La teoría de la lógica mental no acepta una regla correcta en el cálculo proposicional estándar: la regla de introducción de la disyunción (esto es, la regla que permite inferir, por ejemplo, p o q de p). Esto es un problema porque esa misma teoría admite otro esquema en el que la regla está realmente implicada. Es cierto que, como ha mostrado López-Astorga, la teoría de la lógica mental puede ser actualizada de acuerdo con resultados empíricos recientes y que (...) tal actualización puede ayudar a la teoría a resolver algunas de sus dificultades. No obstante, la actualización de López-Astorga no afronta los desafíos directamente planteados por la regla de introducción de la disyunción y este trabajo pretende proceder en esa dirección. En concreto, mi tesis aquí es que todas las dificultades de la mencionada regla pueden desaparecer si no es considerada un Esquema Núcleo de la sintaxis del pensamiento humano, sino un Esquema Alimentador de la misma. (shrink)

La teoría de la disciplina formal sostiene que el estudio de las matemáticas desarrolla las habilidades lógicas de los individuos. Attridge e Inglis realizaron un experimento con el fin de comprobar si esta teoría es correcta o no. Su conclusión fue que sus resultados mostraban que, si bien las matemáticas pueden, efectivamente, mejorar las capacidades lógicas, es necesario asumir la interpretación defectuosa del condicional. Sin embargo, López-Astorga contraargumentó que eran posibles otras interpretaciones de sus resultados, que tales resultados no (...) prueban que la interpretación material del condicional no es válida y que la teoría de los modelos mentales también los puede explicar. En este trabajo, comento los problemas vinculados a las otras interpretaciones posibles propuestas por López-Astorga y trato de mostrar que la mejor opción para la interpretación de los resultados de Attridge e Inglis es asumir la teoría de la lógica mental. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: The mental models theory predicts that, while conjunctions are easier than disjunctions for individuals, when denied, conjunctions are harder than disjunctions. Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird proved that this prediction is correct in their work of 2014. In this paper, I analyze their results in order to check whether or not they really affect the mental logic theory. My conclusion is that, although Khemlani et al.'s study provides important findings, such findings do not necessarily lead to questioning or to rejecting (...) the mental logic theory. RESUMO: A teoria dos modelos mentais prevê que, enquanto as conjunções são mais fáceis do que as disjunções, para os indivíduos, quando negadas, as conjunções são mais difíceis do que as disjunções. Khemlani, Orenes e Johnson-Laird provaram que essa previsão está correta, em seu trabalho de 2014. Neste trabalho, analiso os seus resultados, a fim de verificar se eles realmente afetam a teoria da lógica mental ou não. Minha conclusão é que, embora o estudo da Khemlani, Orenes and Johnson-Laird forneça resultados importantes, tais resultados não conduzem necessariamente a minar ou rejeitar a teoria da lógica mental. (shrink)

DePrince relates problems such as dissociation, revictimization and difficulties in social cognition. In particular, she states that individuals with dissociation or have been, by their own testimony, revictimized show obvious difficulties to solve selection tasks designed as social contracts or precautory problems. In my view, these facts mean that, if we accept the theories that there are mechanisms in human mind to regulate social exchanges and situations of risk, individuals with dissociation or revitimized may have altered such mechanisms. However, these (...) theories have been critized and we have no evidence that they are valid. Therefore, in this paper, not admitting the existence of these mechanisms, I try to show that DePrince’s outcomes can be interpreted from other perspectives. DePrince establece relaciones entre problemas como la disociación, la revictimización y ciertas dificultades en la cognición social. En concreto, afirma que las personas que padecen de disociación o que han sufrido, según su propio testimonio, episodios de revictimización manifiestan evidentes dificultades para resolver tareas de selección planteadas como contratos sociales o como problemas de precaución. En nuestra opinión, esto significa que, si aceptamos las teorías que defienden que existen mecanismos en la mente humana que regulan los intercambios sociales y las situaciones de riesgo, las personas que han sido diagnosticadas con disociación o que han sido revictimizadas pueden presentar alteraciones de tales mecanismos. No obstante, esas teorías han sido cuestionadas y no contamos con pruebas concluyentes de que sean válidas. Por ello, en este trabajo, no admitiendo la existencia de los mencionados mecanismos, intentamos mostrar que los resultados de DePrince pueden ser interpretados desde otras perspectivas. (shrink)

