Written by a distinguished international team of contributors, this volume explores Shakespeare's vivid depictions of moral deliberation and individual choice in light of Renaissance debates about ethics. Examining the intellectual context of Shakespeare's plays, the essays illuminate Shakespeare's engagement with the most pressing moral questions of his time, considering the competing claims of politics, Christian ethics and classical moral philosophy, as well as new perspectives on controversial topics such as conscience, prayer, revenge and suicide. Looking at Shakespeare's responses to emerging (...) schools of thought such as Calvinism and Epicureanism, and assessing comparisons between Shakespeare and his French contemporary Montaigne, the collection addresses questions such as: when does laughter become cruel? How does style reflect moral perspective? Does shame lead to self-awareness? This book is of great interest to scholars and students of Shakespeare studies, Renaissance studies and the history of ethics. (shrink)

Health care reforms, in particular the expansion of public and/or private health care benefit coverage to some or all population groups, is becoming an increasingly hot topic for discussion—and in some cases for action—at all levels of government. With almost 16% of Americans estimated to be uninsured for at least part of the year, opinion polls show health care near the top of the general public’s list of concerns. Little wonder that presidential candidates for the 2008 election are incorporating ‘‘universal (...) health care coverage’’ proposals in their campaign platforms. Will ‘‘cradle-to-grave’’ coverage for all become a reality or will they just experience cradle-to-grave debates over this issue? That is essentially one of the questions posed in the following discussion on the role of nonprofit health care organizations in promoting, and operating under, universal health care coverage. (shrink)

Three pivotal claims of Kant’s moral philosophy are that: the obliged agent’s will is some form of practical reason; the supreme principle of obligation is an a priori moral law which can in some way determine the agent’s choices; the obliged agent must be thought of as some kind of being with a will free in both a negative sense and a positive sense. The traditional explication of these takes Kant to be claiming that: the obliged agent’s will is pure (...) practical reason; the a priori moral law can determine the agent’s choice in a wholly a priori way; we must suppose the obliged agent is a noumenon. I shall call this the “pure, a priori, noumenal reading” or “PAN.” My aim here is to make out a case for taking Kant instead to claim that: the obliged agent’s will is empirical practical reason; the a priori moral law can determine the obliged agent’s will as applied in an a posteriori way and only as applied in that way; we must suppose the obliged agent is neither a phenomenal object nor a thing in itself but of a third ontological kind I shall refer to as a “subject.” I shall call this the “empirical, a posteriori, subject reading” or “EAS.” There is ample textual support for PAN but philosophically it is a radically unacceptable, because self-defeating, view. EAS is equally plausible as a reading of Kant’s texts and markedly superior philosophically. (shrink)

Hopes for biasing the odds towards the development of AGI that is human-friendly depend on finding and employing ethical theories and practices that can be incorporated successfully in the construction; programming and/or developmental growth; education and mature life world of future AGI. Mainstream ethical theories are ill-adapted for this purpose because of their mono-logical decision procedures which aim at “Golden rule” style principles and judgments which are objective in the sense of being universal and absolute. A much more helpful framework (...) for ethics is provided by a dialogical approach using conflict resolution and negotiation methods; a “Rainbow rule” approach to diversity; and a notion of objectivity as emergent impartiality. This conflict resolution approach will also improve our chances in dealing with two other problems related to the “Friendly AI” problem; the difficulty of programming AI to be not merely smarter but genuinely wiser and the dilemmas that arise in considering whether AGIs will be Friendly to humans out of mere partisanship or out of genuine intent to promote the Good. While these issues are challenging; a strategy for pursuing and promoting research on them can be articulated and basic legislation and corporate policies can be adopted to encourage their development as part of the project of biasing the odds in favor of Friendly and Wise AGI. (shrink)

This work systematically explicates and defends four key claims in Kant's moral philosophy: The human will is some form of practical reason. The supreme criterion for determining the morality of our choices is provided by an a priori moral law. We find this law to be a source of felt value; it commands unqualified respect. We must suppose the human will is free. ;Traditionally, Kant has been read as holding that these claims imply that the responsible moral agent is a (...) noumenon whose will is a pure practical reason structured completely a priori by the moral law. I show that this position must be rejected on philosophical grounds because it implies that the agent is not free, has an impotent and vacuous will, and is neither obligated nor capable of acting out of a sense of respect for the moral law. ;I argue an alternative reading of Kant is textually sound and philosophically superior. This alternative view, which is explicated and defended in detail, holds that: The human will is empirical practical reason. The moral law is an a priori structure which is always applied a posteriori. It is not constitutive but regulative. The feeling of respect is an intuition of the formal pattern of the subjective time order which results insofar as the a priori structure of empirical practical reason directs or commands the movement of our attention. The responsible moral agent is neither a phenomenal object or a noumenal object but rather a subject, a being of a third and distinct ontological kind. ;In working out such an interpretation, I also reconstruct Kant's account of the relations between the faculties of imagination, understanding, reason, and will, holding them to be simply alternative employments of a single, underlying power of synthesis. I also recharacterize the fundamental project of Kant's critical enterprise in order to locate his moral philosophy within it, arguing that his central concern is with how judgment is possible. (shrink)

