary properties on the ontological level. Thus, the Kripke Paradigm is primarily a thesis in de re realist essentialism. The final verdict in this study is that the Kripke Paradigm cannot sustain the realistic conception of de re metaphysical essentialism. If we should adopt a transcendental reading of modality, then certain portions of the Kripke Paradigm are valid. I do not delineate or possess the details of a comprehensive doctrine of transcendental metaphysic. Nevertheless, the observations I make should suffice to bring about the rough orientation of how I conceive the notion of transcendental modality. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom's Four-Case Argument is among the most famous and resilient manipulation arguments against compatibilism. I contend that its resilience is not a function of the argument's soundness but, rather, the ill-gotten gain from an ambiguity in the description of the causal relations found in the argument's foundational case. I expose this crucial ambiguity and suggest that a dilemma faces anyone hoping to resolve it. After a thorough search for an interpretation which avoids both horns of this dilemma, I conclude (...) that none is available. Rather, every metaphysically coherent interpretation invites either a hard- or soft-line reply to Pereboom's argument. I then consider a recharacterization of the dilemma which seems to clear the way for the defence of a revised Four-Case Argument. I address this rejoinder by identifying a still more fundamental problem shared by all viable interpretations of the manipulation cases, showing that each involves a type of manipulation which undermines the victim's agency. Because this diagnosis supports a soft-line reply to every viable interpretation of the argument and can be endorsed by any compatibilist, I consider it the final piece of the Soft-line Solution to the Four-Case Argument. Finally, I suggest a new taxonomy of manipulation arguments, arguing that none that employs the suppressive variety of manipulation found in Pereboom's argument offers a threat to compatibilism. -/- (For direct download option, search Kristin M. Mickelson, Soft-line Solution). (shrink)

Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my (...) account portrays honor norms as radically different from liberal ones, it actually strengthens Doris and Plakias’ case in some respects: cultures of honor are not merely superficially different from Western liberal ones. Nonetheless, the persistent appeal of honor’s principles, and their moral plausibility in certain contexts, suggests not antirealism, but pluralism—a reply on behalf of realism that itself has considerable empirical support. (shrink)

[Updated 2/23/21: complete chapter scan] In this chapter I sketch a rightist approach to monumentary policy in a diverse polity beleaguered by old ethnic grievances. I begin by noting the importance of tribalism, memorialization, and social trust. I then suggest a policy which 1) gradually narrows the gap between peoples in the heritage landscape, 2) conserves all but the most offensive of the least beloved racist monuments, 3) avoids recrimination (i.e., “keeps it positive”) and eschews ideological commentary in new monuments (...) or revisions to old ones, 4) as much as politically feasible, recognizes only the offense of willing tribemates, and 5) responds to aesthetic and other “irrational” offenses more than to “objective” historical or philosophical critiques. (shrink)

Some researchers have recognized that privileged communities dominate the discourse on AI Ethics, and other voices need to be heard. As such, we identify the current ethics milieu as arising from WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) contexts, and aim to expand the discussion to non-WEIRD global communities, who are also stakeholders in global sociotechnical systems. We argue that accounting for honor, along with its values and related concepts, would better approximate a global ethical perspective. This complex concept already underlies (...) some of the WEIRD discourse on AI ethics, but certain cultural forms of honor also bring overlooked issues and perspectives to light. We first describe honor according to recent empirical and philosophical scholarship. We then review “consensus” principles for AI ethics framed from an honor-based perspective, grounding comparisons and contrasts via example settings such as content moderation, job hiring, and genomics databases. A better appreciation of the marginalized concept of honor could, we hope, lead to more productive AI value alignment discussions, and to AI systems that better reflect the needs and values of users around the globe. (shrink)

Let X be an infinite set and let and denote the propositions “every filter on X can be extended to an ultrafilter” and “X has a free ultrafilter”, respectively. We denote by the Stone space of the Boolean algebra of all subsets of X. We show: For every well‐ordered cardinal number ℵ, (ℵ) iff (2ℵ). iff “ is a continuous image of ” iff “ has a free open ultrafilter ” iff “every countably infinite subset of has a limit point”. (...) implies “every open filter on extends to an open ultrafilter” implies “has an open ultrafilter” implies It is relatively consistent with that (ω) holds, whereas (ω) fails. In particular, none of the statements given in (2) implies (ω). (shrink)