Como se sabe, el ensayo se ha convertido en una de las mejores formas de interpretar las realidades del mundo y de la vida. Su característica más significativa consiste en ofrecer un ejercicio de comprensión que va más allá de las explicaciones que suelen encontrarse en los textos atados a una disciplina. Valga señalar que es en el campo de las ciencias sociales y las humanidades donde se aprecian claramente sus privilegios. La versatilidad no afecta al rigor, la diversidad de (...) miradas se articula con la densidad de la argumentación, la historicidad aparece en sintonía con el presente, la intuición no es ajena a las formas conceptuales, la poesía se anuda con el ejercicio de interpretación. De esta forma, curiosamente, el ensayo logra dar cuenta con notable solidez, a través de diversas formas discursivas, de lo que varias disciplinas muestran o demuestran de manera aislada. (shrink)

DePrince establece relaciones entre problemas como la disociación, la revictimización y ciertas dificultades en la cognición social. En concreto, afirma que las personas que padecen de disociación o que han sufrido, según su propio testimonio, episodios de revictimización manifiestan evidentes difi..

While most business ethics texts focus exclusively on individual decision making--what should an individual do--this resource presents the whole business ethics story. Highly realistic, readable, and down-to-earth, it moves from the individual to the managerial to the organizational level, focusing on business ethics in an organizational context to promote an understanding of complex influences on behavior. The new Fifth Edition is the perfect text for students entering the workplace, those seeking to become professionals in training, communications, compliance, in addition to (...) chief ethics officers, corporate counsel, heads of human resources, and senior executives. (shrink)

Baratgin and colleagues have questioned certain aspects of the mental models theory related to disjunction. It is truth that, from this last theory, the paper authored by Baratgin et al. has already been responded. However, I try to further develop that response here by insisting in two important points of the theory: the role that modulation plays in it and the clear differences between its framework and standard logic. In this way, my main aim is to support to a larger (...) extent, by means of theoretical arguments based on its general approach, the idea that the objections presented in the mentioned paper do not really impact the mental models theory. (shrink)

Contemporary African philosophy in indigenous African languages and English translation.

As described, for example, by Hornstein, the general linguistic framework given by the contemporary government-binding theory distinguishes several levels. This paper is intended to show that a differentiation of that kind, if such levels are understood in a different manner, can be clearly consistent with some developments in current cognitive science, and, in particular, with approaches such as the one of López-Astorga, which attempts to link proposals that, in principle, can be deemed as irreconcilable, such as the mental models (...) theory and the idea that human cognition is led by logical forms. In this way, without accepting the characteristics that usually are assigned to the levels pointed out by the government-binding theory, it is argued that the role attributed to semantics and syntax by López-Astorga can be compatible with a general structure more or less akin to the one of this last theory. (shrink)

Este artículo plantea que el concepto de solidaridad, usualmente exaltado en tiempos de crisis, contiene en sí mismo el conjunto de límites que lo debilitan y lo convierten, paradójicamente, en una sutil manifestación del egoísmo. Para analizar esta contradicción, se abordan las posiciones emblemáticas de cinco autores contemporáneos: John Rawls, Richard Rorty, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor y Hannah Arendt. A través de este análisis puede mostrarse que los grandes desafíos de nuestra civilización permiten advertir los dilemas y las contingencias que (...) afectan el nexo entre el liberalismo y la solidaridad. (shrink)

