La calidad en la educación superior tecnológica se ha caracterizado mejor por la formación de las capacidades del estudiantado que por los niveles alcanzados en la rendición de cuentas o en la gestión institucional. En virtud de la literatura especializada han existido dos grandes enfoques que caracterizaron la temática de la calidad en la Educación Superior en las últimas décadas. Desde una perspectiva administrativa, la apuesta fue por la gestión de calidad, y desde los estudios sociales fue la promoción de (...) la cultura institucional. En este marco, el estudio buscó caracterizar los referentes de la calidad subyacentes en los modelos de evaluación de los institutos superiores tecnológicos en el Ecuador desde el 2010 al 2020, para visibilizar la necesidad de replantear las políticas públicas desde el Estado y fortalecer la agencia de los institutos. Para alcanzar este objetivo se utilizó el instrumental teórico del análisis de las políticas a través de una revisión de información documental que permitió reinterpretar el concepto de la calidad. Finalmente, a modo de conclusión, el estudio determinó que el concepto de calidad preponderante en los modelos de evaluación de los IST se ajustó a la adquisición de altos niveles de excelencia y no incluyó la discusión de la naturaleza de la formación técnica y tecnológica relativa con la transformación de las capacidades de los y las estudiantes. (shrink)

There is strong evidence suggesting that harm reduction policies are able to reduce the adverse health and social consequences of drug use. However, in this article I will compare two different countries to demonstrate that some social aspects lead to the adoption or rejection of harm reduction policies. In this case, countries where drugs are seen as a security concern are less likely to adopt these harm reduction policies. For that purpose, I will compare Colombia and Uruguay’s political, normative, and (...) social aspects, which are considered drivers in the adoption of harm reduction policies, as well as how those factors influence the treatments available for substance abuse disorders. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze recognition as a kind of power. I analyze the notion of power in the general sense as some sort of causal capacity, and introduce the distinction between the active power of doing something and the passive power of undergoing something. Such a distinction is needed in order to capture some central features of the phenomenon of recognition, and in particular the way that ‘being recognized’ and ‘recognizing’ are intertwined. I then argue in favor of both (...) the conceptual and genetic priority of the passive power of being recognized over the active power of recognizing. Furthermore, I introduce the notion of ‘attractor’ of recognition as a way to analyze some relevant features of the phenomenon of ‘being-recognized’. My approach to recognition as some kind of power, should here offer some tools not only to bridge the gap between the theory of recognition and the theory of power, but also to get the passive side of both power and recognition right. This could provide a more plausible and phenomenologically adequate understanding of both, and be useful to help capture and read anew within a recognitive grounding of critical theory some aspects of the contemporary debate on biopolitics. (shrink)

