Patrick Hopkins has claimed that SM is compatible with feminist principles. I argue that his account relies on both mistaken analogies and an untenable account of the allegedly changed meaning of SM scenes.

It is a commonplace of long standing that one should be “authentic” or—in expressions which may have an approximately similar meaning—that one should be “true to oneself” or that one should “lead a life of one’s own”. Duty and morality aside, this command to be “authentic” leads the prudentially-minded reader to ask, “Why? Why should I be authentic, or true to myself, or lead a life of my own? Will I, of necessity, be horribly unhappy if I am not authentic? (...) Is not an inauthentic, but happy life, at least a conceptual possibility? And, if I can be happy though inauthentic, then why should I strive toward authenticity, especially since the psychological literature on this subject makes much of the considerable pain involved in this process?” It is not self-evidently clear, from the prudential point of view, why authenticity is desirable. (shrink)

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.

Study of the philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian philosopher and fundamentals of Hindu philosophy.

Vāda, the classical name for the act of discussion/debate in the Indian tradition, forms the basis of every conversation undertaken to reach correct knowledge. The paper explores the Indian tradition of Vāda and its subcategories with the intention of highlighting the all-encompassing and holistic nature of this Indian tool of cultural studies in both theory and praxis. It checks into its evolution through contemporary times, wherein it has lost its essence to accommodate the corrupted interests of modern individuals (...) as well as leaders and debaters. Through the analysis of various examples, the paper endeavours to establish Vāda as a comprehensive way to attain correct knowledge. Examples from day-to-day life as well as the historic-literary world help to explicitly comprehend these tools that have been used for establishing the nearest truth from ancient times in India. These tools are potent to all aspects of research across spatial-temporal limits as they are innate and immutable to all disciplines of knowledge and education. (shrink)

Sabdabrahma Siddhanta, popularized by Patanjali and Bhartruhari will be scientifically analyzed. Sphota Vada, proposed and nurtured by the Sanskrit grammarians will be interpreted from modern physics and communication engineering points of view. Insight about the theory of language and modes of language acquisition and communication available in the Brahma Kanda of Vakyapadeeyam will be translated into modern computational terms. A flowchart of language processing in humans will be given. A gross model of human language acquisition, comprehension and communication process forming (...) the basis to develop software for relevant mind-machine modeling will be presented. The implications of such a model to artificial intelligence and cognitive sciences will be discussed. The essentiality and necessity of a physics, communication engineering , biophysical and biochemical insight as both complementary and supplementary to using mathematical and computational methods in delineating the theory of Sanskrit language is put forward. Natural language comprehension as distinct and different from natural language processing is pointed out. (shrink)

This article discusses the unique practice of many philosophers in classical India to write on several philosophical and religious systems, each time adopting a sympathetic point of view for a different tradition. The article describes the development of this phenomenon in the context of interreligious debates between Buddhists, Jains, and Brahmins in the course of three distinct historical periods, transitioning from pluralism about views to pluralism about philosophical systems and culminating in the ideal of _sarva-tantra-sva-tantra_, a polyvocal philosopher and a (...) polymath. Contrary to such approaches as nihilism, agnosticism, skepticism, and dogmatism, pluralism about views and systems was an attempt to justify the acceptance of several competing schools of thought. The article demonstrates that varieties of pluralism about views and systems played a role in forming and broadening philosophical alliances to defeat religious rivals, but also enhanced the scholarly reputation of erudite thinkers capable of “proving and refuting any system by will.”. (shrink)

Indepth analization of three states of Consciousness in spiritual life.

This article examines the emergence of the Nyāya distinction between vāda and jalpa as didactic-scientific and agonistic-sophistical forms of debate, respectively. Looking at the relevant sutras in Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra (NS 1.2.1-3) in light of the earlier discussion of the types of debate in Caraka Saṃhitā 8, the article argues that certain ambiguities and obscurities in the former text can be explained on the hypothesis that the early Nyāya presupposed an agonistic understanding of vāda similar to what we find (...) in Caraka. (shrink)

_Contemporary discussions of self and consciousness have for some time incorporated Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on the existence and nature of self (Ram-Prasad 2012). The ideal of responsibly_ _incorporating this dialogue raises an interpretive dilemma: on the one hand, we should eschew the simplistic picture of a “sterile contest” in which all Hindu schools are committed to the doctrine of the self (ātmavāda) and all Buddhists are invariantly committed to denying its existence (2012: 3). To treat Hindu ātmavādins as monolithically opposed to (...) Buddhist no-self theorists without attending to disagreements within the two camps would be to woefully underrepresent the complexity of the terrain at hand. Yet, we should not forget that what we are dealing with is still a structured debate of some sort. I propose that two Jaina “disambiguation strategies” (Balcerowicz 2017)—the theory of viewpoints (naya-vāda) and the theory of sevenfold predication (syād-vāda), also called the sevenfold formula (__sapta-bha__ṅ__g__ī__)—can together facilitate a re-imaginative reconstruction of Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on the self as something other than a two-sided battle or an arbitrary cluster of views. Following superimposition of the __sapta-bha__ṅ__g__ī__ onto what I temporarily term “the debate,” wherein each figure (bha__ṅ__ga)__ is understood as indexed in part by a specific viewpoint (naya) or a set thereof, we find a dynamic description of an indeterminate phenomenon, embracing affirmation and negation of the “self” (ātman) without antecedent commitment to the substantive existence of the referent of the term. This exercise in working with Jaina tools has implications for broader methodological concerns facing cross-cultural philosophical projects, and bears on how we might fruitfully re-imagine otherwise stymied contemporary debates. _. (shrink)