We can conceive of peace in many different ways, and these differences are related to a variety of assumptions and practices we can adopt in our culture. This book is about those differences. Part I describes the ways in which we usually talk about peace. It argues that our conception is fundamentally obscure. We do not know what peace is and we do not know how to promote it. Part II develops an explanation of how peace has been obscured. It (...) has been obscured by a network of beliefs and institutions in our culture. Part III critically evaluates some key parts of this cultural web and argues that there is an alternative cluster of assumptions and practices which we ought to adopt. It is a cluster which is intrinsically better—regardless of whatever it may imply about peace. Part IV argues that it happens to imply that we should think of peace as an activity—a practice we can cultivate at high levels of excellent performance. It draws on Gandhian satyagraha, Quaker process and practices of "principled negotiation" using the Harvard model to illustrate. (shrink)

Gordon Nagel’s Kant differs sharply form Berkeley. More importantly, he offers a powerful and systematic account of perception and understanding which can be argued to be a serious contender in contemporary discussions of epistemology and cognitive psychology. Readers tempted to think that Kant may be dismissed because of his commitments to the myths of the given and the analytic/empirical distinction are forced to think again. Here we have a Kant for whom the given is analyzable and who is a species (...) of holist—and yet who also defends a detailed account of a priori structures of experiences. Nagel offers us all this and more including illuminating discussions of Kant’s departures from the Modern tradition, a suggestive discussion of analogies between twentieth-century accounts of language and Kant’s account of cognitive synthesis, and a distinction between interpretation and understanding that helps demystify the phenomena/noumena distinction. (shrink)

Historian Candy Gunther Brown has noted that since the mid-twentieth century, "evangelicalism has reemerged as the normative form of non-Catholic American Christianity, supplanting what is usually referred to as mainline Protestantism."1 However, in the 1970s few people predicted that this would occur. In Gray Sabbath, Shawn David Young describes a lesser-known countercultural side of evangelicalism. Young explains, "This book explores a post–Jesus Movement 'Jesus People' commune that does not conform to our common understanding of evangelical Christianity or popular Christian (...) music". Through ethnographic and historical research, Young offers an analysis of how Jesus People USA... (shrink)

Western civilization since the Renaissance, argues Gray Cox, conceives of material things as objectively knowable and hence manipulable by the detached subject. We knowers are masters of nature. The presuppositions about how things are known and used also color our attitudes concerning human problems. Our culture is conflict centered. When we try to give substance to the concept of peace, we draw a blank: peace is the static absence of war. We do not bring peace to fruition because we (...) have no inkling of the kind of thought it requires. Cox shakes up our habitual ways of thinking in order to give peace a chance. The ways of peace are activities in which subjects mutually engage with openness to understanding. We grow in intersubjective community by working together. (shrink)

Western civilization since the Renaissance, argues Gray Cox, conceives of material things as objectively knowable and hence manipulable by the detached subject. We knowers are masters of nature. The presuppositions about how things are known and used also color our attitudes concerning human problems. Our culture is conflict centered. When we try to give substance to the concept of peace we draw a blank: peace is the static absence of war. We do not bring peace to fruition because we (...) have no inkling of the kind of thought it requires. Cox shakes up our habitual ways of thinking in order to give peace a chance. The ways of peace are activities in which subjects mutually engage with openness to understanding. We grow in intersubjective community by working together. (shrink)

Western civilization since the Renaissance, argues Gray Cox, conceives of material things as objectively knowable and hence manipulable by the detached subject. We knowers are masters of nature. The presuppositions about how things are known and used also color our attitudes concerning human problems. Our culture is conflict centered. When we try to give substance to the concept of peace we draw a blank: peace is the static absence of war. We do not bring peace to fruition because we (...) have no inkling of the kind of thought it requires. Cox shakes up our habitual ways of thinking in order to give peace a chance. The ways of peace are activities in which subjects mutually engage with openness to understanding. We grow in intersubjective community by working together. (shrink)

Western civilization since the Renaissance, argues Gray Cox, conceives of material things as objectively knowable and hence manipulable by the detached subject. We knowers are masters of nature. The presuppositions about how things are known and used also color our attitudes concerning human problems. Our culture is conflict centered. When we try to give substance to the concept of peace we draw a blank: peace is the static absence of war. We do not bring peace to fruition because we (...) have no inkling of the kind of thought it requires. Cox shakes up our habitual ways of thinking in order to give peace a chance. The ways of peace are activities in which subjects mutually engage with openness to understanding. We grow in intersubjective community by working together. (shrink)

Talk about time travel is puzzling even if it isn't obviously contradictory. Philosophers however are divided about whether time travel involves empirical paradox or some deeper metaphysical incoherence. It is suggested that time travel requires a Parmenidean four-dimensionalist metaphysical conception of the world in time. The possibility of time travel is addressed (mainly) from within a Parmenidean metaphysical framework, which is accepted by David Lewis in his defence of the coherence of time travel. It is argued that time travel raises (...) formidable difficulties which are not satisfactorily resolved by Lewis's ingenious defence of time travel. Objections to time travel considered include: (1) travel to other times is impossible because there is nowhere (or “nowhen”) to go to; (2) the problem that upon setting out on a journey to the past a time machine will collide with itself; (3) time travel generates a mysterious temporal dualism between experiential time and physical time; (4) travel to the past permits reverse causation, raising the possibility of causal loops and attendant problems arising, for example, from the prospect of empirical contradiction and the possibility of someone being one of their ancestors. (shrink)

Manuel DeLanda discusses his neo-materialist philosophy with Christoph Cox.