Purpose. The signification of the theoretical grounds for the conceptual reconstruction of the dichotomy "spirit-body" in the field of postmodern notions in philosophy and culture, the identification of the location of the given dichotomy in the processes of the transition of philosophy from being classical to the postclassical one, simultaneously, culture – to the cultural forms of postmodernity. Theoretical basis. The changing systems of post paradigm relations, radically transforming human life in the postmodern world, represent the obvious transformations of the (...) fundamental conceptual schemes. For postmodern philosophers, the dichotomy "spirit-body" does not mean better interpretation of separate substances any more, but the development of the relationship between mental and physical properties. Feminist philosophers assert that the "spirit-body" opposition occupies the special place among classical dichotomies, as it acquires the key meaning in the patriarchal concepts of masculinity and femininity. In the post modernity, the body and corporality become dominant themes not only in the philosophy and "high" culture, but also in mass culture; at the same time, the emphasis on their common narratives and intertexts testifies to the fundamental transformations that reflect the "condition" of postmodernity. Originality of this research lies in the expose of the specific transformation features of the dichotomy "spirit-body" as a philosophic opposition closely connected with postmodernism and realized in the practices of mass culture. This research is reflectedof the idea of the absoluteness and invariabilityof this duality as thebasicdichotomy of the classical philosophy in its correlation with cultural logic of the postmodernity at the end of the 20 – the beginning of the 21st centuries. Conclusions. With the reinterpretation of the "spirit-body" dichotomy, the body is theorized as a cognitive agent with desires independent of the mind. In postmodernism, the body is the source of charm, and aversion and destruction, and restoration. At the same time, with the growth of the visualization factor and the change in the status of "high" culture, the "turn" in the status of mass culture is created: today both the former and the letter have many common discourses, narratives and intertexts. (shrink)

Resumen Atendiendo a la lógica estándar, solo uno de los cinco indemostrables propuestos por Crisipo de Solos es realmente indemostrable. Sus otros cuatro esquemas son demostrables en tal lógica. La pregunta, por tanto, es: si cuatro de ellos no son verdaderamente indemostrables, por qué Crisipo consideró que sí lo eran. López-Astorga mostró que si ignoramos el cálculo proposicional estándar y asumimos que una teoría cognitiva contemporánea, la teoría de la lógica mental, describe correctamente el razonamiento humano, se puede entender (...) por qué Crisipo pensó que todos sus indemostrables eran tan básicos. No obstante, en este trabajo trato de argumentar que la teoría de la lógica mental no es el único marco que puede explicar esto. En concreto, sostengo que otra importante teoría sobre el razonamiento en el presente, la teoría de los modelos mentales, también puede ofrecer una explicación al respecto.According to standard logic, only one of the five indemonstrables proposed by Chrysippus of Soli is actually indemonstrable. The other four schemata are demonstra-ble in that logic. The question hence is, if four of them are not really indemonstrable, why Chrysippus considered them to be so. López-Astorga showed that, if we ignore standard propositional calculus and assume that a current cognitive theory, the mental logic theory, truly describes human reasoning, it can be explained why Chrysippus thought that all of his indemonstrables were so basic. However, in this paper, I try to argue that the mental logic theory is not the only framework that can account for that. In particular, I hold that another important reasoning theory at present, the mental models theory, can offer an explanation in that regard as well. (shrink)

Philosophical Analysis Its Development between the Two World Wars.

Luiz de Oliveira Astorga | : Dans cet article, je montre qu’une grande section de texte cajétanien a été accidentellement copiée dans l’ouvrage d’un de ses plus véhéments critiques, le P. Francesco Licheto, un éminent professeur et commentateur de la pensée de Duns Scot. Le texte est inséré sans aucune marque distinctive et termine une section du commentaire en donnant au lecteur une idée complètement opposée à celle que le vrai auteur soutenait. Cette erreur paraît avoir échappé à l’attention (...) des éditeurs pendant des siècles et s’est perpétuée dans les cinq plus grandes éditions qui contiennent l’ouvrage de Licheto, dont deux sont celles des Opera Omnia de Scot : celles de 1639 et 1893. | : In this paper I demonstrate that a large section of a Cajetanian text was accidentally copied into the work of one of his most vehement critics, Fr. Francesco Licheto, a prominent professor and commentator of Duns Scot’s thought. The text was originally inserted without markings or observations and ends the section of commentary giving the reader the exact opposite view of what the actual author had intended. The mistake seems to have evaded editors for centuries and has perpetuated itself in the five major editions that contain Licheto’s work, two of them being Scot’s Opera Omnia, those of 1639 and 1893. (shrink)

The mental model theory is an approach with clear psychological, linguistic, and cognitive consequences. This paper delves into some of the epistemological conclusions that can be drawn from it. In particular, it addresses the process why knowledge acquisition can modify the inferences people tend to make. That process is described by means of an example based on a well-known logical schema related to the conditional: Modus Tollendo Tollens.