기원후 7세기경에 아디셰샤가 쓴????빠라마르타 사라????(이하, PS)는 제설혼합주의의 표본 에 해당하는????바가바드 기따????를 계승하면서도 독자적인 특징을 가지는 제설혼합주의를 제 시한 문헌이다. 20세기 초반부터 21세기 초반까지 상당수의 연구자들은 PS의 사상적 정 체성을 제설혼합주의와 관련하여 다양하게 검토했고, 그 결과 PS는 대체로 ‘상크야, 아 드바이따 베단따, 베다-아베다 베단따, 바이슈나바 유신론’이라는 4가지 힌두교 사상들 의 일부나 전부가 혼합된 문헌으로 간주되었다. PS의 연구자들은 거의 예외 없이 4가지 사상들 가운데 어느 하나가 중심이 되는 ‘단일 중심적 제설혼합주의’의 견지에서 PS를 분석했다. 그러나 PS의 시대에 애당초 제설혼합 주의가 하나의 장르로서 존재했고 (...) PS가 그 제설혼합주의를 바탕으로 특정 주제마다 여러 사상들을 혼합시켰을 가능성이 크기 때문에, PS는 ‘다중심적 제설혼합주의’를 보여준다고 할 수 있다. 더 나아가, PS는 ‘사르바-아뜨마-바다’(sarva-ātma-vāda, 모든 것이 아뜨 만이라는 이론)를 통해 이 세상의 모든 사상을 일거에 통합하고자 하기 때문에, PS는 ‘사 르바-아뜨마-바다’를 특징으로 하는 제설혼합주의를 보여준다고 할 수 있다. 이로부터 PS에서 구축되는 것은 ‘독자적인 제설혼합주의 이론’과 ‘제설혼합주의적 구원론’이다. 그런데 PS의 ‘사르바-아뜨마-바다’는 보편주의의 전략을 통해 일원론적 또는 일신론 적 기획을 도모하는 까닭에 오히려 다중심적 제설혼합주의로부터 암시되는 다원적이고 다 가치적인 혼합이라는 장점을 잃어버릴 수 있다. PS의 예시처럼 제설혼합주의에서 다중심성을 더 강조할 것이냐 아니면 보편성을 더 강조할 것이냐 하는 것은 현재의 힌두교 사상이 당면한 중요한 문제이기도 하다. (shrink)

Melinda Vadas rejects my claim that there are morally relevant differences between simulations of unjust events and actual unjust events on the ground that I overlook the connection between simulations and that which they simulate. I argue that this purported moral connection can only be understood as either the result of a necessary psychological disposition or as a "magical," metaphysical attachment, neither of which is defensible or satisfactory.

AbstractŚaṅkara’s Brahma-advaita-vāda and Abhinavagupta’s Śiva-advaita-vāda are well-known non-dualistic systems in Indian philosophy.1In Advaitavedānta, Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality, and there is unanimity about the fact that all the Upaniṣads speak of an attribute-less non-dual reality that is consciousness, existence and bliss. In Trika, Paramaśiva is the only reality with the nature of sat, cit and ānanda.2 This non-dual reality is self-luminous (sva-prakaśa) in both the schools. Both the schools, in different ways, accept the world as an appearance. In (...) Advaitavedānta, the world-illusion is a superimposition on Brahman whereas according to Trika, the world is a spontaneous self-projection of Paramaśiva. Both the systems agree that there is total identity between individual self and the Absolute, ajñāna as the cause of bondage, and jñāna as the means to self-realization. Jīvanmukti as the state of complete freedom and realization of one’s unity with the ultimate reality have been accepted in both the schools. The focus of this paper is to dwell upon the concept of non-dualism (Advaita) from the Trika angle as enunciated by Abhinavagupta and Advaitavedānta as propounded by Śaṅkara. Abhinava has envisaged a non-dualistic dimension of consciousness with the inclusion of prakāśa and vimarśa, which means that within the format of non-dualism, Trika accepts a second in the form of Śakti without compromising the non-dualistic dimension of the school whereas Śaṅkara’s Advaitic non-dualism has no space for anything other than the self, i.e., Brahman-Ātman. (shrink)

Nathmal Tatia, one of the leading Jaina scholars of our time, provides us with the first systematic and in-depth study of the great problems dealt with in Jaina philosophy. It begins with the basic Jaina worldview of non-absolutism (anekanta-vada), and deals next with Jaina epistemology.Three major topics are then studied in great detail, with full reference to the Jaina scriptures. These are: the problem of avidya in the various Indian schools; the Jaina doctrine of karman; and Jaina yoga. This latter (...) includes an important study of Haribhadra's comparative studies in yoga. Tatia hashere given us a first-rate advanced level study of Jaina philosophy. (shrink)