Faced with the choice between supporting industrial plant agriculture and hunting, Tom Regan’s rights view can be plausibly developed in a way that permits a form of hunting we call “dignitarian.” To motivate this claim, we begin by showing how the empirical literature on animal deaths in plant agriculture suggests that a non-trivial amount of hunting would not add to animal harm. We discuss how Tom Regan’s miniride principle appears to morally permit hunting in that case, and we address recent (...) objections by Jason Hanna to environmentally-based culling that may be seen to speak against this conclusion. We then turn to dignity, which is especially salient in scenarios where harm is necessary or justifiable. We situate “dignitarian” hunting within a larger framework of adversarial ethics, and argue that dignitarian hunting gives animals a more dignified death than the alternatives endemic to large-scale plant agriculture, and so is permissible based on the kinds of principles that Regan endorses. Indeed, dignitarian hunting may actually fit better with Regan’s widely endorsed animal rights framework than the practice of many vegans, and should only be rejected if we’re just as willing to condemn supporting conventional plant agriculture. (shrink)

In the realm of Lindelöf metric spaces the following results are obtained in : (i) If is a Lindelöf metric space then it is both densely Lindelöf and almost Lindelöf. In addition, under the countable axiom of choice, the three notions coincide. (ii) The statement “every separable metric space is almost Lindelöf” implies that every infinite subset of has a countably infinite subset). (iii) The statement “every almost Lindelöf metric space is quasi totally bounded implies. (iv) The proposition “every quasi (...) totally bounded metric space is separable” lies, in the deductive hierarchy of choice principles, strictly between the countable union theorem and. Likewise, the statement “every pre‐Lindelöf (or Lindelöf) metric space is separable” lies strictly between and. (shrink)

Let {: i ∈I } be a family of compact spaces and let X be their Tychonoff product. [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C] denotes the family of all basic non-trivial closed subsets of X and [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C]R denotes the family of all closed subsets H = V × Πmath imageXi of X, where V is a non-trivial closed subset of Πmath imageXi and QH is a finite non-empty subset of I. We show: Every filterbase ℋ ⊂ [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL (...) C]R extends to a [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C]R-ultrafilter ℱ if and only if every family H ⊂ [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C] with the finite intersection property extends to a maximal [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C] family F with the fip. The proposition “if every filterbase ℋ ⊂ [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C]R extends to a [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C]R-ultrafilter ℱ, then X is compact” is not provable in ZF. The statement “for every family {: i ∈ I } of compact spaces, every filterbase ℋ ⊂ [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C]R, Y = Πi ∈IYi, extends to a [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C]R-ultrafilter ℱ” is equivalent to Tychonoff's compactness theorem. The statement “for every family {: i ∈ ω } of compact spaces, every countable filterbase ℋ ⊂ [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C]R, X = Πi ∈ωXi, extends to a [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C]R-ultrafilter ℱ” is equivalent to Tychonoff's compactness theorem restricted to countable families. The countable Axiom of Choice is equivalent to the proposition “for every family {: i ∈ ω } of compact topological spaces, every countable family ℋ ⊂ [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C] with the fip extends to a maximal [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C] family ℱ with the fip”. (shrink)

We show that the axiom of choice AC is equivalent to the Vector Space Kinna-Wagner Principle, i.e., the assertion: “For every family [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL V]= {Vi : i ∈ k} of non trivial vector spaces there is a family ℱ = {Fi : i ∈ k} such that for each i ∈ k, Fiis a non empty independent subset of Vi”. We also show that the statement “every vector space over ℚ has a basis” implies that every infinite well (...) ordered set of pairs has an infinite subset with a choice set, a fact which is known not to be a consequence of the axiom of multiple choice MC. (shrink)

Call the ethos understanding rightness in terms of spiritual purity and piety, and wrongness in terms of corruption and sacrilege, the “fetish ethic.” Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues suggest that this ethos is particularly salient to political conservatives and non-liberal cultures around the globe. In this essay, I point to numerous examples of moral fetishism in mainstream academic ethics. Once we see how deeply “infected” our ethical reasoning is by fetishistic intuitions, we can respond by 1) repudiating the fetishistic impulse, (...) by 2) “sublimating” our fetishism into liberal rationales, or by 3) accepting the fetishism on its own terms. Of these options, I argue that sublimating our fetishism is not advisable, and that embracing our ethical fetishism isn’t as obviously misguided as some suggest. (shrink)

We find properties of topological spaces which are not shared by disjoint unions in the absence of some form of the Axiom of Choice.