My research takes as its guiding thread the statement from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1805-06, that «cognition is recognition[Erkennen ist Anerkennen]». In this perspective I delineate, first, the consequences of this position for Hegel's epistemology, in particular with reference to the question of skepticism. Then, I show in what sense the recognitive conception of knowledge makes it possible for Hegel to comprehend unitarily, on one hand, cognition as exercise of natural capacities and cognition as exercise of (...) normative capacities socially articulated, and,on the other hand, theoretical self-consciousness and practical self-consciousness. The gnoseological importance of this solution can be comprehended only if we reconstruct the evolution of Hegel's thought in that span of time in which he most directly tackles the issue of skepsis: that is, from 1797 - the beginning of his Frankfurt period - when he began to occupy himself with gnoseological questions, until the end of his stay in Jena,which begins in 1801 and concludes in 1807 with the writing of the Phenomenology. The analysis of the development of the Hegelian theory of knowledge - worked out in the first part of my study - is dealt with in the context of a reconstruction of the historico-argumentative constellation within which it matured. The constellation of importance for our analysis is represented by the skeptical crisis - triggered by authors such as Schulze, Maimonand Platner - that invested the post-Kantian galaxy, within which the idealist solutions to the problem of cognition matured. Through the analysis of journals and authors with whom Hegel came directly or indirectly into contact - from Platner to Reinhold, Jacobi, Fichte and Schelling, to Hölderlin and Sinclair, concluding with Zeender, Krug, Bouterwek and Werneburg, and among the journals Fülleborn's Beiträge and Niethammer's Journal in particular - it is possible to map the various solutions proposed for the skeptical problem andsee how it is in relation to this problem that the conceptions of self-consciousness evolve and the very concept of "interpersonality" - "intersubjectivity" - emerges for the first time. At the same time, pursuing my objective of broadening the investigation of the phenomenon of recognition, which in my view is not reducible to the field of practical philosophy, I proposea fresh reconstruction of the lexical and conceptual evolution of the various terms -Erkennen, Wiedererkennen, Recognition, Anerkennen - through which the various modalities of the phenomenon of recognition were indicated in the philosophical tradition to which Hegel refers: recognition of objects as perceptive reidentification; reminiscence on the level of theory of memory; recognition of subjects as self-recognition (apperception) and attribution to others of intentionality; logical recognition as recognition of the validity of a proposition; moral recognition, where "recognizing" generally means approving, accepting(more specifically, someone may be "recognized" as an autonomous subject and as a unique,genuine individuality). I focus in particular on the theory of memory as «recognitio» in Wolff and in his school, on the conception of «reconnaissance» in Bonnet, on Kantian«Recognition» and on the theory of «Anerkennen» in Ernst Platner. This investigation serves, on the one hand, to show how the phenomenon of recognition is central for a comprehension of the structure both of the lower and of the higher cognitive faculties. This ought to allow us to understand in what sense Hegel, taking intersubjective recognition as hisleading phenomenon, attempts to reunite the various meanings of recognition within a theory of knowledge on the basis of which «cognition is recognition». On the other hand, my conceptual and lexicographic investigation also serves to bring to light - in a new way with respect to the studies on Anerkennung - a hitherto unknown problematic constellation and the input of certain authors, such as Werneburg and Platner, whose conceptions may haveinfluenced Hegel's approach.The second part and the third of my study - a reconstruction of the pre- phenomenological Jena writings dealing with «Anerkennung» - dwells on the theme of the notion of natural recognition, whose centrality for the Hegelian conception of recognition has not yet been adequately grasped. This reconstruction of the theory of natural recognition gives due weight to the influence of Schelling on Hegel's understanding of «Anerkennung» -while the critical literature has generally concentrated on Fichte. Analyzing the conception of the animal organism developed in particular in the lectures on the philosophy of nature of 1803-04 brings to light how Hegel already individuates the recognitive phenomenon at the level of sexual reproduction: it is from here that he posits the natural prerequisites for the development of consciousness of self. The category of natural recognition will present itself anew in Hegel's analysis of the social ontology of the human world in the philosophy of spirit, where it concerns sexual love, reproduction and child raising: natural recognition is, then, that on the basis of which Hegel develops his theory that cognition is recognition.Recognition, as a «middle» of spirit, is a cognitive phenomenon that is primitive with respectto linguistically structured human intersubjectivity; it is, properly, that cognitive structure which is necessarily presupposed by a self-conscious subjectivity that expresses itself linguistically: linguistic intersubjectivity expresses various modes of recognition, but notevery form of recognition is linguistic. The evolutional theory of cognition as recognition is in fact designed to show how increasingly complex recognitive relations emerge from a basic level of natural interactions to take on a linguistically mediated and universal structure. Withthe notion of spiritual recognition Hegel indicates just that ensemble of normative relations that constitute the infrastructure of action and thus mediate the formation of socially articulated self-conscious knowing of self. In the lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 and of 1805-06 Hegel thus reconstructs the recognitive structure of the social institutions of right, of labor, and of exchange, showing that, within a politically structured community,dyadic (I-you) interactions are mediated by the universal viewpoint of the "we" incarnated in institutions that can be recognized by citizens as their own and by which citizens can be recognized. (shrink)

Lightness -- Quickness -- Exactitude -- Visibility -- Multiplicity.

With the growing fragmentation of western societies and disillusionment with the political process, the question of legitimacy has become one of the key issues ...