A reasoned argument or tarka is essential for a wholesome vāda that aims at establishing the truth. A strong tarka constitutes of a number of elements including an anumāna based on a valid hetu. Several scholars, such as Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu and Dignāga, have worked on theories for the establishment of a valid hetu to distinguish it from an invalid one. This paper aims to interpret Dignāga’s hetu-cakra, called the wheel of grounds, from a modern philosophical perspective by deconstructing it (...) into a simple probabilistic mathematical model. The objective is to understand how and why a vāda based on a probabilistically weaker hetu can degrade into a Jalpa or vitaṇḍā. To do so, the paper maps the concept of ‘Bounded Rationality’ onto the hetu-cakra. Bounded Rationality, an idea coined by the management thinker Herbert Simon, is often employed in understanding decision-making processes of rational agents. In the context of this paper, the concept would state that the prativādin and ālocaka (debater) may not hold unbounded information to back their pratijñā (proposition). The paper argues that within the probabilistically deconstructed hetu-cakra model, most people argue in the ‘Zone of Bounded Rationality’, and thus, the probability of a debate degrading into Jalpa or vitaṇḍā is high. -/- . (shrink)

This paper in an elementary level expresses the inevitable relation between the word and meaning from the prominent Indian philosophical trends by giving stress on Vyakti-śakti-vāda and Jāti-śakti-vāda, the two contender doctrines. The first one puts emphasis on the semantic value of a predicate whereas the latter draws attention to the generic uses of nouns. The second part of the writing underpins Navya Nyāya and Kumārila’s positions on the word-meaning reliance and the debate initiate when we look back (...) to the question whether the word-meaning relation sounds conventional or eternal. I propose a position (śabda-vivarta-vāda) on these issues derived from the works of Patan᷈jali and Bhartṛharị, two grammarians of classical Indian tradition. They defend eternal verbum as the material cause of the word and objects. This doctrine advocates uniforism by giving up bifurcation between the word and the world. (shrink)

Comparative philosophy has been subjected to much criticism in the latter half of the last century, though some of these criticisms were appropriate and justified. However, in our present cultural milieu, where traditions and culture transcend their geographical boundaries, seeping through the global network of views and ideas, it seems to be a legitimate enterprise to understand one’s own traditions and culture through the critical lens of the ‘other culture’. It is such cross-cultural understanding that paved the way towards legitimizing (...) “human rights” as a universal discourse. So also, the discourse on “environmental ethics” has gained acceptance in a similar manner across cultures and traditions. The paper attempts at an understanding of “Indian Philosophy” as a theoretical practice by exemplifying the notion of “sādhanā” in the Yoga system of Indian Philosophy through a reading of the notion of ‘phenomenological reduction’ as espoused in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Thus, we reject the claim that philosophy as a pure rational activity was unique to the West as proclaimed in some Eurocentric readings. It is pertinent to recall here that the Sāṅkhya philosophy, which the Yoga system accepts as an allied school of thought was atheistic in its origin and attempted to explain the universe in terms of an evolutionary theory—the “prakṛti pariṇāma vāda”. (shrink)

_Abstract_: Cognitive science is typically defined as the multidisciplinary study of mind, with the disciplines involved usually listed as philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. Furthermore, these six “core disciplines” are generally regarded as having equal status vis-à-vis cognitive science. In contrast to the latter position, I argue that psychology has a special status here: it is central to cognitive science in a way that none of the other five disciplines is. I support this argument via both theoretical (...) and empirical considerations. _Keywords_: Psychology; Cognitive Science; Interdisciplinarity/Multidisciplinarity _La psicologia è – e dovrebbe essere – al centro della scienza cognitiva_ _Riassunto_: La scienza cognitiva viene definita comunemente come indagine multidisciplinare sulla mente e tra le discipline che vi sono coinvolte vengono solitamente indicate la filosofia, la psicologia, l’intelligenza artificiale, la neuroscienza, la linguistica e l’antropologia. Queste sei “discipline fondamentali” sono generalmente considerate come aventi pari dignità nell’ambito della scienza cognitiva. A dispetto di quest’ultima posizione sosterrò, invece, che alla psicologia vada riconosciuto uno status speciale: la sua importanza per la scienza cognitiva è tale da non poter essere eguagliata da nessuna delle altre cinque discipline. A supporto di questa posizione porterò alcune riflessioni di natura teoretica ed empirica. _Parole chiave_: Psicologia; Scienza cognitiva; Interdisciplinarità/Multidisciplinarità. (shrink)

The publication is a commented translation and study of the work “Pakṣilasvāmin’s Introduc­tion to his Nyāyabhāṣyam” by a prominent Austrian indologist and intercultural philosopher G.R.F. Oberhammer. The author examines the background of Oberhammer’s research, gives a brief information about the school of Nyāya and focuses on how Oberhammer demonstrates the history of Nyāya and its becoming aware of itself as a philosophical system based on the short text of Pakṣilasvāmin (Vātsyāyana) introduction to his Nyāyabhāṣyam. In his article, Oberhammer answers the (...) question why such heterogeneous parts as elements of the theory of argumentation borrowed from the ancient tradition of Vāda (the theory of debate), logic and epistemology, cos­mology and the doctrine of the soul and its liberation from the bonds of saṁsāra (soteriology) were combined into the harmonious philosophical system of Nyāya and how this happened during the development of the school due to its becoming aware of itself as a method of searching for truth (and what this truth is from the point of view of Nyāya), how this was helped by creative bor­rowing from another philosophical school – Yoga. The publication is prefaced by a brief history of the Viennese oriental and indological school, to which Oberhammer belongs. (shrink)

