Aunque el denominado problema de marco generó múltiples debates a finales del siglo pasado, aún es un problema fundamental para el avance en las Ciencias Cognitivas, en general, y para la Inteligencia Artificial, en particular. En este trabajo, y restringiéndonos al aspecto lógico del problema, postulamos que la discusión actual y subyacente a este aspecto gira en torno a cómo determinar lo que no cambia en términos de acciones y propiedades dentro de un sistema lógico formal. Es sobre este aspecto, (...) y en función de sus dificultades (i) definicional y (ii) resolutiva, que en este trabajo argumentaremos que el denominado “criterio temporal” no solamente puede estimarse como uno los principales requerimientos teóricos para (i) resolverlo sino también para (ii) explicitar más claramente su dificultad principal, a saber, “lo que es relevante” frente al cambio en el tiempo. De esta manera, sostenemos que el razonamiento lógico-temporal resulta necesario para construir cualquier solución íntegramente satisfactoria del aspecto lógico del problema de marco entendido como el modo en que, inmediatamente, determinamos relevancia frente al cambio. (shrink)

The moral pedagogy in the fairy tales is simple but powerful. It is concentrated in the lesson –according to the message of Aristotle– about the finalism sense of action: it makes the child understand that the human answer is an action with sense. Everything in the fairy tale leads to this perspective. Moreover, it exemplifies MacIntyre’s opinion which says that current people tend to be proto-aristotelian and to understand their own life and the other’s in narrative terms.

The moral pedagogy in the fairy tales is simple but powerful. It is concentrated in the lesson -according to the message of Aristotle- about the finalism sense of action: it makes the child understand that the human answer is an action with sense. Everything in the fairy tale leads to this perspective. Moreover, it exemplifies MacIntyre's opinion which says that current people tend to be proto-aristotelian and to understand their own life and the other's in narrative terms.

We report on an interview-based study of decision-making capacity in two classes of patients suffering from depression. Developing a method of second-person hermeneutic phenomenology, we articulate the distinctive combination of temporal agility and temporal inability characteristic of the experience of severely depressed patients. We argue that a cluster of decision-specific temporal abilities is a critical element of decision-making capacity, and we show that loss of these abilities is a risk factor distinguishing severely depressed patients from mildly/moderately depressed (...) patients. We explore the legal and clinical consequences of this result. (shrink)

RESUMENPresentamos la contribución de Th. Tymoczko a la filosofía de la matemática y analizamos y evaluamos las demostraciones asistidas por ordenador y los razonamientos no rigurosos en la matemática experimental, con particular referencia al Teorema de los Cuatro Colores.PALABRAS CLAVETYMOCZKO – CUASI-EMPIRISMO – MATEMÁTICA EXPERIMENTAL – RAZONAMIENTO NO RIGUROSO – DEMOSTRACIONES ASISTIDAS POR ORDENADORABSTRACTWe present Th. Tymoczko’s contribution to the philosophy of mathematics, and we analyze and evaluate the computer-assisted proofs and the non-rigorous reasonings in the experimental mathematics, particularly (...) in reference to the Four-Colour Theorem.KEYWORDTYMOCZKO – QUASI-EMPIRICISM – EXPERIMENTAL MATHEMATICS – NON-RIGOROUS REASONING – COMPUTER-ASSISTED PROOF. (shrink)

Suppose we believe that God created the world. Then surely we want it to be the case that he intended, in some sense at least, to create THIS world. Moreover, most theists want to hold that God didn't just guess or hope that the world would take one course or another; rather, he KNEW precisely what was going to take place in the world he planned to create. In particular, of each person P, God knew that P was to exist. (...) Call this the "standard" conception. Most theists find the standard conception appealing. Unfortunately, the view seems to conflict with the equally appealing idea — call it "temporal actualism" — that there are no "future" individuals beyond those that already exist in the present moment. For, on this view, for any historical person P, prior to creation, there was no such person as P and hence nothing about P for God to know. Hence, in particular, God couldn't have known that P was to exist. This is of course not a new problem. But past solutions to it are highly problematic. In this paper, after canvassing previous approaches, I will propose a solution that seems to preserve both temporal actualism and a suitably robust form of the standard conception while avoiding the pitfalls of the past. (shrink)

