Philosophy of ecology has been slow to become established as an area of philosophical interest, but it is now receiving considerable attention. This area holds great promise for the advancement of both ecology and the philosophy of science. Insights from the philosophy of science can advance ecology in a number of ways. For example, philosophy can assist with the development of improved models of ecological hypothesis testing and theory choice. Philosophy can also help ecologists understand the role and limitations of (...) mathematical models in ecology. On the other side, philosophy of science will be advanced by having ecological case studies as part of the stock of examples. Ecological case studies can shed light on old philosophical topics as well as raise novel issues for the philosophy of science. For example, understanding theoretical terms such as “biodiversity” is important for scientific reasons, but such terms also carry political importance. Formulating appropriate definitions for such terms is thus not a purely scientific matter, and this may prompt a reevaluation of philosophical accounts of defining theoretical terms. We consider some of the topics currently receiving attention in the philosophy of ecology and other topics in need of attention. Our aim is to prompt further exchange between ecology and philosophy of science and to help set the agenda for future work in the philosophy of ecology. The topics covered include: the role of mathematical models, environmental problem formulation, biodiversity, and environmental ethics. (shrink)

Talk about time travel is puzzling even if it isn't obviously contradictory. Philosophers however are divided about whether time travel involves empirical paradox or some deeper metaphysical incoherence. It is suggested that time travel requires a Parmenidean four-dimensionalist metaphysical conception of the world in time. The possibility of time travel is addressed (mainly) from within a Parmenidean metaphysical framework, which is accepted by David Lewis in his defence of the coherence of time travel. It is argued that time travel raises (...) formidable difficulties which are not satisfactorily resolved by Lewis's ingenious defence of time travel. Objections to time travel considered include: (1) travel to other times is impossible because there is nowhere (or “nowhen”) to go to; (2) the problem that upon setting out on a journey to the past a time machine will collide with itself; (3) time travel generates a mysterious temporal dualism between experiential time and physical time; (4) travel to the past permits reverse causation, raising the possibility of causal loops and attendant problems arising, for example, from the prospect of empirical contradiction and the possibility of someone being one of their ancestors. (shrink)

Epicurus notoriously argued that death at no time is a harm because before death there is no harm and after death there is no victim. The denial that death can be a harm to the one who dies has been challenged by various claims including (1) death is eternally bad for the victim (Feldman), (2) it is before death that it is bad for the victim (Feinberg and Pitcher), (3) death is bad for the victim but at no particular time (...) (Nagel), and (4) it is at the time of death that death is bad for the victim (Lamont). Nagel's account is more plausible and is consistent with the view that the temporal location of the harm of untimely death is best understood as the time when the decedent might otherwise have lived. (edited). (shrink)

Our environmental crisis is commonly explained as a product of a set of attitudes and beliefs about the world which have been developed by post‐Cartesian technological society. Deep ecologists claim that the crisis can only be overcome by adopting an alternative non‐technological paradigm, such as can be discovered in non‐Western cultures. In this paper I express misgivings about the use of the expression ‘Paradigm’ by deep ecologists, question the claim that a science‐based world‐view inevitably fosters manipulative and exploitative attitudes to (...) the natural world, suggest that non‐technological cultures do not necessarily provide exemplary and superior models for relating to the natural world, and defend a scientific naturalism as a satisfying way of realising our unity with the natural world. (shrink)

Philosophical interest in ecology is relatively new. Standard texts in the philosophy of biology pay little or no attention to ecology (though Sterelny and Griffiths 1999 is an exception). This is in part because the science of ecology itself is relatively new, but whatever the reasons for the neglect in the past, the situation must change. A good philosophical understanding of ecology is important for a number of reasons. First, ecology is an important and fascinating branch of biology with distinctive (...) philosophical issues that arise from its study. Second, ecology is only one small step away from urgent political, ethical, and management decisions about how best to live in an apparently increasingly-fragile environment. Third, philosophy of ecology, properly conceived, can contribute directly to both our understanding of ecology and help with its advancement. Philosophy of ecology can thus be seen as part of the emerging discipline of “biohumanities”, where biology and humanities disciplines together advance our understanding and knowledge of biology (Stotz and Griffiths forthcoming). In this paper, we focus primarily on this third role of the philosophy of ecology and consider a number of places where philosophy can play an important role in ecology. In the process, we.. (shrink)