Sguardo d'insieme -- Armonia delle sfere celesti : Hildegard von Bingen, symphonia -- Il tempo di Dio : Johann Sebastian Bach, Cantata Gottes Zeit -- Trasmutazioni : Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Die Zauberflöte -- "Questo bacio vada al mondo intero" : Ludwig van Beethoven, An die Freude -- Viaggio d'inverno : Franz Schubert, Winterreise -- Inni all notte : Richard Wagner, Tristan und Isolde -- L'ultimo rito : Richard Wagner, Parsifal -- Azzurre solitudini : Gustav Mahler, Terza sinfonia -- Universi sonori (...) : Gustav Mahler, Ottava sinfonia -- Orizzonti perduti : Gustav Mahler, Das Lied von der Erde -- Labirinti : Richard Strauss, Also sprach Zarathustra -- Cortei di ombre : Richard Strauss, Metamorphosen -- La terza via : Omaggio a Francesco d'Avalos. (shrink)

The exhaustive explications on jāti-s (sophisticated ripostes) and their seemingly chaotic arrangement in early Indian philosophical texts arouses an expectation for a systematic taxonomy or typology. Such taxonomy would enormously increase the heuristic value of the list of jāti-s. The present article aims to reveal some interpretational problems relevant to the understanding of the jāti-s’ historical development, as well as the theoretical implications of their typology. Focusing historically on the early texts of debate manuals of Nyāya and Buddhist circles, this (...) article will excavate and explicate the vague and the obvious attempts to establish a typology of jāti-s. Given that Diṅnāga was the philosopher who shifted the history of Indian philosophy into the era of macro theory by integrating ontology and epistemology into a general system, the minimal changes of the order of the jāti-s in the list given in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, in contrast to the one found in the Nyāyamukha, will be interpreted as a paradigm shift. The rearrangement of the jāti list in the Pramāṇasamuccaya represents the paradigm shift from the debate (vāda) manual to the epistemological (pramāṇa) treatise, confirming Frauwallner’s ideas regarding the development of Diṅnāga’s thought. (shrink)

Illustrations: Numerous B/w Figures Description: Key questions in the history of Navya-nyaya (New Nyaya) remain unresolved: when did this school of logic begin, who was its founder, what distinguishes Navya-nyaya from Pracina-nyaya (Old Nyaya), and so on. This book attempts to answer these key questions in Part I. Part II provides a translation, analysis, and critical edition of the Lion and Tiger Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Simha-vyaghra-laksana: LT Chapter) of the Tattva-cintamani-rahasya (TCR) of Mathuranatha (16th-17th c.). The hypothesis adopted (...) by the author with regard to the first question is that Udayana, who lived in the 11th century, is the founder of Navya-nyaya. This hypothesis is closely linked to the hypothesis offered regarding the second question, which is that the feature that distinguishes Navya-nyaya from the earlier school is its description of concepts and the structure of the world in terms of relation. Early Navya-nyaya authors, who flourished between Udayana and Gangesa (14th c.), devised specific terminology, of which delimitor (avacchedaka) and describer (niËpaka) are the most important, in order to identify or specify relation. This book attempts to illustrate the function of these and other Navya-nyaya terms from the viewpoint of relation. The main sources upon which the author has based his conclusions are Udayana s Laksanavali and the chapters on invariable concomitance or pervasion (vyapti) of the Nyaya-siddhanta-dipa (NSD) of Sasadhara (13rd-14th c.), the Tattva-cintamaÆi (TC) of Gangesa, and the TCR. Of these Sanskrit texts no scholar has worked on the Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Vyapti-vada) of the NSD in detail or the LT Chapter of the TCR. The latter chapter follows in the TCR the Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Vyapti-pancaka), which Ingalls edited, translated, and analyzed in his epoch-making book Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic (1951). One major innovation of this book made in Part II is to explain the structure of Navya-nyaya analysis by employing 86 diagrams based on the dharma-dharmin (property and property-possessor) relation, which serve as a visual aid and help readers to more easily understand the complicated structure of its analysis. The diagrams are also helpful in ascertaining how the definitions of invariable concomitance apply to individual cases and how the entities are connected in the application of the definitions. Another major innovation is: almost every sub-section of the LT Chapter of the TCR contains Mathuranatha s clarification of part of the two definitions; but this clarification does not give the definition incorporating prior clarifications and insertions; this book provides such a definition accompanied by a diagram. In other words, Part II illustrates the structure of the whole definition at every process of the clarification, which (definition) is never presented as such in Mathuranatha s text. (shrink)