In this article I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of “second nature” and “recognition”. To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper to the theory of Hegelian and post- Hegelian Anerkennung. The solution strategy I propose is signifi cant also in terms of bringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of “space of reasons” that stems from the Hegelian concept of “Spirit”. I thus broach the notion of “second nature” as a bridgeconcept (...) that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Anerkennung and for a rethinking of the “space of reasons” within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the novelties introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between fi rst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levels. I then return to the question of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makes to the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalness. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the central role of the notion of " habit " (Gewohnheit) in Hegel's theory of " embodiment " (Verleiblichung) and to show that the philosophical outcome of the Anthropology is that habit, understood as a sensorimotor life form, is not only an enabling condition for there to be mindedness, but is more strongly an ontological constitutive condition of all its levels of manifestation. Moreover, I will argue that Hegel's approach somehow makes a (...) model of embodied cognition available which offers a unified account of the three main senses of embodiment understood as both a physiological, a functional, and a phenomenological process. In this sense Hegel's approach to habit can make a useful contribution to the contemporary debate on embodiment in philosophy of mind, the cognitive sciences, and action theory. For a long time habit in 20th century philosophy and science has been mostly read in a negative way, identified with mechanical and repetitive routine. The reconstruction of Hegel’s approach is particularly relevant here and can fruitfully contribute to this discussion, since it offers us not only a model that assigns to habit a positive constitutive role in the formation of embodied human mindedness but which also overcomes the dualism between habitual motor routine and intentional activities that is prevalent nowadays in the cognitive sciences and in action theory, and allows for some sense of natural agency as belonging to animal life. Furthermore, Hegel’s approach cuts across the great divide between associationist and holistic approaches to habit that has for a long time dominated the philosophical debate on habit and still shapes the current opposition between classical cognitive science and embodied cognitive science. (shrink)

"Six memos for the Next Millenium" is a collection of five lectures Italo Calvino was about to deliver at the time of his death. Here is his legacy to us: the universal values he pinpoints become the watch-words for out appreciation of Calvino himself. What should be cherished in literature? Calvino devotes one lecture, or memo to the reader, toe each of five indispensable qualities: lightness, quickness, exactitude, visibility, and multiplicity. A sixth lecture, on consistency, was never committed to paper, (...) and we are left only to ponder the possibilities. With this book, he gives us the most eloquent defense to literature written in our century - a fitting gift for the next millennium. (shrink)

I tackle the definition of the relation between first and second nature while examining some problems with McDowell's conception. This, in the first place, will bring out the need to extend the notion of second nature to the social dimension, understanding it not just as `inner' second nature — individual mind — but also as `outer' second nature — objective spirit. In the second place the dialectical connection between these two notions of second nature will point the way to a (...) critical use of the concept itself, which will link up with a theory of reification. Furthermore, I shall endeavor to fit my reflection into the problematic constellation of critical theory: my analysis in fact rests on the question whether, within a critical theory, the philosophy of nature can be recaptured today, in such a way as to give meaning to the very notion of socio-philosophical criticism of reality. (shrink)

The paper proposes a reconstruction of some fragments of Hegel’s Jena manuscripts concerning the natural genesis of recognitive spiritual consciousness. On this basis it will be argued that recognition has a foothold in nature. As a consequence, recognition should not be understood as a bootstrapping process, that is, as a self-positing and self-justifying normative social phenomenon, intelligible within itself and independently of anything external to it.

Enterprise Risk Management and security have become a fundamental part of Enterprise Architecture, so several frameworks and modeling languages have been designed to support the activities associated with these areas. Archi- Mate’s Risk and Security Overlay is one of such proposals, endorsed by The Open Group. We investigate the capabilities of the proposed security-related con- structs in ArchiMate with regard to the necessities of enterprise security modeling. Our analysis relies on a well-founded reference ontology of security to uncover ambiguity, missing (...) modeling elements, and other deficiencies of the security mod- eling capabilities in ArchiMate. Based on this ontologically-founded analysis, we propose a redesign of security aspects of ArchiMate to overcome its original limitations. (shrink)

Revisión de la actividad “Acto de Homenaje y Entrega de Legajos Reparados de los/as Detenidos/as, Desaparecidos/as y Asesinados/as de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación”.