This paper examines the intersecting of the themes of temporality and truth in Deleuze's philosophy. For the ancients, truth was something eternal: what was true was true in all times and in all places. Temporality (coming to be and passing away) was the realm of the mutable, not the eternal. In the seventeenth century, change began to be seen in a positive light (progress, evolution, and so on), but this change was seen to be possible only because of the immutable (...) laws of nature that govern change. It was not until philosophers such as Bergson, James, Whitehead – and then Deleuze – that time began to be taken seriously on its own account. On the one hand, in Deleuze, time, freed from its subordination to movement, now becomes autonomous: it is the pure form of change (continuous variation) that lies at the basis of Deleuze's metaphysics in Difference and Repetition (and is explored more thematically in The Time-Image). As a result, on the other hand, the false, freed from its subordination to the form of the true, assumes a power of its own (the power of the false), which in turn implies a new ‘analytic of the concept’ that Deleuze develops in What Is Philosophy? (shrink)

Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes, and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to which (...) what partly explains one or both of the explananda is that people believe themselves to have a stable persisting self which is imagined either as moving through time, or as being stationary, with time moving around it. This paper empirically investigates this explanation. We found, however, no evidential support for the stable-self explanation, leaving the non-dynamist but also, we will argue, the dynamist, with an extant explanatory challenge. (shrink)

RESUMENRealizamos un acercamiento al razonamiento explicativo mediante estructuras modales. Usamos el formalismo bien conocido de los marcos de Kripke, pero asociamos a cada mundo, no una interpretación, sino una lógica. De este modo, definimos operadores que nos permiten expresar distintas modificaciones que puede sufrir una teoría, concretamente ampliaciones y contracciones. Mostramos cómo los tratamientos lógicos tradicionales del razonamiento abductivo pueden ser comprendidos desde nuestra propuesta.PALABRAS CLAVERAZONAMIENTO ABDUCTIVO, LÓGICAS NO CLÁSICAS, LÓGICA MODAL, MODELOS DE KRIPKE, EXPLICACIÓN CIENTÍFICA.ABSTRACTWe propose an (...) approach to explanatory reasoning through modal structures. We use the wellknown formalism of Kripke frames, but associated with each world, there is not an interpretation but a logic. Then, we define operators that allow us to express different modifications of a theory, specially expansions and contractions. We show that traditional logical treatments of abductive reasoning can be understood from our proposal.KEYWORDSABDUCTIVE REASONING, NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS, MODAL LOGIC, KRIPKE FRAMES, SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION. (shrink)

According to Leininger, presentists and growing blockers cannot explain why past and present regularities persist in the future. In order to do so, they would have to appeal to enforcers, such as causation, laws or dispositions. But in a world with no future, these enforcers are powerless and cannot guarantee future regularity. I disagree and argue that Leininger’s coordination problem can be met by distinguishing type- from token-level necessitation. Whereas token-level necessitation is cross-temporal and subject to Leininger’s coordination problem, (...) type-level necessitation is atemporal and immune to the coordination problem. For this solution to work, though, type-level necessitation must be ontologically prior to token-level necessitation. This forces us to adopt a Platonist position according to which universals are transcendent, and not immanent. (shrink)

Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the (...) temporal belief hypothesis according to which future-bias is explained by the belief that time robustly passes. Our results do not match the apparent predictions of this hypothesis, and so provide evidence against it. But we also find that people give more future-biased responses when asked to simulate a belief in robust passage. We take this to suggest that the phenomenology that attends simulation of that belief may be partially responsible for future-bias, and we examine the implications of these results for debates about the rationality of future-bias. (shrink)