For many people, the phenomenon of divine hiddenness is so total that it is far from clear to them that God exists at all. Reasonably enough, they therefore do not believe that God exists. Yet it is possible, whilst lacking belief in God’s reality, nonetheless to see it as a possibility that is both realistic and attractive; and in this situation, one will likely want to be open to the considerable benefits that would be available if God were real. In (...) this paper I argue that certain kinds of desire for God can aid this non-believing openness. It is possible to desire God even in a state of non-belief, since desire does not require belief that its object exists. I argue that if we desire God in some particular capacity, and with some sense of what would constitute satisfaction, then through the desire we have knowledge -- incomplete yet vivid in its personal significance -- about the attributes God would need in order to satisfy us; thus, if God is real and does have those attributes, one knows something about God through desiring him. Because desire does not require belief, neither does the knowledge in question. Expanding on recent work by Vadas and Wynn, I sketch the epistemology of desire needed to support this argument. I then apply this epistemology to desire for God. An important question is how one might cultivate the requisite kinds desire for God; and one way, I argue, is through engaging with certain kinds of sacred music. I illustrate desire’s religiously epistemic power in this context, before replying to two objections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Remembering Jitendra Nath MohantyArindam Chakrabarti (bio)The only philosopher in the global history of philosophy who read and taught (in the original Sanskrit, German, and English) Patañjali, Vyāsa, Śaṅkara, Gangeśa, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Frege, Wittgenstein, Hume, McTaggart, Russell, Davidson, and Dummett with equal expertise, depth, and hermeneutic originality is no more. Jitendra Nath Mohanty, who passed away on the 7th of March 2023, was emeritus professor of philosophy at (...) Temple University, Philadelphia. In the last decade of his life, he used to spend long periods in his home in Kolkata, the city where he studied as an undergraduate. Born in in 1928 in Cuttack, Orissa, India, Mohanty ranked first in all public examinations and in his B.A. at Presidency College, Kolkata and his M.A. examination at the University of Calcutta. After receiving a Ph.D. from the University of Göttingen in 1954, he came back to India and continued his traditional-style tutelage under two great Sanskrit Pandits: Ananta Tarkatirtha (for Navya Nyāya) and Mahamahopadhyaya Yogendranath Bagchi (for Advaita Vedānta). In his long academic career, he taught at the University of Burdwan, the University of Calcutta, the New School for Social Research, the University of Oklahoma, Emory University, and Temple University and held visiting professorships at All Souls College Oxford and Jadavpur University, Kolkata.JNM was trained equally thoroughly in three distinct traditions and styles of philosophy. Even great modern Indian philosophers of the twentieth century, such as K. C. Bhattacharya, B. N. Seal, R. D. Ranade, Radhakrishnan, B. K. Matilal, Daya Krishna, and R. C. Gandhi, could claim scholarly fluency in at most two traditions (of course the "Indian tradition" itself is a maddeningly complex plurality of traditions often sharing very little in common—e.g., Abhidharma Buddhism and Mādhva Dualist Vedānta). But Mohanty was well-versed in and collected insights and inspiration from European (Continental) Phenomenology, and Analytic Anglo-American Philosophy and several of the diverse Sanskrit Indian Philosophical schools of thought. More importantly, as can be demonstrated in detail, it is his expertise in the pluralistic yet both logically and phenomenologically rigorous styles of classical Indian philosophies that made him uniquely capable of doing the bridgework between continental and analytic philosophies of the West—between Husserl and Frege, for example. [End Page 1]Within philosophy in general his interests ranged from metaphysics to epistemology, ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of physics (especially Time), Logic, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language and mind. Among his numerous publications, the following books achieved bench-mark status in their respective fields: Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth: Containing the Text of Gaṅgeśa's Prāmāṇya (jñapti) vāda (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, India, 1966); Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Classical Indian Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2002); The Self and its Other (Oxford University Press, 2000); Logic, Truth, and the Modalities (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999; Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 1999); The Concept of Intentionality (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1972); Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy (Northwestern University Press, 1997); Husserl and Frege (Indiana University Press, 1982); Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning (Springer, 1976); and The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development (Yale University Press, 2008). His charming and inspiring intellectual autobiography was published in 2012 by Oxford University press with the title Between Two Worlds: East and West, an Autobiography. Some of his classic papers are collected in the volume edited with an introduction by Purushottama Billimoria: J. N. Mohanty: Essays on Indian Philosophy Traditional and Modern (New York and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002). Philosophy East and West is going to publish a special issue devoted to JNM's life-time achievements in different branches and traditions of philosophy. [End Page 2]Arindam Chakrabarti Philosophy Department, University of Hawai'[email protected] © 2024 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

Šiame straipsnyje pirmosios pokomunistinės kartos (gim. 1991–2000) vertybių analizei 24-iose pokomunistinėse šalyse pasitelkiama Ronaldo Ingleharto materialistinių-postmaterialistinių vertybių kaitos teorija. 1990–1993 m., 1999–2004 m., 2008– 2014 m. ir 2017–2022 m. bangų Pasaulio ir Europos vertybių tyrimų duomenų analizė leidžia daryti išvadas, kad daugumoje pokomunistinių šalių postmaterialistinės vertybės pirmojoje pokomunistinėje kartoje, palyginti su vyresnėmis kartomis, sustiprėjo. Tokia tendencija ypač ryški ekonomiškai stipriose pokomunistinėse šalyse, tačiau matoma ir ekonomiškai nepasiturinčiose. Tik šešiose šalyse fiksuotas statistiškai reikšmingas ryšys tarp religijos svarbos žmogaus gyvenime ir materialistinių-postmaterialistinių (...) vertybių pirmojoje pokomunistinėje kartoje. Tyrimas taip pat atskleidė, kad šalyse, kuriose dominuoja Romos katalikų tikėjimas, postmaterialistinės vertybės yra labiau paplitusios nei stačiatikių ortodoksų ir islamo dominuojamose šalyse pirmojoje pokomunistinėje kartoje. (shrink)