The theory of modality Buridan develops is linked to different propositions. This paper addresses one of those propositions. The aim is to show that, if the operator of necessity included in it is ignored, the proposition allows deriving, within first-order predicate logic, a reduction sentence with the characteristics required in Carnap’s framework. Besides, the paper tries to argue that the mentioned operator of necessity can be understood not only in a technical sense (as modal logic does), but also in the (...) way a naïve individual (without modal logical training) could interpret it. These latter arguments are given from the theory of mental models. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza el debate sobre la forma adecuada de entender el condicional producido en el siglo IV a. C. El análisis se lleva a cabo mediante el método proporcionado por Rudolf Carnap para estudiar el significado de las expresiones, es decir, mediante el método de extensión e intensión. Los resultados de ese análisis parecen mostrar que, aunque, según Sexto Empirico, el debate fue sobre cuatro criterios diferentes para comprender el condicional, en realidad tres de esos criterios parecen (...) ser iguales y tienen una forma lógica común muy clara en el marco de Carnap. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap proposed three reduction rules to improve scientific language. Those rules indicate when it is correct to add a property in situations in which other properties are already had. Assuming the theory of mental models, it has been shown that the rules are not hard to use from the cognitive point of view. The key to argue that is to accept that the human mind works as dual-process theories claim. According to these theories, people can use two different systems. (...) One of them implies effort but the other one does not. Thus, the idea is that Carnap’s reduction rules can be applied resorting just to the system not implying cognitive effort. This paper goes one step further and poses that even from a Popperian perspective the reduction rules keep not being difficult. One might think that falsifiability requires cognitive effort because it needs to address situations in which the sentences are false. However, this paper tries to explain that, following the theory of mental models, that is not hard if the sentences are conditionals, and the sentences in the reduction rules have conditional structures. (shrink)

Carnap and Popper proposed ways scientists have to work. According to Carnap, they should look for confirmations for hypotheses. In Popper‘s view, what is important is to try to falsify hypotheses. Cognitive science seems to prove that, in real scientific research, both activities play a role. First, people attempt to confirm hypotheses. Second, they seek examples refuting those hypotheses. This paper is intended to show that the theory of mental models can describe the mental processes involved in both tasks: confirmation (...) and falsification. It addresses the mental possibilities individuals consider in both cases. In addition, the paper reveals that, in accordance with both Carnap‘s framework and Popper‘s approach, both mental activities are related to conditional reasoning. (shrink)

En este trabajo se presenta una explicación para el problema de las versiones abstractas de la tarea de selección de las cuatro tarjetas de Peter Wason: los discretos resultados de los participantes cuando se enfrentan a ellas. Nuestra explicación apunta a que los sujetos no comprenden la regla de la tarea como un condicional, sino como un bicondicional, provocando tal circunstancia que no elijan las tarjetas correctas. Santamaría planteó una objeción para todo enfoque que defienda que en la tarea de (...) selección se produce una interpretación bicondicional de la regla, pero nosotros también respondemos aquí a dicha objeción atendiendo a la primacía que en el razonamiento humano puede tener la regla lógica del modus ponens. Igualmente, exponemos un estudio, basado en diálogos de seminario tutoriales al modo socrático, realizado por nosotros con el propósito de comprobar si nuestra explicación puede ser viable y comentamos los resultados obtenidos. In this paper, we present an explanation for the problem of the abstract versions of Peter Wason’s four-card selection task: modest subjects’ results when they are confronted with these tasks. Our explanation poses that individuals do not comprehend the task rule as a conditional sentence, but as a biconditional one, causing that subjects do not choose the correct cards. Santamaría presented an objection for any approach that suggests a biconditional interpretation in the task selection. In this work, we discuss this objection based on the apparent primacy of a logical rule in human reasoning: modus ponens. Additionally, we present a study based on Socratic dialogue seminars with a tutorial style, developed by us, to check whether our explanation is viable or not, and discuss the results achieved. (shrink)