In this paper I will explore a phenomenology of the menstrual cycle, focusing on the cycle’s rhythm as a form of lived temporality. Drawing on the work of Henri Lefebvre and Thomas Fuchs I will outline a key connection between embodiment and rhythmic temporality more generally, before applying this analysis to the rhythm of the menstrual cycle specifically. I will consider the phenomenology of the experience of cycling through the phases of pre-ovulation, ovulation, pre-menstruation and menstruation as a pattern, or (...) specifically an embodied rhythm that constitutes a form of lived temporality. I will consider a way that the subject may potentially be alienated from this rhythm as a result of a dominant cultural narrative of “linear time”. I will argue further that this dissonance between the menstrual body and the contemporary world tends to be compounded by a lack of “menstrual literacy” in education and culture. (shrink)

Temporal non-dynamists hold that there is no temporal passage, but concede that many of us judge that it seems as though time passes. Phenomenal Illusionists suppose that things do seem this way, even though things are not this way. They attempt to explain how it is that we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion. More recently, Cognitive Error Theorists have argued that our experiences do not seem that way; rather, we are subject to an error that leads (...) us mistakenly to believe that our experiences seem that way. Cognitive Error Theory is a relatively new view and little has been said to explain why we make such an error, or where, in the cognitive architecture, such an error might creep in. In this paper we remedy this by offering a number of hypotheses about the source of error. In so doing we aim to show that Cognitive Error Theory is a plausible competitor to Phenomenal Illusion Theory. (shrink)

RESUMENPresentamos la contribución de Th. Tymoczko a la filosofía de la matemática y analizamos y evaluamos las demostraciones asistidas por ordenador y los razonamientos no rigurosos en la matemática experimental, con particular referencia al Teorema de los Cuatro Colores.PALABRAS CLAVETYMOCZKO – CUASI-EMPIRISMO – MATEMÁTICA EXPERIMENTAL – RAZONAMIENTO NO RIGUROSO – DEMOSTRACIONES ASISTIDAS POR ORDENADORABSTRACTWe present Th. Tymoczko’s contribution to the philosophy of mathematics, and we analyze and evaluate the computer-assisted proofs and the non-rigorous reasonings in the experimental mathematics, particularly (...) in reference to the Four-Colour Theorem.KEYWORDTYMOCZKO – QUASI-EMPIRICISM – EXPERIMENTAL MATHEMATICS – NON-RIGOROUS REASONING – COMPUTER-ASSISTED PROOF. (shrink)

En este artículo hacemos un estudio analítico de la teoría del razonamiento defectible (o no monótono) atendiendo tanto a cuestiones de orden epistémico como metodológico. El razonamiento defectible es un tipo de razonamiento que está basado sobre la construcción de argumentos no lineales. Esto es, a lo largo de un proceso de razonamiento la introducción de nuevos supuestos en los argumentos puede llegar a retractar las conclusiones inferidas. Además, el razonamiento del sentido común que trabaja (...) con deducciones es bidireccional, en el sentido que no sólo opera desde las premisas a la conclusión (hacia adelante), sino también desde la conclusión a las premisas (hacia atrás). Los sistemas de razonamiento que combinan ambos tipos de razonamiento se dice que son dirigidos a intereses. Que un agente esté interesado en conocer el status de una proposición determinada exige que éste sea capaz de discernir entre razonamiento teórico (razonamiento acerca de qué creencias poseer) y razonamiento práctico (razonamiento acerca de qué acciones llevar a cabo). Una cuestión en la modelización del razonamiento ordinario es establecer una distinción entre teorías de la justificación y teorías de la garantía. Aquellas proposiciones que estén soportadas por algún argumento no derrotado en algún estadio de la computación para una situación epistémica concreta, se dirá que están justificadas, sin estar necesariamente garantizadas. Las proposiciones garantizadas son aquellas que deberían estar justificadas `a largo plazo', en el caso de que el sistema de razonamiento fuera capaz de llevar a cabo todo el razonamiento relevante posible. Sin embargo, veremos que una vez que una proposición resulte estar justificada, es razonable aceptarla provisionalmente y actuar sobre ella. (shrink)