Enterprise Risk Management involves the process of identification, evaluation, treatment, and communication regarding risks throughout the enterprise. To support the tasks associated with this process, several frameworks and modeling languages have been proposed, such as the Risk and Security Overlay (RSO) of ArchiMate. An ontological investigation of this artifact would reveal its adequacy, capabilities, and limitations w.r.t. the domain of risk and security. Based on that, a language redesign can be proposed as a refinement. Such analysis and redesign have been (...) executed for the risk elements of the RSO grounded in the Common Ontology of Value and Risk. The next step along this line of research is to address the following research problems: What would be the outcome of an ontological analysis of security-related elements of the RSO? That is, can we identify other semantic deficiencies in the RSO through an ontological analysis? Once such an analysis is provided, can we redesign the security elements of the RSO accordingly, in order to produce an improved artifact? Here, with the aid of the Reference Ontology for Security Engineering (ROSE) and the ontological theory of prevention behind it, we address the remaining gap by proceeding with an ontological analysis of the security-related constructs of the RSO. The outcome of this assessment is an ontology-based redesign of the ArchiMate language regarding security modeling. In a nutshell, we report the following contributions: (1) an ontological analysis of the RSO that identifies six limitations concerning security modeling; (2) because of the key role of the notion of prevention in security modeling, the introduction of the ontological theory of prevention in ArchiMate; (3) a well-founded redesign of security elements of ArchiMate; and (4) ontology-based security modeling patterns that are logical consequences of our proposal of redesign due to its underlying ontology of security. As a form of evaluation, we show that our proposal can describe risk treatment options, according to ISO 31000. Finally, besides presenting multiple examples, we proceed with a real-world illustrative application taken from the cybersecurity domain. (shrink)

L’articolo mostra che la teoria hegeliana del riconoscimento è alternativa rispetto alla concezione tradizionale dell’autocoscienza e alle teorie del punto di vista soggettivo. Dopo un confronto con le obiezioni sollevate da D. Henrich e M. Frank contro la teoria del riconoscimento, si mostra come il punto di vista espresso da Hegel potrebbe essere ricostruito all’interno della costellazione contemporanea. Nell’ultima sezione si sostiene che la nozione di “familiarità con sé”, utilizzata da Henrich e Frank contro le teorie dell’intersoggettività, può essere integrata (...) all’interno del modello riconoscitivo.This paper aims at showing that the Hegelian theory of recognition is an alternative to traditional self-consciousness and subjective theories. After a confrontation with the objections D. Henrich and M. Frank raised against recognition theory, I try to sketch how the point of view that Hegel expressed could be nowadays reconstructed. In the last section I argue that the notion of «Self-Intimacy» that was used by Henrich and Frank against theories of intersubjectivity can be integrated within the recognition model. (shrink)

Negli scritti dei primi anni trenta Adorno si propone di superare l’antitesi fra natura e storia senza ricadere in un modello fondativo di conciliazione. Attraverso una critica della ripresa nella filosofia contemporanea dell’ac­cezione mitica della natura come origine e come invariante , Adorno intende recuperare il carattere polisemico dell’esperien­za della natura e del suo intreccio paradossale con la storia. Il concetto di ‘seconda natura’, ripreso attraverso il confronto con Lukács e con Benja­min, e connesso con le nozioni di ‘caducità’ e (...) ‘allegoria’, si rivela così de­cisivo per comprendere il senso dialettico della storia naturale. In his writings of the early thirties Adorno intends to overcome the an­tithesis between nature and history without falling into a foundationalist model of conciliation. Through a criticism of the reprise in contemporary philosophy of nature’s mythical meanings, as origin and in­variant , Adorno wants to retrieve the polysemous character of nature’s experience and its paradoxical relation with history. The concept of ‘second nature’, as read through Lukács and Benjamin, and connected with the notions of ‘caducity’ and ‘allegory’, reveals itself to be decisive in understanding the dialectical meaning of natural history. (shrink)