The moral status of future persons is problematic. It is often claimed that we should take the interests of the indefinite unborn very seriously, because they have a right to a decent life. It is also claimed (often by the same people) that we should allow unrestricted access to abortion, because the indefinite unborn have no rights. In this paper I argue that these intuitions are not in fact inconsistent. The aim is to provide an account of trans-temporal concern which (...) resolves the prima facie inconsistency between commonly held intuitions about our obligations to future persons. I argue that our intuitions can be reconciled provided that we explicate obligations to the future in terms of impersonal principles subject to retroactive person-affecting constraints. (shrink)

The ethics of human genetic engineering.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 740-743, December 2011.

A major stream of Artificial Life research aims to build synthetic life forms, operating in virtual worlds, implemented as computer programs. A clear long-term target for this research is the evolution of digital life-forms with a complexity of structure and behaviour analogous to biological life-forms, potentially exhibiting intelligence and self-awareness. The creation of intelligent, self-aware digital life-forms has clear ethical implications, but there is no current research into how these ethical issues might be addressed. This paper argues that such ethical (...) research is needed. Furthermore, it describes our future research plans to build a solid philosophical foundation for the consideration of these ethical issues. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate some characteristics of anomalous or deviant belief systems, such belief systems which include the extraordinary diversity of paranormal claims. It is frequently suggested that the appropriate attitude to adopt to such belief systems is one of scepticism—and that is a conclusion which I will not dispute. However I also suggest that deviant belief systems have characteristics which reveal much of interest about human psychology and the way that we try to make sense of the world.

The critique of traditional Western ethics, and in particular its anthropocentric foundations, is a central theme which has dominated environmental philosophy for the last twenty years. Anthropocentrism is widely identified as a fundamental source of the alienating and destructive attitudes towards the nonhuman world which are a principal target of a number of salient ecophilosophies. This paper addresses a problem about articulating the concern with anthropocentrism raised by the influencial formulations of deep ecology by nature liberation proponent Val Plumwood.

In this paper I explore the question: Can what is said metaphorically be said literally? I provide a qualified affirmative answer to this question. However I also suggest that although a paraphrase can be provided which satisfactorily conveys the cognitive content of the metaphor, the paraphrase is unable to provide the insight which the metaphor did. I go on to argue that the tendency to take an ex post facto view of metaphor obscures the central role which metaphor plays in (...) concept formation. (shrink)

A variety of objections to human germ-line genetic engineering have been raised, such as the claim that we ought not to place individuals at significant risk without their consent It has also been argued that it is paternalistically objectionable to confer significant benefits on individuals without their consent. As well as imposing a risk of harm to non-consenting parties, there is the risk of harm to others. This paper evaluates these and related objections to germ-line genetic engineering. While a complete (...) prohibition on human germ-line genetic engineering is rejected it is argued that acceptable germ-line engineering (a) should at least expand and enrich rather than restrict and constrain the choices for individuals affected, and (b) should not seek to change basic human dispositions and values (‘human nature’). (shrink)

An international event established by UNESCO in 2002 • Observed annually on the third Thursday of November, in order – to honor philosophical reflection around the world – to share thoughts, and to openly explore and discuss ideas and inspire public debate or discussion about social challenges • Objective: to make philosophy accessible and create opportunities for rational reflection, discussion and to foster independent and critical thought.

Epicurus famously argued that death is never a harm to the one who dies, because there is no time at which the decedent is worse off. While the decedent is still alive death isn't a harm; but after death there is no one to be harmed. Life is death-excluding, and death is harm-excluding. When then can the decedent be worse off? Either: at no particular time; always; before death; at death; or, after death. In an earlier paper ('Epicurus and the (...) harm of Death') I argued that decedents may suffer posthumous harm. Here I answer objections to the posthumous harm proposal, and provide further clarification of this position. (shrink)