Resumen En el presente estudio se aborda la descripción de la semántica de los marcadores evidenciales por lo visto y se ve que en el marco de la teoría de la relevancia (TR). Tomando como punto de partida el análisis que Albelda, M. (2018). ¿Atenuación del compromiso del hablante?: El caso de los evidenciales por lo visto y se ve que. Rilce, 34.3, 1179–1214. traza de ambos evidenciales en un corpus oral, se realizó un estudio tanto cuantitativo como cualitativo de (...) los patrones y el rango de interpretaciones de cada expresión en una muestra de géneros escritos formales procedentes del Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual (CREA). Los resultados cuantitativos mostraron algunas diferencias con respecto a los obtenidos por Albelda, M. (2018). ¿Atenuación del compromiso del hablante?: El caso de los evidenciales por lo visto y se ve que. Rilce, 34.3, 1179–1214: por lo visto es principalmente inferencial y, en menor medida, reportativo en la escritura formal. En contraste con los géneros orales, tiende a introducir inferencias genéricas, y en ocasiones también precede conjeturas. Se alinea con el parámetro de la objetividad, permitiendo al emisor mostrar una menor implicación hacia la evidencia, así como un mayor compromiso epistémico hacia la fiabilidad de la información. Se ve que, por el contrario, es generalmente un marcador inferencial, tanto en géneros escritos como orales. Se emplea, principalmente, para encabezar inferencias conjeturales. Con se ve que, el emisor muestra una mayor implicación y subjetivización, y un menor compromiso epistémico hacia la evidencia que se introduce en el discurso. Los diferentes patrones de comportamiento discursivo exhibidos por ambos evidenciales pueden explicarse en el marco de la teoría argumentativa del razonamiento (Mercier, H. y Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34.2, 57–74; Mercier H. y Sperber, D. (2017). The Enigma of Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.). Por lo visto y se ve que tienden a introducir, respectivamente, conclusiones intuitivas y reflexivas que deben ser verificadas y aceptadas por la audiencia. Se ve que apunta, generalmente, a la activación de los mecanismos cognitivos de vigilancia epistémica y lectura de la mente, mientras que por lo visto tiende a desencadenar los procesos de vigilancia epistémica y de razonamiento. (shrink)

In ordinary conscious experience, consciousness of time seems to be ubiquitous. For example, we seem to be directly aware of change, movement, and succession across brief temporal intervals. How is this possible? Many different models of temporal consciousness have been proposed. Some philosophers have argued that consciousness is confined to a momentary interval and that we are not in fact directly aware of change. Others have argued that although consciousness itself is momentary, we are nevertheless conscious of change. (...) Still others have argued that consciousness is itself extended in time. In this entry, the motivations and merits of these and other positions will be expounded and assessed. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el debate entre los intérpretes epistémicos y descriptivistas de la discusión humeana de la inducción y el razonamiento probable. Los intérpretes epistémicos consideran a Hume como concernido principalmente con cuestiones relacionadas con la autoridad y justificación epistémica de nuestros principios y creencias inductivas. Los intérpretes descriptivistas, por contra, sugieren que lo que Hume pretende es explicar cómo se producen nuestras creencias, no dictaminar si están epistémicamente justificadas. En particular, me centro en tres de estas lecturas: (...) dos de ellas epistémicas, la tercera descriptivista. La primera interpretación epistémica, la de Peter Millican, nos presenta a Hume abrazando un escepticismo respecto a la inducción; la segunda lectura epistémica, de Louis Loeb, lo presenta como un externalista no escéptico a propósito de la inducción; la lectura descriptivista, defendida por David Owen, presenta a un Hume comprometido principalmente con la tarea científica de describir los mecanismos por los que llegamos a formar nuestras creencias. En este artículo propongo una interpretación alternativa a estas interpretaciones escépticas, externalistas y descriptivistas. Argumento que, aunque estas lecturas tienen innegables puntos de apoyo y ayudan crucialmente a mejorar nuestra comprensión del pensamiento de Hume, todas ellas enfrentan problemas potencialmente insuperables. Concluyo que la mejor estrategia que nos queda abierta pasa por perseguir una explicación que no sea ni escéptica ni externalista de la posición de Hume. Parte de mi objetivo es cuestionar una asunción implícita en estas tres lecturas, a saber: que para Hume el concepto de naturaleza humana es puramente descriptivo. (shrink)

Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research.