Such a bewildering and contradictory welter of behaviors and traits are connoted by “honor” and its best equivalents in other languages that analyses of the concept have daunted philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and literary scholars for millennia. Is it an external good given — and revoked just as easily — by others? Or does “honor” name an inner good that’s absolutely in our control: our integrity, our very commitment to right conduct? Is honor a central moral virtue — (...) as when we might say that “all was lost, save our honor”? Or is it a good quality that’s not-quite “moral,” or indeed even an antiquated virtue hostile to true morality? Is the honorable man a heroic figure who protects the weak, or one who can be expected to bully the weak, as in the case of “honor killings”? Is honor aristocratic and inegalitarian, and thus a virtue that enables and ennobles what’s essentially oppression? Or is honor a signal virtue of fair-dealing, fair-fighting, and fair competition, as evidenced in sportsmanship? (shrink)

After a century-long hiatus, honor is back. Academics, pundits, and everyday citizens alike are rediscovering the importance of this ancient and powerful human motive. This volume brings together some of the foremost researchers of honor to debate honor’s meaning and its compatibility with liberalism, democracy, and modernity. Contributors—representing philosophy, sociology, political science, history, psychology, leadership studies, and military science—examine honor past to present, from masculine and feminine perspectives, and in North American, European, and African contexts. Topics include the role of (...) honor in the modern military, the effects of honor on our notions of the dignity and “purity” of women, honor as a quality of good statesmen and citizens, honor’s role in international relations and community norms, and how honor’s egalitarian and elitist aspects intersect with democratic and liberal regimes. (shrink)

According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible. This is the basis of Mackie's now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie's approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark (...) Kalderon has argued that moral fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie's error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege-Geach problem shows that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this doubleapproach to acceptance generates a new problem -a descendent of Frege-Geach -which we call the acceptance-transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon's version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the noncognitivist aspect of Kalderon's account that generates the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude problem. (shrink)

An overview is provided of how the concept of the thought experiment has developed and changed for the natural sciences in the course of the 20th century. First, we discuss the existing definitions of the term 'thought experiment' and the origin of the thought experimentation method, identifying it in Greek Presocratics epoch. Second, only in the end of the 19th century showed up the first systematic enquiry on thought experiments by Ernst Mach's work. After the Mach's work, a negative attitude (...) towards thought experiments came in the beginning of the 20th century, which went on until the Thomas Kuhn's and Karl Popper's work on thought experiments. Only from the mid-1980s did thought experiments begin to be considered relevant to scientific enterprise. Finally, we show the existing empirical and 'functional' theories which have developed about the nature and purpose of thought experiments. (shrink)

Just War Theory (JWT) replaced an older "warrior code," an approach to war that remains poorly understood and dismissively treated in the philosophical literature. This paper builds on recent work on honor to address these deficiencies. By providing a clear, systematic exposition of "Honor War Theory" (HWT), we can make sense of paradigm instances of warrior psychology and behavior, and understand the warrior code as the martial expression of a broader honor-based ethos that conceives of obligation in terms of fair (...) competition for prestige. Far from being a romantic and outmoded approach to war, HWT accounts for current conflicts and predicts moral intuitions that JWT either rejects or cannot comfortably accommodate. So although it is not recommended as a replacement for JWT, there is good reason think that a fully mature, realistic, and yet properly normative theory of war ethics will incorporate a variety of insights from HWT. (shrink)

The mechanism-realist paradigm in the philosophy of science, championed by Mario Bunge and Roy Bhaskar, sets certain expectations for the substantive social-scientific application of the paradigm. To evaluate the application of the paradigm in accomplished substantive research, as well as the potential for future research, I examine the work of Charles Tilly, the exemplary substantive work in the mechanism-realist tradition. Based on this examination, I argue for the usefulness of explanatory mechanisms, provided that they are couched in terms of a (...) heuristic. Such a position is the most reasonable one to adopt given the expectations set by the paradigm in relation to complexity stemming from mechanism interaction and to a notion of causality that is deeper than that acknowledged by empiricism and positivism. (shrink)

In the realm of metric spaces the role of choice principles is investigated.

Controversially, psychologist and public intellectual Jordan Peterson advises “enforced monogamy” for societies with high percentages of “incels.” As Peterson’s proposal resonates in manosphere circles, this chapter reconstructs and briefly evaluates the argument for it. Premised on the moral importance of civilizational sustainability, advocates argue that both polygamous and socially monogamous but sexually liberal mating patterns result in unsustainable proportions of unattached young men. Given the premises, monogamous societies are probably justified in maintaining their anti-polygamist social and legal norms. The case (...) for imposing stricter sexual norms on socially monogamous but sexually liberal societies is weaker, however, as male involuntary celibacy in those places isn’t as directly caused by male intrasexual competition, and since less intrusive social interventions are more likely to ameliorate “the incel problem.”. (shrink)