A noção de biopolítica de Michel Foucault é frequentemente usada nos mais diversos contextos, devido ao seu potencial analítico singular. Esse trabalho busca investigar a inteligibilidade da noção para entender a gestão política da Covid-19 no Brasil. A consolidação de estratégias biopolíticas estão relacionadas a práticas sociais que constituem um corpo político soberano. Portanto, o caminho escolhido para entender o contexto brasileiro, foi perceber que o limites crítico da noção de biopolíticas é considerar uma prática de política nacional situada num (...) neoliberalismo periférico e lógica neocolonial. (shrink)

"Con uno stile piano, e nello stesso tempo acceso, Italo Mancini presenta una sintesi che potrebbe raccogliersi attorno al quesito sul "che fare, adesso?", soprattutto da parte di un credente, di fronte a forme sempre più avvertite di appesantimento e di invecchiamento della Terra.

Neste artigo, trago a uma maior explicitação o conceito de direito da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel, buscando reabilitá-lo como alternativa às concepções jusnaturalistas e juspositivistas tradicionais. Busco uma resposta à questão “o que significa ter um direito?” a partir da Filosofia do Direito hegeliana. Questiono pela gênese e locus do direito e argumento que este se origina de uma relação de reconhecimento recíproco intersubjetivo, posteriormente consubstanciando-se objetivamente na eticidade, por meio das instituições sociais. A partir das conclusões de que (...) (i) ter um direito significa ser intersubjetivamente reconhecido como possuidor de uma reivindicação legítima a algo; e que (ii) tal reconhecimento intersubjetivo se torna progressivamente objetivo nas instituições, proponho a ideia de “título de reconhecimento” como definidora do conceito de direito. (shrink)

: In this paper I will focus on the notion of “dominant patterns”, as revealed by the recently discovered typescript of what we can assume to be Dewey’s fragmentary and incomplete preliminary lecture notes for the Lecture Series on Social and Political Philosophy. I will show that the way the notion of “dominant patterns” is dealt with in the text of the lecture notes is not only consistent with the conceptual content of the whole series of the Lectures in China (...) as published by R. W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen, but also gives us further arguments to appreciate the centrality of this question to the development of Dewey’s philosophical project during this period. In particular, I will argue that a comparative reading of the lecture notes and of the Lectures in China allows us to appreciate the central role dominant patterns play for Dewey’s understanding of social groupings as embodying habitual patterns of action and the way habit formation shapes and gives content to the interests that groups identify with and are identified by in social practices. Secondly, I will argue that such a comparative reading allows us to appreciate how in the lecture series Dewey has developed the notion of dominant patterns into a theory of social domination which is basically described in terms of habitualized recognitive relations. Hence, the discovery of the lecture notes is also very helpful in deepening our understanding of the Deweyan approach to the question of social recognition – and in particular of the dynamics of institutional recognition and its ideological function – and how it relates to habitualized patterns of dominant-subservient relations. -/- domination, habits, social philosophy, struggle for recognition, conflict, groups, hegemony, power, institutionalization. (shrink)

Formal Ontology is a discipline whose business is to develop formal theories about general aspects of reality such as identity, dependence, parthood, truth-making, causality, etc. A foundational ontology is a specific consistent set of these ontological theories that support activities such as domain analysis, conceptual clarification, and meaning negotiation. A (well-founded) core ontology specifies, under a foundational ontology, the central concepts and relations of a given domain. Foundational and core ontologies can be seen as ontology engineering frameworks to systematically address (...) the laborious task of building large (more specific) domain ontologies. However, both in research and industry, it is common that ontologies as computational artifacts are built without the aid of any framework of this kind, often yielding modeling mistakes and representation gaps. In this paper, we analyze a case in the domain of cybersecurity, namely, the case of D3FEND — an OWL knowledge graph of cybersecurity countermeasure techniques proposed by the MITRE Corporation. Based on the Reference Ontology for Security Engineering (ROSE), a core ontology of the security domain founded in the Unified Founda-tional Ontology (UFO), our investigation reveals a number of semantic issues and opportunities for improvement in D3FEND, including missing concepts, semantic overload of terms, and lacking constraints that cause an under-specification of the model. As a result of our ontological analysis, we propose several suggestions for the appropriate redesign of D3FEND to overcome those issues. (shrink)

Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegelian heritage of this model and argue that habit qua second nature is understood by Dewey as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment.. Secondly, the notion of habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as such a (...) dialectical concept which connects ‘impulse’ and ‘habit’, ‘original’ or ‘native’ and ‘acquired’ nature, ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. Thirdly, the ethical model of second nature as habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one another, since by distinguishing ‘routine’ and ‘art’ as two modes of habit, he makes space for an expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I argue that the expressive dialectics of habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey’s critical social philosophy and that first and second nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies. (shrink)

In this paper recognition is taken to be a question of social ontology, regarding the very constitution of the social space of interaction. I concentrate on the question of whether certain aspects of the theory of recognition can be translated into the terms of a socio-ontological paradigm: to do so, I make reference to some conceptual tools derived from John Searle's social ontology and Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics. My strategy consists in showing that recognitive phenomena cannot be isolated at the (...) level of human interaction, and are, rather, in part proper to animal interaction as well. Furthermore, it is argued that recognitive powers are constitutive powers more basic than deontic ones and play a role much broader than the one they in fact assume in Searle and in Brandom. (shrink)

Dopo aver brevemente ripercorso la storia della filosofia della religione, Italo Mancini organizza la sua trattazione secondo i seguenti capitoli: Forme spurie, La forma pura, Ermeneutica o strutturalismo, L'essenza della religione, La fede come evento, Teoria della parola di Dio, Teoria degli eventi fondatori, Il principio della creazione, Quale fondamento, L'utopia della filosofia della religione.

Je vais reconstruire quelques aspects de la genèse naturelle de la conscience dans les écrits hégéliens d’Iéna, avec le but de montrer que cette reconstruction est essentielle pour comprendre la genèse des capacités fondamentales qui sont présupposées par l’interaction de la reconnaissance. En particulier, je vais défendre la thèse suivante: Hegel a jeté une base pour une Naturphilosophie de la reconnaissance, en esquissant une sorte d'histoire naturelle de l’évolution de la relation consciente à soi-même, relation qui commence par le soi (...) organique étant doué des capacités communicatives qui lui permettent d’interagir avec l’environnement et avec ses semblables. Avant touts, je vais suivre le fil rouge qui mène de la Differenzschrift aux leçons de philosophie de la nature et de philosophie de l’esprit dispensées par Hegel à Iéna pendant le semestre d’été deu 1803 et le semestre d’hiver du 1803-4 et qui seront le sujet principale de ma reconstruction interprétative. Cette reconstruction s’articule en cinq phases. Dans une première partie, j’aborderai la question de la reconnaissance naturelle a partir du problème de la différentiation et de l’interaction sexuelle. Dans une deuxième partie, je parlerai de la conception hégélienne du soi organique proto-intentionnel et de sa structure proprioceptive et communicative. Dans une troisième partie, j’aborderai le sujet de la structure pratique de la Begierde (de l’appétit) en tant que forme d’intentionnalité pratique et des formes d’interactions conflictuelles proto-recognitives qui surgissent de cette intentionnalité. Dans une quatrième partie je vais m’occuper de la question de la voix animale comme acte expressive expressif qui manifeste l’aspiration par l’être naturel à voir reconnue sa propre individualité.Dans une cinquième partie je vais analyser la forme de reconnaissance qui se manifeste avec la génération du fils et qui constitue la matrice naturelle de la raison en tant que première forme d’objectivation. Après avoir esquissé les aspects défectueuxifs des formes naturelles de la reconnaissance, j’avancerai enfine vais finalement avancer la thèse à laquelle ma reconstruction aboutit : les formes de conscience spirituelle réflexive qui se déploient dans l’esprit présupposent la conscience reconnaissante préréflexive et sont des réorganisations plus complexes de ses structures fondamentales. (shrink)

