The first time Umāsvāti uses the word manas in his Tattvārtha-sūtra, the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy, is when he lists the means of knowledge: mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya and kevala. These are the pramāṇas. In TAS 1, 14 mati or sense perception is said to be caused by indriya and aninindriya; Pūjyapāda’s commentary says that anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas are synonyms. This obviously raises questions about the specific role and function of the manas/anindriya in mati, manaḥ-paryāya and (...) śruta, and how these retain their exclusivity without reducing the function of any of them to another means of cognition. In the Sāṅkhya system manas is seen as both an organ of cognition and an organ of action. It is interesting for a better understanding of the role of manas in Jaina thought to compare some aspects of it with the Sāṅkhya system. (shrink)

It is shown that Jaina epistemology has its own history, with differences in certain respects depending on the thinker, and it is demonstrated that the Jainas did not lag behind the mainstream concerns in Indian philosophy. After dealing with the beginnings of epistemology in India, the basic Jaina epistemology is outlined based on selected aspects of the problem in the original words of selected early thinkers such as Kundakunda, Umāsvāti, and Māṇikyanandin.

CHAPTER Introduction Some basic questions in philosophical anthropology The question whether there is indeed a concern in Indian thought of what comes under ...

Kundakunda’s handling of several basic ideas cannot be omitted when one deals with the following concepts in Jaina philosophy: 1. Sy_āt/siya, syādvāda_ or _saptabhaṅgī_. 2. _Nayas_, _vyavahāra_ and _niścaya nayas_ and _naya_vāda. 3. _Sapta_ and _Nava tattvas/padārtha_ and 4. _Anekāntavāda_. No doubt his dates are a major conundrum; recent research regards him to have lived around the fourth or fifth centuries (Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism, BEJ: Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia), edited by Knut (...) Jacobsen, John A. Cort, Paul Dundas and Kristi L. Wiley. Leiden | Boston: Brill, 2020., p. 853). Moreover, it has been said that Kundakunda “_thread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller_”, evident by the fact that hardly, if any, Digambara or even Śvetāmbara scholar elaborates on his ideas, let alone crediting him for significant basic insights into Jaina philosophy. Moreover, it seems to be evident, as will be attempted to show, that some ideas appear to be taken over from Kundakunda. Together with Kundakunda’s ‘legacy’, this article will highlight several conundrums regarding the philosophical impact of several concepts in his works that fortunately have not been relegated to oblivion. (shrink)

As is the case with most pre‐modern philosophers of India, very little historical information is available about Bhartṛ‐hari. There are many interesting legends, some turned into extensive plays and poems, current about him. However, it is impossible to determine on their basis even whether there was only one philosopher called Bhartṛ‐hari. The appellation “philosopher” could unquestionably be applied to the author or authors of at least two Sanskrit works that are commonly ascribed to Bhartṛ‐hari.

The Sacred Garden Monasteries of Lumbini, with a guided tour of the Maya Devi Temple as another highlight.

The contributors to this focus issue participated in a unique gathering of over sixty scholars in Lukenya, Kenya in January 2009, organized by Globethics.net. The three contributions here by Sumner B. Twiss, Shanta Premawardhana, and Ariane Hentsch Cisneros are not the outcome of the deliberations and discussions there; however, they led to the idea of this focus issue. Each essay incorporates major aspects of the general themes discussed in different groups at the Lukenya meeting: (1) defining global ethics; (2) ensuring (...) a successful interreligious dialogue on ethics; (3) integrating means and methods of sharing values in a human to human approach; (4) balancing power relations, inducing a real transformation; and (5) sharing values in the Kenyan and East-African contexts. (shrink)

This chapter tries to show that there is indubitable evidence for the claim that the Yoga philosophy of Patañjali can be said to be a philosophy as therapeia. For this reference will be made particularly to the Sāṅkhya school, whose ontology and metaphysics are presupposed by Yoga philosophy. The Sāṅkhya school begins with the question about overcoming three kinds of ‘suffering’ that torment human beings, and Patañjali himself says that the implementation of yoga, is, among other things, for the sake (...) of minimising the afflictions. The second part of the chapter will be concerned with the philosophical activity referred to in Yoga itself, namely the active yoga, or yoga in the form of action, in order to show how this can be seen as advancing the case for Yoga as therapeia. (shrink)

Two of the terms in the title are from Vidyānandin’s Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, which is his commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra. Sūtra 6 of the TAS states the following: pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ, ‘knowledge—of the seven categories—is obtained through the pramāṇas and the nayas’). Vidyānandin’s commentary on this sūtra 6 entails a total of 56 ślokas, with his own prose vārttika on each of them in varying lengths. TAŚV 1, 6, 1–8 deal with particulars and universals, for which he uses the synonymous pairs aṃśa/aṃśin and (...) avayava/avayavin. That he is attacking the Buddhist position regarding this age old theme in Indian philosophy, is evident also in that he quotes Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-vārttika. By the time he comes to his TAŚV 1, 6, 6, he establishes that an object as a whole is open to perception and that the Buddhist also accepts perception as a valid means of knowledge, but does not accept the perception of an object as a whole. From TAŚV 1, 6, 11 onwards Vidyānandin continues with the same theme, elaborating his attack of the Buddhist view even further, doing so in terms of svasaṃvedana, pratyakṣa and pramāṇa. The presentation will attempt to deal with these concepts in order to see how Vidyānandin vindicates the Jaina position vis-à-vis the Buddhist one. This presentation will continue from my previous study of Vidyānandin’s TAŚV 1, 6, 1–10. (shrink)