It is shown that AC, the axiom of choice for families of non-empty subsets of the real line ℝ, does not imply the statement PW, the powerset of ℝ can be well ordered. It is also shown that the statement “the set of all denumerable subsets of ℝ has size 2math image” is strictly weaker than AC and each of the statements “if every member of an infinite set of cardinality 2math image has power 2math image, then the union has (...) power 2math image” and “ℵ ≠ ℵω” is Hartogs' aleph, the least ℵ not ≤ 2math image), is strictly weaker than the full axiom of choice AC. (shrink)

We establish the following results: 1. In ZF (i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory minus the Axiom of Choice AC), for every set I and for every ordinal number α ≥ ω, the following statements are equivalent: (a) The Tychonoff product of| α| many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact. (b) The union of| α| many non-empty finite subsets of I is well orderable. 2. The statement: For every infinite set I, every closed subset of the Tychonoff product [0, 1] (...) I which consists of functions with finite support is compact, is not provable in ZF set theory. 3. The statement: For every set I, the principle of dependent choices relativised to I implies the Tychonoff product of countably many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF⁰ (i.e., ZF minus the Axiom of Regularity). 4. The statement: For every set I, every ℵ₀-sized family of non-empty finite subsets of I has a choice function implies the Tychonoff product of ℵ₀ many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF⁰. (shrink)

We formulate an abstract version of the finite injury method in the form of the Baire category theorem. The theorem has the following corollaries: The Friedberg-Muchnik pair of recursively enumerable degrees, the Sacks splitting theorem, the existence of a minimal degree below 0′ and the Shoenfield jump theorem.

It is shown that in ZF Martin's $ \aleph_{0}^{}$-axiom together with the axiom of countable choice for finite sets imply that arbitrary powers 2X of a 2-point discrete space are Baire; and that the latter property implies the following: the axiom of countable choice for finite sets, power sets of infinite sets are Dedekind-infinite, there are no amorphous sets, and weak forms of the Kinna-Wagner principle.

Whereas civil discourse is usually thought to be about defusing conflict, this essay argues it may be fruitfully thought of as fighting honorably for what we believe. Thus agonistic honor, which conceives of rightness in terms of fair and respectful contest for status, will be an especially important virtue in contexts—from classrooms to courtrooms to pluralistic democracies in general—where conflict is inevitable and desirable. To motivate this claim, I take a Hobbesian approach. I begin with a rational reconstruction of honor (...) patterned after Hobbes’ rational reconstruction of justice, and imagine honor-equivalents of “rational” individuals in a “state of nature.” I then describe a multi-stage process that culminates in honorable contests among a natural aristocracy. The lessons from this exercise apply to the question of civil discourse: while the "standard model" of civil discourse aims at resolving disagreement by downplaying rivalry and ego, the more realistic agonistic model harnesses these factors to make our civil debates more culturally sustainable. (shrink)

Perhaps the biggest disconnect between philosophers and non-philosophers on the question of gun rights is over the relevance of arms to our dignitary interests. This essay attempts to address this gap by arguing that we have a strong prima facie moral right to resist with dignity and that violence is sometimes our most or only dignified method of resistance. Thus, we have a strong prima facie right to guns when they are necessary often enough for effective dignified resistance. This approach (...) is distinctively non-libertarian: it doesn’t justify gun rights on the basis of (mere) liberty or security. Nonetheless it is compatible with libertarian defenses of gun rights based on a liberty right to guns, and, if sound, in fact lowers the bar for gun rights in some ways, as it justifies access to guns even when nonviolent means would better achieve the liberty or security aims of potential victims. And although this defense of gun rights is most readily categorized as “conservative” or rightist, it relies upon principles and intuitions about dignity popular among progressives in other domains, such as in disability, women’s, or LGBT rights debates. (shrink)

This essay distinguishes between honor-typical and authoritarian behavior in humans and animals. Whereas authoritarianism concerns hierarchies coordinated by control and obedience, honor concerns rankings of prestige determined by fair contests. Honor-typical behavior is identifiable in non-human species, and is to be expected in polygynous species with non-resource-based mating systems. This picture lends further support to an increasingly popular psychological theory that sees morality as constituted by a variety of moral systems. If moral cognition is pluralistic in this way, then the (...) question of moral agency is better considered in terms of particular moral modes, one of which will be “honor-agency.” The universal principles of honorable conduct suggest a handful of criteria for counting as an honorable agent (human or otherwise), and these criteria can be specified without commitment to any particular account of what it takes to be an agent in general. (shrink)