The suppression task and first‐order predicate calculus

Theoria 89 (6):800-810 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The suppression task challenges classical logic. Classical logic is monotonic. However, in the suppression task, an inference with the form of modus ponendo ponens is inhibited by adding a new premise. Several explanations have been given to account for this fact. The present paper indicates three of them as examples: that of the theory of mental models, that based on logic programming and closed world assumption, and that referring to Carnap's concept of state‐descriptions. Besides, the paper offers one more explanation linked to Carnap's idea of reduction. It proposes sentences akin to a reduction sentence, a pair reduction, and a bilateral reduction sentence. Those sentences are related to the initial conditional in the suppression task. This proposal tries to stay within first‐order predicate logic.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,745

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-10-06

Downloads
11 (#351,772)

6 months
6 (#1,472,471)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Testability and meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Testability and meaning (part 1).Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):420-71.
Testability and meaning (part 2).Rudolf Carnap - 1937 - Philosophy of Science 4 (4):1-40.

View all 15 references / Add more references