„Posocializmas“, „pokomunizmas“, „transformacija“ ir kiti semantiškai susiję žodžiai turi laikinumo atspalvį. Akademikai ir politikos formuotojai suvokė, kad šis laikotarpis bus sunkus eiliniams gyventojams. Svarstoma, kad Lietuvoje transformacijos laikotar­pis baigėsi – pavyzdžiui, 2004 m., šaliai įstojus į ES ir NATO. Tačiau nežinome, kada šis laikotarpis pasibaigė žiūrint iš Lietuvos gyventojų perspektyvos (jeigu apskritai pa­sibaigė). Todėl šiame straipsnyje siekiama atsakyti į klausimą, kokie su transformacija susiję periodai arba lūžiai išryškėja (jeigu išryškėja) socialinėje atmintyje. Straipsnyje laikomasi periodo definicijos, pagal kurią jis turi ribas (...) laike ir pavadinimą, suvokiamas kaip homogeniškas. Kokybiniai interviu, 2021 m. vasarą surinkti Panevėžyje, Jonavo­je ir kaimuose aplink šiuos miestus, analizuojami taikant refleksyviąją teminę analizę (RTA). Daroma išvada, kad transformacija yra glaudžiai įsipynusi į dabartinį Nepri­klausomybės laikotarpį. Viena vertus, kai kurie tyrimo dalyviai pasakojo apie „per­ versmo“, „suirutės“ laiką, kartais jį lygino su pokariu. Kita vertus, atmintyje kur kas ryškesnis bendras atkurtos Nepriklausomybės laikotarpis: jis suvokiamas kaip daug­maž homogeniškas laipsniškos kaitos laikas, kurį įmanu palyginti su stambiu periodu prieš esminį lūžį – sovietmečiu. (shrink)

L’abbandono heideggeriano dell’atteggiamento teoreticistico è condotto a partire dalla centralità dell’esperienza significativa propria dell’esserci in quanto storico. La critica alla problematica filosofica dell’a-priori è condotta proprio in nome dell’idea che l’origine dei significati vada ricercata nella storicità dell’esserci. Significatività del mondo e temporalità dell’esserci, come due facce della stessa medaglia, caratterizzano la trascendenza dell’esserci quale apertura alle possibilità del progettare, in un modo che differisce radicalmente dal soggettivismo trascendentale e dall’ipotesi di a-priori conoscitivi e valoriali. Il saggio segue un tale (...) processo di storicizzazione, mostrando che la posizione heideggeriana non implica un ingenuo relativismo, ma riporta l’origine dei significati al loro contesto di senso, inteso come espressione della vita stessa e delle risorse fondative della sua temporalità. (shrink)

À travers une vision gestaltiste, déjà à l’oeuvre dans la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cet article essaie de montrer que toutes les difficultés propres à l’interprétation de la problématique du rapport à autrui, notamment celle concernant le fait de ne pouvoir jamais avoir un accès complet à autrui, peuvent être surmontées ou, du moins, peuvent être mises en discussion. Toute la question est de savoir si ce rapport est basé sur une constitution mutuelle, une constitution réductible à ceux qui le (...) constituent, moi ou autrui, ou si ce rapport va au-delà, étant plus et autre chose que les sujets qui entrent en relation, puisqu’il est lui-même quelque chose d’irréductible. Ni réductibilité à moi, comme chez Husserl, ni réductibilité à autrui, celui totalement autre, comme chez Levinas, mais une irréductibilité conciliante de ce rapport qui, en tant que forme, dépend des éléments qui le constituent et, néanmoins, est autre chose qu’eux et leur demeure irréductible.Through a Gestaltist vision, already present in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, this article attempts to show that all difficulties inherent in the interpretation of the problems concerning the relationship to the Other, especially the fact that we can never have complete access to the Other, can be overcome, or at least, put into discussion. The most important question is to know whether this relationship is based on a mutual constitution, one that is reducible to its terms, self or Other, or if this relationship goes beyond its subjects and is something irreducible in itself. This relationship is not reducible to the self, as in Husserl’s work, nor is it reducible to the Other, as something completely Other, as in Levinas, but is a relationship of reconciliatory irreducibility which, while entirely dependent on its constitutive elements, is nevertheless something else irreducible to both.Attraverso una visione gestaltista, già all’opera nella filosofi a di Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cercheremo qui di mostrare come tutte le difficoltà tipiche della problematica del rapporto all’altro, specie quella relativa al fatto che non possiamo mai avere un accesso completo all’altro, possano essere superate o almeno rimesse in questione. L’intero problema dipende da un’opzione di fondo: se cioè tale rapporto sia basato su una reciproca costituzione, ovvero su una costituzione riducibile a coloro che lo costituiscono, cioè l’io e l’altro; o se tale rapporto vada al di là, sia qualcosa di più, o di diverso, rispetto ai soggetti che entrano in rapporto, essendo il rapporto stesso qualcosa di irriducibile. Né riducibilità a me, dunque, come in Husserl, né riducibilità all’Altro, come in Levinas, ma conciliante irriducibilità del rapporto in quanto forma, che pur dipendendo dagli elementi che la costituiscono è altro dagli elementi stessi. (shrink)

