The argument of this article is that the Albert Memorial acted as a catalyst for some of Collingwood's most well known ideas in the philosophy of history and aesthetics. It was not, however, the exclusive source of those ideas, and indeed they had philosophical expression elsewhere. One may view his contemplations, then, as work in progress. For example, the logic of question and answer promoted by the Memorial was also prompted by Collingwood's reading of Bacon and Descartes. This was a (...) reflection of his determination to depart from the realism of his philosophical teachers. Similarly, the Memorial directs Collingwood's thought forward. The Memorial acts as a facilitator of his thought on history, which in the course of its formulation undergoes many transformations. The logic of question and answer also finds a place in Collingwood's early thinking about art, but even here it is in the process of constant transition. Collingwood's reaction to the Memorial helps us to conclude that there is nothing ironic about the fact that Collingwood loathed the structure that was also the instigator of one of his most influential philosophical doctrines. (shrink)

Given that R. G. Collingwood and P. F. Strawson introduced a Kantian inspired "reform of metaphysics" in a strikingly similar terminology, the absence of a comparative article on their concepts of a "descriptive metaphysics" is rather surprising. In a recent article, Giuseppina D'Oro filled this gap. Her thoughtprovoking article "The Myth of Collingwood's Historicism" is not only the first endeavor to locate Collingwood's concept of metaphysics against the background of Strawson's distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, but it is also (...) a defense against the often-heard claim that their "descriptive" metaphysics "saved the letter of traditional metaphysics, but abandoned its spirit." This paper, partly set up as a critical dialogue with D'Oro, consists of four parts. First, it elaborates on D'Oro's comparison between Collingwood and Strawson by focusing not only on Strawson's distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics in Individuals but by concentrating on his use of three different concepts of metaphysics in The Bounds of Sense. Second, it locates the differences between Collingwood's and Strawson's concepts of metaphysics on the basis of their respective approaches toward Kant's transcendental idealism. Subsequently, it defends a historical and ontological reading of Collingwood's metaphysics of objective idealism. Finally, Collingwood's metaphysics is located in the light of the union between Strawson's descriptive metaphysics and his soft naturalism. (shrink)

Boceto de la receptio viquiana en R. G. Collingwood Pablo Badillo O’Farrell Este estudio aborda y esboza, en un tratamiento inédito en español, la recepción de Vico en el filósofo e historiador inglés R.G. Collingwood.PALABRAS CLAVE: Vico, Collingwood, historia, filosofía política, autobiografía, Croce.This study deals for the first time in Spanish with Vico’s reception by the English philosopher and historian R.G. Collingwood.KEYWORDS: Vico, Collingwood, history, political philosophy, autobiography, Croce.

R.G. Collingwood greatly admired Dilthey’s philosophy of history. In this article, I show that despite the obvious affinities between both authors, their views on the historical role of philosophy are clearly divergent. I focus on one topic in particular in their writings, namely, the status of metaphysics and its relation to history. Whereas Dilthey argues that the awareness of the historicity of metaphysics and its psychological-hermeneutical foundation inevitably leads to the euthanasia of metaphysics, Collingwood defends the possibility of a reform (...) of metaphysics into a historical discipline, based on a logic of question and answer. The analysis of the difference between these two thinkers with respect to the role of metaphysics consists of three steps. First, I situate Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics into the whole of his oeuvre, followed by a presentation of his ”solution’ to the metaphysical antinomy. Second, I focus on the role of Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and on his ”solution’ to the metaphysical antinomy. To that end, I make use of Collingwood’s recently released unpublished manuscripts so as to shed greater light on his rejection of Dilthey’s understanding of the historical role and definition of metaphysics. Finally, I reformulate the differing statuses of metaphysics between these two thinkers by relating their divergent views to their respective understandings of human finitude. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that R.G.Collingwood's An Essay on Philosophical Method and An Essay on Metaphysics are closely related but are also significantly different. If they do in fact differ in any significant way, one wonders whether there are good reasons to prefer one account over the other at the points where they differ. In this article, I would like to try to answer this query by referring to two passages, where the text in both essays is nearly identical but (...) which nevertheless reveal the differences between the two essays. In these passages Collingwood gives a presentation of Plato's and Kant's philosophical method and compares their methodologies to his own. Precisely the small differences between the two fragments not only show the continuity between both essays, but also make clear how Collingwood's concept of metaphysics after 1936, under the pressure of logical positivism, loses its distinctive sharpness and hence becomes liable to the charge of relativism and historicism. If my analysis has any plausibility, I hope to make it clear that Collingwood's position in EPM is preferable to that of EM or, to put it more mildly, that 'any account of EM must do justice to EPM if we are to allow the rest of Collingwood's philosophy to live and flourish'. (shrink)

There are many alternative ways that a mind or brain might represent that two of its representations were of the same object or property, the 'Strawson' model, the 'duplicates' model, the 'synchrony' mode, the 'Christmas lights' model, the 'anaphor' model, and so forth. I first discuss what would constitute that a mind or brain was using one of these systems of identity marking rather than another. I then discuss devastating effects that adopting the Strawson model has on the notion that (...) there are such things as modes of presentation in thought. Next I argue that Evans' idea that there are 'dynamic Fregean thoughts' has exactly the same implications. I argue further that all of the other models of thought discussed earlier are in fact isomorphic to the Strawson model. a search for the source of these difficulties reveals the classical notion of modes of presentation as resting on two assumptions, neither of which I recommend. It depends on denying that the way the mind reacts to or understands the thoughts or ideas that it harbours has any bearing on their intentional contents. And it depends on an internalist view of thought content, in particular, on denying that the natural informational content carried or potentially carried by a thought has any bearing on its intentional content. (shrink)

This treatise on aesthetics begins by showing that the word "art" is used as a name not only for "art proper" but also for certain things which are "art falsely so called." These are craft or skill, magic, and amusement, each of which, by confusion with art proper, generates a false aesthetic theory. In the course of attacking these theories the author criticizes various psychological theories of art, offers a new theory of magic, and reinterprets Plato's so-called "attack on art," (...) showing that it has been entirely misunderstood. Finally, he draws important inferences concerning the position of art in human society. (shrink)

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a new edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction. The volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.