The suppression task challenges classical logic. Classical logic is monotonic. However, in the suppression task, an inference with the form of modus ponendo ponens is inhibited by adding a new premise. Several explanations have been given to account for this fact. The present paper indicates three of them as examples: that of the theory of mental models, that based on logic programming and closed world assumption, and that referring to Carnap's concept of state‐descriptions. Besides, the paper offers one more explanation (...) linked to Carnap's idea of reduction. It proposes sentences akin to a reduction sentence, a pair reduction, and a bilateral reduction sentence. Those sentences are related to the initial conditional in the suppression task. This proposal tries to stay within first‐order predicate logic. (shrink)

This article discusses the representation of law in Toni Morrison’s Beloved in the context of legal philosophy. Beloved’s contribution to the legal humanities has been described in terms of the contrast Morrison dramatizes between two visions of law: the violence of human chattel slavery embodied by the titular ghost, Beloved, and the communal act of solidarity that exorcizes her from her mother’s house. Yet this characterization neglects the associations Morrison draws in Beloved and in her metacommentary between the ghost and (...) other juridical forms, including personality and property. This article proposes an interpretation of Beloved that reads the ghost as a metaphor for the modern, metaphysicalized sense of the legal person for whom self-possession has become a prerequisite for action. Through a reading of Beloved that considers the final version of the novel against an unpublished earlier ending revealed by Morrison’s papers, I argue that Beloved challenges the reducibility of modern personhood to reflexive ownership. (shrink)

Kai kurios šiuolaikinio kognityvinio mokslo teorijos teigia, kad žmogaus prote veikia dvi sistemos: sistema, vykdanti greitą intuityvų mąstymą, bei sistema, vadovaujanti lėtam logiškam mąstymui. Būtų galima manyti, kad šių sistemų egzistavimą patikrinti sudėtinga. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiamas būdas palaipsniui patvirtinti šių dviejų sistemų egzistavimą. Pasitelkiamas dviejų sistemų, pasireiškiančių per mentalinių modelių teoriją, principas. Be to, laikantis Carnapo redukcijos idėjos, straipsnyje aprašomos dvi procedūros, kuriomis hipotezė patvirtinama palaipsniui. Viena iš jų tyrinėja, kaip žmogaus protas nagrinėja žmogaus proto veiklą darant išvedimus pagal modus (...) tollendo tollens. Kita hipotezė tyrinėja išvedimus iš griežtosios disjunkcijos su trimis disjunktais. (shrink)

This paper is intended to address the work “Against logical form”, authored by Johnson-Laird in 2010. In it, based on the theory of mental models, Johnson-Laird claims that the way people interpret sentences in natural language has nothing to do with logic. This is because that action is not related to logical forms. According to him, the mental activity is mainly linked to semantics and pragmatics. However, here, following arguments provided by López-Astorga, I try to show that the theory (...) of mental models can be linked to syntactic structures. My main point is made by dealing with an argument given in the mentioned Johnson-Laird’s paper. In principle, that argument seems to undermine proposals such as that of López-Astorga. However, the present work proposes otherwise. (shrink)

This paper describes a study about inter-understanding between Portuguese and Spanish. Based on Peano’s work, the study resorts to the logical relation of intersection between sets and applies it to words in Portuguese and Spanish meaning the same. The material is a text that is the abstract of a psychology paper. Each of the words in that text, which is written in Portuguese, is compared to its corresponding Spanish word by means of the relation of intersection. This is made by (...) considering the letters in the words to be elements in sets. The results show the potential that this methodology can have to provide percentages of inter-understanding between the two languages (and between any pair of languages). (shrink)

The social contracts theory claims that, in social exchange circumstances, human reasoning is not necessarily led by logic, but by certain evolved mental mechanisms that are useful for catching offenders. An emblematic experiment carried out with the intention to prove this thesis is the first experiment described by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby in their paper of 2000. Lopez Astorga has questioned that experiment claiming that its results depend on an underlying conditional logical form not taken into account by Fiddick, (...) Cosmides, and Tooby. In this paper, I propose an explanation alternative to that of Lopez Astorga, which does not depend on logical forms and is based on the mental models theory. Thus, I conclude that this other alternative explanation is one more proof that the experiment in question does not demonstrate the fundamental thesis of the social contracts theory. (shrink)