Funkcinës psichiniø savybiø analizës atveriama jø materialiojo ákûnijimo ávairovës galimybë verèia materialistiná monizmà sàmonës filosofijoje formuluoti ne psichiniø ir fiziniø savybiø tapatumo, bet pirmøjø pareities nuo antrøjø tezæ. Pareities sàvoka sàmonës filosofijoje iðreiðkia minimalius reikalavimus fizikalistinëms teorijoms – paneigus pareities fizikalizmà bûtø paneigtos ir stipresnës fizikalizmoversijos. Straipsnyje tyrinëjama fizikalizmo kritika paremta vadinamuoju kokybiø perkeitimo galimybës argumentu. Parodoma, kad, viena vertus, toks argumentas negali bûti atremtas nuorodomis áempirinius duomenis, nes svarstoma hipotetinë situacija numano jos empiriná nestebimumà; kita vertus, jei svarstoma situacija (...) ið tikrøjø yra galima, tai kokybinës psichinës charakteristikos niekaip nërasusaistytos funkciðkai ar fiziologiðkai apraðomais ryðiais, vadinasi, antireduktyvistinæ iðvadà galima grástisvarstant ne tik atvejus, kai kokybës perkeistos, bet ir kai jø apskritai nëra.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: sàmonës filosofija, fizikalizmas, funkcionalizmas, pareitis, perkeistos kokybës. (shrink)

The subject of the study is the institution of the ancient Indian dispute, the theoretical understanding of which has become part of the doctrines of all religious and philosophical schools. The “Shraman period” (5th century BC) is considered in detail, during which there was a sharp controversy between religious and philosophical schools, during which effective methods of conducting disputes “crystallized” and developed argumentative normativity. It is shown that the pluralism and diversity of ontological models that existed in the spiritual culture (...) of that time were reflected in the logical and epistemological doctrine - pramana-vada. Thus, in the first (pre-logical) period, epistemological and logical questions were raised within the framework of anvikshika, “the science of conducting public disputes,” and the widespread culture of philosophical disputes and their actual practice were completely determined by the original cultural context. The argumentative canon of the Nyaya school is analyzed, the categories of the Indian and Western European traditions are compared, illustrating the discussion, in particular, of the Aristotelian syllogistic and the Nyayak five-term syllogism, the doctrine of the dispute between the ancient Chinese school of the late Mohists and ancient Chrya. The productive methodological ideas of the polemical strategy of conducting philosophical disputes in late Buddhism are revealed, the role of the dual unity of proof and refutation, as well as examples, questions and tricks, as topoi of the ancient Indian culture of dispute is shown. (shrink)

The Buddhism has been developed as a philosophical system along with the Brhamanic tradition to maintain a complete and distinct identity of its own thought after Buddha. This paper attempts to understand the basic philosophical foundation of Buddhism. It believes that the Four Noble Truths (ārya-satya) are the original teachings of the Buddha which contained philosophical insights and thoughts like its doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda. It also presumes that the very existence itself produces the whole human predicaments in the form of (...) anxiety, desire, anger, sorrow and pain which are the effects that relate to certain causes. In Buddhism, two revolutionary views, i.e., universal impermanence (anityatā-vāda) and refutation of permanent soul-substance (anātma-vāda) are formulated. These views are the anticipated philosophical ideas of Buddhism which have a parallel to the sceptic philosophy of Hume in western philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception:A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka PratyakṣaStephen H. PhillipsIn the lead article of the fiftieth anniversary issue of Philosophy East and West (January 2000), Arindam Chakrabarti elaborates seven reasons why Nyāya should jettison "indeterminate perception" and view all perception as determinate, that is to say, as having an entity (a) as qualified by a qualifier (F) as object (Fa). In his notes, (...) Chakrabarti invites a reply "so that," as he says, "I may know why immaculate perception is needed by Nyāya after all." The following is a response that shows not so much why indeterminate perception is needed by Nyāya but why it is identified as a causal factor necessary to the arising of some (not all) determinate perception defined as "perception of an entity as qualified." Here I follow Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the fourteenth-century founder (with the help of a few less well known predecessors and contemporaries) of "New Logic," Navya Nyāya. Gaṅgeśa devotes an entire section (about one eighteenth) of the perception chapter of his monumental Tattvacintāmaṇi (Jewel of Reflection about Epistemology) to nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa,1 and he is a chief target of Chakrabarti's chastisement.2Now, first of all, I want to follow Gaṅgeśa's ground rules. The Naiyāyika is not concerned with strategies about how to look good in debates (with Buddhists or anyone else). His attitude is truth-seeking, not eristic, and thus no reply will be given to Chakrabarti's agonizing about how best to show ourselves in controversies with (in particular, Buddhist) adversaries (and Wilfrid Sellars). Gaṅgeśa's reflections are vāda—and the section is rightly titled nirvikalpaka-vāda, vāda being "inquiries among friends"—directed to uncovering real causal factors, not to winning a debate or countering sophisms. Deception, or counter-deception, is sometimes appropriate—for instance, to protect a student or other judge from fallacies advanced by people of bad character. But not here. So I will lay out Gaṅgeśa's argument for identifying nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa, and then run through Chakrabarti's list of reasons for rejecting it with an eye to the objection's salience to Gaṅgeśa's project. In other words, Chakrabarti's objections will be taken up with an eye to the truth as it appears to a Naiyāyika, not with an eye to how our team should best present itself to outsiders. I have little to say about Chakrabarti's complaints about appearances—in fact, I find them delightful. Don't let him fool you. There's no greater Naiyāyika enthusiast than Chakrabarti himself, and he knows how to distill a controversy to show the wisdom [End Page 104] of Nyāya in contrast to revealing a deficiency, as he appears to be doing here. He does this to make us think broadly about Nyāya in a contemporary context. And at the end I join him in making some very general comments about Nyāya's realism. First, Gaṅgeśa's argument and a rebuttal of Chakrabarti's seven reasons from Gaṅgeśa's point of view.There is no direct, apperceptive evidence for nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa; rather, it is posited by force of the following inference as the first step of a two-step argument. "The perceptual cognition, 'A cow' (for example), is generated by a cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition of an entity as qualified (by that qualifier appearing), like an inference." The second step takes a person's first perception of an individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., as having some such property) as the perceptual cognition figuring as the inference's subject (or pakṣa) such that the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood. The qualifier has to be available, and the best candidate seems to be its perception in the raw, a qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some are wont to misinterpret the point... (shrink)