Plural Temporality traces out a dynamic historical relationship between the texts of Spinoza and of Althusser. It interrogates Spinoza's text through Althusser and vice versa regarding the question of materialism.

The article presents Erwin W. Straus’ unpublished manuscript “Temporal Horizons” from 1952. In the paper, in addition to an extensive philosophical discussion with St. Augustine, Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud, Straus elaborates on his idea of a unified view of temporal experience, comprising both the personal and the impersonal dimensions of time. The manuscript also contains an interview with a psychotic patient, which is supposed to exemplify Straus' core idea on the psychotic temporal experience, according to which (...) the break of the invisible bond between immanent or personal, and clock or impersonal time leads to a loss of a sense of reality. (shrink)

Analyses of errors from a sequential auditory recall experiment indicated that perceptual factors influence the shape of the serial position curve of recall errors. The signal to noise ratio and presentation rate of the stimuli, as well as presentation rate during a prior training session, affected item and order errors. For experiments in which Ss simply monitored the auditory sequences for a preassigned critical item, and in which items were recalled in addition to monitoring, analyses of montoring RTs provided evidence (...) that the requirement to recall induces perceptual difficulties. (shrink)

The process of revising the beliefs of the actors involved in receiving new information in the form of a representation‐occurrence, i.e. new and contradictory to their current beliefs, can lead to a radical transformation of the latter. This chapter describes two cases such as weak transformation of beliefs and the radical transformation of beliefs. The possible worlds semantics sets out several principles, two of which are of particular interest to us: the rational actor follows a principle of minimal change and (...) seeks to preserve his most “rooted” beliefs. On the contrary, actors who would perform a level 3 Batesonian learning would ipso facto interpret given events in a different way than before, so that they would now interpret the same one in a context that has become different. Such learning would introduce a temporal disruption in individual actors' flow of thoughts, and consequently in the evolution of their network. (shrink)

Este artículo reúne los resultados de nuestra sistematización de las magnitudes físicas y de las expresiones matemáticas de los aparatos formales de la mecánica clásica, relativista y cuántica, revelando su estructura subyacente común. La sistematización se ha realizado ordenando en tablas algunas de las magnitudes físicas y expresiones matemáticas más conocidas según sus diferentes grados de derivación, abriendo paso, de este modo, a un criterio de fundamentalidad de las leyes, principios, postulados y ecuaciones de cada aparato formal.

What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker, a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker and Byrne, claims that we can (...) reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them. I sketch responses to both objections. ¿Qué relación existe entre el razonamiento y el autoconocimiento? Según Shoemaker, cierto tipo de razonamiento depende de un autoconocimiento: no podemos revisar nuestras creencias racionalmente sin saber que las tenemos, en parte porque no podemos ver que la inconsistencia de un conjunto de proposiciones constituye un problema a menos que estemos conscientes de creerlas. En el presente artículo argumento que esta propuesta es errónea. Una segunda posición, versiones de la cual se pueden encontrar en Shoemaker y Byrne proclama que es posible razonar desde creencias sobre el mundo hacia un autoconocimiento sobre tales creencias. Mientras el zany argument de Shoemaker no logra mostrar cómo tal razonamiento puede resultar en un autoconocimiento, la teoría de Byrne, que se centra en la regla epistémica “Si p, cree que crees que p” tiene más éxito. Dos objeciones interesantes son que la regla epistémica incorpora una inferencia insana y que nos hace formar creencias de primer orden, en lugar de revelarlas. Esbozo respuestas a ambas objeciones. (shrink)

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective “sense of agency”. However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive (...) observation of a cause-effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, have been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people’s causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding. (shrink)