The Covid-19 pandemic creates an unprecedented threatening situation worldwide with an urgent need for critical reflection and new knowledge production, but also a need for imminent action despite prevailing knowledge gaps and multilevel uncertainty. With regard to the role of research ethics in these pandemic times some argue in favor of exceptionalism, others, including the authors of this paper, emphasize the urgent need to remain committed to core ethical principles and fundamental human rights obligations all reflected in research regulations and (...) guidelines carefully crafted over time. In this paper we disentangle some of the arguments put forward in the ongoing debate about Covid-19 human challenge studies and the concomitant role of health-related research ethics in pandemic times. We suggest it might be helpful to think through a lens differentiating between risk, strict uncertainty and ignorance. We provide some examples of lessons learned by harm done in the name of research in the past and discuss the relevance of this legacy in the current situation. (shrink)

This paper provides a method for characterizing space events using the framework of conceptual spaces. We focus specifically on estimating and ranking the likelihood of collisions between space objects. The objective is to design an approach for anticipatory decision support for space operators who can take preventive actions on the basis of assessments of relative risk. To make this possible our approach draws on the fusion of both hard and soft data within a single decision support framework. Contextual data is (...) also taken into account, for example data about space weather effects, by drawing on the Space Domain Ontologies, a large system of ontologies designed to support all aspects of space situational awareness. The framework is coupled with a mathematical programming scheme that frames a mathematically optimal approach for decision support, providing a quantitative basis for ranking potential for collision across multiple satellite pairs. The goal is to provide the broadest possible information foundation for critical assessments of collision likelihood. (shrink)

First published in 1997. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The moral status of future persons is problematic. It is often claimed that we should take the interests of the indefinite unborn very seriously, because they have a right to a decent life. It is also claimed (often by the same people) that we should allow unrestricted access to abortion, because the indefinite unborn have no rights. In this paper I argue that these intuitions are not in fact inconsistent. The aim is to provide an account of trans-temporal concern which (...) resolves the prima facie inconsistency between commonly held intuitions about our obligations to future persons. I argue that our intuitions can be reconciled provided that we explicate obligations to the future in terms of impersonal principles subject to retroactive person-affecting constraints. (shrink)

Boredom is a frequently experienced and unpleasant state (Bench & Lench, 2019; Danckert et al., 2018; Eastwood et al., 2012) that people are experiencing more frequently (Weybright et al., 2020). W...

Stakeholder consultation is part of the democratic process, embraces respect for persons, and is necessary for upholding the principle of justice. People are more likely to uphold standards they have participated in setting, so stakeholder consultation encourages adherence to societal and institutional standards as these evolve. Stakeholder consultation is also responsive to the call to “resocialize” ethics by contextualizing dilemmas and involving the destitute in choices about their healthcare. In resource-poor settings, such consultation promotes local “ownership” of, and leadership within, (...) development programs, which enhances effectiveness and sustainability. Stakeholder consultation is, therefore, a form of capacity building. To succeed, it must be responsive to regional, national, and individual constraints, including socioeconomic, cultural, and political ones. Several such constraints impact on the demand for, and availability of, palliative healthcare in the Caribbean. (shrink)

There is international recognition of the need for sustainable research ethics committees to provide ethical review of human subjects research in developing countries, but many developing countries do not have such committees . Theoretical and practical uncertainties encountered by an IRB on the Caribbean island of Grenada offer insight into ethical review of research in developing countries. Theoretical uncertainties include questions about whether means of ensuring confidentiality and obtaining informed consent will be effective in local settings, and whether deviations from (...) Western norms are justifiable. International guidelines are helpful in addressing these concerns, but are subject to interpretation. Guidelines are less helpful in practical areas like selecting members or chairs. They do not address what sort of procedures and paperwork will work in a developing country, or IRBs’ relationships to governments that have no mandate for them. Experiences presented here show that IRBs in developing countries can sustainably adhere to international standards. Sustainability requires knowledge, personal commitment, and an official mandate to uphold international standards. Capacity building must therefore focus on educational programs to make developing country leaders knowledgeable about the value of international guidelines to their nations. Such knowledge is needed before people will become motivated to promote, implement, and uphold the guidelines. People in developing countries must help design bridges to help their nations put international standards into practice. The structure of such bridges may, of necessity, vary in different settings. (shrink)