In Risk Management, security issues arise from complex relations among objects and agents, their capabilities and vulnerabilities, the events they are involved in, and the value and risk they ensue to the stakeholders at hand. Further, there are patterns involving these relations that crosscut many domains, ranging from information security to public safety. Understanding and forming a shared conceptualization and vocabulary about these notions and their relations is fundamental for modeling the corresponding scenarios, so that proper security countermeasures can be (...) devised. Ontologies are instruments developed to address these conceptual clarification and terminological systematization issues. Over the years, several ontologies have been proposed in Risk Management and Security Engineering. However, as shown in recent literature, they fall short in many respects, including generality and expressivity - the latter impacting on their interoperability with related models. We propose a Reference Ontology for Security Engineering (ROSE) from a Risk Treatment perspective. Our proposal leverages on two existing Reference Ontologies: the Common Ontology of Value and Risk and a Reference Ontology of Prevention, both of which are grounded on the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO). ROSE is employed for modeling and analysing some cases, in particular providing clarification to the semantically overloaded notion of Security Mechanism. (shrink)

This article deals with the question of skepticism within Hegel's Phenomenology. The article reconstructs the role played by the tropes of ancient skepticism in Hegel's criticism of foundationalism and monological thinking. Furthermore, the skeptical method applied by Hegel is read as a sort of negative dialectics that is constitutive of a relational theory of rationality, and which culminates in his conception of the Absolute Knowing as speculative tropology.

Paper given at the 20th Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America, University of South Carolina, October 24-26, 2008 -/- The local problem of the soul-body relation can be grasped only against the global background of the relation between Nature and Spirit. This relates to Hegel's naturalism: the idea that there is one single reality - living reality - and different levels of description of it. This implies, moreover, that it is possible to ascribe some form of naturality also (...) to the social body of institutionalized ethical life. Hegel’s position can thus be characterised as a kind of aristotelian social naturalism: this, at bottom, is the combined meaning of the Hegelian theses that soul is the substance of Spirit, and habit its universal form. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article aims to defend the dialogical nature of the landscape. Working in between the borders of the Bakhtinian philosophy of language and cultural studies on landscape, we defend that landscape study should not be studied without considering the cultural forms of communication in the different domains of social organization– the speech genres; that landscape is a semiotic encounter with a concrete otherness; that the interpreter who emerges when an area enters a relationship of representation is necessarily characterized as (...) a chronotope; that every landscape is a chronotopic representation; that cultural geography recognizes that the semiotic aspects of the landscape are as material as its morphology. We start from the hypothesis that landscape is a chronotopic representation that is always made possible by means of some speech genre, because it is always a communicative process, and an encounter with another in a situation of socially organized interrelation – it is concrete dialogue. To find the deeper meaning of a landscape, one must recognize and understand its material, historical, geographical, and dialogic nature. RESUMO O artigo objetiva defender a índole dialógica da paisagem. Trabalhando na fronteira entre a filosofia bakhtiniana da linguagem e os estudos culturais da paisagem, defendemos que a paisagem não seja estudada sem considerar as formas culturais de comunicação nos diferentes domínios da organização social – os gêneros discursivos; que toda paisagem é encontro semiótico com uma alteridade concreta; que o intérprete que emerge quando uma área entra em relação de representação é necessariamente caracterizado por um cronotopo; que toda paisagem é representação cronotópica; que a geografia cultural reconheça que os aspectos semióticos da paisagem são tão materiais quanto sua morfologia. Partimos da hipótese de que a paisagem é uma representação cronotópica que sempre se realiza através de algum gênero discursivo, pois sempre é um processo comunicativo e de encontro com o outro em uma situação de inter-relação socialmente organizada – é diálogo concreto. Para adentrar à profundeza de seus sentidos, precisa-se reconhecer e compreender sua índole material, histórica, geográfica e dialógica. (shrink)

Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality. In the first part I (...) will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’. (shrink)