Secondo un recente bilancio della filosofia del Novecento di Rossi e Viano, nel nostro secolo «il successo maggiore è toccato alle dottrine filosofiche che si sono proposte di offrire alternative alla conoscenza tecnico-scientifica e che sostengono la possibilità di alleggerire i vincoli che il sapere positivo porrebbe al modo di pensare e ai progetti di azione»2. Tali dottrine prospettano un ritorno all’antica metafisica, a cui «si ricorre non come a una forma di sapere sistematico, bensì come alla testimonianza di una (...) possibilità di pensare qualcosa che vada al di là del sapere positivo»3. Perciò il Novecento si è concluso con la vittoria, se non del «duro conservatorismo di Heidegger», almeno di «un più blando tradizionalismo, che si limita a sostenere il primato della cultura umanistica tradizionale rispetto alla cultura tecnico-scientifica»4. Per Rossi e Viano la filosofia del Novecento ha avuto questo esito poiché è risultata insostenibile la convinzione, diffusa nella filosofia analitica all’inizio degli anni Trenta, «che la filosofia avesse imboccato la strada giusta per inserirsi nel mondo del sapere scientifico specializzato»5. Dopo «che si era affermata la specializzazione del sapere, la filosofia aveva cercato di stabilire una posizione di dominio legandosi a quelle che erano sembrate le discipline titolari di un qualche primato: ora a quelle matematiche, ora a quelle naturalistiche, ora a quelle storiche»6. Essa, inoltre, aveva cercato di accreditare l’idea che l’analisi logica delle teorie scientifiche fosse comunque lo strumento più attendibile per fare filosofia. Questo tentativo della filosofia analitica, però, è fallito, e così nella cultura contemporanea è diventato chiaro che non «ci sono legami particolarmente stretti tra la filosofia e qualche scienza particolare»7. Insieme all’idea che esistesse un legame privilegiato tra la filosofia e qualche scienza particolare, «la cultura filosofica del Novecento respingeva anche l’idea che l’analisi logica delle teorie scientifiche fosse comunque lo strumento più attendibile per fare filosofia»8.. (shrink)

È una credenza diffusa che i marchi di origine (DOCG, DOC, DOP, IGT, IGP e PAT, rispettivamente: di origine controllata e garantita; di origine controllata; di origine protetta; indicazione geografica tipica; indicazione geografica protetta; prodotti agroalimentari tradizionali) siano di grande utilità sia per i consumatori che per i produttori: certificando l’origine e il metodo di produzione di un prodotto, essi ne garantiscono una certa qualità di fronte al consumatore. Ma è proprio così? Che cosa giustifica l’introduzione di un marchio di (...) origine? Quanto sostengo qui di seguito è che, sebbene non credo si possa negare che i marchi di origine segnalino anche una certa qualità di un prodotto, forse non sono il modo migliore per farlo. Di fatto, per il consumatore, i marchi non garantiscono niente che vada oltre alla qualità richiesta affinché la certificazione venga rilasciata; ma, al contempo, in quanto forme di protezionismo, favoriscono certi produttori, prevenendo l’utilizzo della denominazione a chi offre un prodotto di qualità analoga o superiore, ma provienente da una zona priva di tradizioni. In altre parole: se vi sono prodotti equiparabili per qualità e gusto ad un dato prodotto di origine, e possibilmente più economicamente vantaggiosi, il consumatore non avrà modo di accorgersene dalla sola nomenclatura. Quindi: i marchi di origine sono (talvolta) un ostacolo all’acquisto e al godimento dei prodotti migliori al miglior prezzo. Talvolta: questo deve essere ben sottolineato, poiché in certi casi (per esempio quello dei PAT) il prodotto certificato dal marchio ha un mercato talmente di nicchia da costituire un tuttuno tra qualità e origine. (Si potrebbe aggiungere che le certificazioni dei marchi non sono sempre ottenute attraverso procedure affidabili. Non insisterò oltre su questo punto, per il quale si rimanda a: Paolo Conti, La leggenda del buon cibo italiano e altri miti alimentari contemporanei, Fazi Editore, 2006; Peter Singer e Jim Mason: The Way We Eat.. (shrink)