Die Principia Isaac Newtons (1643-1727) gelten als zentraler Beitrag zur klassischen Mechanik. Eine nähere Betrachtung zeigt jedoch, dass es sich bei diesem Werk lediglich um den Anfangspunkt einer jahrhundertelangen Entwicklung handelt, an deren Ende das steht, was heute als klassische Mechanik bezeichnet wird. Dies gilt insbesondere für Newtons Raumtheorie: Newtons absoluter Raum hat nicht nur zentrale Bedeutung für seine Mechanik, sondern auch für seine Metaphysik. Der Einfluss metaphysischer Überlegungen auf das Werk Newtons wird in der Forschung jedoch häufig heruntergespielt. Erdmann (...) Görg nimmt in diesem Band die Verbindung physikalischer und metaphysischer Überlegungen in der Raumtheorie Newtons in den Blick und untersucht davon ausgehend die Entmetaphysierung des Raumes im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert anhand der Position Immanuel Kants (1724-1804) und der noch kaum erforschten Raumtheorie Jakob Friedrich Fries' (1773-1843). Indem Görg die Konzeptionen von Raum, Gott und Gravitation bei Newton, Kant und Fries ins Verhältnis setzt, kann er ein vollständigeres Bild der Entwicklung der klassischen Mechanik zeichnen "--Publisher's description. (shrink)

The Idea of History is the best-known book of the great Oxford philosopher, historian, and archaeologist R.G. Collingwood. It was originally published posthumously in 1946, having been mainly reconstructed from Collingwood's manuscripts, many of which are now lost. For this revised edition, Collingwood's most important lectures on the philosophy of history are published here for the first time. These texts have been prepared by Jan van der Dussen from manuscripts that have only recently become available. The lectures contain Collingwood's first (...) comprehensive statement of his philosophy of history; they are therefore essential for a full understanding of his thought, and in particular for a correct interpretation of The Idea of History itself. Van der Dussen contributes a substantial introduction in which he explains the background to this new edition and surveys the scholarship of the last fifty years. (shrink)

This early work by Robin G. Collingwood was originally published in 1939 and we are now republishing it with a brand new introductory biography. 'An Autobiography' is the story of Collingwood's personal and academic life. Robin George Collingwood was born on 22nd February 1889, in Cartmel, England. He was the son of author, artist, and academic, W. G. Collingwood. He was greatly influenced by the Italian Idealists Croce, Gentile, and Guido de Ruggiero. Another important influence was his father, a professor (...) of fine art and a student of Ruskin. He published many works of philosophy, such as Speculum Mentis (1924), An Essay on Philosophic Method (1933), and An Essay on Metaphysics (1940). (shrink)

The New Leviathan, originally published in 1942, a few months before the author's death, is the book which R. G. Collingwood chose to write in preference to ...

Classroom discussion constitutes a unique opportunity for student deliberation and is often believed to be a desirable attribute of Social Science teaching. Yet, despite its potential, large scale observational research on discussion in Nordic classrooms is scarce. To address this shortcoming, the present study investigated the prevalence and contexts of classroom discussion in a Nordic sample of 375 teaching segments (each lasting 15 min). The sample was gathered through video observations, and discussion was measured by an element from the Protocol (...) for Language Arts Teaching Observations. Discussion was present in 39.2% of the investigated segments but was very unequally distributed across classes. While this study found classroom discussion to be most likely during small group work, in the middle of a 45-min lesson, and in schools with high achieving students, more research is needed to determine the sources of inequality in social science students’ opportunities for classroom deliberation. (shrink)

2014 Reprint of 1945 Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. The first part deals with Greek cosmology and is the longest, the most elaborate and, on the whole, the liveliest part of a book which never deviates into dullness. The dominant thought in Greek cosmology, Collingwood holds, was the microcosm-macrocosm analogy, nature being the substance of something ensouled where "soul" meant the self-moving. Part II is "The Renaissance View of Nature ." Collingwood describes (...) the rise and decline of the deists' view of Nature as a machine designed by the Great Contriver who, having turned it out, watches it go. Part III, "The Modern View of Nature," deals with very recent or contemporary philosophy and science, discerning in it a radical evolutionism first in biology and later in cosmology. Remains to this day a classic text in the history of ideas. (shrink)

This book explores solving the problem of complexity for science in the 21st century.

This treatise on aesthetics criticizes various psychological theories of art, offers new theories and interpretations, and draws important inferences concerning ...

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a revised edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction, and the volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.

When travellers are overcome by cold, it is said, they lie down quite happily and die. They put up no fight for life. If they struggled, they would keep warm; but they no longer want to struggle. The cold in themselves takes away the will to fight against the cold around them.